JUDGMENT : - B.M. Lal, J. Judgment rendered in this application shall also dispose of Civil Misc. Application No. 1095 of 1994-Dr. L. P. Misra v. State of U. P. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 292 of 1994, Anand Mohan v. State of U. P. and Habeas Corpus Petition No. 291 of 1994, A. K. Bajpai v. State of U. P. , as all these applications/petitions arise out of the judgment and order dated 15-7-1994 rendered by this Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 2058 (C) of 1994-State of U. P. v. Dr. L. P. Misra and four others, whereby the applicants and petitioners have been sentenced to imprisonment for one month and a tine of Rs, 1,000 each, an1 in default of payment of the tine to further imprisonment for 15 days. 2. ON the same day i. e. on 15-7-1994 the application No. 1096 of 1994 was moved on behalf of all the five contemners by the President of Avadh Bar Association, Sri Nagendra Mohan, with the prayer that order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court convicting the five contemners, be suspended and atleast six weeks' time be granted enabling the contemners to file special leave petition before the Apex Court inter alia on the ground that without giving any opportunity of being heard the order impugned dated 15-7-1994 has been passed by this Court is against all well settled norms. Criminal Misc. Application No. 1095/1994 was filed on behalf of Dr. L. P. Misra, advocate in his personal capacity for staying operation of the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court and for granting him six weeks' time for preparing and filing special leave petition before the Apex Court. This application was presented by learned senior counsel of this Court Sri K. B. Sinha, who while taking resort to the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 vehemently contended that punishment of Dr. L. P. Misra is to be suspended so that he may file appeal before the Apex Court. 3. This application was presented by learned senior counsel of this Court Sri K. B. Sinha, who while taking resort to the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 vehemently contended that punishment of Dr. L. P. Misra is to be suspended so that he may file appeal before the Apex Court. 3. TWO writ petitions, being No. 292 of 1994 and 291 of 1994, one on behalf of Sri Anand Mohan and the other on behalf of Sri A. K. Bajpaie have been filed on 17-7-1994, in the shape of Habeas Corpus Petitions but in the relief clause mandamus is sought directing the respondents to refrain from seeking the arrest and detention of petitioners of from taking any action to ensure compliance of the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court. On 20-7-1994 a supplementary affidavit was filed by Sri Nagendra Mohan, President of Avadh Bar stating that there are two Anand Mohan, advocates and one Anand Mohan Srivastava. However, the same could not be substantiated by record. 4. BEFORE attempting to decide these applications and petitions, it seems desirable to narrate in brief how that tragic moment came on the fateful day of July 15, 1994 when this Court was constrained to take recourse to the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution in convicting and punishing the applicants. In obedience to the order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, myself and Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. P. Singh commenced to hold court at Lucknow with effect from 4-7- 1994. 5. ON 4-7-1994 itself it so happened that illegible photo-stat copies in the shape of petitions, annexures etc. etc. were presented before the Court. Since it was practically impossible to go through those photo- stat documents, one of us (Hon'ble A. P. Singh, J.) suggested respective learned counsel to file typed and legible documents and offered to grant time for the purpose. 6. HOWEVER, it was suggested to the Court that matters could be heard and appropriate orders could be passed instantly and as regards the question of filing typed copies, the same could be filed subsequently. The Court did not agree to the aforesaid suggestions of the bar and desired presentation of at least legible documents. 6. HOWEVER, it was suggested to the Court that matters could be heard and appropriate orders could be passed instantly and as regards the question of filing typed copies, the same could be filed subsequently. The Court did not agree to the aforesaid suggestions of the bar and desired presentation of at least legible documents. Similarly, this Court also passed orders directing certain petitions to be transmitted to Allahabad main seat of this Court as those petitions arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of this Court but were wrongly filed at Lucknow Bench. Members of the bar also suggested that as per practice of this Court stay orders granted earlier which were going to expire on that day, may be sent for on the basis of chits/slips containing only serial number of the case and signatures of the learned counsel and the stay be extended without advancing any argument. This Court could not accede to their such request, upon which much hue and cry surfaced among the members of the bar present in the court-room on these trivial issues. 7. NEXT day i.e. 5-7-1994 on coming to know that stay orders had not been extended, a group of Advocates headed by the President of the bar Sri Nagendra Mohan and Dr. L. P. Misra came in the court- room and wanted to know as to why stay orders which were going to expire on the same day have not been extended. 8. THE reply offered by the Court was that since there is no application for the purpose nor counsel to argue was present, it was not possible to extend the stay orders, hence proper applications may be made for the purpose and arguments may be advanced. This reply of the Court was treated by the bar as adding fuel to the fire and it was stated at the bar that right from inception of this Lucknow-bench it has been a practice here to extend the stay order without any application and even without any counsel. Not only this, derogatory remarks were also passed on to the effect that "if you are unable to work as per practice prevalent here, Go back to Allahabad." 9. AND with effect from 5-7-1994 the members of the bar went on strike and started boycotting the Courts. 10. ON 5th July onwards we used to hold court as usual. Not only this, derogatory remarks were also passed on to the effect that "if you are unable to work as per practice prevalent here, Go back to Allahabad." 9. AND with effect from 5-7-1994 the members of the bar went on strike and started boycotting the Courts. 10. ON 5th July onwards we used to hold court as usual. Some Advocates, who dared to come and argue the case in the court-room despite the decision of strike, were compelled by the striking lawyers to leave the court-room. Some Advocates, who had come from outside Lucknow and who took the plea that as they are not members of the Avadh Bar Association and thereby are not bound by the Avadh Bar Resolution, wore also misbehaved and not permitted to argue their matter by the striking Advocates. Similarly, the members of poor litigant public, who were requesting the Court to take-up their urgent matters and pass appropriate orders, were also not permitted to argue their cases personally by the striking lawyers. 11. THIS lawlessness had become the order of the day and this Court had to tolerate all these happenings like a mute-spectator under a sanguine hope that Advocates belong to intellectual class of the society and there are Advocates within the Advocates who will condemn and object to the recurrence of such happenings and one day or the other good sense will prevail and situation will certainly return to normalacy. 12. BUT, to the utter surprise shattering all sanguine hopes as indicated above, on 15-7-1994 at about 11. 15 a. m. when Sri Dooki Naudan Agrawal (an Ex-judge of this Court) had been arguing his own Writ Petition, Deoki Nandan Agrawal v. Commissioner, Faizabad, Division and others, in respect of management of the famous Ram Jauam Bhoomi Temple issue and Sri J. N. Bhalla, Addl. Chief Standing Counsel and others were also sitting in the court-room, a huge crowd of unruly members of the bar headed by Dr. L. P. Misra stormed into the court-room raising slogans and ordering the court to rise and stop functioning. The court, however, continued its functioning. Realising that Court was not going to rise as dictated by them, infuriated Dr. JL. P. Misra alongwith his associates despite resistance offered by the court staff, came on the dias. Dr. L. P. Misra stormed into the court-room raising slogans and ordering the court to rise and stop functioning. The court, however, continued its functioning. Realising that Court was not going to rise as dictated by them, infuriated Dr. JL. P. Misra alongwith his associates despite resistance offered by the court staff, came on the dias. Dr. L, P. Misra caught hold of one of us (Hon. A. P. Singh, J.) to force him to raise and used abusive language against one of us (Justice B. M. Lal, J.) in the following words: "turn shale utthjaao nahien tojaansemaar daalenge. Tumne Chief Justice se kaha hai ki Lucknow ke Judges 5000 rupya lekar stay grant karte hai aur stay extend karte hain. Aaj 2 baje tak agar turn apna boriya bistar lekar yahan se nahien bhagjaate ho to tumhejaan se maar dalenge. " In this way, having been so forced the Court had to retire to the chambers. 13. BUT beyond the reach of thinking, the episode did not end here and again Dr. L. P. Misra alongwith his associates entered the chambers (Hon. B. M. Lal, J.) where Hon. A. P. Singh, J. was also sitting. He again repeated the same language and extended the same threat in the chambers. It was only at the persuation by Sri J. N. Bhalla, Addl. Chief Standing Counsel and some members of the staff of the court that the unruly group of contemners namely, Dr. L. P. Misra, Sri A. K. Bajpai, Sri Anand Mohan Srivastava, Sri Y. C. Pandey and Shri Shamim Ahmad left the chambers. 14. THUS, except physical assault upon the Judges of the court, con temners left no stone unturned to damage and undermine the dignity and authority of the court in all possible manners. Under these circumstances narrated above, the Court very painfully had to pass and deliver judgment dated 15-7-1994 in the open Court at about 2.15 p.m. 15. THEREAFTER so many un to wards happenings which took place in this Court in the past w ere brought to the notice of the Court, but one of such incidents which finds place on the record, is that on 16-5- 1991 uncongenial scenes were also created in the court-room of Hon. Mr. THEREAFTER so many un to wards happenings which took place in this Court in the past w ere brought to the notice of the Court, but one of such incidents which finds place on the record, is that on 16-5- 1991 uncongenial scenes were also created in the court-room of Hon. Mr. Justice S. C. Mathur (as he then was now retired Chief Justice of Jammu and Kashmir High Court), who brought this very fact on record in the shape of a judicial order. The order passed by Hon. Mr. Justice S. C. Mathur on 16-5-1991 in one of such Writ Petition No. 6843/1989 (SB), Chandra Singh v. D. IO. S. and others, is being reproduced below in verbatim: "the lawyers are on indefinite boycott of Courts. When I tried to hold Court, a group of lawyers shouted slogans including the slogan, "justice S. C. Mathur Hai Hai", It is not possible to do work. Accordingly, the case shall stand out. Sd/- Hon. S. C. M. 16-5-1991" 16. CONSIDERING entire conduct of the lawyers involved in the aforesaid incidents in its totality, it is not that they simply brought down the dignity, honour and majesty of sacred temple of justice alone but of their noble profession as well eroding centuries old basic traditions as well as healthy norms attached to this sacred institution. Now while dealing with Criminal Misc. Application No. 1096 of 1994-Dr. L. P. Misra and 4 others v. State of U. P. , which was moved on behalf of all the contemners on 15-7-1994 itself by Shri Nagendra Mohan, learned President of the Avadh Bar Association, it is averred that the impugn ed order dated 15- 7-1994 is non-est inasmuch as the same has been passed without giving any notice to the contemners and thus it suffers from the principle of audi alteram partem and, therefore, conviction and sentence awarded to the applicants be suspended at least for six weeks enabling the applicants to file appeal before the Apex Court. Since this specific ground is taken hence it is necessary to deal with the same. 17. Since this specific ground is taken hence it is necessary to deal with the same. 17. AT this juncture it is relevant to mention that indeed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India High Court has inherent and plenary jurisdiction to deal with such situations as this Court being the Court of record may evolve its own procedure but the procedure should not be oppressive and fanciful rather it must be fair and reasonable. Thus in exercise of this inherent and plenary jurisdiction High Court being Court of record having original and appellate jurisdiction can certainly evolve its own procedure. 18. ACCORDING to the Black's Dictionary (page 1154) the word 'plenary' means full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect and unqualified. As regards the point that the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court is a nullity and non est as it suffers from the principle of audi alteram pattern, suffice to say, undoubtedly non-observance of the principle of audi alteram partem renders the order a nullity, therefore, the basic concept of this principle cannot be lost sight of. The rule of audi alteram partem is a rule of justice and its application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice. This rule cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation' and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. There are certain exceptional circumstances and situations where under the application of the rule of audi alteram partem is not attracted. 19. NOW it has to be examined as to whether the circumstances and situations in the present case were so grave that the application of the rule of audi alteram partem was attracted or not attracted. For this purpose let us see the sequence of events and the manner in which most unfortunate, unfore seen and unheard of mishappenings took place in Court No. 3 of this Court and in the Chambers (of B. M. Lal, J.) on 15-7-1994. 20. ON 15-7-1994 this Court was functioning in Court No. 3, quite smoothly. For this purpose let us see the sequence of events and the manner in which most unfortunate, unfore seen and unheard of mishappenings took place in Court No. 3 of this Court and in the Chambers (of B. M. Lal, J.) on 15-7-1994. 20. ON 15-7-1994 this Court was functioning in Court No. 3, quite smoothly. In the process of hearing the contemners raised slogans, ordered the Court to rise and stop functioning, tried to manhandle the Judges, one of the contemners caught hold of one of us (A. P. Singh, J.) to force him to rise, used abusive language and threatened to kill one of us (B. M. Lal, J. in open court and stormed on the dias. Thus having been so forced when the Judges retired to Chambers, it was an opportunity for the contemners to end the process of committing contempt but even then good sense could not prevail in the contemners and they could not satisfy their sentiments and they again repeated same things while entering in the Chambers. Thus in these exceptional circumstances when the contemners did not avail of the opportunity to end their misdeeds, it cannot be presumed that even then it was reasonably practicable to afford opportunity of being heard to such hardened contomners. There, was no occasion at all to attract the application of the principle audi alteram partem in the exceptional circumstances of the present case. The occurrence was witnessed by the members of staff on duty, Sri J. N. Bhalla, Additional Chief Standing Counsel State of U. P. and Sri Deoki Nandan. Agarwal, former Judge of this Court who was on his legs advancing arguments in Writ Petition No. Nil of 1994, Deoki Nandan Agrawal v. Commissioner, Faizabad Division and others, at the time of occurrence. Agarwal, former Judge of this Court who was on his legs advancing arguments in Writ Petition No. Nil of 1994, Deoki Nandan Agrawal v. Commissioner, Faizabad Division and others, at the time of occurrence. In these most unfortunate circumstances where per se contempt, ex-facie on the face of the Court was committed and the functioning of the Court was made impossible by the contemners, this Court was very much pained and constrained to exercise its inherent plenary jurisdiction ingrained under Article 215 of the Constitution of India resulting into immediate conviction of the contemners adopting summary procedure except which there was no option for the Court to ensure smooth functioning of the Court and free and fearness administration of justice as well as to preserve high tradition and standard in the noble profession of lawyers who are pillars and custodians of the liberty of the citizens. The conviction and punishment awarded by this Court on 15-7-1994 also finds support by the judicial pronouncement in Balogh v. Crown Court at St. Albans, (1974)3 All ER 283, at p. 287, where Lord Denning said: "but I find nothing to tell us what is meant by 'committed in the face of the court', it has never been defined. Its meaning is, I think, to be ascertained from the practice of the judges over the centuries. It was never confined to conduct which a judge saw with his own eyes. It covered all contempts for which a judge of his own motion could punish a man on the spot. So 'contempt in the face of the court' is the same thing as 'contempt which the court can punish of its own motion. ' It really means 'contempt in the cognizance of the court'. " In R. v. Almon, (1765) Wilmot's Notes 243, Wilmot, CJ opined: ". . . . . . it is a necessary incident to every court of justice. . . . . . to fine and imprison for a contempt of the court acted in the face of it. . . . . . 'and' the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned at the discretion of the Judges. . . . . . it is a necessary incident to every court of justice. . . . . . to fine and imprison for a contempt of the court acted in the face of it. . . . . . 'and' the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned at the discretion of the Judges. " lb EX parte Terry, (1888) 128 US 289, at p. 307, 9 S Ct 77, at p. 80 and in Matsusow v. United States, 229- F 2d 335, 339 (5th Cir 1956), it has been ruled that:- "if the contempt be committed in the face of the Court, the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, without any further proof or examination. " 21. THE same view has been followed and approved and quoted by the apex court vide para 33, in Pritam Pal v. High Court of M. P. , AIR 1992 SC 904 . In Jinnison t. Baker, (1972) All England Reports 997 at p. 1006: "the law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. " Lord Morris in Attorney General v. Times Newspaper, 1974 AC 273 at p. 302, opined in the following words: "in an ordered community courts are established for the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of the Courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed, it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned with their own dignity, it is because the very structure of ordered life is a risk if the Courts of the land are to be flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. "Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ahmadi of the Apex Court in M. B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, 1991 (3) JT SC 318, observed thus: "where there is deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution. THE foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity. "In Balram Singh v. Bhikam Chand Jain and others, AIR 1985 SC 1726 , view of the Apex Court had been thus: "it would be travesty of justice if the Courts were to allow gross ' contempt of Court to go unpunished without an adequate sentence. " In Re Abdool v. Mahtab, (1867) 8 WR Cr 32 at p. 33, Hon'ble Peacock, C. J. laid down the rule quite broadly in the following words: "there can be no doubt that every court of record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt. " 22. IN Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur through Registrar, AIR 1992 SC 904 , their Lordships of Apex Court ruled that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. The power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 213 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and the jurisdiction vested if a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation on abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. [see also C. K. Daphtary v. O. P. Gupta, AIR 1971 SC 1132 , Bardabanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 710 and Him Lai Dikshit v. State of U. P. , AIR 1964 SC 743 ]. [see also C. K. Daphtary v. O. P. Gupta, AIR 1971 SC 1132 , Bardabanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 710 and Him Lai Dikshit v. State of U. P. , AIR 1964 SC 743 ]. Here it would not be out of place to mention that like Code of Criminal Procedure, Contempt of Courts Act and any other statute or legislation, the Advocates Act, 1961 is not an impediment in the exercise of inherent, plenary and constitutional power of this Court being a Court of Record, enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the Advocates Act and Article 215 of the Constitution of India both have got independent field to operate. Section 35 of the Advocates Act deals with the disciplinary proceedings against the Advocates in respect of (professional) misconduct, to be taken up by the State Bar Councils whereas Article 215 of the Constitution deals with the contempt proceedings in respect of contempt to be drawn by the Court of Record therefore, even if a contemner happens to be a practising advocate the Court can punish him to the extent depending upon the gravity of the contempt committed. 23. THE lawyers community as a whole cannot be blamed for the law lessness and indiscipline which is prevailing in this community day by day and which is a black spot on this noble profession, rather it is a handful frustrated disguised elements, who on their failure to get any job entered in this noble profession, are exclusively to be blamed as it is they who are bringing bad name to such a good profession. Now the time has come when the Bench and Bar both should rise to the occasion and come forward with open hearts to fight such evils and eliminate the same for ever and ever from this noble profession, so that high values and age old traditions of this noble profession could be preserved in the institution of justice. 24. IN Morris v. Crown Office, (1970) 1 All ER 1079, where a group of Welsh students with a view to demonstrate for the preservation of the Welsh language, by pre-arrangement, invaded a Court in the High Court of Justice, London, where a Judge was sitting to hear a case, broke up the hearing by striding into the well of the court, shouting slogans, scattering pamphlets and singing. Some of them refused to apologise to the Judge who instantly sentenced them to 3 months, imprisonment for contempt of court. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence in principle. Somewhat similar occurrence took place in the instant case expect that in aforesaid case Morris v. Crown Office (supra) the contemners were students whereas in the instant case the contemners are advocates belonging to and privileged class of society and in the instant case the contemners threatened to kill the Judge, caught hold the Judge (A. P. Singh, J.) and except physical assault, left no stone unturned to humiliate, degrade, insult and undermine the Court and thereby escalatingly scandalised the Court and the actions of the contemners are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious, intimidatory and beyond condonable limit and the same amounts to a flagrant on slaught on the independence of the judiciary, destructive of the orderly administration of justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of law. 25. IN the instant case the conduct of the contemners was such that it impaired the administration of justice, struck a blow on the judiciary and seriously sullied the image, dignity and high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High Court carries with it and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source and steam. 26. THUS instead of 'aucti alteram partem' the maxim 'salus populi supremo lex' which means 'the welfare of the people is the supreme law' was attracted in the instant case. This maxim adequately enunciates the ideal of law which can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. [see Pritam Pal v. High Court o/m. P. (supra)]. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, AIR 1954 SC 186 , it has been observed: ". . . . . . the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for con tempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts of record and Section 1 (2) of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its scope. . . . . . the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for con tempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts of record and Section 1 (2) of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its scope. " The view expressed in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi (supra) has been followed in R. L. Kapur AIR 1972 SC 858 and has been referred with approval in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, 1991 AIR SCW 2419 and Pritam Pal v. High Court of M. P. AIR 1992 SC 904 . The Apex Court in the case of Pritam Pal (supra) has made the following observations: "to punish an advocate for contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. " 27. IN the instant case the act of contemners was wilful, deliberate, persistent and so heinous that it comes within the purview of moral turpitude. 28. THUS in view of above discussions this Court is of the considered opinion that under the exceptional circumstances of present case, the contemners were not entitled to the benefit of the principle of audi alteram partem as they have committed ex facie contempt on the face of the Court. As regards the question of suspending the conviction and sentence and granting atleast six weeks time to the contemners, as prayed for on behalf of all the contemners in Crl. Misc. Application No. 1096 of 1994, Dr. L. P. Misra and 4 others v. State of U. P. and on behalf of Dr. L. P. Misra in Civil Misc. Application No. 1095 of 1994, Dr. Misc. Application No. 1096 of 1994, Dr. L. P. Misra and 4 others v. State of U. P. and on behalf of Dr. L. P. Misra in Civil Misc. Application No. 1095 of 1994, Dr. L. P. Misra v. State of U. P. , in the considered opinion of this Court no ground for suspension of the operation of the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court and grant of six weeks time for preferring appeal before the Apex Court is made out particularly in view of the settled legal position that the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have no application in the proceedings initiated in exercise of plenary jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India as discussed above in detail, consequently both the above referred applications as framed and filed deserve to be rejected. 29. NOW while dealing with the two Habeas Corpus Petitions namely Habeas Corpus Petition No. 292 (HC) of 1994, Anand Mohan v. State of U. P. and Habeas Corpus Petition No. 291 (HC) of 1994, A. K. Bajpai v. State of U. P. , wherein common ground of mistaken identity is raised, it may be mentioned here that on behalf of Anand Mohan firstly it is contended that though he is Kayastha by caste yet he does not write 'srivastava' in his name and he writes simply Anand Mohan and not Anand Mohan Srivastava whereas in the older dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court 'srivastava' is transcribed which creates the question of mistaken identity, secondly by filing a supplementary affidavit on 20-7-1994 it is further contended that there are two Anand Mohans in the Avadh Bar Association therefore, on this count also his identity is doubtful. Similarly on behalf of Sri A. K. Bajpai also it is contended that there are 3 A. K. Bajpai in the Bar, therefore, his identity is also doubtful. 30. AS regards the question of mistaken identity of these two petitioners namely Sri Anand Mohan and Sri A. K. Bajpai, suffice it to say that in Crl. Misc. Similarly on behalf of Sri A. K. Bajpai also it is contended that there are 3 A. K. Bajpai in the Bar, therefore, his identity is also doubtful. 30. AS regards the question of mistaken identity of these two petitioners namely Sri Anand Mohan and Sri A. K. Bajpai, suffice it to say that in Crl. Misc. Application No. 1096 of 1994 which was moved by Sri Nagendra Mohan, learned President of Avadh Bar Association on behalf of all the contemners including Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai on 15-7-1994 itself, there was not even whisper about the mistaken identity of Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai or any of the conternners. Had there been any doubt regarding identity of any of the contemners, the same must have been raised in the application No. 1096 of 1994 itself which was moved on behalf of all the contemners on the same day i. e. on 15-7-1994 by Sri Nagendra Mohan, learned President of Avadh Bar Association. The non-raising of the question of identity in the aforesaid application moved by learned President of Avadh Bar Association and raising of the same subsequently by means of aforesaid habeas corpus petitions which were filed after much deliberations, creates doubt the bonafide of these petitioners and leads to the inference that the plea of mistaken identity is not bonafide rather is a device invented by the petitioners after deliberations and consultations and is totally an afterthought and thus after giving due and deepen judicious thought on this issue this Court comes to the irresistible conclusion that the plea of mistaken identity is contrary to the contemners own application and that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands by means of these petitions consequently these habeas corpus petitions are liable to be rejected on this score also. Further on the issue of mistaken identity it is also relevant to mention that after the punishment was pronounced on 15-7-1994 in the open Court, it was brought to the notice of this Court that the contenaners Anand Mohan Srivastava and A. K. Bajpai, had been office bearer also in the Avadh Bar Association. The Directory of Avadh Bar Association shows that the petitioners Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai had been office bearer of Avadh Bar Association. The Directory of Avadh Bar Association shows that the petitioners Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai had been office bearer of Avadh Bar Association. This also fortifies the identity of Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai that Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai who have filed those habeas corpus petitions are the same A. K. Bajpai and Anand Mohan who are the actual contemners. Thus the plea of mistaken identity is liable to be rejected on this count also. 31. AS regards the plea of surname taken by Anand Mohan that he does not write 'srivastava' his surname therefore he is not the contemner Anand Mohan Srivastava, suffice it to say that since Anand Mohan is Kayastha by caste non-writing of sur name 'srivastava' by him or absence of full particulars in the order dated 15-7-1994 would not make his indentity doubtful. For the reasons given above his identity is also fully established and the plea of non-writing 'srivastava' his surname is also liable to be rejected. 32. DURING the course of arguments in the habeas corpus petitions it is revealed that neither the petitioners have been arrested nor detained but they simply apprehend that they are likely to be arrested pursuant to the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by this Court and as such their personal liberty which is a natural and in alienable right apart from being a right conferred by and embodied in Part III of the Constitution of India, is likely to be jeopardised and therefore writ petition in the nature of habeas corpus petition is quite maintainable. The argument was indeed ingenious. In this regard it may be stated that the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable relief and thus it is expected of petitioners to approach the writ courts with clean hands. In the instant case though both the petitioners Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai have styled their petitions in the shape of habeas corpus petitions yet both have miserably failed to establish as to when and where they have been detained and how their personal liberty is being jeopardised by the administrative authorities except stating simply that they apprehend their assert which does not satisfy the test for issuance of writ in the nature of habeas corpus, under the circumstances of present case. 33. 33. NO doubt, in normal course where there is no conviction awarded to the petitioner and when he approaches this Court by means of habeas corpus petition with the plea that he is likely to be arrested without any rhyme and reason and without any authority of law certainly such apprehensions may satisfy the test for issuance of writ in the nature of habeas corpus considering connected facts and circumstances of the case but here in the instant case both the petitioners have been convicted by this Court in exorcise of powers conferred by Article 215 of the Constitution of India therefore, their apprehension for arrest does not satisfy, the test under the circumstances of present case, for issuance of writ in the nature of habeas corpus. When the petitioners have been convicted and sentenced, as a necessary corollary they are bound to be taken into custody. Thus in the opinion of this Court they have not approached this Court with clean hands and are not entitled to issuance of writ in the nature of habeas corpus. 34. IN All LR 238 (239) a Division Bench of this Court, where petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge, habeas corpus petition was filed, held that it is not within the scope of writ petition to examine legality of the judgment as the same was appellable to High Court. Similarly in ILR (1972) AP 836, where conviction was made by the High Court, writ petition of habeas corpus was not entertained as remedy of appeal to Supreme Court by special leave was not adopted by the petitioner. 35. SIMILARLY in the present case the conviction and sentence has been awarded by this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction ingrained under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, against which neither appeal has been preferred to the Apex Court nor the contemners have surrendered. Therefore, their habeas corpus petitions are not liable to be entertained. Moreover since the petitioners have not surrendered pursuant to the conviction and sentence awarded by this Court, hence they are within the category of absconder and as such on this count also they are not entitled to any relief whatsoever in their habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, both the habeas corpus petitions are liable to be rejected. 36. Moreover since the petitioners have not surrendered pursuant to the conviction and sentence awarded by this Court, hence they are within the category of absconder and as such on this count also they are not entitled to any relief whatsoever in their habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, both the habeas corpus petitions are liable to be rejected. 36. CONNECTED with other questions which have been discussed and decided above, the question of review by this Court in the proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution also emerged for determination by this Court. In this regard, it may be stated that no doubt under the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of this Court, this Court being the Court of record has every power and jurisdiction to review its own judgment and order under Article 215 of the Constitution where facts and circumstances of the case so require. 37. IN Khetrabasi Mohanty v. State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 271, wherein a Division Bench of Orissa High Court consisting of Hon. Mr. Justice B. L. Hansaria, Chief Justice as he then was (now a Judge of the Apex Court) and Hon. Mr. Justice K. C. Jagadeb Roy, ruled that High Court can review its order in exercise of inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and provisions of Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code are no impediments, basing this decision on Mrs. V. G. Peterson v. O. V. Forbes, AIR 1963 SC 362 and Sukhdev Singh v. Hon. Chief Justice, AIR 1954 SC 186 where it has been ruled that Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. 38. THIS view was further reiterated by the Apex Court in Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176 , Pritam Pal v. High Court of M. P., AIR 1992 SC 904 and M. V. Elisabeth v. Harsoan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1993 SC 1014 , wherein the Apex Court in so many words ruled that where statutes are silent and remedy is to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is duty of the Court to devise procedural Rules by analogy and expediency. Further, the High Courts in India are superior Courts of record. They have inherent and plenary powers. Further, the High Courts in India are superior Courts of record. They have inherent and plenary powers. In this case reference of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , is also given, in which Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 10, para 713 has been reproduced in the following words: "prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court. " Thus, this being the law of the land in respect of Article 215 of the Constitution, there is no difficulty to revive the orders considering exigencies of the circumstances. Thus in the considered opinion of this Court review is permissible. 39. THIS is not all in Hemanta Kumar Mohapatra v. Binod Bihuri Mohapatra, 1992 Cr LJ 2183, the Orissa High Court has ruled that if by mistake certain persons are impleaded as accused in the charge-sheet and their names is not mentioned in the complaint, the error pointed out subsequently the Court has power to make corrections as the same error amounts to mere a clarical error. Thus, if certain mistake is found in mentioning correct initials or surnames etc. including mistaken identity of the person, indeed the Court of record has power to correct that error. 40. IN this way, this Court had no difficulty even in correcting the names or even correcting the mis-identity giving appropriate benefit required in accordance with the facts of the case. But, such is not the position here. As observed above, the plea of mistaken identity is an after thought. It is relevant to state that one will no doubt agree that Advocates should be encouraged to be active, bold and dynamic. But this dynamism should not be carried too far and directed to the acts of destruction, hooli ganism disrupting the very administration of justice. Liberty granted by the law to the Advocates for arguing their professional matters, cannot be permitted to become a licence for indulging in lawlessness and violence. 41. IF an institution like our reverend judiciary is to progress, we have to have discipline and character at all levels. Liberty granted by the law to the Advocates for arguing their professional matters, cannot be permitted to become a licence for indulging in lawlessness and violence. 41. IF an institution like our reverend judiciary is to progress, we have to have discipline and character at all levels. Discipline is not something confined to army alone. But it is equally necessary and essential for all citizens in general and members of our legal fraternity in particular, no matter what their profession is. Just like others, an Advocate should also know his duties and responsibilities to himself, his home, community and the country. He should certainly not take law in his own hands to dictate the court and simultaneously must have confidence, faith and trust in the institution abiding with the age old traditions as well as sense of mutual respect. 42. THEREFORE, it becomes responsibility of both i.e. Bench and the Bar to come to some workable understanding and work in co-operation so that the judiciary may serve the country in the manner it was intended by the founding fathers of our Constitution. Let up proceed with slow but steady and firm steps to promote and strengthen the sanctity and supermacy of our judicial system. 43. IN view of the premises aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court it is beyond reasonable doubt that the identity of present petitioners Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai and their complicity in the occurrence dated 15-7-1994, is not mistaken nor the same suffers from any infirmity whatsoever under the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, both the habeas corpus petitions and applications referred to above, are liable to be dismissed. 44. IN the result, both habeas corpus Petitions (one on behalf of Anand Mohan and the other on behalf of A. K. Bajpai; and both applications (one on behalf of all the contemners and the other on behalf of Dr. L. P. Misraj are hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Before parting with the case, we must record words of appreciation for learned Senior Counsel Sri K. B. Sinha, Sri R. N. Trivedi, Sri Nagendra Mohan, learned President of Avadh Bar Association and Sri Vireshwar Nath, Government Advocate, who by their valuable knowledge and vast experience enlightened this Court during the entire period they took in making very good submissions. W. P. dismissed. W. P. dismissed. A. P. Singh, J.- I had the occasion to go through the judgment prepared by brother B. M. Lal, J. with which I fully agree the facts, reasons and conclusion given and arrived at by him respectively are no exception still looking to the extraordinary importance of the case and the delicacy of the situation in asmuch as we ourselves are involved in the unfortunate incident which compelled us to take action against the petitioners and other persons for punishing them for contempt of court, I, therefore, in the fitness of things decided to write my own separate but concurrent judgment. However, to avoid repetition 01 the facts and happenings in the court which brother Lal has given in the judgment precisely and succinctly only such facts are being given by me in the judgment which are necessary for making the judgment a compact reading 68. These two writ petition Nos. 291 (HC) of 1994 and 292 (HC) of 1994 and C. M. Application Nos. 296 (w) of 1994, 297 (w) of 1994 as well as Crl. Misc. Application Nos. 1095 of 1994 and 1096 of 1994 have come up before us for disposal as they arise out of the judgment and order of conviction earlier rendered by me and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. M. Lal in Cri. Misc. Case No. 2058 of 1994 State of U. P v. Dr, L. P. Misra and others, on 15-7-1994, where five Advocates of this court were found guilty of ex facie Contempt of Court under Article 215 of the Constitution and wore convicted to undergo imprisonment of one month and pay the fine of Rs. 1000 and in default of payment of fine to further undergo the imprisonment of 15 days. Both these writ petitions and the applications being common and arising from aforementioned case are being decided jointly by a common order. 69. Lucknow Lawyers, identified as members of the Oudh Bar Association resorted to strike on 5-7-1994, firstly, on the ground that courts insistence for filing of typed second copy of the petition for the second Judge of the divisional court was improper. They, however, changed their stand and took another ground for their strike, the ground being that all the Judges who had been sent from Allahabad to Lucknow be sent back specially Hon'ble Mr. They, however, changed their stand and took another ground for their strike, the ground being that all the Judges who had been sent from Allahabad to Lucknow be sent back specially Hon'ble Mr. B. M. Lal with whom I happen to constitute the Division Bench since 4-7-1994. The representatives of the Association are reported to have also met the Chief Justice at Allahabad for persuing their demand but I am informed that the meeting with Chief Justice was without success. During the strike litigants themselves have been appearing in some cases including fresh cases and also listed cases; even some lawyers, who do not support the strike have also been appearing almost every day but over all functioning of the court has generally remained paralysed from 5-7-1994. Faced with the danger of failure of the strike/boycott of the courts the officers of the Association and their followers started causing interference in the working of the court inasmuch as the striking lawyers vehemently opposed the appearance of lawyers and even the litigants and every now and then they successfully adopted various methods for disrupting the smooth hearing of cases at the instance of litigants and non-cooperating lawyers; some of whom claimed were not the members of the Association. We the Judges avoided taking any action against lawyers who indulged in disturbing the functioning of the court and instead the lawyers were warned against severe action for contempt of court if they dragged or disturbed the arguing lawyers or the litigants in the court rooms and mostly the warning was heeded to and striking lawyers adopted the alternative method of threatening lawyers and the litigants who were found arguing cases from outside the court room. On one day dialogue between Sri R. N. Gupta, Advocate who was arguing his case in our court went on for some time with striking lawyers who were threatening him from outside the court room. Ultimately Sri Gupta had to take our leave and went out of the court room without concluding his arguments. 70. On 15-7-1994 the work was going on until 11.14 a. m. when Sri Deoki Nandan Agarwal, a former Judge of this court was making his submissions in a writ petition in which he himself was the petitioner. Ultimately Sri Gupta had to take our leave and went out of the court room without concluding his arguments. 70. On 15-7-1994 the work was going on until 11.14 a. m. when Sri Deoki Nandan Agarwal, a former Judge of this court was making his submissions in a writ petition in which he himself was the petitioner. During the course of his arguments in a case of public importance a group of about 20 to 25 lawyers led by Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra came shouting slogans against the sitting of the courts and entered our court room in an attitude of ransacking the court room. The litigants, the lawyers and others ran belter and skelter, the group started abusing us specially Justice Lai and ordered us to rise and leave the court room when their orders were not complied by us they came to the dias hurled abuses and manhandled one of us with the result the functioning of the court was totally disrupted and we were forced to rise without concluding the case under hearing We were followed by the mob of slogan shouting lawyers even in the Chambers where too we were given the same treatment as in the court: we were completely shaken and alarmed from the happening. After the dust settled and we gathered our breath we immediately took stock of the situation and proceeded to take necessary lawful action against the lawyers who had indulged in the incident and had climbed the dias and had also come to the Chambers. We accordingly passed order of conviction and punishment against Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra,, Sri A. R. Bajpai, Sri Anand Mohan Srivastava, Sri G. K. Pandey wrongly written as Y. C. Pandey in the conviction order and Sri Mohd. Shamim again wrongly typed in the order as Shamim Ahmad. Apart from Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra. We read out the conviction order and the sentence of punishment in the open court on the same day after lunch as we resumed the court work to finish the remaining work after making arrangements of police security. 71. On the same day an application was filed after the court hours before the Senior Judge Hon'ble Mr. We read out the conviction order and the sentence of punishment in the open court on the same day after lunch as we resumed the court work to finish the remaining work after making arrangements of police security. 71. On the same day an application was filed after the court hours before the Senior Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice Brijesh Kumar, without affidavit in which the convicted lawyers prayed for the suspension of the sentence of punishment awarded against them as they wished to prefer appeal in the Supreme Court for the reason that their conviction was bad and illegal as no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them before their conviction and punishment. The application was signed by Sri Nagendra Mohan, Advocate as counsel, he also happens to be the President of the Association as in that capacity he had met us once in the residential room of Justice Lal within the court compound. The application being No. 1056 of 1994 was ordered by the Senior Judge Sri Brijesh Kumar to be put up for orders before the appropriate bench (us) on 18-7-1994. However, before the date fixed could arrive the two of the convicted lawyers, namely, Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan (Srivastava) filed habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution through their next friend Sri R. N. Trivedi, an eminent and senior Advocate of this Court. Allegations and grounds of the petition being wrong identification and alibi. Writ Petitions were presented before regular habeas carpus Bench, on Sunday the 17th, On nomination by the Hon'ble Chief Justice we were to hear the writ petitions that day itself. The hearing took place in the guest house wing of the court at about 8. 30 p.m. A hoast of lawyers led by Sri R, N. Trivedi appeared but the entire show turned out to be a non-starter as we found that none of the petitioners of the writ petition had neither been arrested nor detained in pursuance of the orders of conviction and despite our specific order for immediate execution of the punishment awarded to the convicts. On insistence of the Advocate next friend, who also very ably argued the case, we adjourned the hearing of the case for the next morning in the court room. Sri (Dr. On insistence of the Advocate next friend, who also very ably argued the case, we adjourned the hearing of the case for the next morning in the court room. Sri (Dr. L. P. Misra, too filed his application praying for the suspension of the sentence awarded against him so that he may file appeal in the Supreme Court as the conviction order according to him was wrong and without jurisdiction being not in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, this application along with the two writ petitions of Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan (Srivastava) as well as the combined application of all the convicts referred to be me earlier were heard on 18th July, 1994. Arguments were again made by Sri R. N. Trivedi, Sri K. B. Sinha, another Senior Advocate and Sri Nagendra Mohan, the President of the Association for the petitioners applicants and by the Government Advocate on behalf of the State. After the arguments were concluded we reserved the judgment. However, since Sri Trivedi during the course of his arguments in the court room had contended that notwithstanding the clear view of the Supreme Court in the case of Naresh v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1385 disallowing review after conviction this court in exercise of its power under Article 215 of the Constitution could review the conviction wrongly recorded by it against Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan (Srivastava). We considered it proper to call the Advocates to substantiate the arguments jointly made in this regard. We, accordingly fixed the case for rehearing on 20th. All the above lawyers with many others again appeared on 20th and made their submissions. Sri Trivedi had also supplied the case law and the authorities, the previous evening in a most scientific and systematic manner from which we were immensely helped in understanding the submission made by him the other day. Full length hearing again took place on 20th and after conclusion of hearing we fixed 22nd July, 1994 for delivery of judgment. The Writ Petition: 72. In the two habeas corpus writ petitions which caused our sitting in the night of 17th July, 1994 there was no statement that petitioners had either been arrested or detained or restrained by any one. The Writ Petition: 72. In the two habeas corpus writ petitions which caused our sitting in the night of 17th July, 1994 there was no statement that petitioners had either been arrested or detained or restrained by any one. What was stated was that the police was in hot persuit of petitioners to arrest them in pursuance of the conviction order with the result petitioners had their family members were on the run which caused harassment to them. Though the writ petitions were styled as habeas corpus writ petitions but in the relief clause prayer was made for issue of the writ of mandamus restraining the respondent State of U. P. from arresting, detaining or taking any other action towards the compliance of our conviction order; in substance the writ petition was actually a review application in the cloak of habeas corpus writ petition as no prayer was made for the production of the corpus or for the quashing of the conviction order as against the petitioners. Shri Trivedi: 73. It was a great relief hearing his humble but learned and polite (arguments) submissions in the otherwise tense atmosphere which prevailed in the court since 5th July, 1994 Sri Trivedi took strong exception to the incident which tools place in our court room on 15-7-1994 he also condemned the lawyers who were involved in it, he also apologised to the court for the same without any reservations, he however, urged that for the confusion in the correct identity of the petitioners due to duplicity of names of A. K Bajpai and Anand Mohan' which was brone roipoctivoly by two other lawyers of the court he would not have either filed the writ petition nor would have appeared in its support to argue in the court. He candidly accepted that what happened in the court room on 15th was most unfortunate and shocking. He did not question the legality of the conviction on any of the grounds either of lack of jurisdiction or the breach of the solitary rule of audi alterm partem and confined his submissions only to the question of proper identity and prayed for giving benefit of doubt to the petitioners who happened to be one of the three A. K. Bajpi and Anand Mohan, Advocate practicing in the court. The Grounds: 74. The Grounds: 74. Petitioners Anand Mohan has alleged in the writ petition that he does not write 'srivastava' with his name and has throughout been writing only Anand Mohan since 'anand Mohan Srivastava' has been convicted by the court the police cannot and should not arrest him only because of mistaken identity; he further alleged that he was laid down with vital fever and had not come to the court from 6-7-1994 to 15-7-1994. On a second thought a supplementary affidavit was filed on his behalf by Sri Nagendra Mohan on 20-7-1994 alleging that there were two 'anand Mohan' and one 'anand Mohan Srivastava' who practice as Advocates in this court, therefore, there is confusion regarding the identity of the actual convict. Similar is the plea of the other petitioner Sri A. K. Bajpai who took claims that there are three A. K. Bajpai practicing in this court, therefore, the judgment of conviction about the identity of actual A. K. Bajpai, convicted by the court without proper identification of the petitioner by the court is not clear hence the police has no authority to arrest him; he further alleges that he was not present in the court on 15-7-94 at the time of the incident leading to the conviction. The Writ of Habeas Corpus 75. It is well known fact even to a lay man that writ petition of habeas corpus would lie only after arrest or detention of a person if it is without authority of law. 76. As a general rule an application for habeas corpus is filed by the presentation of a petition of complaint to the court designated by or on behalf of the person detained or restrained of his liberty praying that the writ may issue directing to the person in whose custody the petitioner is detained and requiring him to produce the petitioner bodily to the end that the legality of the detention or restraint may be determined. The proceeding is therefore initiated by the writ of the court commanding respondent to produce the body and to show by what authority ha restrains or detains the body in whose behalf the writ is issued. The proceeding is therefore initiated by the writ of the court commanding respondent to produce the body and to show by what authority ha restrains or detains the body in whose behalf the writ is issued. In India in view of the constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution the proceedings are initiated not by the writ of the court but on application filed questioning the detention either by the prisoner or by his relatives or the next friend; an application for habeas corpus is also entertained in public interest even by societies engaged in the social work. Pre requsite for the maintainability of the petition for habeas corpus, however, is that the prisoner in whose respect the application is directed must be in the custody of some identifiable person who must be made party to the petition so that the court may call him to produce the 'body' before the court for determining the legality of the detention or restraint. If, however, there is no detention or restraint or where place of detention is not known writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued and the petition in that case would not lie. 77. From the very perusal of the petition filed by Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajai, the two petitions for the issue of the writ of habeas corpus does not appear to be maintainable for the following reasons: (a) There being no allegation in the petitions that Anand Mohan and A. K. Bajpai have been arrested or detained or restrained in pursuance of the judgment of conviction rendered by us on 15-7-94 convicting them under Article 215 of the Constitution for committing ex facie contempt of this court and awarding the punishment of one month imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,900 and in case of default of the payment of the fine to undergo further term of 15 days; the only statement made therein in substance is that the police is trying to arrest them and they are some how avoiding their arrest. 1,900 and in case of default of the payment of the fine to undergo further term of 15 days; the only statement made therein in substance is that the police is trying to arrest them and they are some how avoiding their arrest. It has not been disclosed as to where the petitioner are living at present and which police personnel is harassing them not it has been stated as to what exactly was done by the policemen for arresting them; the petition thus is wholly vague in this very important aspect of the matter inasmuch as it does not disclose any cause of action for the filing of the writ petition for issue of the writ of habeas corpus or even of mandamus. (b) The names of respondents to whom the writ must be issued have not been given. Even the names of the police station or the concerned police officers who may be pursuing the petitioner or his other family members is not to be found in the writ petition. Only State of U. P. has been made the opposite- party without any allegation against the Government of U. P. or any of its officers. Impleadment of the State of Uttar Pradesh as opposite-party in my opinion is not based on any plausible reason or cause as no order passed by the State Government has been filed with the petition to justify its impleadment in the writ petition as opposite-party. I am constrained to observe that the writ petition is devoid of necessary allegations, particulars and information justifying filing of the writ petition and also for non-impleadment of persons responsible for the harassment, if any, being caused to the petitioner unnecessary wrongful impleadment of the State of U. P. without there being any allegation or charge against it and there is no occasion here for the issue of the writ either of habeas corpus or of mandamus as per the prayer clause of the two writ petitions. On over-all scrutiny of the two writ petitions the endeavour of the petitioners appears to be to request or approach us to review our judgment of conviction rendered against the petitioners. On over-all scrutiny of the two writ petitions the endeavour of the petitioners appears to be to request or approach us to review our judgment of conviction rendered against the petitioners. As a matter of fact both the counsel, namely, Sri Trivedi and Sri Sinha addressed the court on the scope of review and emphasised that since the order of conviction as it concerns petitioners was vague, in so far as their identity is concerned, therefore, the same may be recalled. 78. It has been alleged in the writ petition of Sri A. K. Bajpai that there are three Advocates with the name of 'a. K. Bajpai' but when con fronted in the court with the fact that Sri A. K. Bajpai, the present petitioner before the court was an erstwhile office bearer of the Oudh Bar Association as Joint Secretary and an active participant in the strike, this fact was not denied by the next friend Sri R. N. Trivedi who has presented the petition on his behalf. It is not case of the petitioner in the writ petition that all the three persons bearing the name of 'a. K. Bajpai', Advocate are being subjected to harassment by the police and that the police is persuing them all for arresting them in pursuance of the judgment of conviction. As a matter of fact only the petitioner that is to say Shri A. K. Bajpai who was earlier the Joint Secretary of the Oudh Bar Association and who is being allegedly persued by the police for arrest in pursuance of the order of conviction has alone come to this court to seek redress from arrest on the wholly misconceived ground of mistaken identity. It has not been argued by the counsel that the conviction is illegal on the ground of want of jurisdiction or for proper identification of the persons convicted. We are not sure from the material available on the record or the information tendered to us at the Bar as to whether the petitioner is actually under the threat of arrest or some other A. K. Bajpai has either been arrested or is being perused by the police for being arrested or detained in pursuance of the order of conviction passed by us. Thus, there is utter confusion in the writ petition in this regard. Thus, there is utter confusion in the writ petition in this regard. So in absence of definite and relevant allegations which may make out a case in petitioner's favour, it is very difficult for the court to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether the petitioner A. K Bajpai is entitled for any of the reliefs claimed. As observed above, the writ for habeas corpus would not lie at the instance of the petitioner who has neither been arrested nor has so far been subjected to restraint by any person whatsoever much less, the Slate Gavernment or any police officer specially when the persons responsible for causing the so-called harassment to him and his family members have not been named. In the situation even the writ of mandamus would not lie. 79. Similar is the case of the other petitioner Shri Anand Mohan who although raised the same plea though a little belatedly but has not denied that he is not Anand Mohan Srivastava. His case is that he does not write 'srivastave' with his name Anand "mohan. ' Initially what had been stated by him in the writ petition was that he does not write 'srivastava' with his name Anand Mohan and only wanted to take advantage of the prefix 'srivastava' which was written in the order of conviction with his name. Similar question was also put to his counsel by me in respect of him. The counsel was asked whether or not petitioner Anand Mohan 'srivastava' happens to be the erstwhile Joint Secretary of the Association, this fact, however, was not denied by the counsel. There is no categorical statement in either of the two writ petitions that petitioners were not taking active part in the strike launched by the Association from 5-7-1994. What has been stated is that petitioners were not present on the date of the incident (15-7-1994) and both of them have taken the plea of alibi of illness and absence from the court. These facts, in my opinion, do not call for any rethinking on the part of the court in respect of the order of conviction already rendered by us under the extraordinary situation which had arisen in the court and with which this court was unfortunately faced on 15-7-1994. These facts, in my opinion, do not call for any rethinking on the part of the court in respect of the order of conviction already rendered by us under the extraordinary situation which had arisen in the court and with which this court was unfortunately faced on 15-7-1994. The petitioners cannot be allowed to have a second thought and to seek redress from the court against their conviction and arrest on the ground either of alibi or of mistaken identity. 80. When the learned counsel for petitioners were told by us that appeal and not the writ petition was maintainable on the facts of the case, the learned counsel argued that since petitioners may not file appeal as such for removing the injustice done to the petitioners the writ petition was maintainable. It was argued that since the order of conviction is open for misuse due to want of proper identification either of A. K. Bajpai or of Anand Mohan (Srivastava) as such the order deserves to be recalled in exercise of this court's power under Article 226 read with Article 215 of the Constitution. It was emphasised by the counsel that since there was no codified procedure under Article 215 of the Constitution this court could itself evolve its own procedure for punishing the guilty persons for contempt of court and also for reviewing its order if the occasion arises as in the present case and the aggrieved person need not be relegated to the remedy of appeal. 81. It is true appeal will not lie as a matter of course against an order of conviction passed under Article 215 for ex-fade contempt but with the leave of the Supreme Court appeal against such conviction too can be filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. There is clear right of appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but the question whether that provision is available to the petitioners or not need not be decided as the question neither arises in this case nor has been argued by the learned counsel. The statement of the counsel that the petitioner may not file appeal however docs not appear to be correct. The statement of the counsel that the petitioner may not file appeal however docs not appear to be correct. As will appear from the application that has been filed on behalf of all the convicted lawyers including the petitioners Sri Anand Mohan and A. K Bajpai prayer has been made to the effect that they be allowed six weeks time by the court for filing appeal in the Supreme Court and for that period their conviction order may be suspended. 82. It is next contended by the learned Counsel on the strength of various authorities, which were cited at Bar, that since this court had exercised its power of punishing petitioners under Article 215 of the Constitution the court was fully empowered under that article to review its own order and punish the rightful persons instead of petitioners who is not identifiable from the order of conviction. The authorities cited, which have been referred to by my learned brother in his judgment separately given, only suggest that if the order of conviction is with out jurisdiction, the court in a fit case can reconsider it. I am afraid no endeavour was made at the Bar by the counsel to say and demonstrate that the order of conviction passed by us was without jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, both Sri Trividi and Sri Sinha specifically stated at the Bar that the order of conviction was not being challenged by them. They only wanted identification of the petitioners by the court as to whether they were actually the persons whom the court had convicted. In my opinion such an exercise after recording the conviction and awarding punisment even under Article 215 is not permissible in view of the special facts of the case which I have already noted in this regard and the finding that there is no con fusion and it was the petitioners who happen to be the erstwhile office of the Association and were involved in the incident and have been duly punished. 83. Even if there is some confusion in regard to the identity of the persons convicted, namely, Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan, the petitioners before us, that by itself does not render our order without jurisdiction. 83. Even if there is some confusion in regard to the identity of the persons convicted, namely, Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan, the petitioners before us, that by itself does not render our order without jurisdiction. Even the police officers who are under duty to execute the order of conviction have not approached this court complaining of the con fusion, if any, regarding the correct identity of the convicted lawyers including Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan. It is, however, a very sorry state of affairs that the police has not executed the order so far and the petitioners are being allowed to pursue their remedy by filing applications and writ petitions in this court for their acquittal. None of the five persons convicted so far that is a sad commentary of the police efficiency and their concern to the judicial orders even passed by the highest court of the State. The writ petitions in my opinion lack merit and also are not maintainable. Application for Stay Order 84. A joint application by all the convicted lawyers as well as a separate application by Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra have been filed praying for the stay of the operation of the conviction order to enable them to approach the Supreme Court by filing an appeal. The reason given for the stay of the conviction order is that the order was passed without notice to the applicants and opportunity of hearing without framing any charge; the order is also attacked have been arrested on the ground that it was passed against any legally established procedure and against the norms which are necessarily to be adopted in judicial proceedings by the courts of law. 85. A number of grounds of general nature have been taken in support of the case but these grounds were not pressed by the counsel, Sri Nagendra Mohan at the Bar who also happens to be the President of the Association nor by Sri K. B. Sinha who also addressed us on the question. 85. A number of grounds of general nature have been taken in support of the case but these grounds were not pressed by the counsel, Sri Nagendra Mohan at the Bar who also happens to be the President of the Association nor by Sri K. B. Sinha who also addressed us on the question. The only argument that was pressed before us by the learned counsel was that since the applicants, have a right of appeal in the Supreme Court against the order of their conviction they are entitled to be given sometime by way of exemption from arrest so that they may easily move and approach the Supreme Court by way of appeal against the order of their conviction. Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra who had made separate application also made identical prayer without denying the facts stated in the judgment of conviction. As will be apparent from the judgment of conviction he was leading the procession of lawyers who ransacked the court and forced it to rise on 15-7-94. There is no repentance or imorseness on the part of the applicants in respect of the incident although it was expressed by Sri R. N. Trivedi, Senior Advocate on his own behalf although he was neither involved in the incident nor has been punished by us. The incident which occurred on 15-7-94 in our court and which provoked us to take this extreme step of initiating ex facie proceedings of contempt of court were alarming had shocking in nature, its intensity and seriousness does not at all justify taking of any lenient view in the matter by me specially when such incidents have become the order of the day. In this context it will not be out of place to refer the incident which took place in District Ballia where the District Judge Sri S. L. Adarsh was not only manhandled by lawyers but was thoroughly thrashed by a group of lawyers during the course of hearing of a bail application. A similar incident occurred in District Ghaziabad as well as in the District of Meerut in the recent past. Again very recently in the district of Varanasi a Muasif was physically assaulted by a group of lawyers in the course of hearing in his court. A similar incident occurred in District Ghaziabad as well as in the District of Meerut in the recent past. Again very recently in the district of Varanasi a Muasif was physically assaulted by a group of lawyers in the course of hearing in his court. All these incidents in the lower courts have so far gone unpunished only on account of the intervention of some Senior lawyers who plead the cause of their guilty colleagues at the Bar in the so-called largest interest of the profession. The question is whether the let off practice so far adopted by us has worked against the interest of justice or in the interest of justice. The incident which took place on 15-7-94 in our court was without any apparent provocation from our side. When lawyers are on strike they may desist from working either in court or even outside. They, however, cannot force the courts to stop functioning nor they can force litigants who have legal as well as constitutional right of approaching this court from appearing in the court for redressal of their grievances. They do not have a right or any say in the court except as an agent or representative of the litigant who may chose to appoint him to communicate with the court on his behalf. On such authority having been given to him by the litigant he does not enjoy any superior right than the right enjoyed by the litigant. He still remains a middleman between the court and the litigant, he has no right to cause closer of the functioning of the Court. They have no legal right to go on strike. They cannot at the most return the brief to their client and refuse to argue or appear on his behalf, subject, however, to the hazards of professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961. Having once accepted the brief the lawyers have no right to refuse to appear in the case for pleading the cause of his client even on the pretext of strike or boycott of the courts. Lawyer indulging in such act is exposing himself to professional misconduct. Be that as it may, while considering applicant's request for grant of the stay order all these factors deserve consideration and merit evaluation. 86. Lawyer indulging in such act is exposing himself to professional misconduct. Be that as it may, while considering applicant's request for grant of the stay order all these factors deserve consideration and merit evaluation. 86. The over-all scinario (sic) of the present state of affairs casts a doubt on the age old concept that lawyers are the officers of the court. 87. The factors noticed herein above amply suggest that the situation is to be dealt with firmly by identifying and punishing the guilty persons responsible for causing disturbance in the functioning of the court by one or the other method. 88. On over-all consideration of the gravity of the offence and the state of affairs prevailing in this case as well as the general scinario (sic) of the courts of law and also that prevailed in our court for the last 15 days I think it will not be at all in the interest of justice to grant any relief to the applicants by staying the operation of the order of conviction specially when they have themselves successfully avoided their arrest so far. On the other hand if the operation of conviction order is stayed that may prove detrimental to the cause of justice as it is bound to imbolden the lawyers who have been booked for their wrong for the first time. After considering the facts and circumstances and prevailing atmosphere in the court I do not consider it proper to suspend the sentences passed on the applicants. Police is directed to impliment the order of the conviction as delay may defeat the purpose and laxity on the part of the police may not rebound on them. 89. In view of the above discussion the writ petitions filed by Sri A. K. Bajpai and Sri Anand Mohan as well as the applications jointly filed by all the convicted persons, namely, Sri (Dr.) L. P. Misra, Sri Anand Mohan, Sri A. K. Bajpai, Sri G. K. Pandey and Mohammad Shamim and the application separately filed by Dr. L. P. Misra merit dismissal and are accordingly dismissed summarily. 90. Let a copy of this order as well as the order of conviction be sent to the Chief Secretary of the State Government for necessary action against the lax police officers. B M Lal and A. P. Singh. L. P. Misra merit dismissal and are accordingly dismissed summarily. 90. Let a copy of this order as well as the order of conviction be sent to the Chief Secretary of the State Government for necessary action against the lax police officers. B M Lal and A. P. Singh. JJ.- For the reasons recorded by us separately Cri Misc Application No. 1096 of 1994 (moved on behalf of all contemners) Crl Misc. Application No. 1095 of 1994 (moved on behalf of Dr. L. P. Misra) Habeas Corpus Petition No. 292 (H/c) of 1994, Anand Mohan v. State of U. P. and Habeas Corpus Petition No. 291 (H/c) of 1994, A. K. Bajpai v. State of U. P. are dismissed. Appeal dismissed.