Judgment :- The order of assessment to tax under the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 (the 1950 act) made on the' petitioner for the assessment year 1980-81, was taken up in suo mote revision under S.34 of the Act by the Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram (the Commissioner, for brevity). After hearing the assessee-petitioner, the Commissioner passed order dated March 30,1991, a copy of which is Ext. P10, revising the order of assessment. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner applied for reference to this court for its opinion, of certain questions of law stated to arise therefrom, under S.60 of the 1950 Act. A copy of the application is Ext. P11 dated August 9,1991. By that time, the 1950 Act had been repealed and replaced by the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991 (the 1991 act) which came into force on April 1-1991. Section 76 of the 1991 Act corresponds to S.34 of the 1950 Act and confers power on the Commissioner to exercise suo molu power of revision in respect of orders passed by subordinate authorities which are considered prejudcial to the revenue. But wide departure was made in the matter of the remedy available to an aggrieved assessee against the order in revision of the Commissioner. While under the 1950 Act he had to seek reference to this court for its opinion of any questions of law arising out of the order of the Commissioner, he was afforded, by S.78 of the 1991 Act, the remedy of approaching this court direct by way of revision petition on the ground that the Commissioner had cither erroneously decided or failed to decide any question of law. Since the 1950 Act stood repealed by the time the application for reference was made, the Commissioner entertained doubt about its maintainability, and eventually, and after affording an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard, he rejected the application as not maintainable by the order Ext. P14 dated 9-11-1991. According to him, the petitioner's remedy was to approach this court by way of revision under S.78 of the 1991 Act. The question is whether this view of the Commissioner is correct. The petitioner questions this view and reiterates that the remedy available to him was that under S.60 of the 1950 Act, the revisional order under S.34 having been passed on 30-3-1991 before the 1991 Act came into force. 2. The question is whether this view of the Commissioner is correct. The petitioner questions this view and reiterates that the remedy available to him was that under S.60 of the 1950 Act, the revisional order under S.34 having been passed on 30-3-1991 before the 1991 Act came into force. 2. Section 99 (1) of the 1991 Act repeals the 1950 Act, but the proviso thereto state that the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the 1950 Act, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder and, subject thereto, anything done or any action taken, including any order passed in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the 1950 Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under the 1991 Act as if this Ac t were in force on the dale on which such thing was done or action was taken. As to what is the proper remedy of the petitioner has to be decided with reference to this repealing provision. Section 99(1) is clear and specific that the repeal will not affect the previous operation of the 1950 Act or any right, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder. It is only subject to tin's that anything done or any action taken under the said Act is deemed to have been done or taken under the 1991 Act. 3. So far as the order Ext. P10, which was passed on 30-3-1991, is concerned, the remedy of the petitioner under 1950 Act was to move for reference to this court of any questions of law arising therefrom, under S.60 of the said Act. That remedy stood attracted as soon as the order Ext. P10 was passed, on 30-3-1991 when the law in force was the 1950 Act. In other words, the remedy of seeking a reference to this court under S.60 of the 1950 Act accrued to the petitioner on 30-3-1991, with a corresponding right on the respondent not to have the order challenged except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the 1950 Act. In other words, the remedy of seeking a reference to this court under S.60 of the 1950 Act accrued to the petitioner on 30-3-1991, with a corresponding right on the respondent not to have the order challenged except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the 1950 Act. This right of either party which had accrued on the order being passed, is not taken away by anything slated in the repealing provision, in as much as the deeming provision referred to earlier in the proviso to S.99(1) is specifically subject to rights or obligations accrued or incurred under the 1950 Act. 4. In the case of a repeal and re-enactment; the line of enquiry is not whether the new Act keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. (State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 and Indira Sclianlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Properly, AIR 1956 SC 77). The proviso to section 99 (1) of the 1991 Act does not evince any intention to affect the rights and liabilities accrued under the 1950 Act. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier the fiction created by the latter part of the proviso is clearly subject and subservient to the rights and obligations accrued or incurred under the 1950 Act. The remedy of the petitioner in relation to the order Ext. P10 was thus under S.60 of the 1950 Act, as rightly invoked by them. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the order of the Commissioner Ext. P14 is unsustainable in law and against the plain terms of S.99(1) of the 1991 Act. 5. Accordingly I quash Ext. P14. The second respondent Commissioner is directed to consider and dispose of the reference application Ext. P11 afresh, in accordance with the provisions of S.60 of the 1950 Act, with all expedition, and at any rate within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The original petition is allowed as above. No costs.