MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES CONGRESS (NON-TECHNICAL) UNION v. STATE
1994-02-09
A.P.RAVANI, H.L.GOKHALE
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IS it not within the powers of Municipal corporation constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to grant to its employees higher grade on completion of service of certain number of years ? Can such decision of a corporation be suspended by State Government in exercise of its powers under Sec. 451 of the B. P. M. C. Act ? Broadly these are the questions which have arisen for consideration in this petition. ( 2 ) PETITIONER No. 1 is a union of workmen employed by respondent No. 3, i. e. . Baroda Municipal Corporation. Petitioner No. 2 is the General Secretary of the Union. Respondent No. 3 passed resolution no. 222 dated 6/07/1982 and granted sanction for giving the benefit of higher grades to its employees. As per the resolution an employee who may complete ten years, eighteen years and twenty-two years of service and who may have been deprived of promotion to higher post on account of nonavailability of posts is to be granted the benefit of higher grade. The State government of Gujarat cancelled the said resolution by order dated 30/12/1983 produced at Annexure k to the petition. The legality and validity of this order passed by the Government is challenged by the petitioners. The petitioners have also challenged the legality and validity of the consequent circulars giving effect to the Government orders. The procedure prescribed and the norms laid down pursuant to resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 passed by the Corporation is produced at Annexure a to the petition. ( 3 ) BY impugned order dated 30/12/1983 the Government cancelled the aforesaid resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation on the ground that in the opinion of the Government the resolution of the Corporation sanctioning the fixed time promotion scheme was contrary to the "general principles of granting of promotion", and therefore the Corporation acted in excess of the powers conferred on it by the Bombay Provincial Municipal corporations Act, 1949 (for short b. P. M. C. Act ). On the aforesaid ground, on exercise of powers under Sec. 451 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act the Government suspended execution of resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 passed by the corporation.
On the aforesaid ground, on exercise of powers under Sec. 451 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act the Government suspended execution of resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 passed by the corporation. ( 4 ) IT is an undisputed position that the impugned order is passed by the Government in exercise of powers under Sec. 451 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act. As stated above, the reason for suspending execution of the resolution is that in the opinion of the Government it was contrary to the general principles of granting of promotion. It is contended that there are no general principles regarding grant of fixed time promotion. No such "general principles of granting of promotion" have been spelt out by the Government. No such principles have been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Even if it is assumed for a moment that there are such general principles governing grant of fixed time promotion, then also before exercising the powers under Sec. 451 (1) of B. P. M. C. Act it is necessary for the government to show that it was not within the powers of the Municipal corporation to make departure from the general principles and lay down its own promotion policy. Neither such general principles have been pointed out to us nor any such provision in the Act has been pointed out which prohibits the Municipal Corporation from laying down the rules regarding grant of benefit of higher grade on completion of 10 years, 18 years or 22 years of service by its employees. Thus, the very basis of the government order that the Municipal Corporation has acted in excess of its power is not sustainable. ( 5 ) IT is submitted on behalf of the respondents that Resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 passed by the Municipal Corporation is contrary to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of the B. P. M. C. Act. In order to examine the submission, the provision of Sec. 51 of Act may be reproduced :"51. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) the Standing Committee shall from time to time determine the number, designations, grades, salaries, fees, and allowances of auditors, assistant auditors, officers, clerks and servants to be immediately subordinate to the Municipal Chief Auditor and the Municipal Secretary respectively.
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) the Standing Committee shall from time to time determine the number, designations, grades, salaries, fees, and allowances of auditors, assistant auditors, officers, clerks and servants to be immediately subordinate to the Municipal Chief Auditor and the Municipal Secretary respectively. (2) The Commissioner shall, from time to time, prepare and bring before the standing Committee a statement setting forth the number, designations and grades of the other officers and servants who should in his opinion be maintained, and the amount and nature of the salaries, fees and allowances, which he proposes should be paid to each. (3) The Standing Committee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (4), sanction such statement either as it stands or subject to such modifications as it deems expedient. (4) No new permanent office of which the minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, exceeds such amount as may be fixed by the State Government by a general or special order from time to time in the case of each Corporation shall be created except with the previous sanction of the Corporation and no new office of which the minimum or maximum monthly salary exclusive of allowances exceeds such amount as may be fixed in this behalf by the State Government, by a general or special order, from time to time in the case of each Corporation shall be created except with the previous sanction of the State Government. (5) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the right of the Corporation or of the Commissioner to make any temporary appointment which it or he is empowered to make under See. 53. Explanation :- An increase in the salary of any permanent office shall be deemed, for the purpose of sub-sec. (4), to be creation of new office if, by reason of such increase, the minimum or, as the case may be, the maximum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, exceeds the minimum or, as the case may be, the maximum amount fixed by the State Government for the purpose of the said sub-sec. (4 ). " ( 6 ) CHAPTER IV of the B. P. M. C. Act deals with the Municipal officers and servants - their appointment and conditions of service. Sections 51 to 55 deal with other officers and servants of the Corporation, who are not covered by the provisions of Secs.
(4 ). " ( 6 ) CHAPTER IV of the B. P. M. C. Act deals with the Municipal officers and servants - their appointment and conditions of service. Sections 51 to 55 deal with other officers and servants of the Corporation, who are not covered by the provisions of Secs. 45 to 50 of the Act. It is contended that the Government has issued order dated 19/09/1987 under the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of B. P. M. C. Act. By this order the Corporation has been directed that no new permanent office of which the minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowance, exceeds Rs. 350. 00 or maximum monthly salary exclusive of allowances exceeds Rs. 650. 00 shall be created except with the previous sanction of the government. It is further directed that no new permanent office of which the minimum salary exclusive of the allowances exceeds Rs. 700. 00 or the maximum monthly exclusive of the allowances exceeds Rs. 1,300. 00 shall be created except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Therefore, it is contended that the resolution passed by the Corporation is contrary to the provisions of subsec. (4) of Sec. 51 read with Government order dated 19/09/1987. ( 7 ) BARE reading of the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of the b. P. M. C. Act and the order dated 19/09/1987 passed by the government makes it clear that the provisions of sub-sec. (4) and the order passed by it applies to creation of new posts. This has nothing to do with the service conditions of the employees already in service. Neither sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 nor the order dated 19/09/1987 passed thereunder by the Government places any restriction on the powers of the municipal Corporation for laying down policy for grant of promotion or grant of benefit of higher grade on completion of service of certain number of years. Therefore, the reliance placed on the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of the Act and the order dated 19/09/1987 passed by the Government is of no help to the respondents. 8. The argument that the Explanation to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of the B. P. M. C. Act would apply may be examined. Explanation to sub-sec. (4) deals with a situation wherein salary of any permanent post is increased.
8. The argument that the Explanation to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 51 of the B. P. M. C. Act would apply may be examined. Explanation to sub-sec. (4) deals with a situation wherein salary of any permanent post is increased. Such increase in the salary of permanent post is considered to be creation of new posts. By resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 the Corporation has not decided to increase the salary of any permanent post. As indicated hereinabove, all that has been done by the Corporation is to lay down the eligibility criteria for grant of higher grade to the employees. The eligibility criteria fixed is that the employee concerned should have completed ten years of service on or after 1-1-1973. If the employee has completed ten years of service, on completion of ten years of service in the same post, without benefit of promotion to a higher post on account of the fact that there was no vacancy in the higher post, he would be entitled to the benefit of higher grade in service. This does not amount to increase in salary of any permanent post. Similarly, by this very resolution benefit of further higher grade is conferred upon the employee who completes 18 years of service. Again, similar benefit is conferred on the completion of 22 years of service. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner that resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 is covered by the provisions of Sec. 51 (4) read with the Explanation cannot be accepted and the same is rejected. ( 8 ) THE reason mentioned in the impugned order passed by the government that the promotion policy adopted by the Corporation is contrary to the "general principles of granting promotion" may be examined. As indicated hereinabove, neither in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Government or on behalf of the Corporation and the municipal Commissioner, any explanation is provided as regards "general principles" of granting promotion. We fail to understand, from where the government has invented this concept of "general principles of granting promotion". On the contrary, the principles of personnel management require that an employee should not be stagnated on one post in all his service and must have a chance of being promoted to the higher post.
We fail to understand, from where the government has invented this concept of "general principles of granting promotion". On the contrary, the principles of personnel management require that an employee should not be stagnated on one post in all his service and must have a chance of being promoted to the higher post. As observed hereinabove, even if there be any such "general principles" there is nothing to indicate that the Corporation has no power to make departure therefrom. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Corporation has acted in excess of its powers. ( 9 ) IN this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme court in the case of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1972 . In that case a Civil Engineer-A in the Central Food and Technology Research Institute, Mysore was denied promotion though he had served for nearly two decades. He approached the administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, making grievance regarding nonpromotion and asking for the relief for being promoted to a higher post. He relied upon certain bye-laws of the society, i. e. , the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. The Tribunal found that the employee had remained in the same cadre and pay-scale till 1981 while junior scientific officers and junior technical officers were given periodical promotion under bye-law 71 (b) (ii ). The employee was denied promotion on the ground that he was not engaged in the "scientific work" and the bye-law covered only the employees who were engaged in the scientific work. The Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the claim of the employee and directed that he be granted promotion as prayed for by him. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research challenged the legality and validity of the decision of the Tribunal before the Honble Supreme court. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the bye-laws. The Supreme Court held that as per the extant bye-law only one who is engaged in the scientific work was entitled to the benefit of the bye-law. It was the necessary qualification for being considered for accelerated promotion. The bye-law had no application to the staff who were doing administrative work. The employee in that case was falling under administrative category and, therefore, stood excluded from purview of byelaw 71 (b) (ii ).
It was the necessary qualification for being considered for accelerated promotion. The bye-law had no application to the staff who were doing administrative work. The employee in that case was falling under administrative category and, therefore, stood excluded from purview of byelaw 71 (b) (ii ). Ever so, the Supreme Court thought it proper not to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. 11. Reasons for non-interference with the decision of the Tribunal have been inter alia mentioned in para 9 of the reported decision, which reads as follows :"that then is the scope of bye-law 71 (b) (i ). But that does not mean that we should interfere with the relief granted to respondent. By pointing out the error crept into the decision of the Tribunal, we need not take to its logical end which will defeat justice. Respondent 1 is not a lay-man. He is a highly qualified Engineer. Although joined service with a Diploma in Engineering, he later passed Bachelor of Engineering (B. E.) and also acquired M. Tech. degree and one more Diploma (D. P. M. ). He was, however, left without opportunity for promotion for about twenty years. This indeed is a sad commentary on the appellant management. It is often said and indeed, adroitly, an organisation public or private does not hire a mind but engages or employs a whole man. The person is recruited by an organisation not just for a job, but for a whole career. One must, therefore, be given an oppoctuaity to advance. This is the oldest and most important feature of the free enterprise system. The opportunity for advancement is a requirement for progress of any organisation. It is an incentive for personnel development as well (See : principles of Personnel Management by Flipo Edwin B. , 4th Ed; p. 246 ). Every management must provide realistic opportunities for promising employees to move upward. "the organisation that fails to develop a satisfactory procedure for promotion is bound to pay a severe penalty in terms of administrative costs, misallocation of personnel, low morale, and ineffectual performance, among both non-managerial employees and their supervisors. " (see: p. 277 ). There cannot be any modern management much less any career planning man-power development, management development etc , which is not related to a system of promotions. (See: Management of Personnel in Indian Enterprises by Prof. N. N. Chatterjee, Chap.
" (see: p. 277 ). There cannot be any modern management much less any career planning man-power development, management development etc , which is not related to a system of promotions. (See: Management of Personnel in Indian Enterprises by Prof. N. N. Chatterjee, Chap. 12, p. 128 ). The appellant appears to have overlooked this basic requirement of management so far as respondent 1 was concerned till N. R, and A. S. were introduced. "the aforesaid decision of the Honble Supreme Court on the contrary shows that modern principles of personnel management requires that there should be an opportunity to every employee for promotion to a higher post. In view of this position, what the Municipal Corporation has done by passing resolution no. 222 dated 6/07/1982 is in accordance with the modern principles of personnel management. The view taken by the Government prima facie appears to be archaic and out-dated. Thus, even on merits the order passed by the government is unjust and unreasonable. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents submitted that if the resolution no. 222 dated 6/07/1982 and the policy embodied therein is implemented, it will entail heavy financial burden upon the Municipal Corporation. In further affidavit dated 8/02/1994 some particulars are given showing the total figure of revenue by way of taxes and the amount of expenditure incurred by the Corporation towards salaries. However, it is not indicated even in this further affidavit as to what will be the additional financial burden upon the municipal Corporation on account of the implementation of the promotion policy embodied in the resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982. The figures mentioned in para 4 of the affidavit-in-reply are of the year 1990-91. Broad picture of collection of tax, revenue and the expenditure on salary is mentioned therein as in the year 1990-91. As stated hereinabove, no particulars whatsoever are mentioned as regard the likely additional burden. However, in the affidavit - in-reply dated 26/08/1984 sworn by Shri Fatesingh Jasol, the then Municipal commissioner, it is stated in para 3. 4 that the additional burden would be to the tune of about Rs. 80 to 85 lakhs per year. It is also stated therein that the total annual salary bill would be about 40% of the total annual income of the Corporation.
4 that the additional burden would be to the tune of about Rs. 80 to 85 lakhs per year. It is also stated therein that the total annual salary bill would be about 40% of the total annual income of the Corporation. Of course, these averments have been denied in the affidavitin- rejoinder dated 3-9-1984 filed by petitioner No. 2, i. e. , Ranjitsinh Ramsinh bodana. It is averred by him that the total annual income of the Municipal corporation was nearly Rs. 51 crores and there was scope for further increase as the Corporation had increased the rate of octroi. ( 11 ) BE that as it may. Whether the implementation of the resolution No. 222 dated 6/07/1982 would entail heavy financial burden upon the municipal Corporation or not, is not a question relevant for the purposes of deciding the issues involved in this petition. In this petition we are concerned with the legality and validity of the order dated December 30, 1883 passed by the Government. The only ground on which the Government has exercised its power is that the Corporation has passed resolution No. 222 in excess of powers conferred upon it. This ground as indicated herein above is not sustainable. Therefore, the impugned order dated 30/12/1983 cannot be sustained. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents submitted that this very resoution was challenged by another Union by filing Special Civil Application No. 5873 of 1987. In that petition the Union arrived at a settlement with Municipal corporation. Pursuant to the settlement the petition has been withdrawn. It is submitted that the Corporation has evolved a new policy of fixed timescale. As per this policy the employees are to be given benefit of higher grade at the end of 9 years, 18 years and 27 years of service. This policy is made effective from 1/04/1992. It is further submitted that about 70% of the employees have voluntarily accepted this policy. Therefore, it is submitted that the order passed by the Government be not quashed and set aside. The submission cannot be accepted. The legality and validity of the order passed by the Government has to be adjudged on its own merits. If the impugned order is quashed and set aside, there is nothing to prevent the Municipal corporation from modifying and or cancelling its own resolution.
The submission cannot be accepted. The legality and validity of the order passed by the Government has to be adjudged on its own merits. If the impugned order is quashed and set aside, there is nothing to prevent the Municipal corporation from modifying and or cancelling its own resolution. ( 13 ) THE Municipal Corporation has ample power to modify or cancel its own resolution. Here reference may be made to Sec. 453 of the Act which inter alia provides that Rules in Schedule A as amended from time to time shall be deemed to be part of the Act. In Chapter II of the Schedule A, rule 1 provides for regulating the Corporations proceedings. Clause (r) of rule 1 of Chapter II rends as follows :"no resolution passed by the Corporation shall be modified or cancelled within three months after the passing thereof, except by resolution supported by not less than one half of the whole number of Councillors or by such larger number of Councillors as may be required by this Act in any particular case and passed at a meeting whereof notice shall have been given fulfilling the requirements of clause (h) and setting forth fully the resolution which it is proposed to modify or cancel at such meeting and the motion or proposition for the modification or cancellation of such resolution. "in view of the aforesaid provision the Corporation could have modified or cancelled its resolution even within a period of three months from the date of passing the resolution with requisite majority as provided in the Rule. However, after the period of three months of the passing of resolution, even this restriction is not applicable. If the Corporation thought that its resolution no. 222 dated 6/07/1982 was required to be modified or cancelled, it had not to depend upon the orders of the Government. The Corporation itself could have and should have taken appropriate steps for modifying and/ or cancelling its own resolution. We make it clear that the decision in this petition will not preclude the Corporation from taking appropriate action in accordance with law. ( 14 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 15 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30/12/1983 passed by the State Government of Gujarat, produced at Annexure k, is quashed and set aside.
( 14 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 15 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30/12/1983 passed by the State Government of Gujarat, produced at Annexure k, is quashed and set aside. The consequent circulars issued by the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner, produced at Annexure l, M and N dated 26-2-1984 and Annexure o dated 8-3- 1984 are also quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. .