Judgment : The writ petition has been filed with the following prayer: To call for the records relating to the order dated ‘Nil’ and signed on 23. 1993 and the consequential order signed on 4. 1993. passed by the 1st respondent and quash the same by issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus, and to direct the respondents to receive the prescribed fee for 1993-94 in the form of bank draft and direct the respondents to renew the licence for the year 1993-94. 2. The case of the petitioner in brief is as follows: In the year 1991, the petitioner had applied for a licence to run a flour mill with 15 H.P. motor in the premises at No.29, P.V.Koil Second Street, Pudupet, Royapettah, Madras-14, for the 1991-92. The 1st respondent granted Planning Permit No. 101615 dated 12. 1991 to erect and run a flour mill with 15 H.P. motor. On the strength of such planning permit, the petitioner had purchased a flour mill and motor at a cost of nearly rupees one lakh and leased out the said premises for the installation of the machinery under Sec.287 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He had applied for licence to run the F.C.S.FlourMill under Sec.288 (1) of the Act for the year 1991-92. He had approached the authorities several times and requested them to issue the licence for 1991-92. The 1st respondent did not pass any order either by granting or refusing the licence within sixty days and as such, under Sec.288(8) of the Act, he has earned the licence for the year 1991-92. 3. According to the petitioner, no proceedings were issued during the course of the whole year to revoke the licence. Since the petitioner had not received any order of rejection for 1991-92, he, within, the prescribed period, applied for renewal of the licence for 1992-93 and paid the prescribed licence fee. Even the second time, the 1st respondent authorities did not pass any order either of renewal or refusal to renew the said licence for the year 1992-93, within the prescribed period of sixty days, resulting in the ‘statutory effect of renewal having once again being made. 4. During the currency of valid licence for the year 1992-93 the 1st respondent issued a revocation orderbyproceedingsZ.O.VIl-AHO.C.No.H1/9403/ 92 dated 1. 4. During the currency of valid licence for the year 1992-93 the 1st respondent issued a revocation orderbyproceedingsZ.O.VIl-AHO.C.No.H1/9403/ 92 dated 1. 1993 without any notice to show cause as to why the licence for the year 1992-93 should not be revoked. The petitioner came up before this Court by way of W.P.No.3517 of 1993 and this Court admitted the writ petition and granted interim stay of the said order for a period of one week, by order dated 22. 1993, which was made absolute on 3. 1993 after the respondents had filed counter. 5. On 12. 1993, the petitioner, had applied for renewal of licence for the current year 1993-94 along with the necessary fees. The 1st respondent authorities have issued to the petitioner an order dated ‘Nil’ but signed on 23. 1993, rejecting his application for licence by way of renewal for 1993-94. The grounds for such rejection are as follows: (i)Running of a flour mill in a primary residential Zone is not permitted. (ii) The petitioner has not been given licence to run the flour mill in the said premises. (iii) Running a flour mill at the said premises will be nuisance to residents. 6. According to the petitioner he has received the said order only on 23. 1993, which is totally illegal, mala fide and without jurisdiction. 7. The following legal contentions were raised by Mr.T.Chengalvarayan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner; (A) The petitioner has a fundamental right to commence and carry on any lawful business to earn his livelihood and such a right is constitutionally guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. Such a right is always subject to reasonable restriction. Permit or licence system has been held per se not an unreasonable restriction and no person can claim a licence or permit as of right. Where the administrative authority seeks to regulate the same by rules and is exercised in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the courts will presume that any such rules are reasonable restrictions. But, where the administrative authority is conferred with power to grant or refuse in its uncontrolled discretion, such action ex facie infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. But, where the administrative authority is conferred with power to grant or refuse in its uncontrolled discretion, such action ex facie infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In such a case of total prohibition, the burden of proving that a total prohibition in the exercise of that right alone will ensure the maintenance of the general public interest, lies heavily upon the licensing authorities. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order, does not at all discharge that burden and in the absence of such details, the impugned order violates and infringes the petitioner’s fundamental right. 8. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.T.Chengalvarayan would make the following submissions. .(a) The first ground of refusal states that the running of a F.C.S. Mill in a Primary Residential Zone is not and cannot be permitted. It is submitted that no details, no terms and conditions, under which other purposes can be permitted, are furnished. Mere bald vague and timely ground is no ground in the eye of law. .(b) As early as 12. 1991, the planning permit was given and acted upon by the petitioner. If it was granted by mistake, the respondents, did not take any action all these years. The respondents in their proceedings dated 1. 1993 which is the subject matter of W.P.No.3517 of 1993 now pending before this Court, has not stated that such planning permit was granted by over sight. Thus, it is submitted that the respondents themselves state in the impugned order that suitable action is being considered for cancelling the planning permission. That is to state that as on the date of the impugned order, the planning permission stands and subsisting. It is, therefore, an error apparent on the face of the record, there is a prohibition. As long as permission lasts, prohibition does not operate. .(c) The second ground stated in the impugned order is, that the petitioner has not been given a licence in the said permission. The petitioner made an application for the installation of machinery as required by Sec.288(1) of the Act, and the respondents granted permission in the form of planning permit. The petitioner had also applied for licence to carry on the business paid the prescribed fee and the respondents did not pass any order of refusal within the prescribed period sixty days and thereafter, the applicant earns licence for that period under the Act. The petitioner had also applied for licence to carry on the business paid the prescribed fee and the respondents did not pass any order of refusal within the prescribed period sixty days and thereafter, the applicant earns licence for that period under the Act. Thus, it is not correct to state that there is no licence for that year. The respondents by their earlier order dated 1. 1993 admit that the petitioner has earned licence for the year 1992-93 and revoked the same. .(d) The third ground is that running a flour mill will be a nuisance. ‘Nuisance’ is defined in the Act as well as in the Public Health Act. Various forms of nuisance are statutorily stated. The impugned order merely states the ground “nuisance” without stating how and what is the nuisance caused. There has so far been no complaint by the neighbours. In fact, the petitioner has obtained no objection certificates from several of them at the time of application for licence in 1991. .(e) No notice or opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause as to how it is not a nuisance. Before action to refuse the licence, the authorities must give the petitioner a show cause notice, which the respondents, have failed and neglected to do. Thus, the impugned order violates the principles of natural justice as well as the statutory provisions. .(f) The petitioner has stated in W.P.No.3517 of 1993 that the order suffered from the vice of discrimination, in that, opposite to his flour mill premises, there is another drug factory by name Thirukuda Pharmaceuticals with 10 H.P. motor and that neither the respondents nor the residents have considered that either as a nuisance or as being located in Primary Residential Zone. The respondents in their counter filed in W.P.No.3517 of 1993 have admitted that it is so. In view of this, it is submitted, that the impugned order is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, (g) It is submitted that pursuant to the order dated ‘Nil’ and signed on 22.3/1993 the 1st respondent has issued another order dated 4. 1993 which has been signed on 4. 1993, which was sought to be served on 4. 1993. Since the shop was closed, it was affixed on the wall of the shop premises on 4. 1993. 1993 which has been signed on 4. 1993, which was sought to be served on 4. 1993. Since the shop was closed, it was affixed on the wall of the shop premises on 4. 1993. On coming to know of the same, the petitioner went to the authorities to receive the same. The authorities have issued the second impugned order under Sec.379-A of the Act, in and by which the petitioner was directed to stop the trade immediately and remove all the machineries from the shop premises within 24 hours from the receipt of the said order. The second impugned order is also being challenged in this writ petition. .(h) For these reasons and under these circumstances, the petitioner would submit that the said impugned orders are liable to be quashed and the respondents must be directed to receive the renewal fee and consequently renew the licence for 1993-94. 9. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit dated 8. 1993. The contentions in main are as under: .(a) The site for locating the flour mill falls in Primary Residential Zone, wherein the grant of licence to run the flour mill is not permissible. .(b) Since the premises, where the proposed flour mill was to be located, falls in a Primary Residential Zone, no licence could be granted under Secs.287 and 288 of the Act. .(c) Since the planning permission was issued by oversight to run a flour mill with 15 H.P. motor in the premises in question, the petitioner cannot insist the respondents to issue licence. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the mistake committed by the officers earlier. .(d) The petitioner does not have any right to commence or carry on a flour mill in a primary Residential Zone, where running of a flour mill is not permissible under the Act. .(e) It will be clear that the action was taken only in conformity with the directions of this Court given earlier. 10. I have heard the arguments of the learned Senior Advocate Mr.T.Chengalvarayan for Mrs.T.Kokilavani, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr.D.Murugesan, learned counsel for the Corporation of Madras. At the time of hearing, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Mr.T.Chengalvorayan has produced a site plan also and argued at length on the grounds of challenge made in the writ petition. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides. At the time of hearing, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Mr.T.Chengalvorayan has produced a site plan also and argued at length on the grounds of challenge made in the writ petition. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides. 11. The petitioner has filed the writ petition to quash the order dated 23. 1993 refusing to renew his licence for the year 1993-94 and the consequential order dated 4. 1993 for running F.C.S.FlourMill at Door No.29, P.V.Koil Second Street, Pudupet, Royapettah, Madras-14. The Corporation refused to renew the licence for the year 1993-94 by the impugned orders. As stated above, for quashing the said orders, and for a direction to renew the licence for the year 1993-94 the present writ petition has been filed. 12. The order impugned states two main grounds for refusal and they are: .(i) The place is situate in a Primary Residential Zone within the meaning of the Development Control Rules for Madras Metropolitan Area under the Town and Country Planning Act: .(ii) It will be a nuisance to the residents of the locality. 13. The Development Control Rules have classified: the Madras Metropolitan Area into ten zones, viz., 1. Primary Residential Use Zone. 2. Mixed Residential Use Zone. 3. Commercial Use Zone. 4. Light Industrial Zone. 5. General Industrial Zone. 6. Special and Hazardous Industrial Zone. 7. Institutional Zone. 8. Open Space and Recreational Zone. 9. Agricultural Zone. 10.Non-urban Zone. The said Rules delimit the mixed residential use zone as referable to the municipal divisions. The place in question is within the mixed residential use zone as referable to Municipal Division No.60 (Royapettah) with the following boundaries: North: By Peters Road. East: By Royapettah High Road, Sri Gaudiya Mutt Road (Royapettah Bazaar Road) Mowbrays Road. South: By St. George Cathedral Road. West: By Gopalapuram First Street and Conran Smith Road. .(i) R.S.Nos.278 to 286 323 to 341 of Mylapore. Along the Western side of Royapettah High Road and both sides of Royapettah Bazaar Road. .(ii) (1) Both sides of Mowbrays Road from Lloyds Road to St. George Cathedral Road. .(2) Both sides of Lloyds Road from Mowbrays Road to Lloyds Road Area Town Planning Scheme Limit. (iii) Southern side of Peters Road from Royapettah High Road to Lloyds Road Area Town Planning Scheme. .(ii) (1) Both sides of Mowbrays Road from Lloyds Road to St. George Cathedral Road. .(2) Both sides of Lloyds Road from Mowbrays Road to Lloyds Road Area Town Planning Scheme Limit. (iii) Southern side of Peters Road from Royapettah High Road to Lloyds Road Area Town Planning Scheme. (iv) Area bounded by: North: S.P.Sannathi Street East: Gaudia Mutt Road South and West: Ammaiappa Mudali Street. 14. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also filed a sketch indicating the four boundaries and the concerned street within the zone. The Development Control Rules also provide for what are mixed residential use zone. In this connection, it is useful to refer to Clauses (v) and (viii) thereof, which run thus: “(v) Establishment and shops retailing in vegetables, fruits, flowers, fish, meat and such other daily necessities of the residents occupying a floor area not exceeding 500 square metres or an organised markets. (viii) Manufacturing service establishments using electric motors employing not more than 15 horse power and or employing not more than ten workers excluding those which are obnoxious or hazardous in nature by reason of dour, effluent dust, smoke, gas, vibration, noise, etc. or otherwise likely to cause danger and nuisance to public health or amenity.” It provides that the daily necessaries of the residents of the locality and manufacturing service establishments using electric motor employing not more than 15 H.P. or employing not more than ten workers are permitted. 15. The above Rules prohibit works which are obnoxious or hazardous in nature by reason of odour, effluent dust, smoke, gas, vibration, noise etc., or otherwise likely to cause danger and nuisance to public health or amenity. According to the petitioner, only two workers are employed in his flour mill and the same is running with an electric motor of 10 H.P. It is not the case of the respondents that this process does fall under any of the prohibited items in Clause (viii) referred to above. It is further submitted by Mr.T.Chengalvorayan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, that the Rules in Annexure VII enumerate the list of industries permissible in light industrial zone under Rule 10(a)(iii) of the Development Control Rules. It enumerates certain industries under each classification. One such classification with which we concerned is under the heading ‘Food’ and under this head, ‘Flour Mills’ is mentioned as itemNo.7 in Classification IV. It enumerates certain industries under each classification. One such classification with which we concerned is under the heading ‘Food’ and under this head, ‘Flour Mills’ is mentioned as itemNo.7 in Classification IV. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the place in question falls entirely within the mixed residential use zone, and that the manufacturing service establishments employing not more than ten persons and using not more than 15 H.P. is permitted and that the manufacturing activity of the petitioner does not fall under any one of the prohibited uses under Clause (viii) referred to above. I see merit in his above contention. I, therefore, hold that the refusal to renew the licence of the petitioner on the ground that the place is covered by primary residential use Zone is an error apparent on the face of the record and as such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed on this ground. 16. With reference to the second ground, it is submitted that the flour mill can be a nuisance only if it falls under the prohibited part of clause viii referred to above. I have gone through the order impugned in the writ petition. It does not state that any of those prohibited items are present in this case. I, therefore, hold that the impugned order is illegal and with error apparent on the face of the record and therefore liable to be quashed. .17. It is also a matter of record that as early as 12. 1991, the planning permit was given and acted upon by the petitioner. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Corporation that the planning permit was granting by mistake. If so, the respondents did not take any action at all all these years. The respondents in their proceedings dated 1. 1993, which is the subject matter of W.P.No.3517 of 1993, has not stated that such planning permit was granted by oversight. As on date, the planning permit stands and subsisting. The petitioner made the application for the installation of machinery as required by Sec.288(1) of the Act and the respondents granted permission in the form of a planning permit. He had also applied for a licence to carry on the business and paid the prescribed fee. As on date, the planning permit stands and subsisting. The petitioner made the application for the installation of machinery as required by Sec.288(1) of the Act and the respondents granted permission in the form of a planning permit. He had also applied for a licence to carry on the business and paid the prescribed fee. The respondents did not pass any order of refusal within a period of sixty days and thereafter the applicant earns licence for that period under the provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, not correct on the part of the respondents to state that there is no licence for that year. The respondents by their earlier order dated 1. 1993 have admitted that the petitioner has earned the licence for the year 1992-93 and revoked the same. 18. In regard to the nuisance alleged, the impugned order merely states the ground ‘nuisance’ without stating what is the nuisance. The term ‘nuisance’ is defined in the Act as well as in the Public Health Act. Admittedly, there has so far been no complaint by the neighbours of the petitioner. In fact, the petitioner has obtained no objection certificates from several of them at the time of his application for licence during 1991. 19. Yet another submission made by Mr.T.Chengalvarayan, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner, also merits acceptance. According to him, no notice or opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause as to how it is not a nuisance. I am of the view that before the action to refuse the licence, the authorities must give the petitioner a show cause notice, which the respondents have failed and neglected to do so. Thus, the impugned order also violates the principles of natural justice as well as the statutory provisions. 20. The impugned order also suffers from the vice of discrimination as rightly urged by Mr.T.Chengalvorayan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. It is not disputed that opposite to the petitioner’s flour mill premises, there is a drug factory by name Thirukuda Pharmaceuticals with 10 H.P. motor. Neither the respondents nor the residents have considered that either as nuisance or being located in a primary residential use zone. The respondents, as stated in paragraph supra, have also admitted it in W.P.No.3517 of 1993. .21. Admittedly, the petitioner had obtained stay of the order of re vocation dated 1. Neither the respondents nor the residents have considered that either as nuisance or being located in a primary residential use zone. The respondents, as stated in paragraph supra, have also admitted it in W.P.No.3517 of 1993. .21. Admittedly, the petitioner had obtained stay of the order of re vocation dated 1. 1993 for the 1icence earned by him for the year 1992-93. The authorities have also issued the second impugned order under Sec .3 79(A) of the Act in and by which the petitioner was directed to stop the trade immediately and remove all the machineries from the shop premises within 24 hours from the receipt of the said order. The respondents have also returned the banker’s Pay Order for the licence fee along with the impugned order through the concerned Sanitary Inspector on 23. 1993. The petitioner has also purchased the F.C.S. Flour Mill at a cost of rupees one lakh under the cover of the planning permit, which is subsisting till date, and that he has been running the said mill at the same place for the last 2 1/2 years without any complaint from the neighbours. If at this stage the licence is not renewed, the petitioner will be put to huge loss and hardship and total loss of his business. As noticed earlier, this is a case of renewal of licence and under the provisions of the Act, the business can be carried on and continued by the petitioner till final orders of non-renewal are passed. By exercising the power conferred upon the respondents under Sec.379-A of the Act, they have proceeded and sealed the shop premises on 4. 1993. J.Kanakaraj, J., by order dated 24. 1993 in W.M.P.Nos.10838 and 10840 of 1993 has directed the respondents to remove the seal affixed on the premises with a direction that the petitioner will not run the mill pending further orders on the writ petition. Now that the impugned order is quashed and the writ petition is allowed, the respondents are directed to receive the renewal fee by banker’s draft as prayed for in W.M.P.No.10839 of 1993 and renew the licence. 22. For the fore-going reasons, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for and the impugned orders dated 23. 1993 and 4. Now that the impugned order is quashed and the writ petition is allowed, the respondents are directed to receive the renewal fee by banker’s draft as prayed for in W.M.P.No.10839 of 1993 and renew the licence. 22. For the fore-going reasons, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for and the impugned orders dated 23. 1993 and 4. 1993 of the respondents are quashed and a direction is issued to the respondents to receive the prescribed fee for 1993-94 in the form of bank draft and renew the licence for 1993-94 onwards. However, there will be no order as to costs.