JUDGMENT : T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. The appellant is an unregistered firm doing abkari business. The appellant did not file any return for purposes of assessment under the Income Tax Act, 1961, inter alia, for the year 1973-74 until the search of the residential premises of the managing partner in September, 1974, after which the appellant filed its return for the year 1973-74. An assessment was completed on the basis of this return u/s 143(3) on March 31, 1976, on a total income of Rs. 1,14,000. This was reduced in appeal to Rs. 1,03,230. The appellant had made a disclosure under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of the Income and Wealth Ordinance, 1975. In determining the amount of tax payable under the assessment, the amount of tax paid under this scheme was given credit. In the original assessment made on March 31, 1976, a copy of which is exhibit P-1, the Income Tax Officer did not levy any interest either u/s 159(8) or 217. 2. The assessment was reopened u/s 147(a) to bring to tax an amount of Rs. 82,376 claimed as sales tax liability. The reassessment was made on November 22, 1981 (exhibit P-2), and in completing it the Income Tax Officer levied interest of Rs. 43,628 u/s 139(a) and Rs. 49,816 u/s 217. This assessment was modified in appeal by the order, exhibit P-3, dated October 1, 1982, by which the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the amount of sales tax liability to the extent of Rs. 79,688, sustaining the balance. 3. In the meanwhile, the appellant had filed an application dated December 18, 1981, before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax for waiver of the interest charged on it. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner issued directions to the Income Tax Officer who rectified the assessment in consequence by his proceedings, exhibit P-5, dated March 2, 1982. Thereby he reduced the amount of interest u/s 139(8) to Rs. 22,868 and u/s 217 to Rs. 26,135. The appellant challenged this order in revision before the Commissioner u/s 264 of the Act. The Commissioner noted, inter alia, that the reduced interest was the amount of interest leviable on the income assessed in the regular assessment completed on March 31, 1976. 22,868 and u/s 217 to Rs. 26,135. The appellant challenged this order in revision before the Commissioner u/s 264 of the Act. The Commissioner noted, inter alia, that the reduced interest was the amount of interest leviable on the income assessed in the regular assessment completed on March 31, 1976. He held that the levy of interest u/s 139(8) under the reassessment order, exhibit P-2, was not barred by any provision of the Act and, therefore, sustained it overruling the contention of the appellant that interest u/s 139(8) can be levied only in the course of regular assessment. So far as the interest u/s 217 was concerned, the Commissioner held that the levy of such interest in reassessment proceedings even if it was restricted to the tax determined in the original regular assessment cannot be upheld. He disposed of the revision petition accordingly confirming the levy of interest u/s 139(8) and cancelling the levy u/s 217. A copy of this order is exhibit P-7. The appellant challenged this order by filing the writ petition which was dismissed by the learned single judge (see Thekkanatu Firms Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, (1993) 110 CTR 205). The appeal is filed therefrom, the challenge being to the levy of interest u/s 139(8) along with the reassessment order, exhibit P-2. 4. We must note even in the first instance that the interest is not levied on the amount of tax determined on reassessment, but only on the amount of tax due as per the original regular assessment, exhibit P-1, completed on March 31, 1976. We must also note that the appellant has no case that interest u/s 139(8) is not leviable, the only case put forward being that it could not have been levied along with the reassessment order, exhibit P-2. 5. A large number of decisions were relied on by either side, the applicability of which, we feel, it is unnecessary to consider having regard to the view that we are taking. We shall, however, briefly refer to them in deference to the contentions raised on either side. We may state here that according to counsel for the Revenue an assessment u/s 147 is also a regular assessment as defined in Section 2(40), namely, an assessment made u/s 143 or 144. We shall, however, briefly refer to them in deference to the contentions raised on either side. We may state here that according to counsel for the Revenue an assessment u/s 147 is also a regular assessment as defined in Section 2(40), namely, an assessment made u/s 143 or 144. Counsel points out that once a notice is issued u/s 148 and the assessment is reopened, the further proceedings are u/s 143. He refers to the decision in LAXMI NARAIN BHADANI Vs. COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax, BIHAR AND ORISSA., AIR 1949 Patna 209, which was confirmed on another point in Lakshminarain Bhadani Vs. Commr. of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 429 , where it was held that Section 34 of the 1922 Act requires issuance of notice for assessment and for that purpose the provisions of Section 23 also apply. Counsel also made reference to the decision of this court in Kerala Kaumudi (P.) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1990) 181 ITR 30, where it was held that once proceedings are initiated u/s 147, the assessment proceedings start afresh and the proceedings for assessment for that year will -be pending and will continue until a final order is rendered. When the assessment is reopened, Section 143(3) is attracted, bringing in its trail Section 144B as well, if the intended addition to the returned income is more than Rs. 1,00,000. The submission was that the reassessment being u/s 143, it was a regular assessment u/s 2(40), in the course of which interest u/s 139(8) could be levied. 6. We shall now refer to the decisions referred on the assessee's side. But before doing so, we may mention that the Full Bench of this court which dealt with the question as to what is a regular assessment in Lally Jacob Vs. Income Tax Officer and Others, (1992) 3 ILR (Ker) 107 and held that an assessment made for the first time u/s 147 was also a regular assessment, did hot expressly deal with the question as to whether a second assessment by way of reassessment would be a regular assessment or not. The Full Bench made it clear that they were concerned only with the question as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to Section 147 was a regular assessment or not. The Full Bench made it clear that they were concerned only with the question as to whether an assessment made for the first time by resort to Section 147 was a regular assessment or not. We must also note that the said decision was one rendered regarding interest u/s 217. 7. In Gates Foam and Rubber Co. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1973) 90 ITR 422, the decision in which led to the reference to the Full Bench and the decision in Lally Jacob Vs. Income Tax Officer and Others, (1992) 3 ILR (Ker) 107) was one in which it was held that reassessments made after resort to Section 147 are not assessments u/s 143. As such, it was held that these assessments were not regular assessments for purposes of Section 273 of the Act. In COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax, KERALA-II, ERNAKULAM Vs. G. B. TRANSPORTS, GURUVAYUR, (1985) 50 CTR 9, the Full Bench of this court dealt with the question as to whether an assessment made pursuant to an appellate order was a regular assessment for the purpose of Section 214 of the Act. The Full Bench answered the question in the negative. In P.A. Abdul Muthalif Rowther Vs. Income Tax Officer, "A" Ward, (1976) 102 ITR 694, a Division Bench of this court held that Section 148 treats reassessment proceedings as assessment proceedings u/s 139 and, therefore, interest u/s 139 can be levied in proceedings u/s 148 as well. The decision on which considerable reliance was made by Sri P. Balachandran for the appellant was that of the Karnataka High Court in Charles D'souza Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka-II, (1984) 40 CTR 353, where the court held, inter alia, that a regular assessment as defined in Section 2(40) means an assessment made u/s 143 or 144 in contradistinction to an assessment/reassessment made u/s 147. It was accordingly held that interest under Sections 139(8) and 217 cannot be levied in the ease of a reassessment u/s 147. It must be noted that the interest with which the court was concerned in that decision was one levied on the amount computed as the tax payable on reassessment and it was in that context that the court made the observations mentioned above. Counsel stressed on the point that the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP against this decision as is evident from the note [1990] 186 ITR 28. Counsel stressed on the point that the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP against this decision as is evident from the note [1990] 186 ITR 28. He also pointed out that a similar decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was also confirmed by the Supreme Court by dismissal of the SLP as is evident from the note [1991] 191 ITR 78. 8. We have already pointed out that the case with which we are concerned is one in which the interest levied was what was leviable even under the original order of assessment, but which was not actually levied. We have also pointed out that there was no dispute about the correctness of the levy apart from the contention that it ought not to have been levied in the reassessment proceedings. Section 139(8) provides that the assessee shall be liable to pay interest in the circumstances and for the period mentioned therein on the amount of tax payable on the total income as determined on regular assessment, as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid and any tax deducted at source. The Explanation which was added with effect from April 1, 1985, clarified that even an assessment made for the first time u/s 147 will be a regular assessment. The reference in the sub-section to regular assessment is only in relation to the quantum of tax on which the interest is payable, that is, it is the amount of tax determined on regular assessment less the deductions mentioned. The section does not, on its face, speak of the period of time at which the levy should be made, whether it should be in the regular assessment itself or whether it could be in subsequent proceedings. When the reference to regular assessment is only for the purpose of quantifying the interest nd pegging it down to the tax determined on regular assessment, we do not find any reason why we should further peg down the levy itself to the date of the regular assessment foreclosing its levy on a subsequent date. When the reference to regular assessment is only for the purpose of quantifying the interest nd pegging it down to the tax determined on regular assessment, we do not find any reason why we should further peg down the levy itself to the date of the regular assessment foreclosing its levy on a subsequent date. The Commissioner in his revisional order, exhibit P-7, has taken the view that the only injunction contained in Section 139(8) is that the interest is to be levied with reference to the tax determined on regular assessment and, therefore, the reduced interest levied under the provision based on the tax determined on the regular assessment cannot be stated to be incorrect or improper. We are not prepared to hold that this conclusion of the Commissioner suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record justifying interference with the same in certiorari proceedings under Article 226. We must also note that since the levy itself is not being challenged on the merits, no manifest injustice is caused to the assessee by sustenance of the levy. The view taken by the Commissioner is supported by the language of the section which does not foreclose the levy in subsequent proceedings provided it is related to the quantum of tax determined in the original assessment. Since there is no error apparent on the face of the record, we do not feel that this is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned judge has also exercised the discretion against the appellant. 9. This writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed.