Judgment :- Gulab C. Gupta, J. This order will also govern disposal of H.C.P.No. 409 of 1994 as the facts and legal submissions in both the petitions are identical. 2. The petitioners are at present in preventive detention by order dated 112. 1993 passed by the 1st respondent in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and has preferred this writ petition invoking this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India challenging the legal and constitutional validity thereof. .3. It appears that the petitioner in the company of Mahesh Deepchand Rathod, petitioner in H.C.P.No. 409 of 1994 and two others was apprehended by the police on 7. 1993 and on interrogation it was discovered that the petitioner Mahesh was in possession of 1 kg. of heroin in the suit-case carried by him. On the search of the said suit-case two cloth bags containing brown coloured powder packet in polythene bags were found. On personal search of the petitioner some incriminating documents were also found. The brown coloured powder was weighed and representative samples thereof were prepared for chemical analysis. On interrogation the petitioner Mahesh informed the officials that the heroin under seizure was brought from Mandasaur in Madhya Pradesh for being handed over to the petitioner. The heroin was supposed to be received by him from petitioner Mahesh and passed on to one Rahmatullah of Dindigul. The said Rahmatulla was also apprehended and on interrogation admitted that he was to receive the heroin in question from the petitioner under instruction from one Sikkandar of Dindigul. During investigation it was revealed that the petitioner Mahesh came in contact with this petitioner Abdul Rasheed while he was working in Safety Electronics, Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner is alleged to have left the said job and returned to his native place only to carry on illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. It was also revealed that the petitioner Mahesh agreed to work as carrier on the persuasion of the petitioner and on payment of Rs. 5,000 per trip. The petitioner also introduced the petitioner Mahesh to Mohamed Ashan who in turn introduced him to one Salim and initiated the petitioner in this illegal trafficking. It was also revealed that the petitioner Mahesh agreed to work as carrier on the persuasion of the petitioner and on payment of Rs. 5,000 per trip. The petitioner also introduced the petitioner Mahesh to Mohamed Ashan who in turn introduced him to one Salim and initiated the petitioner in this illegal trafficking. The said Salim used to give narcotic drugs to the petitioner Mahesh for being carried to Madras to be handed over to this petitioner. It was also revealed that the seized heroin was given to the petitioner Mahesh on 7. 1993 to be carried to Madras and handed over to the petitioner. The said heroin was thereafter carried on Grand Trunk Express to Madras and was seized by the police as aforesaid. The other information obtained from the petitioners and others revealed that it was a regular business and was being carried on with the active help and participation of the petitioner. 4. The petitioners were arrested on 7. 1993 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences, Madras on 7. 1993 and were remanded to judicial custody. The petitioner Abdul Rasheed filed a bail petition on 20.7.1993 before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras and the said Court by its order dated 27. 1993 granted him the conditional bail. The bail was, however, cancelled by the High Court by its order dated 19. 1993 passed in Cr.CXP.No. 8973 of 1993. Even thereafter this petitioner filed bail application on 210. 1993,whichwasdismissedon 111. 1993. He again filed another bail application on 211. 1993 which was pending consideration on the date of the impugned order. 5. Similarly, the petitioner Mahesh filed a bail application on 28. 1993 before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, but, the said bail application was dismissed on 19. 1993. Yet another bail petition of this petitioner filed on 29. 1993 was dismissed on 110. 1993. The third bail application was filed by him on 110. 1993 and dismissed on 110. 1993. Thereafter this petitioner moved the High Court on 210. 1993 but his bail application was dismissed on 111. 1993. 6. The first respondent, on consideration of facts and circumstances, as gathered during investigation as aforesaid, came to the conclusion, that the petitioners were engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. The first respondent, therefore, was satisfied that it was a fit case for exercising powers of preventive detention under the Act. 1993. 6. The first respondent, on consideration of facts and circumstances, as gathered during investigation as aforesaid, came to the conclusion, that the petitioners were engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. The first respondent, therefore, was satisfied that it was a fit case for exercising powers of preventive detention under the Act. The first respondent, however, noticed that the two petitioners were injudicial custody at present, but, came to the conclusion that since they were making successive bail applications, possibility of their being released on bail cannot be ruled out. The first respondent, therefore, passed the impugned order detaining the petitioners as aforesaid. 7. It appears that the matter was referred to the Advisory Board, which, after hearing the petitioners and considering the facts and circumstances held that there was sufficient material to support their preventive detention. The impugned orders have thus been approved as aforesaid and their legal and constitutional validity is under challenge in these writ petitions. 8. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned detention orders are illegal and unconstitutional because (1) they have been passed mechanically and without applying mind by the Authority to the facts and circumstances of the case: (2) the petitioners were denied the opportunity to examine witnesses who were present at the time of hearing before the Advisory Board, and (3) the documents given to the petitioners were in Hindi and could not be understood. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioners had been denied the reasonable opportunity of submitting the representation, and hence their detention is illegal. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, denied any illegality in the impugned order and submitted that the orders were passed after proper appreciation of facts and circumstances of the case and consideration thereof in the context of law on the subject. As regards non-examination of witnesses it is submitted that no such request was made to the Advisory Board and, therefore was no question of the request being rejected. As regards documents, it is submitted that the documents were properly explained to the petitioners in the language understood by them and were actually understood by them. In any case there has been no prejudice of any type caused to the petitioners. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petitions are devoid of substance and deserve dismissal. .9. As regards documents, it is submitted that the documents were properly explained to the petitioners in the language understood by them and were actually understood by them. In any case there has been no prejudice of any type caused to the petitioners. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petitions are devoid of substance and deserve dismissal. .9. It is well settled that the provisions of the Act have to be appreciated and understood in the context of Art. 22 of the Constitution which provides procedural safeguards in the matter of preventive detention. The constitutional imperatives of this provision as laid down in Khudiram Dass v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 are two fold: (1) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security. In Rajendra Kumar v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1255 it was clarified that there is an unmistakable connection between the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds and the right given to the detenu to have an earliest opportunity to make the representation. Since preventive detention is a serious in road on individual liberty and his justification is prevention of inherent danger of activity prejudicial to the community, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied as to the sufficiency of the grounds which justify taking of the drastic measure of preventive detention. The Court also clarified that if the requirements of Art.22(5) are satisfied the basic facts and materials which weighed with the Detaining Authority in reaching his subjective satisfaction are communicated to the detenu. The test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes are quite different. The Court also clarified that if the requirements of Art.22(5) are satisfied the basic facts and materials which weighed with the Detaining Authority in reaching his subjective satisfaction are communicated to the detenu. The test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes are quite different. For the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the Authority and for the second, the test is whether it is sufficient to enable the detenu to make his representation at the earliest opportunity which must of course be a real and effective opportunity. There can, therefore, be no doubt that if the orders have been passed by the Authority without considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without applying mind to those facts, the Courts, will have to rule that the subjective satisfaction of the Authority was unconstitutional. Similarly if the petitioner has been denied in any manner the opportunity to make real and effective representation the order of detention would be violative of constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards and liable to be set aside. Keeping these principles in view, the grievance of the petitioners may be examined to ascertain whether the impugned order suffer from illegality as alleged. .10. As regards non-application of mind, it is specifically submitted that though the detenus were in judicial custody on the date of passing of the impugned orders, the orders indicate that they were living in their native place. The original detention orders, which have been placed on record for our perusal, mention the petitioners, their fathers, name and address without stating whether they were available at that address or were inside the jail. A copy of the order has, however, been sent to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras. If these orders are to be read by themselves it will not be possible to infer that the petitioners were in Central Prison and hence it will not be possible to judge the correctness of the complaint. These orders in the opinion of this Court cannot be read by themselves and hence to be read along with the grounds of detention. Para 12 of the grounds specifically mentions that both the petitioners were arrested on 7. 1993 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.), Madras on 7. 1993 who remanded them to judicial custody. These orders in the opinion of this Court cannot be read by themselves and hence to be read along with the grounds of detention. Para 12 of the grounds specifically mentions that both the petitioners were arrested on 7. 1993 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.), Madras on 7. 1993 who remanded them to judicial custody. Para 31 of this document mentions the efforts of the petitioners Abdul Rasheed to get himself released on bail. It clearly mentions that the bail was granted but subsequently cancelled by the High Court. To the same effect is para 29 of the document which relates to the petitioner Mahesh. Para 28 mentions that respondent was “aware that you are in judicial custody at present. However, the possibility of getting released on bail again cannot be ruled out”. These facts would clearly establish that the fact that the petitioners were in jail was within the knowledge of the Detaining Authority, who was of the view that the possibility of their being released on bail cannot be ruled out. Under the circumstances, there is no justification for the submission that the respondents-Authority has ignored the fact of petitioners being in judicial custody and passed the impugned order on the assumption that they were living in their native place. 11. It was also submitted that the Authority has not taken into consideration the fact that there was no apprehension of any crime being committed by the petitioners/detenus and the petitioner Abdul Rasheed did not indulge in any criminal activity even during the period when he was enlarged on bail. It is true that the petitioners have not committed any crime after their arrest on 7. 1993, that is, within six months of the date of the impugned order. But this, in the opinion of this Court, would not give any benefit to the petitioners. As far as the petitioner Mahesh is concerned he was in custody during this period and could not have committed any crime. As far as the petitioner Abdul Rasheed is concerned, he was free for a short period only following his release on bail by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, but, during that period an application for cancellation of bail was pending consideration of the High Court. In such a situation the petitioner could not take the risk of engaging in any illegal activity. In such a situation the petitioner could not take the risk of engaging in any illegal activity. Under the circumstances, the mere fact that the petitioners did not have an opportunity of engaging themselves in any illegal activity after their arrest would not by itself vitiate the impugned order. It is not as if they were earlier not engaged in illegal trafficking. We have ourselves gone through the material on record which consists of statements of various persons including the voluntary statement of the petitioners and feel satisfied that the petitioners were part of a gang the members of which were earning their livelihood by engaging themselves in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the subjective satisfaction of the Authority rested on objective facts and hence this Court is unable to find any illegality in the impugned order. .12. As regards the grievance that documents were in Hindi, a language not understood by the petitioners, not much need be said by this Court. As far as the petitioner Mahesh is concerned, he is a Hindi knowing person and has signed the affidavit in Hindi. This complaint would, therefore, be of no relevance in his case. As regards the petitioner Abdul Rasheed he has signed his affidavit in English indicating that he is literate person. He has himself signed the endorsement on the back of the detention order and the grounds certifying that he has received the papers after understanding their contents in Tamil. This would, therefore, indicate that the grievance made before this Court is nothing but an after-thought and cannot give any benefit to the petitioners. 13. As regards the grievance of non-examination of witnesses, we have been taken through the records of the Advisory Board, which (iocs not mention any such request having been made to the Board. In the absence of any such request it is difficult to attach any importance to the grievance. Even otherwise, as laid down in Hawabi Sayed Anif Sayed Hanif (Smt) v. L. Hminglianna, (1993)1 S.C.C. 16.1 what is to be considered in all such cases is whether the petitioners had been prejudiced in any manner. On our asking it was stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners they wanted to examine the co-accused as witness before the Advisory Board. The statement of the co-accused is already on record. On our asking it was stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners they wanted to examine the co-accused as witness before the Advisory Board. The statement of the co-accused is already on record. The said statement is not likely to be used against the co-accused in the criminal case. The statement of the co-accused as would be clear from the grounds of detention only establish petitioners’ involvement in the illicit trafficking on regular basis. Even if the co-accused denies this statement the fact that 1kg of heroin was seized from the petitioners cannot be denied. Since the said seizure was made in the presence of the petitioner Abdul Rasheed. burden of explaining his presence would be on him. It is, therefore, apparent that the statement of the co-accused would not have been of any help to the petitioners in the matter. It is, therefore, possible to hold that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, relied on a decision of Delhi High Court in Godwin Chimozie v. Union of India, (1990)2 Crimes 521 in support of his submissions as aforesaid. In the said case it was found as a matter of fact that the detenu had made a request for examination of witnesses, which request was turned down for no justifiable reason. It was in that context that the Court held that there was denial of reasonable opportunity of making effective representation. The facts of the present case are different inasmuch as there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioners have made any such request to the Advisory Board and the said Board rejected their request. .14. During the course of arguments it appeared to this Court that the impugned orders of detention were passed only to avoid grant of bail to the petitioners by the Court of law. It also became apparent to this Court that the respondents may not have passed the order in case there was no possibility of grant of bail. This Court, therefore, directed the learned Public Prosecutor to explain respondents case in this behalf. It was, however, submitted that the impression of this Court has no factual basis. It also became apparent to this Court that the respondents may not have passed the order in case there was no possibility of grant of bail. This Court, therefore, directed the learned Public Prosecutor to explain respondents case in this behalf. It was, however, submitted that the impression of this Court has no factual basis. It is no doubt true that the possibility of the petitioners being released on bail was upper most while passing the impugned orders, but, the said possibility was not the basis of the order. The basis of the order, according to learned Public Prosecutor was the possibility of petitioners again engaging in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material on records, we are satisfied that the order is not intended to deny courts of law their right to grant bail. The orders only express the anxiety of the Detaining Authority to prevent the petitioners from engaging in illegal trafficking. In other words, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is intended to prevent the petitioners from engaging themselves in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs. It is, therefore, not considered necessary to pursue, the matter any further. 15. In the result, both petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs.