JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners have challenged the order dated 28.2.94 by which they were required to make the payment of balance amount payable by the petitioners along with interest/penalty within 10 days and further prayer has made that the direction to pay a sum of Rs. 73.23 lacs by way of interest should be directed to be given by the respondent and they should be restrained in charging the interest at an existing rate of 15% or to act contrary to the settlement dated 30.1.93. The preliminary objections which was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent are that the petitioner has alternate efficacious remedy and the writ petition is not maintainable in the contractual matter. It is also submitted that since the questions which have been raised are disputed question of fact, therefore this Court should refuse to enter into the merits of the case. 2. The argument of both the learned counsel on the preliminary objections as well as on merit have been heard. 3. In order to appreciate the preliminary objections even on merit, the necessary facts relevant for consideration are, that an advertisement was issued by the respondent for auction of the property known as Old Motor Garage (near Amarpura) M.I. Road, Jaipur. The auction was held on 8.1.92 and the petitioners are the highest bidder. A writ petition No. 2841/92 was filed on 9.4.92 wherein a prayer was made to pass an order under section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCAR) and directions were sought to remove the encumbrances and burdens on the land in question and also to have a joint measurement. The demand of the balance amount and penalty and interest was prayed to be quashed without removal of the statutory encumbrances and other burdens, and the letters written by the respondent from time to time were prayed to be cancelled. It was further prayed that the amount which has already been deposited should not be forfeited. The said writ petition was dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,5001- on 3rd July, 1992., It was decided in the writ petition that the petitioner has failed to make the deposit of 85 % of the amount within the stipulated time and the assurance of the J.D.A. has also taken into consideration that the land will be handed over free from all encumbrances including ULCAR Act. 1,5001- on 3rd July, 1992., It was decided in the writ petition that the petitioner has failed to make the deposit of 85 % of the amount within the stipulated time and the assurance of the J.D.A. has also taken into consideration that the land will be handed over free from all encumbrances including ULCAR Act. The oral assurances were denied by the respondent and on that basis it was observed that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel does not arise. The area of temple land measuring 37.50 sq.m. was reduced by letter dated 26th March, 92, and it was observed that all structures on the land were removed by the J.D.A. before issuing the demand notice and no structure or encroachment exists on the land. Since the matter was pertaining to contractual dispute the writ petition was held not a proper remedy. An appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Before the decision of the said appeal, an agreement was entered into in the meeting held in the Chamber of Jaipur Development Commissioner on 30.1.93. The various points which were decided in the said meeting are as under:- "(i) Exemption from ULCAR : On deposition of the amount of Rs. 4 crore's as agreed in this agreement and on submission of the application before the State Government for exemption by the purchaser, the JDA will ensure that the exemption will be given within 60 days but if in any case except due to the default on the part of the purchaser the exemption is not issued within the stipulated period of 60 days, the purchaser will be entitled to claim interest @ 15% per annum. (ii) Exclusion of the Temple area : The main temple area including the passage area,, will be excluded from the allotment and no cost of the land so excluded will be charged. Set backs and Coverage Area : The purchaser will be allowed to construct up to the extent of 62.5% of the ground area and it on any reasons 62.5% ground coverage does not become available under the main building, the set backs on the Motilal Atal road side shall be suitably modified for the main building, subject to the condition that the total built-up area shall under no circumstances exceed to 62.5% of the plot area. Subject to the above, these constructions will be made strictly in accordance with the prescribed building norms and parameters as per JDA Building Regulations. Maps to the approved in 60 days subject to the maps being in accordance with the auction conditions and bye-laws. Terms of payment (i) Rs. 2 crores to be paid today i.e. on 30th Janaury, 1993 towards the balance dues. (ii) Rs. 2 crores to be paid by 20th February, 1993. (ii) Balance outstanding amount to be paid in monthly instalments subject to the condition that each instalment shall be of a minimum amount of Rs. 25 Lacs plus the interest payable on such instalment and the whole of the outstanding auction plus interest amount shall be paid within a maximum period of 12 months from the date of this agreement. Interest @ 18% per annum shall be payable on the outstanding unpaid amount with effect from the date of this agreement. Physical possession of the whole of the property shall be handed over to M/s. K.K. Complex Ltd. as soon as Rs. 4 crores is realised as per this agreement. Boundary on Amarpura temple side to be constructed by J.D.A. up to the temple point i.e. so as to enclose the approach to temple from M.I. Road. The lease deed shall be executed by J.D.A. in favour of purchasers only after receipt of full payment payable by the purchasers. Neither the petitioner nor the J.D.A. will go to any Court against this compromise. Without prejudice to the terms of this agreement the Hon'ble High Court shall independently decide the question as to the claim for interest and penalty, for the period prior to the date of this agreement/clarification. In the event of any default by the purchaser, in payment of the dues, the allotment will stand automatically cancelled and the entire land along with the constructions, if any, will stand vested in J.D.A. without any encumbrance. No further notice by JDA would be necessary for the above. (Note) The Secretary was present during the major part of discussions, but could not be present during the signing of the Agreement, as he had to go elsewhere." 4. The matter was considered by the Division Bench in Special Appeal and it was observed that the only point which remains is the liability on the appellant to pay interest and penalty. The matter was considered by the Division Bench in Special Appeal and it was observed that the only point which remains is the liability on the appellant to pay interest and penalty. After taking into consideration the various facts, the Division Bench held that the appellants are not liable to pay any interest or penalty for the period in question before entering into agreement. It is stated that against this order, an SLP has been filed before the Hon'ble Court; whereas according to the learned counsel for the respondent, which has already been dismissed. I need not go on the point of SLP. Since the decision which has been given by the Division Bench is binding, I am proceeding on the basis of the said judgment. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in accordance with the agreement dated 30.1.93, it was the duty of the JDA to ensure that the exemption is given within 60 days. If the exemption is not issued within the stipulated time, the purchaser will be entitled to claim interest @ 15% per annum. It is submitted that the application was submitted on 13.4.93 but, the State Government has passed the order on 15th July,'93. Therefore the petitioners are entitled for interest on the amount already deposited by them. It is further submitted that condition No. 4 of the said order stipulates that the petitioner would not sell, gift or transfer the land to other person and the restriction which has been placed on the sale or transfer of the land is not comtemplated under the agreement. The respondent should transfer the land free from all encumbrance and the restriction which has been placed on the right of the petitioner to transfer or sell the land is such which cannot be said that the land is free from all encumbrance. It is submitted that, even if the multi-storey construction is made, the right on the land also goes along with the unit transferred and, if the petitioner is not in a position to complete the project, even then he has a right to transfer the land. It is submitted that, even if the multi-storey construction is made, the right on the land also goes along with the unit transferred and, if the petitioner is not in a position to complete the project, even then he has a right to transfer the land. Reference was made to the various conditions of the advertisements, which are as under : 1- O;kolkf;d Hkw[k.M ( O;koklkf;d ladqy@gksVy Hkw[k.M ) okf"kZd 'kgjh tekcUnh ( yht gksYM ) fodz; fd;k tk;sxk ftldh vof/k 99 o"kZ dh gksxhA 2- O;kolkf;d Hkw[k.M@gksVy Hkw[k.M dh 'kgjh tekcUnh okf"kZd vk/kkj ij gksxh ftldh nj #i;s 90-00 izfr oxZ ehVj gksxhA izFke rhu o"kZ ;g jkf'k vk/kh olwy dh tkosxhA ;g okf"kZd 'kgjh tekcUnh izR;sd 15 o"kZ i'pkr~ ifjofrZr gks ldrh gS fdUrq orZeku nj ls 25 izfr'kr ls vf/kd ugha gksxhA 3- rhljs o"kZ ds i'pkr~ iwjh 'kgjh tekcUnh vkSj blls iwoZ vk/kh 'kgjh tekcUnh olwy dh tkosxhA Hkou fuekZ.k 3 o"kZ dh vof/k esa iw.kZ gks tkuk pkfg,A 4- uhykeh }kjk dz; djus ds i'pkr~ dzsrk dks ykblsUl MhM tkjh fd;k tkosxkA ftlds vk/kkj ij mls izkf/kdj.k }kjk Lohd`r uD'ks ds vuqlkj Hkou fuekZ.k dk vf/kdkj izkIr gksxk] og fuekZ.k dCtk izkIr djus dh frfFk ls 3 o"kZ dh vof/k esa iw.kZ gks tkuk pkfg, vU;Fkk tek /ku jkf'k dks fcuk ykSVk;s Hkw&[k.M tCr dj fy;k tkosxkA 5- cksyh yxkus ls iwoZ gj O;fDr dks 5]00]000 ( ikWap yk[k #i;s ) udn tek djkus gksaxs tks mldks uhykeh lekfIr ij ykSVk fn;s tk;saxsA ;fn cksyh yxkus okys O;fDr ds uke ls cksyh NwVrh gS rks ;g jkf'k lek;ksftr dj yh tkosxhA 6- lcls vf/kd cksyh yxkus okys O;fDr dks Hkw&[k.M dh cksyh dh 5 izfr'kr jkf'k rRdky tek djkuh gksxh rFkk 10 izfr'kr jkf'k 72 ?k.Vs ( rhu fnol ) esa tek djkuh gksxh tks ckn esa Hkw&[k.M dh dher esa 'kkfey dj yh tk;sxh ;fn mldh cksyh Lohdkj dj yh tkrh gSA ekSds ij 5 izfr'kr jkf'k tek u djkus ij 5 yk[k #i;s rFkk 72 ?k.Vs esa 10 izfr'kr jkf'k tek u djkus ij 5 izfr'kr jkf'k tCr dj yh tkosxhA 7- dzsrk dks 'ks"k jkf'k 85 izfr'kr jkf'k uhykeh dh iqf"V i= tkjh gksus dh frfFk ls 30 fnu dh vof/k esa tek djkuh iMsxhA vU;Fkk fcuk dksbZ lwpuk fn;s 15 izfr'kr jkf'k tCr dj yh tkosxh rFkk Hkw[k.M jn dj fn;k tkosxkA 30 fnu dh vof/k dks fu;ekuqlkj C;kt ,oa 'kkfLr dh jkf'k tek djkus dh 'krZ ij 3 ekg rd c<+kus ij Hkh fopkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA 8- Hkw[k.M dsoy O;kolkf;d ladqy ;k gksVy gsrq gh iz;ksx esa fy;k tk ldsxkA 9- Hkou fuekZ.k izkf/kdj.k }kjk Lohd`r ekufp= ds vuqlkj gksxkA ftldh fcfYaMx ykbZUl izkf/kdj.k }kjk ewY; ij fn;s lkbZV Iyku esa fn[kk;s vuqlkj gksxkA 10- t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k ds vk;qDr dks fcuk dkj.k crk;s dksbZ Hkh ;k mPpre cksyh vLohdkj djus dk vf/kdkj gksxkA 11- O;kolkf;d Hkw[k.M@gksVy fcfYaMx iSjkehVlZ fuEukuqlkj gksaxs & 1- vf/kdre gksVy fufeZr {ks=Qy &62-5 izfr'kr 2- vf/kdre ry la[;k &ch + th + 4 3- vf/kdre mWapkbZ &55 QhV 4- ,Q0,0vkj0 &2-00 12- uhykeh ds le; ;fn izHkkjh vf/kdkjh dks ,slk vuqHko gks fd izfr;ksfxrk nj Bhd ugha py jgh gS vFkok Bhd <+ax ls ugha gks jgh gS rks ekSds ij gh cksyh dks vLohdkj dj uhykeh dks LFkfxr dj ldrs gSaA 13- ukckfyx vFkok ukckfyx O;fDr ds uke ls cksyh yxkus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gksxkA 14- la;qDr ukeksa ls cksyh yxkus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gksxkA 15- jktLFkku vjcu yS.M fMLiksty :Yl ,oa le; & le; ij jkT; ljdkj rFkk fodkl izkf/kdj.k }kjk tkjh fd;s vkns'kksa ,oa fu;eksa dh ikyuk djuh gksxhA 6. The point which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is entitled for interest, because the exemption was not granted within 60 days. It is also submitted that the exemption granted by ULCAR Act is not exemption in the eyes of law and, therefore the 'petitioners are entitled for interest even today, on all the amount deposited with the respondent. 7. The second point which has been raised is with regard to the height of the basement. This point was not in dispute in the meeting of the JDA held in the Chamber of the J.D.C., on 30.1.93. The petitioner has constructed the basement of 15 ft. to 16 ft. level on the ground that because of the special structure and the requirement of petrol tanks, the depth has been taken to, this extent. The matter was considered by BPC Ilnd in its meeting of 15th October, 93 and it was decided that the structural engineer of the building has to certify that it was a technical requirement to construct the basement, the way it has been constructed. The matter will be discussed by the Structural Engineer/Architect with the Director, Town Planning and the site will be inspected. The decision in the matter was deferred. The certificate of the Structural Engineer has already been submitted, but, the matter has not been cleared. The matter with regard to the temple and the boundary wall also raised as soon as the construction of the boundary wall was started, this point has not been pressed. It is further submitted that the respondents were interfering with the construction which is carried on by the petitioner on one pretext or the other from time to time. The result of the interference by the respondent is that the petitioners were constrained to stop their construction on several occasions, as a result of which the construction schedule has been delayed. In this context reference is made to the representation dated 16th August, 93. No date has been mentioned either in the writ petition or in the representation dated 16th August, 1993 as to in what manner and which of the Officers have ever interfered with the work of the petitioner in construction of the building. In this context reference is made to the representation dated 16th August, 93. No date has been mentioned either in the writ petition or in the representation dated 16th August, 1993 as to in what manner and which of the Officers have ever interfered with the work of the petitioner in construction of the building. The letter dated 16th August, 93 is only with regard to the representation which has been made for basement in which the petitioner had assured that the height of 6 ft. could not be used for commercial purposes, and, therefore the JDA should not interfere the construction and if any objection is not raised within 7 days, it will be deemed that the JDA has no objection in raising the construction. 8. It is submitted that, Annexure -10 dated 28.2.94 is an order by which the respondents are trying to dispossess the petitioner not only from the land but also from the construction which has been made thereon. The respondents cannot take the law in their hand. The petitioner has already made an investment of more than Rs. 10.00 crore, in making the construction over the land. The decision of 1985 (1) SCC 641 and AIR 1989 SC 997 , has been relied on this point that even after the cancellation of the lease, the respondent cannot take the land in their hand or repossess the property without following the procedure under law. 9. It has also been submitted that the measurement of the land is not proper as according to the petitioner the total area of the land is 8941.71 sq.m. while according to the respondent it is 9020.42 sq.m. 10. The last point which has been taken is that the interest is payable by the JDA because of the breach of conditions of agreement dated 30.1.93 in which it was contemplated that the exemption under the ULCAR Act would be granted within 60 days. Since this amount of interest has been calculated from the date of deposit of the amount, it is submitted that interest @ 18% per annum has wrongly been charged by the respondent and it could not be more than 15%. 11. Since this amount of interest has been calculated from the date of deposit of the amount, it is submitted that interest @ 18% per annum has wrongly been charged by the respondent and it could not be more than 15%. 11. The gist of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner as stated above is that the exemption which has been granted by the State Government under the ULCAR Act has not exempted as a ban has been put on the sale or transfer of the land and the purchaser has no absolute right to make any transfer. Since the land is purchased, it should be free from all encumbrance and such type of condition impairs the right of the petitioner; a clear title has not been given. If there is any dispute with regard to the title, of property itself, then the petitioner would not be able to sell the plots. The land and building under Indian Law could vest in different persons, and therefore, if the constructed unit is given to any person without the right to use the land or without transfer of the right in respect of the land then nobody would purchase the property as the condition of not transferring the land is contrary to agreement and is nullity in the eyes of law. Such type of condition was not contemplated under the agreement. Whenever the constructed unit is transferred, the proportionate area of the land is also transferred. On payment of the entire construction, the purchaser should have the right to transfer the land. The order of the State Government in granting the exemption belatedly is non-est and contrary to the agreement and law. The interference by the Officers in the construction of basement hampered the progress and put the petitioners to loss. The petitioners could not generate the cash flow and on account of the non-accrual of the cash, further progress in the construction is hampered. The threat which has been given by the JDA for taking possession of the land by dis-possessing the petitioner is contrary to law, as no individual can overtake the law in his hand for re-possessing the property. The observation of the Division Bench in the Special Appeal, that the land would be given free from all encumbrances have not been complied with. The observation of the Division Bench in the Special Appeal, that the land would be given free from all encumbrances have not been complied with. The ban on the transfer by order of the State Government is contrary to Section-10 of Transfer of Properties Act. It is submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Section-60 of the Act, the construction which has been carried out cannot be estopped. The respondents are expected to act in fairness and the petitioner has the legitimate expectation on the basis of the agreement entered into on 30.1.93, and they are estopped by Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel to act contrary to the said agreement. The interest is payable by the JDA from the initial day the payment has been made. The balance amounts were to he cleared within 30 days hut, they were cleared on 4.5.93. As such, at every stage, there is a delay on the part of the respondent. The petitioner is entitled for the relief claimed. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable looking to the conduct of the petitioner that he is a defaulter and the disputes which has been raised are mainly with regard to the certificate which has been granted by the State Government under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which has not effected any right or prejudice to the petitioner. The land was specifically auctioned with the condition that it can be used only as a commercial complex or for hotel and it was not contemplated that the trader of the land should come in the auction. The condition which has been placed by the State Government is in accordance with law. The State Government has not been made a party. It is submitted that the question as to, what is the area of the land, is a disputed question of fact, whether the fault has been committed by JDA or by the petitioner is also a disputed question of fact which could be decided on the basis of the finding which may be given on the basis of evidence and record in Civil Suit only. It is submitted that the allegation of putting the hindrance by the officers is also a disputed question of fact, and it is absolutely incorrect that any of the officers of the JDA has ever cause hindrance in the construction. It is submitted that the allegation of putting the hindrance by the officers is also a disputed question of fact, and it is absolutely incorrect that any of the officers of the JDA has ever cause hindrance in the construction. No date has been given nor the name of the officers have been given, who have caused hindrance. No representations have ever been made, and the representation of which the reference is made only with regard to the basement, which according to the respondent is not in accordance with the building regulations. It is submitted that, in accordance with the building regulations, the construction could be made if there is a provision in the building regulations then the construction would be covered by the said regulations otherwise the BPC can examine the matter. 13. Since a concluded contract has come into existence the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the decision by this Court in the case of Gammon India Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7199 of 93 D/d. 27.1.94 , wherein it was held that "after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but, by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties in terse. It was further observed that, ordinarily, in respect of any dispute which arises out of the terms of contract writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for the purpose of enforcement of such contractual rights and obligations because in such a case it is not the infraction of any statutory provisions, but of certain facts which has to be ascertained by a detailed enquiry. In Lekh Raj v. Deputy Custodian, AIR 1966 SC 334 it was observed by the Apex Court that any power or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a contact entered into by him as public servant cannot be enforced by the machinery or a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 14. In commercial contract the non-execution/delay or the breach could be for the reason that the contractor might have committed an error in his judgment at initial stage of entering into contract with regard to profitability from such contract. 15. The writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 14. In commercial contract the non-execution/delay or the breach could be for the reason that the contractor might have committed an error in his judgment at initial stage of entering into contract with regard to profitability from such contract. 15. There may be a spurt in the price of the commodity after entering into the contract, the contract might not have been completed within the stipulated period for the financial stringencies of the contractor, there may be unforeseen circumstances on the part of the contractor as a result of which the delay is caused or there may be mistake on the part of the awarded or for similar reasons a dispute may arise. At that stage the allegation and counter allegations are made challenging the rights and obligations out of the contract. An investigation may also be necessary for such rights and obligations and, therefore, it is not proper for the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition for the specific performance of the contract or for damages or for determining the factual position as to who is responsible for the default." 16. According to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, double basement is not permitted in the building bye-laws of 1989. It is submitted that the total F.A.R. is two and 75% of the area of the basement has to be considered in F.A.R. and the basement cannot be used for residential purposes. The regulation 2.29 and 11.21 has also been referred. It is submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Section-54 of JDA , the title to the land continues with the respondent, and it is only the lease which can be granted. The JDA cannot sell any land on free-hold basis and the petitioners are only the user of the land. The lease can be transferred in accordance with the rules and regulations; but the ownership cannot be transferred. The JDA cannot sell any land on free-hold basis and the petitioners are only the user of the land. The lease can be transferred in accordance with the rules and regulations; but the ownership cannot be transferred. It is also submitted that in accordance with the agreement entered into, even if any interest was payable, which according to the learned counsel for the respondent's submission is not payable, the petitioner has no right to stop the payment and whether there is any default of the respondent, or whether the petitioner is entitled to any interest, and if so, for what period which are to be adjudicated by way of Civil Suit only. The petitioner is said to be a defaulter and breach of agreement was alleged on its part. The interpretation which has been placed on the judgment of the division bench that the land should be free from all encumbrance has reference to the area which has covered by temple which has to be excluded. Since it has already been excluded the land was given free from all encumbrance. After the permission was granted on 4.5.93 there is no interruption by the respondent in the construction activities carried on by the petitioner. The exemption by the Ceiling Authority which has been granted on 15th July, 1993 has not prejudiced any right of the petitioner. 17. I have considered over the matter. The writ petition of the petitioner No. 2841/92 was dismissed on 3.7.92 on the ground that the matter related to the contractual obligation, for which the writ is not a proper remedy. An appeal was filed against the said order and during the pendency of the appeal, an agreement was entered into by the petitioner and the respondent in accordance with the meeting held on 30.1.93. So far as the merits and demerits entered into by the petitioners and the respondent are concerned, I need not examine any of them, and will proceed on the basis of the agreement entered into between the parties which is binding unless it could be alleged to have been obtained by fraud, this-representation or the like. In the Special Appeal against writ No. 2841/92 only one issue was decided that whether the appellant (now petitioner) are liable to pay interest and penalty for not making the payment of balance amount of 85% of the bid amount. In the Special Appeal against writ No. 2841/92 only one issue was decided that whether the appellant (now petitioner) are liable to pay interest and penalty for not making the payment of balance amount of 85% of the bid amount. The Division Bench of this Court held that the appellant are not liable to pay any interest or penalty for the period in question before entering into agreement dated 30.1.93. It has not been alleged that the interest which has been claimed by the respondent is in respect of the period prior to 30.1.93. Even if it was the position, the petitioner should have approached to the respondent for making the correction of the interest which is payable in terms of the agreement dated 30.1.93, and the order of the Division Bench dated 8.4.93. The respondent could not have charged any interest for the period prior to 30.1.93. Regarding the claim of the petitioner that the interest is payable to it on account of default on the part of the respondent in not making the exemption under Urban Land Ceiling Act, within 60 days, or that the exemption which has been granted is not exemption in the eye of law, or that the measurement which has been taken is not correct, are all disputed questions of fact. The decision of the Division Bench is only with regard to the liability of interest and penalty for not paying 85% of the bid amount before 30.1.93 which can be considered to have been adjudicated and not any other point. The points which are covered under the agreement dated 30.1.93 are in respect of exemption from ULCAR, exclusion of the temple area, Set-backs and Coverage area and terms of payment, beside construction of boundary wall at Amarpura temple site and execution of the lease deed etc. These points are governed under the terms of the contract. The others points cannot be allowed to be agitated in view of the fact that the complete order of the learned Single Judge dated 3.7.92 had neither been set-aside nor was reversed by the Division Bench except on the point of payment of interest and penalty. The points which are governed by the agreement dated 30.1.93 being the disputed questions of fact which could require evidence on the various aspects, it will not be proper for this Curt to interfere in the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article-226. The points which are governed by the agreement dated 30.1.93 being the disputed questions of fact which could require evidence on the various aspects, it will not be proper for this Curt to interfere in the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article-226. Even otherwise it is the discretion of the Court to see, as to whether a writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus could be issued. No doubt, the discretion has to be exercised judiciously. In a case like the present one where alternative efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner and the matter is allegedly on the basis of the contractual obligations it is not proper for this Court to exercise the extraordinary power under Article-226 of the Constitution, as has been considered in the case of Gammon India Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan referred to above where it was observed that as allegations and counter allegations challenging the rights and obligations out of the contract are made, then an investigation will be necessary for such rights and obligations, and it is not proper for the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition for the specific performance of the contract or for damages (in the present case, interest) or for determining the factual position as to who is responsible for the default. In view of this decision, it is not necessary to refer the other authorities which have been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. The writ petition is dismissed on account of availability of alternative remedy, for the reason that, I do not consider it to be a fit case for interference in the extra ordinary jurisdiction, the writ petition stands dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed *******