Judgment :- NARAYANAN NAMBIAR, J. One Kuriakose was examined as a prosecution witness in a Sessions trial. Learned Sessions Judge proceeded against him under S. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') on the premise that he had committed the offence punishable under S. 193 of the Penal Code alleging that he gave false evidence. He was examined as P.W. 14 being an attestor in Ext. P17 mahazar which was prepared in respect of the recovery of a knife effected by a Circle Inspector of Police. In the course of evidence, P.W. 14 stated that he did not know about the contents of the mahazar (Ext. P17) and that he did not witness the recovery of the knife from the house of the accused. (Of course, placing reliance on the evidence of the investigating officer, recovery of M.O. 2 weapon was accepted by the Sessions Court and the case against the accused ended in conviction). 2. Learned Sessions Judge criticised P.W. 14 in his judgment and qualified him as a person "who is prepared to mortgage his conscience to any extent to oblige a person in authority or for his own aggrandisement". Learned Judge also remarked that "from the manner in which this witness was giving evidence before Court, I am convinced that he has been stating utter falsehood before Court by denying having witnesses the recovery of the knife". Para 32 of the judgment further reads as follows : "Disguising himself as an independent and disinterested witness, P.W. 14 was simulating a veracious disposition by rubberising the facts in order to fit neatly into the mould prepared for him by the accused. He who admitted his signature in Ext. P17 mahazar relating to the recovery of M.O. 2 weapon denied having witnessed the recovery. Although he admitted that he had gone to the house of the accused when the latter led the police party there P.W. 14 would say that he merely paced up and down in the front courtyard of the house of the accused and that he did not follow the accused and the police party to the rear side of the house of the accused. He would say that he merely affixed his signature in Ext. P17 mahazar on being requested to do so by the Police. He would say that he merely affixed his signature in Ext. P17 mahazar on being requested to do so by the Police. According to him he did not read the mahazar nor was it read over to him. This is contrary to what is recited there. He admitted that he is not a person who puts his signature on being asked to do so or who signs a written paper without reading its contents. His confession that he is a close friend and neighbour of the accused and that on several occasions he has borrowed moneys from the accused, has exposed him. From the manner in which this witness was giving evidence before Court, I am convinced that he has been stating utter falsehood before Court by denying having witnessed the recovery of the knife. In spite of taking a solemn Oath, this witness had no qualms to indulge in venal perjury before Court. His palpable attempt before this Court was to salvage his helping friend. The evidence of P.W. 19 (the investigating officer) who has inspired the confidence of the Court shows that the seizure and recovery evidenced by Exts. P15 and P17 mahazars are true and believable. After having obliged the police by figuring as a witness to the recovery, P.W. 14 was making a clean somersault calculated to subvert the prosecution case against the accused. Witnesses of this sort are potential dangers to our society and it will be a travesty of justice to ignore and discharge them as inevitable aberrations. I am, prima facie, of the view that P.W. 14 was committing an offence punishable under S. 193 of the Penal Code and that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into the said offence. Accordingly, a notice in Form No. 33 of the Kerala Criminal Rules of Practice shall be issued to P.W. 14." 3. A notice under Form No. 33 of the Criminal Rules of Practice was issued to P.W. 14. On receipt of the notice, he filed an explanation before the Court. He also reminded the Court that there was no guarantee that the recitals in Ext. P17 mahazar were true and the truth or falsity of his statement on oath might not be judged on the basis of the recitals in Ext. P17. On receipt of the notice, he filed an explanation before the Court. He also reminded the Court that there was no guarantee that the recitals in Ext. P17 mahazar were true and the truth or falsity of his statement on oath might not be judged on the basis of the recitals in Ext. P17. But, learned Sessions Judge was not satisfied with the explanation and so he decided to proceed against P.W. 14. An order was, therefore, passed by the learned Sessions Judge to proceed with the enquiry and so a decision was taken to lodge a complaint with the local Chief Judicial Magistrate. Pursuant to the decision, a complaint under S. 190(1)(a) read with Ss. 195(1)(b)(ii) and 340 of the Code was made by the Sessions Judge. The challenge in this appeal is against the aforesaid proceedings initiated by the learned Sessions Judge. 4. Section 340 of the Code confers powers on a Court to proceed to find out whether an offence punishable u/S. 193 or S. 195, IPC has been committed. But before proceeding under S. 340 of the Code, the court should form an opinion that (a) it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195, IPC, (b) which appears to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in court S. 340 of the Code reads as follows : "340. Procedure in cases mentioned in S. 195 :- (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. Procedure in cases mentioned in S. 195 :- (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, - (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) ....." A reading of the Section reveals that it is not in all cases when witnesses speak falsehood that action should be initiated. There must be prima facie satisfaction on the part of the Court that such a proceeding should be initiated "for the interests of justice" and that there is prima facie evidence to come to the conclusion that false evidence has been tendered. In the absence of those conditions, the Court will not be justified in proceeding with the matter. 5. Presumably, learned Sessions Judge has chosen to proceed on the premise that P.W. 14, being an attesting witness in Ext. P17, should have the knowledge regarding the contents of the document. It must be remembered that a punchnama or a mahazar is not the record of the statement made by the attesting witnesses. It is intended to contain the minutes or record of what the investigating officer sees or witnesses. It is the contemporaneous record of his actions and not that of the attesting witnesses. (See the decision in Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, 1989 (1) Ker 521 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 154)). 6. It is intended to contain the minutes or record of what the investigating officer sees or witnesses. It is the contemporaneous record of his actions and not that of the attesting witnesses. (See the decision in Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, 1989 (1) Ker 521 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 154)). 6. It will be appropriate in this context to refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Ganesh Bhandary v. Ambunhi (1989 (2) Ker LT 882) in which the Division Bench considered whether an attestor can be attributed with the knowledge of the contents of the document. It was held that the mere fact of his being an attestor there is no presumption that he had the knowledge of the contents of the document. This is the view taken by the Privy Council in the decision in Banga Chandra Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Achariya Chowdhuri (AIR 1916 PC 110). The following observations of the Privy Council is contextually useful : "..... attestation proves no more than that the signature of an executing party has been attached to a document in the presence of a witness. It does not involve the witness in any knowledge of the contents of the deed nor affect him with notice of its provisions. It could, at the best, be used for the purpose of cross-examination, in order to extract from the witness evidence to show that he was, in fact, aware of the character of the transaction effected by the document to which his attestation was affixed." This view has been reiterated by the Privy Council in the decision in Pandurang Krishnaji v. M. Tukaram (AIR 1922 PC 20) as follows (at p. 22 of AIR) : "Before their Lordships consider the circumstances in which that attestation took place, they think it is desirable to emphasize once more that attestation of a deed by itself estops a man from denying nothing whatever excepting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed. It conveys neither directly nor by implication any knowledge of the contents of the document, and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that a man consented to the transaction which the document effects." 7. It conveys neither directly nor by implication any knowledge of the contents of the document, and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that a man consented to the transaction which the document effects." 7. Learned Sessions Judge found fault with P.W. 14 when he deposed that he had not read the mahazar nor was it read over to him and further found that "this is contrary to what is recited there". We went through Ext. P77 and we found no indication therein that the witness has read the document or that the same was read over to him. So a ready conclusion need not necessarily be made that the witness had knowledge about the contents of the mahazar. 8. It appears that learned Sessions Judge took it for granted that what the witness had deposed in court was false as his evidence was not in consonance with the recitals in Ext. P17. Just because there is conflict between his evidence and the recitals in the document, it cannot be concluded that what the witness said in court is untrue because the real fact perhaps be just the other way round. It is possible that the witness was tendering true evidence and the contents of the mahazar could be wrong. Unless there are other materials before the court to determine that the witness perjured in court, proceeding cannot be taken against him. A witness is expected to speak the truth and he must be encouraged to do so even if the statement before the court is against his previous statement, without the danger of exposing him for prosecution for perjury. 9. It is not every statement made by a witness which the court would wish to examine further for finding out whether there is perjury. If the court is to notice every falsehood that is sworn to by parties in courts, there would be very little time for courts for any serious work other than directing prosecution for perjury. The gravity of the false statement, the circumstance under which such statement is made, the object of making such statement and its tendency to impede and impair normal flow of the course of justice are matters for consideration when the court decides on the propriety of instituting a complaint for perjury. (See : Thomman v. IInd Addl. The gravity of the false statement, the circumstance under which such statement is made, the object of making such statement and its tendency to impede and impair normal flow of the course of justice are matters for consideration when the court decides on the propriety of instituting a complaint for perjury. (See : Thomman v. IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, 1993 (2) Ker LT 774) : (1994 Cri LJ 48). The power under S. 340 of the Code should be used with care and due consideration. The proceedings under S. 340 of the Code should not be initiated as a matter of course, even when the witnesses give contradictory evidence. In a case where there is no legal evidence for the success, prosecution should be avoided. The courts should act with utmost circumspection in launching prosecution. 10. In the decision referred to above, learned Sessions Judge initiated proceedings against P.W. 9 therein for an offence punishable under S. 193 IPC. That was a case where the witness gave evidence contrary to his statement recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code. Finding that witness resiled from his earlier statement, the Sessions Judge resorted to an action contemplated in S. 340 of the Code. Relying on the decision in Ningappa v. Emperor (AIR 1941 Bom 408 : (43 Cri LJ 167), one among us (Thomas, J.) held that "to prosecute a man who has resiled from a false statement made under S. 164 is to engage him in the belief that it pays to sell a lie and stick to it. It is better that a man should escape punishment for having made false statement under S. 164 than that he should be induced to believe that it is to his interest, however false the statement may have been, to adhere to it, and thereby save himself from prosecution. The danger of such a course leading to the conviction of innocent persons is too great to be risked". Though in a different context, a Division Bench of this Court in Janardhanan v. State of Kerala (1978 Ker LT 546) : (1979 Cri LJ NOC 96) has cautioned the presiding officers of the subordinate courts to be circumspect in its proceedings in launching prosecution against witnesses under S. 193, IPC. Though in a different context, a Division Bench of this Court in Janardhanan v. State of Kerala (1978 Ker LT 546) : (1979 Cri LJ NOC 96) has cautioned the presiding officers of the subordinate courts to be circumspect in its proceedings in launching prosecution against witnesses under S. 193, IPC. We feel that tin view of the aforesaid legal position the evidence of P.W. 14 was not of that nature as to warrant the initiation of proceedings under S. 340 of the Code. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash the proceedings impugned herein. Appeal allowed.