Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : This revision is directed against the order passed in R.C.A. No. 50 of 1985 on the file of Subordinate, Judge, Tuticorin, which in turn arose out of the order pased in R.C.O.P. No. 224 of 1982 on the file of District Munsif of Tuticorin. 2. The landlady is the petitioner herein. The petition for eviction was filed under S. 10(2)(1) and under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by the Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). According to the landlady, the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent from January, 1982 onwards till the date of filing the petition. In spite of the notice, the tenant failed and neglected to pay the rent and thereby committed wilful default in payment of rent, as contemplated under S. 10(2)(1) of the Act. The landlady also required the portion under the occupation of the tenant under S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act. The landlady's husband is carrying on bakery business in a rental premises and he is not having any other non-residential premises of his own. Therefore, the Landlady required the petition premises for the business purpose of her husband. The husband of thelandlady examiened himself as P.W. 1. The tenant examined two of his brothers as R. Ws. 2 and 3. The landlady filed 9 documents, and the tenant filed 7 documents. Considering the facts arising in this case, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant commited wilful default in payment of rent for the petition period and hence is liable to be evicted under S. 10(2)(1) of the Act. So also, the Rent Controller has come to the conclusion that the landlady established her bona fide in requiring the petition premises under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Thus the eviction was ordered on both these grounds. Aggrieved, the tenant filed appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, appraising the facts arising in this case, came to the conclusion that the tenant did not commit any wilful default in payment of rent for the petition period. He further held that the landlady failed to establish her bona fide in requiring the petition premises under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, appraising the facts arising in this case, came to the conclusion that the tenant did not commit any wilful default in payment of rent for the petition period. He further held that the landlady failed to establish her bona fide in requiring the petition premises under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on both these grounds was set aside by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. It is against this order, the present revision has been preferred by the landlady. 3. Learned counsel for the landlady/ petitioner submitted as under :- . The tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent for the petition period. The tenant never used to pay the rent in time. In spite of the notice issued, the tenant was not regular in payment of rent. The Rent Control Appellate Authority was not correct in reversing the well considered eviction order of the Rent Controller. It was therefore pleaded that the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority may be set aside and that of the Rent Controller may be restored. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ tenant submitted as under:- The tenant was regular in payment of rent. The landlady demanded higher rent. When the tenant refused to pay the same, she has come forward with the present petition. The tenant was paying the rent periodically. But the landlady refused to receive the same. Since there was mediation between the landlady and the tenant, there was delay in payment of rent for two months. These two months rent was paid even before filing the petition for eviction. On the date of filing the petition for eviction, there was no arrears of rent. Therefore, there is no wilful default in payment of rent as alleged by the landlady. 5. I have heard the rival submissions. The fact remains, that the petition for eviction was filed under S. 10(2)(1) of the Act. According to landlady, the tenant committed wilful default from January, 1982 till the date of filing the petition. The petition was filed on 5-10-1982. The landlady sent a notice on 10-6-1982. On 26-4-1982, the tenant sent the rent for the month of January and February, 1982 by Money Order. This was refused by the landlady. According to landlady, the tenant committed wilful default from January, 1982 till the date of filing the petition. The petition was filed on 5-10-1982. The landlady sent a notice on 10-6-1982. On 26-4-1982, the tenant sent the rent for the month of January and February, 1982 by Money Order. This was refused by the landlady. There was no explanation on the side of the landlady for having refused to receive the rent sent by Money Order on 26-4-1982. On 19-6-1982, the tenant sent a reply to the landlady. Along with the reply, the rent for the months of January to June, 1982 was sent by demand draft. This was received by the counsel for the landlady. The rent related to the month of July, 1982 was sent by the tenant on 9-7-1982. The rent for the months of August, 1982 and September, 1982 was sent on 24-8-1982. This was also received by the advocate for the landlady. The rent for the month of October, 1982 was sent on 9-10-1982. That was also received by the advocate for the landlady. Therefore, the tenant paid the rent from January to October, 1982 and the same was received by the advocate appearing for the landlady. Therefore, it remains to be seen that the rent for the petition period was paid even prior to the filing of the petition by the landlady. In fact, the rent for the month of September, 1982 can be paid even up to the end of October, 1982. On the other hand, the rent was paid in advance. Considering all these aspects, I hold that the tenant did not commit any wilful default in payment of rent as alleged by the landlady. Therefore, the Rent Control Ap-pellate Authority was correct in dismissing the petition filed by the landlady under S. 10(2)(1) of the Act. 6. Another ground in this revision relates to eviction sought, for under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The landlady required the petition premises for bakery business of her husband. According to landlady, her husband is conducting bakery business under the name and style of 'Macroon India. He is doing his business in State Bank Colony. The landlady submitted that her husband is not having or in occupation of any other non-residential building of his own in the City. According to landlady, her husband is conducting bakery business under the name and style of 'Macroon India. He is doing his business in State Bank Colony. The landlady submitted that her husband is not having or in occupation of any other non-residential building of his own in the City. According to the tenant, as on the date of filing the petition for eviction, the husband of the landlady was not carrying on bakery business as alleged by the landlady. Learned counsel for the tenant further submitted that kitchen portion under his occupation fell vacant and that was surrendered to the landlady. Learned counsel for the tenant further submitted that this portion was let out by the landlady to a third party. 7. In support of her contention, the landlady filed Ex. P3, a licence issued by Tuticorin Municipality to the husband of the landlady. This licence was issued for conducting bakery business. Ex. P4 is the receipt for payment of charge's to the Municipality for obtaining licence. The date of receipt is 24-4-1982. Ex. P5 is the photostat copy of the licence issued to the husband of the landlady for doing bakery business. The date of this document is 4-11-1981. The licence is valid up to 3-5-1982. According to the Rent Control Appellate Authority, for the subsequent period, the landlady has not produced any document to show that her husband was continuing the bakery business. But, Exts. P6 to P8 are receipts dated 5-10-1981, 5-7-1982 and 5-10-1983. Ex. P9 is the receipt for payment of licence relating to the period 1981-82. The landlady filed before this Court, a petition in C.M.P. No. 16419 of 1993 for permission to file additional documents. The tenant filed his counter, in that petition. I have heard the submissions made by both the counsel, in the matter of filing additional documents. The additional documents are sales tax receipts issued by the Sales Tax Authorities dated 2-5-1984 and 20-4-1985 assessment order by the Commercial Tax Department dated 15-3-1982 and tax receipts issued by Tuticorin Municipality to the landlady. Considering the nature of the documents and after hearing learned counsel appearing on both sides, the petitioner landlady was permitted to file additional documents. These documents are public documents. Therefore, no objection can be raised by the tenant with regard to the authenticity of the documents. Considering the nature of the documents and after hearing learned counsel appearing on both sides, the petitioner landlady was permitted to file additional documents. These documents are public documents. Therefore, no objection can be raised by the tenant with regard to the authenticity of the documents. These documents would go to show that even after filing the petition, the husband of the landlady was doing bakery business. The husband of the landlady was examined as P.W. 1. In his evidence, he has clearly stated that he was doing business in bakery before filing the petition for eviction, on the date of filing the petition and after he filed the petition for eviction. He has also stated about various persons to whom he has supplied bakery products. In the cross-examination, the tenant submitted that he does not know whether the husband of the landlady is carrying on bakery business at No. 111 / 56, State Bank Colony, under the name and style of 'Macroon India.' It is not a case of the tenant that the husband of the landlady did not do bakery business under the name and style of 'Macroon India' in State Bank Colony. 8. The Supreme Court in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988) 102 Mad LW 1 held as under (at p. 1068 of AIR):- "The word 'claim' means" a demand for something as due"or" to seek or ask for on the ground of right, "etc. In the context of Rent Control law which is enacted for the purpose of giving protection to tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of making equitable distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in need of them in order to prove that his claim is bona fide, a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in possession of the premises which is in the occupation of a tenant. Any decision on the question whether a landlord deserves to be put in possession of a premises in the occupation of a tenant should naturally depend upon the bona fides of the landlord's requirement or need. The word 'claim' in Cl. (e) of S. 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, be construed as 'the requirement' of the landlord or his deservedness. 'Deserve' means 'to have a rightful claim' or 'a just claim.' Since Cl. The word 'claim' in Cl. (e) of S. 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, be construed as 'the requirement' of the landlord or his deservedness. 'Deserve' means 'to have a rightful claim' or 'a just claim.' Since Cl. (e) of S. 10(3) of the Act is also applicable to a petition filed under sub-cl. (iii) of S. 10(3)(a) of the Act it becomes necessary to examine whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. Otherwise a landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in S. 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Act."* 9. This Court in Chelliah Pandithan v. Smt. Anthoniammal and two others (1985) 98 Mad LW 666 held as under:- "It would be extremely hard to construe S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of 1960 Act, as to mean that if the landlords want to start their own business, they must first start the business in rented premises, taken on rent from somebody else, and then they should take proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground that they require the premises for running their own business. I would therefore agree with view taken by Ismail, J. It appears to me that having regard to the later decisions, the fact that the landlords are not actually carrying on the business when they make an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for their business would not be fatal to their claim under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. In the present case the bona fides of the landlords that they wanted to start their own business was accepted and upheld by the Court below and it would not be proper to interfere with that finding in this revision."* 10. In the counter filed by the tenant, it is stated that the landlady's husband was using a portion a measuring 4' x 2'. He was also using the kitchen behind the petition premises. The father of the tenant was asked to surrender that portion to the husband of the landlady. Accordingly that portion was surrendered to the husband of the landlady. But the landlady instead of utilising the same, joined that portion along with other residential portion and let out the same to one Nankachivayam, who was working in the State Bank of India. Accordingly that portion was surrendered to the husband of the landlady. But the landlady instead of utilising the same, joined that portion along with other residential portion and let out the same to one Nankachivayam, who was working in the State Bank of India. If really the landlady required a portion for conducting the business of her husband she could have utilised the same. This was not done by her. This aspect was not considered by the Rent Controller in proper perspective. The tenant is doing business in selling sweet meat. The landlady's husband is stated to be doing business in bakery. Therefore out of business rivalry, the landlady could have filed the petition for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Thus, on a careful consideration of the facts arising in this case on this aspect in the light of the judicial pronouncement cited supra, I hold that the landlady failed to establish her bona fide in requiring the petition premises under S. 10(3)(e) of the Act. Accordingly, eviction is rot possible under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Hence, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in dismissing the petition filed under S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act. 11. In the result, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.