JUDGMENT (ORAL) M.S. Vaidhya, J. - This is an application under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. challenging the order dated 7th October, 1993 passed by the Judicial Magistrate F.C., Panaji in Private Criminal Case No. 165/90/C under which the application made by the present petitioner to have the criminal case dropped for want of sanction under Section 197 (2) and (3) of Cr. P.C. was rejected by the learned Magistrate. 2. The respondent No.1 Menino Rodrigues had lodged the aforesaid private complaint. The contention of the respondent No.1 in his complaint was that on 9.3.1990 at about 7 p.m. when he was on duty as a Linesman with the Electricity Department of Government of Goa, he had learnt that one Joao Xavier was attacked and his scooter was burnt by some unknown persons. The respondent No.1 alleged further that he himself was in inimical terms with Joao Xavier and therefore he had implicated respondent No.1 in the aforesaid incident. The result was, it was alleged, when the complainant had joined his duty at about 8.30 a.m. on 10.3.1990 the wife of the said Joao Xavier came there along with a policeman and took him near the house of the said Joao Xavier. At that place, it is alleged, the present petitioner assaulted him with fist blows and he was lifted and thrown on the ground and was given kicks. The protest made by the present respondent No.1 were not heeded to by the present petitioner, according to the version given in the complaint lodged by the present respondent No.1 it is further alleged that thereafter the respondent No.1 was carried by the petitioner (police Office) to Goa Velha Outpost and he was arrested there. Ultimately, the brother of present respondent NO.1 is alleged to have filed an application for bail in the Court of J.M. F.C., Panaji and was finally released at about 8.30 p.m. on that day on bail. The averment was that under such circumstances, the present petitioner had committed offences punishable under Sections 322 and 354 I.P.C. 3. The learned Magistrate had issued process against the present petitioner and had issued summons to him. The petitioner had then moved the learned Magistrate by an application dated 11.1.1993 with a request to drop the proceedings inasmuch as the complaint was lodged without appropriate sanction of the Government as required by section 197 (2) (3) of Cr. The learned Magistrate had issued process against the present petitioner and had issued summons to him. The petitioner had then moved the learned Magistrate by an application dated 11.1.1993 with a request to drop the proceedings inasmuch as the complaint was lodged without appropriate sanction of the Government as required by section 197 (2) (3) of Cr. P.C. The learned Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that it was not part of the duty of the present petitioner to give sanction of the Government for the aforesaid prosecution. The learned Magistrate referred in his impugned order to four rulings which were cited before him, but he did not discuss anyone of them to indicate how anyone of them was distinguishable from the facts of the present case or how the same was applicable to the facts of the present case. 4. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred this application contending that the learned Magistrate has misconstrued the provision of the law as propounded by a Division Bench of this Court in Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh and others v. Jammal Patel, S.I. and others1. It was contended that the case of the petitioner was covered explicitly by the provisions contained in Sub-Sections 2 and (3) of S. 197 of Cr. P.C. and that therefore the prosecution was not maintainable against him without the appropriate sanction as required by law. 5. We waited for Mr. Amonkar to argue the matter on behalf of respondent No.1 till about 3.30 p.m. but he did not turn up. There was therefore none on behalf of respondent No.1 to argue the matter. Mr. M. Sonak argued the matter for the petitioner and Mr. Bhobe argued it on behalf of the respondent No. 1 i.e. the State of Goa. 6. Coming then to the facts of the case, it is to be noted that as per1he averments of respondent No.1 complainant in his complaint itself, the present petitioner had gone to the place of his duty on 10.3.1990 along with the wife of the allegedly assailed person Joao Xavier and had apprehended the present respondent No.1. It was not in dispute that Joao Xavier had implicated the present respondent No.1 in the case which pertained to an incident which had allegedly occurred on 9.3.1990 i.e. assault on Joao Xavier and burning of his scooter. It was not in dispute that Joao Xavier had implicated the present respondent No.1 in the case which pertained to an incident which had allegedly occurred on 9.3.1990 i.e. assault on Joao Xavier and burning of his scooter. It cannot therefore be said that when the F.I.R. was lodged with the police against the present respondent NO.1 and that the same involved the offences not only of physical assault on Joao Xavier but also the offence of mischief by burning a scooter worth several thousands of rupees, the petitioner was not justified in making efforts to locate the alleged offender and to take adequate action, as required by law, to bring him to book. As per the averments in the complaint lodged by respondent No.1 himself, it was in that context that the petitioner had gone to the place where respondent NO.1 had been working. It is also clear from the averments in the complaint itself that the petitioner had identified the respondent No.1 at that spot with the assistance of the wife of Joao Xavier. It is not the contention even of the complainant/respondent No.1 in his complaint that present petitioner had acted malafide on account of his earlier strained relations with the respondent No.1 i.e. the complainant. Again it is not his contention that the petitioner had known respondent No.1 at any time before the incident complained of is said to have taken place on 10.3.1990. 7. The question, therefore, is when a police officer like the petitioner who had received the F.I.R. against a person like the respondent No. 1, in respect of a serious offence such as assault and mischief, goes in search of the alleged culprit and tries to catch him by use of certain force, whether he can be said to have acted not in discharge of his duties but otherwise. In the first place when the initial act of locating the alleged culprit was within the powers of the petitioner and when he had in fact done so, the subsequent excess in use of force could hardly take the act out of the four corners of the provisions contained in s. 97 (2) and (3) because the aforesaid sections are meant for protecting officers of the category specified in the aforesaid sub-sections "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty." 8. The point in question is squarely covered in Raizwan Ahmed Shaikh v. Jammal Patel (supra). In that case also some excess was said to have been done by the police in the course of investigation and the question had arisen whether or not the provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 197 could protect him. The Notification issued by the State of Maharashtra in that case was very much similar to the Notification which has been issued by the State of Goa in this State vide No. 1/36/81 HD (C) dated 9thFebruary, 1982 (see page 25 of the Paper Book). The learned counsel arguing the matter before me pointed out that in the present case the Bombay Police Act was not applicable but the Act applicable was the Indian Police Act which conferred on the police authorities almost the same or similar powers as were conferred upon the police officials in the State of Maharashtra by the Bombay Police Act. In any event, It was not in dispute before me that the police officials in the State of Goa had as their part of duty the maintenance of public order. It was on that count that the Notification dated 9th February,1982 in question was issued for protection of the police force charged with the maintenance of public order. In view of the similarity of the legal position as indicated above the present case would be governed squarely by the decision in Raizwan Ahmed Shaikh's case and we would be obliged to hold that in the present case also the sanction of the State Government would be necessary for the prosecution of the present petitioner under sub-section (2) and (3) of S.197 Cr. P. C. It may be noted here that the petitioner in the present case is a Police Inspector in the State Police Force of Goa. The rulings relied upon before the learned Magistrate besides the above mentioned ruling were Prabhakar V. Sinari v. Shanker Anant Verlekar2), Ashok v. Pralhad Namdeo Edke and another3) and Anil J. Solanke v. The State of Maharashtra and another4). It may be noted at the outset that in all the three ruling where the point involved was one under section 197 (1) of Cr. P.C. the protection under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 197 was not claimed in that case. It may be noted at the outset that in all the three ruling where the point involved was one under section 197 (1) of Cr. P.C. the protection under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 197 was not claimed in that case. Indeed the rulings in Anil Solanke v. The State of Maharashtra (supra) was referred to and relied upon in Raizwan Ahmed's case on the point that if the initial act of the commencement of the investigation was legitimate on the part of the police official the subsequent irregularity could not be construed for the purpose of withdrawing the protection afforded by section 197 of Cr. P.C. to the police official. Even in Ashok Pawar v. Pralhad Edke it was held that when the Court was to consider the protection available under Section 197 a co-relation between the act complained of and the duties to be performed under the law had to be established. It was held that if the act and duties were co-related or if there was any nexus between the act and the duties, the case would fall under section 197 and the question whether or not the act was in excess would not be relevant when it was found that the act had some co-relations with the duty. The decision in Prabhakar V. Sinari v. Shanker Verlekar (supra) was on the facts of the case before their Lordships. In that case Dy. S.P. had gone to the alleged scene of offence and had allowed though not permissible under the law the hawkers to occupy the plot of land in respect of which the first informant had claimed certain rights. The Supreme Court found that this had nothing to do with maintenance of public order or the law and order and that it was not part of the duty of the Dy S.P. to allow the hawkers to occupy the plot which was claimed by the-first informant. The observations made in that case were therefore in the context of the facts of that case and they would not regulate necessarily the facts which are now in the present case. 9. We are aware that complaints of police excess in the course of detection of crime or in the matter of handling the persons who are taken in custody by the police in the course of investigation are increasing in number day by day. 9. We are aware that complaints of police excess in the course of detection of crime or in the matter of handling the persons who are taken in custody by the police in the course of investigation are increasing in number day by day. The question whether or not it the face of such rising number of complaints the State Government should withhold the sanction without ordering proper injury or whether or not it should refuse the sanction only to afford protection to the police officers is a question which is to be decided by the Government as a matter of policy at its own level. In view of the special emphasis that is now being laid on the question of protection of human rights, we are sure, the Government of the state would pay due attention to this issue in its proper perspective. For the, time being we are concerned with the enforcement of the law as it stands interpreted by the course of law. We are therefore obliged in the present case to decide the matter according to that law. That does not however mean, nor should it be construed to mean that we are not serious about the excess allegedly committed by the police in the matter of investigation of the offences or in the matter of handling persons who are in custody. We only hope that the Government would consider the matter in its proper perspective and would take adequate steps to give redress to the persons who are really wronged by the police by their excess. 10. As a result of the legal position considered above, however, we are constrained to grant the present application and quash the impugned order dated 7thOctober, 1993 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji in Private Criminal Case No. 165/90/C. We order that the complaint stands dismissed for want of appropriate sanction. Rule made absolute accordingly. Application Allowed. Complaint dismissed. 1. 1990 (2) Bom. C.R. 297. 2. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 686. 3. 1988 (1) Bom. C.R. 219. 4. 1985 (2) Bom. C.R. 778.