JUDGMENT 1. These three writ petitions raise a common question of law and facts and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the convenient disposal of these three writ petitions, the facts mentioned in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 194 of 1994 (Bheru Ratan Ranga v. the State of Rajasthan) are taken into consideration. 2. The petitioners were appointed on daily wages basis as Class IV employees in the Education Department of the Government of Rajasthan. Most of them were appointed in the months of January and February, 1992, as is clear from Schedule-A annexed with the writ petition. Some of them were appointed in the month of December 1991 and some of them were provided appointments in the month of April, 1992. Admittedly, they served the education department as Class IV employees on daily wages basis for more than 240 days in a calendar year. Their services were terminated by the respondent, i.e., the District Education Officer (Elementary Education), Bikaner, vide order Annexure. 5 on the ground that the appointments to the petitioners were given without following the procedure provided under the law, even without the availability of the sanctioned posts and during the period of ban imposed by the State Government on appointments. The petitioners have challenged this order Annexure. 5 on the ground that they were duly registered with the Employment Exchange and the Registration Cards were issued in their favour. There were relaxations in the ban at the time when they were provided appointments and no illegality was committed by the District Education Officer in giving appointments to the petitioners. Further the persons, whose names are mentioned in Schedule-B, who were given appointments after the appointments were given to the petitioners, have been retained in service while the services of the petitioners have been dispensed with and as such it is a clear case of discrimination. The petitioners have, therefore, prayed that the termination of their services vide Annexure. 5 may be declared illegal and they may be ordered to be reinstated in service and their services may be regularised from the date when the services of the persons junior to them were regularised. 3. The petitioners have, therefore, prayed that the termination of their services vide Annexure. 5 may be declared illegal and they may be ordered to be reinstated in service and their services may be regularised from the date when the services of the persons junior to them were regularised. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the services of the petitioners have been terminated without following the procedure provided under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act, 1947') as before terminating the services of the petitioners, neither one month's notice or the wages in lieu of the notice was given to the petitioner nor the 'retrenchment compensation' as is required under sub-section (b) of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, was paid to them and, therefore, the termination of the services of the petitioners deserve to be quashed and set-aside and the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement in service as well as for regularisation of their services. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance over : The State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 610 , Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The Out going Management of Subong Tea Estate (1964) 5 SCR 602 , Udaipur Mineral Development Syndicate Private Limited v. M.P. Dave, 1975 RLW 131 , Bhanwar Lal v. The Municipal Board, Nagpur, 1987 (1) RLR 601 , the General Secretary, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna v. the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna, 1988 (1) JT 29 , Narotam Chopra v. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1988 (3) JT SC 35 , Krishan Kumar Dubey v. Uttar Pradesh Food and Essential Commodities Corporation, 1988 (4) JT 774 , Hardeo Lal Jat v. Alwar Sahkari Vikas Bank Limited, 1989 (2) RLR 369 , Arvind Kumar v. Panchayat Samiti, 1989 (7) SLR 823 (Sic) , Jodhpur Vishva-vidhyalaya Dainik Vetan-Bhogi Karamchari Union v. The University of Jodhpur (WLR 1991 (S) Raj 7) , Chhagan Lal v. Panchayat Samiti, WLR 1991 (S) Raj 57 , Nathu Ram Rao v. The State of Rajasthan, WLR 1991 (S) Raj 484 and Puran Chand Saini v. General Manager, UCO Bank, 1992 (1) WLC 479 . It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the persons junior to the petitioners who have been appointed in the similar circumstances after the appointments were provided to the petitioners and whose names are contained in Schedule-B, have been retained in service while the services of the petitioners have been dispensed with, which is in clear violation of the principles envisaged under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India as well as in violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act, 1947. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance over : Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 2141 (1980 Lab IC 692) , Vishnudas Hundumal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1636 and Abdul Sattar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1775 (2) . It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the statement made in the reply, filed by the respondents, is patently false and fact is that when the petitioners were provided appointments, a relaxation was given, which is clear from Annexure-2. It has, also, been submitted that the persons, whose names have been mentioned in Schedule-B, were given appointments in the similar way without calling their names from the respective Employment Exchanges and during the period of ban but they have been retained in service and, therefore, it does not suit the respondents to argue in one case that there was a ban and on the other hand to regularise the services of the similarly situated persons, who were given appointments during the ban period. It has, also, been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reasons mentioned in the order Annexure-5 were not available to the respondents in dispensing with the services of the petitioners. Lastly, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were discharging the same duties, work and responsibilities as were being discharged by the regularly appointed Class IV employees working in the Education Department and, therefore, they are entitled for the salary in the regular pay scale of the post in question on the basis of the principle of equal pay for equal work. Mr. Mr. U.C.S. Singhvi - Additional Government Advocate - on the other hand, has supported the order dated 31-12-93 (Annexure-5), passed by the District Education Officer (Elementary Education), Bikaner, terminating the services of the petitioners and submitted that the appointments given to the petitioners were wholly illegal and do not confer any right in their favour. It has been submitted that while giving appointments to the petitioners, neither the posts were advertised, as is required under the Rules, nor the names of the petitioners were sponsored by the, Employment Exchange and at the time when the petitioners were given appointments, there were only 129 sanctioned posts of daily-rated employees, which were already filled-up and no sanctioned post was available but still the appointments were given to the petitioners in an illegal way. It has, also, been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appointments of the petitioners were against non-sanctioned posts. It has, also, been contended that since the appointments of the petitioners were wholly illegal and contrary to the Rules, therefore, the termination of the services of the petitioners does not fall within the definition of the word 'retrenchment' and the benefits of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act or of any other provisions of the Act, was not available to the petitioners. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance over: Eranalloor Service Cooperative Bank Limited v. Labour Court (O.P. No. 1305/82-C, decided on 30-5-86 by the High Court of Kerala), Ram Pratap v. The State of Rajasthan, 1992 (3) WLC 533 and Koodaranji Service Cooperative Bank Limited v. Lissy, W.A. No. 903 of 1992, 1993-II CLR 998 . It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there was a ban on the appointments of Class IV employees as is clear from the Circulars Annexure R-2, Annexure-R.3 and Annexure R-4. It has, also, been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the appointments given to the petitioners were wholly illegal and contrary to the Rules, as such this Court is not expected to perpetuate the illegality by issuing a writ in favour of the petitioners. It has, also, been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the appointments given to the petitioners were wholly illegal and contrary to the Rules, as such this Court is not expected to perpetuate the illegality by issuing a writ in favour of the petitioners. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the non-petitioners have placed reliance over : Jagan Singh v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, AIR 1980 Rajasthan 1 and Ramji Lal Raiger v. The State of Rajasthan, 1990 (2) RLR 670 . Two preliminary objections have also been raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions on the grounds that (i) the writ petitions involve a disputed question of facts which cannot be gone into and decided under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and (ii) the alternative remedy under Section 10 of the Act, 1947, is available to the petitioners, which is an adequate and equally efficacious remedy and, therefore, the petitioners should first approach the competent Court to avail the remedy under the Act and the writ petitions, filed by the petitioners, therefore, deserve to be dismissed. 4. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Before deciding the questions on merit, I would first like to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. The first preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the writ petitions involve a disputed question of fact which cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction. It is true that the writ jurisdiction is meant for the enforcement of the legal rights and not for the determination of their rights but where the facts are not much in dispute and the writ petitions can be disposed of on the basis of the admitted facts then the question of disputed facts is no bar for the entertainment of the writ petitions. The object of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to provide an efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party and the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because the question of fact may fall for determination while considering the petitioners rights. In the present case, the writ petitions can be disposed of on the basis of the admitted, facts of the case. In the present case, the writ petitions can be disposed of on the basis of the admitted, facts of the case. The persons, whose names have been mentioned in Schedule-B were given appointments later than some of the petitioners and these appointments were given in the same circumstances and by following the same procedure, therefore, what will be the effect of this equal treatment between the similarly situated persons the writ petitions can be decided on this t alone and the petition did not raise any complicated question of fact which requires oral evidence to be taken for the purpose of determination of such fact. The preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, bereft of any substance and deserves o be rejected. 6. The second preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, is that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioners under the Act, 1947, to raise a dispute before the Tribunal which is an adequate and efficacious remedy and the writ petitions, therefore, deserve to be dismissed. Availability of the alternative remedy under the Act is not an absolute bar for entertainment of the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where the public authority has acted contrary to the law and wants to take undue advantage of its wrong by raising this preliminary objection. Where the authority has acted in contravention of the Rules and treated the similarly situated persons dissimilarly then in that circumstance, availability of alternative remedy is no bar to filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Now, coming to the merit of the case; though a number of arguments have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the present writ petitions, but it is not necessary to go into the other questions namely whether the appointments given to the petitioners were legal or illegal and whether they were given appointments at the time when there was a ban imposed by the State Government on the appointments or whether in case of an illegal appointment the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act, 1947, can be invoked or not; and the case can be decided only on the ground of discrimination made by the authority while giving appointments to the persons mentioned in Schedule-B and terminating the services of the petitioners. It is an admitted case of the parties that the appointments to the persons, whose names have been mentioned in Schedule-B, were given in the same circumstances and during the same period when the petitioners were provided appointments. The only distinction that has been tried to be made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the appointments to the persons, whose names have been mentioned in Schedule-B, were given against the sanctioned strength of 129 daily-rated employees while the appointments to the petitioners were given by the then District Education Officer (Elementary Education), Bikaner, against the non-sanctioned posts and for that act, an enquiry has been initiated against the then District Education Officer. Admittedly, some of the persons, mentioned in Schedule-B, were given appointments after the appointments were given to the petitioners. When there were no vacancies available with the respondents and the petitioners were serving with the department then where was the necessity to give appointments to the fresh candidates ignoring the claim and rights of the petitioners. The petitioners were earlier serving in the department and, therefore, the appointments given to the persons mentioned in Schedule-B, at the time when the petitioners were in service, cannot be said to be against the sanctioned strength and that of the petitioners cannot be said to be against the non-sanctioned posts. The termination of the services of the petitioners are, therefore, in clear violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India in as much as the persons, who entered in the service later than the petitioners have been retained in service and their services have been regularised while the services of the petitioners have been terminated. The appointments to the persons mentioned in Schedule-B were given in the same circumstances, i.e., during the same period and without calling their names from the Employment Exchange(s) and following the same procedure as has been followed in the case of the petitioners. This fact was stated by the petitioners in paragraph No. 6 of the writ petition and has been admitted by the respondents in their reply. If a similarly situated person has been given different treatment then that violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the relief given to such person cannot be denied to the other similarly situated persons. If a similarly situated person has been given different treatment then that violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the relief given to such person cannot be denied to the other similarly situated persons. If the persons, mentioned in Schedule-B were not entitled for giving employment like that of the petitioners but if they have been given appointments then the petitioners, also, deserve the same treatment. When similarly situated persons, who were given appointments during the period of ban and without following the procedure provided under the Rules have been allowed to continue in service and even their services have been regularised then merely because the petitioners' appointments were against non-sanctioned posts, they cannot be denied the right of regulatisation of their services. The view expressed by me finds support from the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha v. the Chancellor, Allahabad University (supra) and Vishnu Das Hundumal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (supra). Thus, the order Annexure-5 dated 31-12-93, passed by the District Education Officer (Elementary Education), Bikaner, terminating the services of the petitioners, is in violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set-aside and the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement of their services with effect from the date when the services of the persons junior to them were regularised. 8. In the result, the writ petitions, filed by the petitioners, are allowed; the order dated 31-12-93 (Annexure-5), terminating the services of the petitioners from the posts of Class IV employees in the Education Department, is quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioners and regularise their services on the post of Class IV employee with effect from the date when the services of the other junior persons were regularised and they will be entitled for the wages in the regular pay scale from the date when the persons junior to them were given appointments and if the date of their regularisation falls after 1-1-94 then the petitioners will be entitled for the pay as daily rated Class IV employees since 1-1-94 till the date of regularisation of their services and this period between 1-1-94 till the regularisation shall be treated as continuity of their services.Petition allowed. *******