Judgment 1. THE petitions was elected Prodhan of the Ramganga Gram Panchayat and while functioning as such Prodhan he was served with a notice by some of the members of the Gram Panchayat requesting him to convene a meeting for the purpose of consideration of a no confidence motion against him. 2. IT appears that, thereafter, on 21st October, 1993, the petitioner received another notice from the said members stating that the meeting to consider no confidence against the petitioner would be held on 21st October, 1993. In the first notice dated 29th September, 1993, the requisitionists had mentioned in the agenda that the members would consider both the question of no-confidence and the removal of the prodhan in the subsequent notice, however, only the question of no confidence was mentioned and the matter relating to removal was not included in the agenda. The petitioner challenged the said notice by way of a writ application and by an order dated 15th December, 1993 this Court disposed of the matter by quashing the impugned notice and the resolution adopted at the meeting held on 21st October, 1993, on the ground that in the absence of a specific agenda for removal of the Prodhan, such resolution was bad and was not capable of being enforced. 3. IT appears that, thereafter, another notice was served on the Prodhan on 20th December, 1993, requesting him to convene a meeting within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice to consider the question of no confidence and removal of the Prodhan. The present writ application has been moved challenging the said notice on the ground that Section 12 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, did not contemplate a notice of a combined nature and that only one matter could be considered at a time in a meeting to be specially convened for the purpose of removal of the Prodhan. 4. APPEARING in support of the writ petition, Mr. Mantu Behari Maity, learned Advocate, referred to a decision of this Court in the case of soleman Shah Vs. Director of Panchayats, reported in 70 C. W. N. at page 1088 wherein this Court held that in the absence of a special agenda for removal of the Prodhan, such removal would be bad in Taw. Appearing for the State and the State respondents, Mr. Manick Ch. Director of Panchayats, reported in 70 C. W. N. at page 1088 wherein this Court held that in the absence of a special agenda for removal of the Prodhan, such removal would be bad in Taw. Appearing for the State and the State respondents, Mr. Manick Ch. Das, learned Advocate, submitted that Section 12 does not contemplate two items to be considered at a meeting for the purpose referred to in section 12 and that accordingly, the impugned notice requesting the prodhan to convene a meeting to consider both the question of no confidence and removal was not permissible in law. 5. MR. Ranabejoy Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the private respondents, however, submitted that there was no bar for considering the proposal for removal jointly with the proposal to ascertain the confidence of the majority, since one was interdependent on the other, and unless no confidence against the person concerned was ascertained the question of removal would not arise. Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that having regard to the order passed in the earlier writ petition, the question of removal of the Prodhan was specifically included in the agenda of the meeting which the Prodhan was requested to convene in terms of Section 12 of the aforesaid Act. 6. IN support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Bhattacharjee referred to the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Royhan and Ors. vs. C. Maltiya and Ors. reported in 89 C. W. N. at page 1044. Mr. Bhattacharjee particularly referred to paragraph 10 of the said judgment wherein the case of Soleman shah (Supra) had been referred to. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submitted that having regard to the above, since there was a specific agenda for removal of the Prodhan, the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner was of no significance and was liable to be rejected and consequently the petition was liable to be dismissed. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, it appears to me that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner have some force in view of the fact that, although, no confidence and removal are inextricably, related to each other, the two are, however, distinguishable matters and are to be considered separately. It is quite correct, as Mr. Bhattacharjee has pointed out, that removal would follow no confidence, but that does not mean that removal can be equated with no confidence. It is quite correct, as Mr. Bhattacharjee has pointed out, that removal would follow no confidence, but that does not mean that removal can be equated with no confidence. This aspect of the matter was considered in the case of soleman Shah by A. N. Ray J, as his Lordship then was, and as mentioned hereinbefore, such decision was looked upon with approval by the Division bench while disposing of the writ application of Royhan and Ors. vs. C. Malliya and Ors. (Supra. 7. MR. Bhattacharjee pointed out that in the said case the Division bench upheld the motion of no confidence brought against the upa-Prodhan, but was of the view that in the absence of any specific agenda for removal, the resolution adopted seeking to remove the Upa-Pradhan was bad and for the said purpose a separate meeting would have to be held with a specific agenda. The observations of the division Bench, as pointed out by Mr. Bhattacharjee, are quite apt as far as the facts of the said case are concerned, inasmuch as, in the said case the Court was considering a situation where a no confidence motion had been adopted pursuant to notice given for holding the meeting far the said specific purpose. It is in that context that their Lordships held that the no confidence motion as adopted was quite regular, but their Lordships did make a distinction regarding removal and no confidence and observed that if the members therein wished to remove the Upa-Prodhan, they would have to hold a meeting for such specific purpose having regard to the decision in the case of Soleman Shah (Supra. 8. IN that view of the matter, this writ application, in my view, must succeed and is, accordingly, allowed. Since when the matter was initially moved, an interim order had been granted on 30th December, 1993, staying operation of the impugned notice, no further steps could have been taken thereupon. In view of the observations mads herein before, the impugned notice is hereby quashed. 9. THIS order will not, however, prevent the members of the concerned gram Panchayat from proceeding afresh for the purpose mentioned in the impugned notice, in accordance with law. 10. THE writ application is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.