JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRA SHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Writ Petition No. 3129 of 1989 is by the tenant and Writ Petition No. 3194 of 1989 is by the landlord. Civil Suit No. 609 of 1978 on the file of the Joint Civil Judge (J.D.), Ahmednagar, was filed by the plaintiff-landlord, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3194 of 1989 against the respondent-tenant, who is the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3129 of 1989, for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of arrears of rent and bona fide requirement. The learned Joint Civil Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that neither there is bona fide requirement nor was there any arrears of rent. 2. Against the said judgment, the plaintiff, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3194 of 1989 filed appeal before the Extra Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, as Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1980. The appellant Court also rejected the plea of bona fide requirement, but decreed the suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. 3. The tenant thereupon filed Writ Petition No. 3129 of 1989 against the decree for possession passed against him and the landlord filed the Writ Petition No. 3194 of 1989 against the rejection of appeal by the appellate Court on the ground of bona fide requirement. That is how these two writ petitions came to be filed based on a single appellate Courts judgment. Since the matters are connected and arise out of a common judgment, I thought it fit to hear these writ petitions jointly and to dispose of the same by a common judgment. 4. As stated earlier, there is a concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below on the question of bona fide requirement and I find no reason to interfere with that concurrent finding of both the authorities below. Therefore, that point has to be held as concluded and Writ Petition No. 3194 of 1989 filed by the landlord is liable to be dismissed as it rests only on the ground of the personal bona fide requirement. 5. Now, only point remains in this case is the divergent findings of the original authority regarding the arrears of rent and eviction ordered on that ground. 5. Now, only point remains in this case is the divergent findings of the original authority regarding the arrears of rent and eviction ordered on that ground. As regards the ground of arrears of rent, the original authority has taken a view that since the tenants Application No. 96 of 1978 was filed by him for fixing standard rent, therefore, the benefit of section 12(2) and 3(a) r/w Explanation 1 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to, in short, as the Rent Act) has to be given to the tenant and, therefore, decree for possession of the suit premises was declined. The appellate Court, on the other hand, has found that the tenant has not complied with requirements that are to be followed in order to claim the benefit of sections 12(2) and 3(a). Therefore, the decree for possession on the ground of arrears of rent has been passed by the appellate authority. Now, the short question before me is that whether or not the appellate Court is justified in granting decree for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. 6. Before going to the relevant point, it will be useful to refer to the section 12(2) and 3(a) of the Rent Act. The original judgment was passed on 29-4-1980. The relevant portion of the section applicable to the facts of this case is under the un-amended Act. I notice that the Rent Act has been amended in 1985 and 1987 whereby considerable changes have been effected. Therefore, for the purpose of this case, I have to deal with the matter with reference to un-amended section of sections 12(2) and (3)(a). It is proved in this case that the demand notice for arrears of rent, and for possession by the landlord to the tenant has been sent under Ex. 18 dated 18-5-1978 and served on 19-5-1978. The Application No. 96 of 1978 for fixing the standard rent was filed by the tenant only on 15-7-1978. In order to avail the protection of section 12(3) of the Rent Act, the tenant has to dispute the rate of rent within one month from the date of receipt of the demand notice from the landlord for arrears of rent and also he has to file an application for fixation of standard rent. In order to avail the protection of section 12(3) of the Rent Act, the tenant has to dispute the rate of rent within one month from the date of receipt of the demand notice from the landlord for arrears of rent and also he has to file an application for fixation of standard rent. Going by facts of this case, the tenant has not fulfilled these conditions, though, lately, he has filed an application for fixation of standard rent on 15-7-1978, which is admittedly 2 months after the date of receipt of the notice of demand made by the landord. The appellate Court was justified while appreciating the evidence adduced in the case, in rejecting the plea of the tenant that there was no arrears of rent due. The appellate Court was justified in setting aside the finding of the original authority to this effect. I find no material in this case to establish that there are no arrears on the date of the demand. In fact, except the oral testimony on behalf of the tenant, there is no material to show that there were no arrears of rent, which fact easily could be proved by the tenant by producing rent receipts for having paid the rent either to the present landlord or the earlier landlords from whom the present landlord purchased the property. Therefore, I have to proceed on the basis that there were arrears of rent on the date of demand. 7. While costruing the provisions of section 12(2) and (3) read with section 11(3) of the Rent Act, difference of opinion in the interpretation of the section 12(3) of the Act existed before the High Court of Bombay and the High Court of Gujrat, which has been set at rest by the Supreme Court of India in its decision in (Harbanslal v. Prabhudas)1, A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2005. 8. Therefore, in this case, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India, the conditions required to be fulfilled by the tenant in order to escape a decree of eviction has not been strictly followed. 8. Therefore, in this case, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India, the conditions required to be fulfilled by the tenant in order to escape a decree of eviction has not been strictly followed. The learned Counsel for the tenant i.e. petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3129 of 1989 has strongly contended that tenants application for fixation of fair rent satisfies the conditions stipulated in sections 12(2) and (3) read with section 11(3) and for that purpose, he relies on the Supreme Court decision reported in (I.A. Shaikh v. K.S. Agarwal)2, A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 1609. In fact, this decision will not be helpful to the tenant. On the other hand, it confirms the earlier decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above. It only further clarifies the position that the tenant, on receipt of the demand notice from the landlord, should dispute the rate of rent and arrears of rent within one month from the date of receipt of the demand, but filing of application for fixation of standard rent need not necessarily be within that one month, but it should be as expeditiously as possible, before receipt of notice from Court. The Supreme Court in I.A. Shaikhs, case, has observed in paragraph No. 3 of the said judgment, thus :-- "It would not appear to have been meant that the application under section 11(3) should also be filed within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice. But expeditious action is called for to prove the bona fides of the tenants disputing the right of the landlord in the claim of standard rent or permitted increases. The Act appears to have intended to quench thirst of the avaricious landlord to claim the rent in excess of the standard rent or permitted increases under the Act and at the same time obligated the tenant, in case of his dispute or disagreement, to have the statutory recourse for determining standard rent or permitted increases. The Act appears to have intended to quench thirst of the avaricious landlord to claim the rent in excess of the standard rent or permitted increases under the Act and at the same time obligated the tenant, in case of his dispute or disagreement, to have the statutory recourse for determining standard rent or permitted increases. Therefore, expeditious action had to be had before the receipt of the notice from the Court which would indicate not only bona fides on the part of the tenant in resisting the claim for excess standard rent or permitted increases but also to have his right to pay the standard rent or permitted increases determined according to law." Therefore, the Supreme Court, in this decision only clarifies the earlier decision as regards the interpretation of section 12(2) and (3) read with section 11(3) of the un-amended section of the Rent Act of 1947. 9. Now the legal position is that any tenant who wants to avoid a decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent has to dispute the rate of rent within one month of the receipt of notice of demand from the landlord. No relaxation has been made by the Supreme Court of India in its decision in A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 1609, regarding the rigour of the requirements disputing arrears of rent and the rate of rent within one month by the tenant. Slight relaxation which has been made in costructing sections 11(3) read with section 12(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, is that application contemplated under section 11(3) of the Act by the tenant need not strictly be within one month but before which a notice from the Court is received. In other words, if the tenant who disputes rate of rent within one month and files an application under section 11(3) beyond a period of one month, but before notice is received from the Court, then alone a tenant can avoid an order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. 10. Viewed in this perspective, the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant has to be rejected because the facts disclosed in this case do not persuade me to take a stand other than what has been taken by the lower appellate Court. 10. Viewed in this perspective, the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant has to be rejected because the facts disclosed in this case do not persuade me to take a stand other than what has been taken by the lower appellate Court. It is clear, as observed by the appellate Court, that there is no clinching evidence in this case to show that the tenant has disputed the standard rent and arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice of demand. That there was no arrears of rent, that the rate of rent is disputed, are all grounds raised by the tenant in the application as aforesaid mentioned, filed in the Court much after the receipt of notice of demand. In this factual context, tenant has lost the protection from eviction. I, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate Court granting the decree for eviction in favour of the landlord on the ground of arrears of rent. 11. In the result, both the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1980 on the file of Extra Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, dated 18-1-1982 stands confirmed. 12. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs throughout. Rule is discharged. petitions dismissed. *****