R. C. Lahoti,j. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehiclesact, 1988 preferred TO by the claimants, arising out of the Award dated 12. 7. 1990passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, New Delhi. ( 2 ) THE claimants are the dependents of late Shri 0m Parkash Puri, who diedhaving met with an unfortunate accident on 23. 2. 1984 at about 9 a. m. on account ofrash and negligent driving of buses owned by D. T. C. and the respondent No. 1 anddriven by the respective drivers who are also respondents. The buses were insuredby the respondent No. 5. The deceased was 33 years of age at the time of hisdeath. He was serving as a postal assistant in the office of the Senior Superintendentof Post Offices at a monthly salary of Rs. 1100. 00. The Tribunal has assessed thedependency of the appellants at Rs. 800. 00 per month and adopted a multiplierarrive at a figure of compensation of Rs. 1,92,000. 00, awarded to the appellants. Theappellant No. 1, the widow of the deceased, was already in an employment. Theamount of compensation has been ordered to carry interest calculated at the rateof 12% p. a. from the date of the award till realisation. ( 3 ) THE sole and singular point arising for consideration in the appeal is thefigure of compensation. According to the claimants- appellants the deceasedwould have served upto the age of 58 years and hence the Tribunal should haveadopted a multiplier of 25 i. e. the period for which the deceased could have servedand earned but for the death occasioned by the accident. Reliance has been placedon a Supreme Court decision in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, AIR 1992 S. C. 1261 and a single Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana Highcourt in Swaran Kaur v. Saghar Singh, 1993 (2) PLR 297. It has also been submittedthat the awarded compensation should have been directed to carry interest at therate of 15% p. a. in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Rukmanidevi v. 0m Parkash, 1990 0 ACJ 687 and a Single Bench decision of Punjab andharyana High Court in Mala Aggarwal v. Jagdish Kumar, 1992 0 ACJ 123. It has also been submittedthat the awarded compensation should have been directed to carry interest at therate of 15% p. a. in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Rukmanidevi v. 0m Parkash, 1990 0 ACJ 687 and a Single Bench decision of Punjab andharyana High Court in Mala Aggarwal v. Jagdish Kumar, 1992 0 ACJ 123. ( 4 ) IN so far as the principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for theappellants concerned, it is not necessary to dwell on it in detail, as law standssettled fully and finally with the pronouncements of their Lordships in Generalmanager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 (1)M. P. Judicial Reporter 1. Repelling a similar contention, as has been raised by thelearned Counsel for the appellants before this Court, their Lordships have held: "it is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier-method is logically sound andlegally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded todetermine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire futureearnings of for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted apercentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and award theresulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, ifthe deceased, says 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancyis 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years. . . virtually adopting a multiplier of 45. . . . and even if one third or one fourth isdeducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are aware that some decision of the Highcourts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some suchbasis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. Theproper method of computation is the multiplier-method. Any departure,except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability forthe assessment of compensation. " (emphasis supplied)AND again, "some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from themultiplier method on the ground that Section 110 (b) of the Motor Vehiclesact, 1939 in so far as it envisages the compensation to be just the statutorydetermination of a just compensation would unshackle the exercise from anyright formula. " (emphasis supplied)AND again, "some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from themultiplier method on the ground that Section 110 (b) of the Motor Vehiclesact, 1939 in so far as it envisages the compensation to be just the statutorydetermination of a just compensation would unshackle the exercise from anyright formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is theaccepted method of ensuring a just compensation which will make foruniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of thehigh Courts, which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that themultiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which canonly be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases. " ( 5 ) THE following statement of law from Halsbury s Laws of England Vol. 34para 98 has been quoted with approval by their Lordships :- "the calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest, in practiceabout 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and inflation is disregarded. It is assumed thatthe return on fixed interest bearing securities in so much higher than 4 to 5 percent rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multipliermay be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax prayer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure:however, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of yearstaken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependents can invest theirdamages, the lump sum awardto reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being thatthe dependents will each year draw interest and some capital ( the interestelement decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the paaaage offund will be exhausted at the age which the Court assesses to be the correctage having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such asillness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarialevidence is admissible but the Courts do not encourage such evidence. " (emphasis supplied) ( 6 ) IN Susamma Thomas s case ( supra) the deceased was 39 years of age. Hewas a salaried employee earning Rs. 1032. 00 per month. Their Lordships deductedl/3rd of the gross income towards the personal expenses of the deceased andtreated the balance amount as likely to be spent on the welfare of the family and thedependents. Hewas a salaried employee earning Rs. 1032. 00 per month. Their Lordships deductedl/3rd of the gross income towards the personal expenses of the deceased andtreated the balance amount as likely to be spent on the welfare of the family and thedependents. A multiplier of 12 was chosen by their Lordships as appropriate to theage of the deseased. ( 7 ) THE contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants does nothold the ground in view of the law laid down by their Lordships in Susammathomas s case ( supra ). Having assessed the dependency of the appellants, the Tribunal has chosen to adopt a multiplier of 20 while the deceased was in histhirties. Thus, the Tribunal has already been liberal in choosing the multiplier. Itcannot be so interfered with as to be scaled down in the absence of a cross appealor cross objections having been preferred TO by any of the respondents. The figure ofcompensation arrived at by the Tribunal has to be maintained. ( 8 ) IN so far as the award of interest is concerned. Section 110-CC of the Motorvehicles Act, 1939 provides for award of simple interest at such rate as the Courtmay deem fit and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim asthe Court may specify. ( 9 ) KEEPING in view the decision of their Lordships in Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins, 1985 0 ACJ 397 as also the fact that in Susammathomas s case ( supra) their Lordship vide para 15 left undisturbed the rate ofinterest of 12% effective from the date of the petition till payment, in the opinion ofthis Court, the Tribunal ought to have awarded interest calculated @12% p. a. fromthe date of the claim petition till realisation. ( 10 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. Though the figureof compensation arrived at by the Tribunal is maintained, in so far as the award ofinterest is concerned, a direction for award of interest @ 12% p. a. from the date ofpreparing claim petition till realisation shall stand substituted in place of thedirection made by the Tribunal. Rest of the award is maintained. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to the costs of thisappeal