K. L. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the name of Smt. Yasmeen alias Megha mathur by her alleged husband and next friend Mohd. Hussain for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for setting her at liberty from the alleged unlawful custody of her parents. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner she got married with Mohd. Hussain on 9. 9. 1993 after conversion of her religion to Muslim Religion according to Muslim Customs and a Nikahnama was executed on 9. 9. 1993 at Lucknow without consent of her parents. The petitioner along with her alleged husband started living together and visiting friends and relatives and also visited her parents together on 12. 9. 1993. The parents of the petitioner did not allow her to return with her alleged husband when he approached her parents on 14. 9. 1993 for rukhsati. The alleged husband came to know that his wife was being tortured and given no food and was being pressurised by her parents to divorce her husband. The husband of the petitioner tried his best to free the petitioner from the clutches of her parents but he failed in his mission as the opposite parties and their friends threatened him with dire consequences. He has therefore, filed this writ petition for selling the petitioner at liberty as she is being illegally detained by her parents against her will and there is danger to her life. ( 3 ) THIS writ petition came up before this Court on 17. 9. 1993 and the Court was pleased to issue notice to opposite parties to produce Smt. Yasmeen alias Megha Mathur in the Court on 8. 10. 1993. On receiving the said notice, the opposite parties represented themselves before this Court through the learned Advocate Sri L. B. Singh with a prayer that they may be permitted first to file a counter affidavit in reply to the allegations made in the writ petition. The learned counsel raised preliminary objection also against the maintainability of this writ petition on several grounds as well as the propriety of the issue of notice to produce the girl in contravention to the rules of his court. The learned counsel raised preliminary objection also against the maintainability of this writ petition on several grounds as well as the propriety of the issue of notice to produce the girl in contravention to the rules of his court. ( 4 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties, the most vital and substantial allegations of the alleged marriage of the petitioner megha Mathur with Mohd. Hussain were clearly and positively denied and the allegation of her conversion to Muslim Religion was refuted on fact and in law. It was, however, admitted that Megha Mathur is their daughter, who was studying in B. A. II in the Avadh Girls College, Lucknow. But it has been pleaded that she got an attack of mental disease on 8. 8. 1993 and she was taken to Dr. S. C. Rai who referred her for treatment at Agra and as such, she is receiving treatment in the Mental Hospital Agra and is staying there with the elder brother of the opposite party No. 1, who has after his retirement, permanently settled at Agra. The allegations of alleged torture, harassment and threats to the petitioner have also been specifically denied. It has specifically been stated that Megha Mathur is in proper custody, care and safety of her parents and is receiving proper treatment for her mental disease in Mental Hospital, Agra and staying with her uncle. ( 5 ) THE opposite parties also filed an application for review and recall of the order-dated 17. 9. 1993, regarding the production of the girl in the Court for the reasons mentioned in the accompanying affidavit. In view of the sufficient and satisfactory cause shown by the opposite parties and the disputed facts of vital importance, it has not been considered necessary by this Court to enforce the compliance of its earlier direction to produce the girl in the Court. ( 6 ) A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner through her next friend Mohd. Husnain reiterating the earlier allegations and disputing the facts mentioned in the counter affidavit which need not be repeated. ( 7 ) I have heard the learned Advocate Sri B. K. Shukla and Sri. S. K. A vashti on behalf of the petitioner; Sri. Husnain reiterating the earlier allegations and disputing the facts mentioned in the counter affidavit which need not be repeated. ( 7 ) I have heard the learned Advocate Sri B. K. Shukla and Sri. S. K. A vashti on behalf of the petitioner; Sri. K. S. Bajpai and Sri I. B. Singh, the -learned Advocates on behalf of the opposite parties and have perused the entire record. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary point that the writ petition is not maintainable against a private person, without impleading the State as an opposite party. He elucidated further that the enforcement of Fundamental Rights through a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be enforced only against the State and not against a private person for the reasons that remedies are available under the ordinary Law before the appropriate courts of civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction. In support of his cementation he has relied upon several decisions of the Hon. Supreme Court and other High Courts which I discuss in the following paragraphs: (I) In the case of Smt. Vidya Verma v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma, the Hon. Supreme Court held that violation of the right to personal liberty by a private individual is not within the purview of Article 21. Therefore, a person whose right to personal liberty is infringed by a private individual must seek his remedy under the ordinary law and not under Article 32. The Hon. Supreme Court referred to two earlier decisions of the Court in the case of A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, and followed the law already declared without discussing at length the earlier decisions of the Court. However, the following observations made by the Hon. Supreme Court in the cited case may be usefully reproduced as follows: As the question that arises here has been discussed at length in two earlier decisions of this Court, we need not examine the matter in any detail. The fundamental right that is said to be infringed is the one conferred by Article 21: the right to personal liberty. The fundamental right that is said to be infringed is the one conferred by Article 21: the right to personal liberty. In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A. I. R. 1950 S. C. 27 (A) four of the six learned Judges who were in that case held that the word law in Article 21 referred to State. made law and not to law in the abstract. They rejected the contention that this was the same as the due process clause in the American Constitution. One learned Judge dissented and one expressed no opinion on this point. Patalljali Sastri, J. (as he then was said at P. 74 that as a rule constitutional safeguards are directed against the State and its organs and that protection against violation of rights by individuals must be sought in the ordinary law; and R. S. Das, 1. dealing with the question of preventive detention said at pp. 120- 121 that Article 21 protects a person against preventive detention by the executive without the sanction of a law made by the legislature. (7) This principle was applied to Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (1) by a Bench of five Judges in PD. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 59 (B) who held that violation of rights of property by a private individual is not within the purview of these Articles, therefore, a person whose rights of property are infringed by a private individual must seek his remedy under the ordinary law and not under Article 32. Art. 21 was not directly involved but the learned Judges referring to Article 1 (1) said at page 60. It is clear that it is a declaration of the fundamental right of private property in the same negative form in which article 31 declares the fundamental right to life and liberty. There is no express reference to the State in Article 21. But could it be suggested on that account that that article was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals? The words except by procedure established by law plainly exclude such a suggestion. There is no express reference to the State in Article 21. But could it be suggested on that account that that article was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals? The words except by procedure established by law plainly exclude such a suggestion. They held that the language of Article 31 (1) was similar and decided that Article 31 (1) did not apply to invasions of a right by a private individual and consequently no writ under Article 32 would lie in such a case. For the same reasons we hold that the present petition which is founded on Article 21 does not lie under Article 32. It is accordingly (II) In the criminal appeal of Mohd. Iqram Husain v. State of U. P. and others, almost similar question was raised and the Hon. Supreme Court answered the question in the following words: The writ of habeas corpus issues not only for release from detention by the State but also for release from private detention. At Common Law a writ of habeas corpus was available to the husband for regaining the custody of his wife if she was wrongfully detained by any on from him without her consent. What amounts to wrongful detention of the wife is, of course, a question for the Court to decide in each case and different circumstances may exist either entitling or disentitling a husband to this remedy. There was also no material irregularity vitiating the order; for inexpediency is not the same thing as irregularity. Exigency of the writ at the instance of a husband is very rare in English Law, and in India the writ of habeas corpus is probably never used by a husband to regain his wife and the alternative remedy under 5. 100 he Code of Criminal Procedure is always used. Then there is the remedy of a Civil Suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Husbands take re-course to the latter when the detention does not amount to an offence and to the former if it does. In both these remedies all the issues of fact can be tried and the writ of habeas corpus is festinum remedium and the power can only be exercised in a clear case. Husbands take re-course to the latter when the detention does not amount to an offence and to the former if it does. In both these remedies all the issues of fact can be tried and the writ of habeas corpus is festinum remedium and the power can only be exercised in a clear case. It is of course singularly inappropriate in cases where the petitioner is himself charged with a criminal offence in respect of the very person for whose custody he demands the writ. The Hon. Supreme Court further recorded a note of caution in the following words: A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged to be his wife does not issue as a matter of course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course especially when a man seeks the assistance of the Court to regain the custody of a woman. Before a Court accedes to this request it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact the husband and further whether valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place. (III) In the case of Prasad Kumar v. C. N. Ravindran and another, facts and questions of similar nature were involved. The husband wanted to seek the custody of a girl on the ground of marriage from the custody of her: parents. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court considered the law laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court and made a specific mention of the following observations made in the case of Mohd. Iqram Husain (supra):5 A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged to be his wife does not issue as a matter of course. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course especially when a man seeks the assistance of the Court to regain the custody of a woman. Before a Court accedes to this request it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact the husband and further whether valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place. Before a Court accedes to this request it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ is in fact the husband and further whether valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place. (IV) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the decision of the High Court in the case of Mahesh Prasad v. Station Officer, Kotwali, Allahabad and another. But I need not refer this case in details as the criminal file against this judgment of the Allahabad High Court was considered and decided by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Iqram Husain (supra) which related to the production of Kaniz Fatima, daughter of the appellant who was illegally wedded wife of the petitioner Mahesh Prasad who filed the writ petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (V) The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ritam (Siddhanh) v. Arvind Singh Chauhan and two others This related to the writ of habeas corpus seeking the custody of a minor son from the father to the mother. The reported judgment, however, docs not carry the full description of the respondents to show whether the State or any public officer was impleaded as respondent or not. However, the facts of this case are materially different from those of this present writ petition and the question of maintainability of the writ petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus against a private person without impleading the State or its public officer was not raised and considered in this case. ( 9 ) AFTER careful perusal of the decisions referred to above, I find the clear-distinction in the matter of Law relating to the issue of writs. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, a fundamental right has been created to move the Hon. Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, a fundamental right has been created to move the Hon. Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India. By Article 32 (2) of the Constitution of India, Hon. Supreme Court has been empowered to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warrant and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part-III which includes Art. 32 also. ( 10 ) THE High Court has also been given power to enforce the fundamental rights but it has been given wider and additional power to issue directions or orders or writs to any Government, authority or person. The relevant provisions are contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India which are necessary to be reproduced below for the purpose of appreciation: (I) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III and for any other purpose. (1) The power conferred by clause (I) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or part, arises, for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32. ( 11 ) A reading of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India makes a clear distinction with the provision of Article 32 of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) A reading of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India makes a clear distinction with the provision of Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Hon. Supreme Court can enforce the fundamental rights only whereas the High Court has been empowered to enforce not only the fundamental rights but also any other legal rights or statutory obligations and to dispense justice in extraordinary circumstances. The case of Smt. Vidya Verma (supra) arises out of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India filed by an Advocate for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of lady as her next friend. The State was not impleaded as the respondent to the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances the Hon. Supreme Court held that since there is no infringement of a fundamental right by a State or the Union Government or by a public officer of the Government without the sanction of law, the writ petition for the enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable against a private personal. The earlier decisions in the case of A. K. Gopal an (supra) and PD. Shamdasani (supra), were confined also to the enforcement of fundamental right against the State or its instrumentality as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the writ petitions under Article 31 of the Constitution of India were filed. ( 12 ) IN the criminal appeal filed by Mohd. lqram Husain (supra), the Hon. Supreme Court was considering an appeal arising out of a decision of the High Court rendered in a writ petition of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 491, C. P. C. , by one Mahesh Prasad had alleged himself to be the husband of Smt. Kaniz Fatima alias Sheila, daughter of Mohd. Iqram Husain, Advocate of Allahabad. Therefore, the Hon. Supreme Court appreciated distinction and held that The writ of habeas corpus issues not only for reiease from detention by the State but also for reiease from private detention. At Common Law a writ of habeas corpus was available to the husband for regaining the custody of his wife if she was wrongfully detained by anyone from him without her Consent. At Common Law a writ of habeas corpus was available to the husband for regaining the custody of his wife if she was wrongfully detained by anyone from him without her Consent. What amounts to wrongful detention of the wife is of course a question for the Court to decide in each case and different circumstances may exist either entitling or disentitling a husband to this remedy. T It was further held that, on the power can only be exercised in a clear case. The note of caution was also recorded to the effect that though a writ of right, it is not a writ, of course, especially when a man seeks assistance of the Court to regain custody of a woman. ( 13 ) AFTER considering the Judicial pronouncements and relevant provisions of the Constitution of India, I come to the conclusion that the present writ petition falls within the ambit of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India which permits the issuance of a writ against a private person also without impleading the State against which there is no allegation of infringement of the fundamental right and that the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable against a private person also but a writ of habeas corpus can not be issued in a routine manner unless and until the court is satisfied with the necessity of issuing such a writ in a clear case. The objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against a private party without impleading the State as a respondent, is, therefore, overruled. If the Court issues the writ after being fully satisfied with the established facts and the necessity of the writ or direction and the party against whom the writ or direction is issued, does not obey it, the Court has no legal or factual obstacle in directing the State or its executive officers without their impleadment as respondent in the writ petition to enforce the compliance of the writ or the direction issued to a private party. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties regarding the maintainability of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without impleading the State is therefore, overruled. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties regarding the maintainability of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without impleading the State is therefore, overruled. ( 14 ) ANOTHER preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that the description of the alleged husband or next friend of the petitioner was neither complete nor correct as required under Chapter IX Rule 4 of the High Court Rules. The contention that the full and correct particulars of the alleged husband or next friend have not been given if the description of the panics in the writ petition, was found correct but this defect is curable one and the petitioner cannot be penalised for such omission or mistake and, therefore, this Court has got the correction and full particulars of the next friend incorporated in the writ petition by its order dated 21/12/1993. This defect or omission in the description of the next friend thus, stands rectified. The State has not been considered to be the necessary party and, therefore, the impleadment of the State has not been required as the writ petition is maintainable even without impleading the State or its public officers. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, further pointed out that annexure-I to the writ petition a so-called transliteration or translation of the alleged Nikahnama has not been filed in accordance with requirement of provisions of the High Court Rules. This defect was also found curable and the petitioner was directed to file document in accordance with the compliance of the Rules of this Court and accordingly, a direction has already been given to the petitioner. If the document has not been filed in accordance with the provisions of the High Court Rules, it can be ignored and excluded from the consideration by this Court at the appropriate stage in the relevant proceedings but the filing of a defective document would not disentitle the petitioner or suiter from maintaining its petition or suit. Therefore, this objection also does not last. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite parties has also raised an objection relating to the lack of jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench in entertaining the present writ petition for the reason that on 16/9/1993, the petitioner Km. Therefore, this objection also does not last. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite parties has also raised an objection relating to the lack of jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench in entertaining the present writ petition for the reason that on 16/9/1993, the petitioner Km. Megha Mathur was not residing in Lucknow and she was already at Agra in connection with her treatment much before 14/9/1993. In support of this objection a reference to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vishambhar Dayal Tripathi v. U. P. Govt. , has been made. I do not find substance in this contention either on the basis of facts or in law. Admittedly, as it appears from the counter affidavit of the opposite parties, Megha Mathur is the daughter of the opposite parties, who are residing at Lucknow and Megha Mathur was studying in B. A.-II in Avadh Girls College, Lucknow but she got an attack of mental disease on 8/8/1993 and thereafter, only for the sake of her specialised treatment at Agra, she has been temporarily shifted to Agra to receive specialised treatment at Agra and there she has been residing with her uncle. For the purpose of territorial jurisdiction it is the ordinary residence which is taken into account. Km Megha Mathur has been ordinarily residing in Lucknow pursuing her studies but temporarily for the sake of her specialised treatment, she has gone to Agra. Therefore, temporary shifting for treatment of Km. Megha Mathur does not oust the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, according to the allegations in the writ petition, cause of action appears to have arisen at Lucknow. According to the pronouncement of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin9, the Lucknow Bench has got the jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, even if a part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction assigned to the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite parties further referred to the two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rakeshdhar Tripathi v. Union of India, and in the case Dayashankar Bhardwaj v. Chief of the Air Star. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the opposite parties further referred to the two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rakeshdhar Tripathi v. Union of India, and in the case Dayashankar Bhardwaj v. Chief of the Air Star. It was held in the first case that the cause, of action has no relation whatever either with the defence which might be set up nor does it depends upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff/petitioner. The relief is given on the facts established or found by a court. The plaintiff! petitioner is required to prove his case on the grounds which are taken in plaint or petition for succeeding in the suit. In the second case, it was held that a person residing anywhere in the country being aggrieved by an order of Government Central or State or authority or person may have a right of action at law but it can be enforced or the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked of that High Court only within whose territorial limits the cause of action only in part arises. The cause of action arises by action of the Government or authority or person and not by the residence. of the person aggrieved. ( 17 ) IN the present case the petitioner and her next friend has sought a writ of habeas corpus against her parents on the allegations of conversion to Islam and marriage with the next friend according to Muslim Law and that she has been illegally detained by her parents against her will. Irrespective of the truth or otherwise or the application of law to the facts, the jurisdiction of the Court shall be determined with reference to the, allegations in the writ petition and the defence will not be looked into for the obvious reason that the petitioner succeeds or fails in the relief sought, only on the strength of the cause of action mentioned in the petition. The ordinary residence or temporary residence of either of the parties will not change the maintainability of a proceeding based on a cause of action revealed in the petition. Therefore, on considering the allegations in the writ petition, I come to the conclusion that he writ petition is maintainable before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The ordinary residence or temporary residence of either of the parties will not change the maintainability of a proceeding based on a cause of action revealed in the petition. Therefore, on considering the allegations in the writ petition, I come to the conclusion that he writ petition is maintainable before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the petitioner being nineteen years old, had voluntarily converted herself to the Muslim Religion and vehemently married her next friend Mohd. Husnain on 9. 9. 1993 at Lucknow and executed a Nikahnama in respect of the marriage and therefore, she was entitled to live with her next friend and husband. But when she visited the house of her parents, the opposite parties, she was not allowed to return with her husband and she is being kept in illegal custody of her parents. The learned counsel for the opposite parties in the affidavit disputed the conversion of Megha Mathur to Islam and disputed her alleged marriage. It was further stated that Megha Mathur received an attack of mental disease as early as on 8th August, 1993 and since then, she has been receiving treatment for mental disorder at the Mental Hospital Agra and she has been residing with her elder uncle who has permanently settled there. The custody of Megha Mathur has been admitted by the opposite parties but the allegation of illegal custody has been emphatically denied. Thus, the facts relating Lo alleged con version from Hinduism to Islam and marriage with Mohd. Hussain, have been clearly denied and disputed beyond doubt However, both the parties have placed on record the necessary material in support of their respective allegations. ( 19 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, photocopies of the High School Examination 1982 relating to Megha Mathur Nikahnama, affidavit of Megha Mathur, mark-sheet of B. A. Examination, character certificate of Mohd. Husnain, a report by Megha Mathur to the S. P. Lucknow and a certificate of training by the Institute of Tourism Management, Lucknow, have been filed. Photocopies of the prescriptions relating to Megha Mathur right from 19. 8. 1983 upto November, 1993 and a certificate of the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Agra dated 27. 12. 1993, have been filed. Husnain, a report by Megha Mathur to the S. P. Lucknow and a certificate of training by the Institute of Tourism Management, Lucknow, have been filed. Photocopies of the prescriptions relating to Megha Mathur right from 19. 8. 1983 upto November, 1993 and a certificate of the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Agra dated 27. 12. 1993, have been filed. ( 20 ) A perusal of the pleadings and material on record shows that on the alleged date of conversion and marriage i. e. 9/9/1993, the petitioner Megha Mathur had attained the age of nineteen years and had become major. The facts. of alleged conversion of Megha Mathur to Islam and her marriage with Mohd. Husnain, have been seriously disputed. ( 21 ) THIS Court does not undertake the detailed examination of the disputed facts as a court of trial in the writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court can only proceed on the facts established from the pleadings and can grant the relief only in a clear cut case. In the present case, the pleadings of the parties only establish the, facts that the girl is a Hindu and the boy is a Muslim and both of them have attained majority according to their respective religion and law of the land but these pleadings do not at all establish beyond doubt very clearly that Megha Mathur has voluntarily and legally adopted Muslim Religion, relinquished Hindu Religion and voluntarily and legally married Mohd. Husnain. Apparently, these allegations do not carry conviction. Learned counsel for the parents has contended that mere conversion of a person from one religion to another religion for the limited purpose of performing marriage, cannot be a valid conversion in the eye of law and further more, speaking specifically, conversion of a Hindu to a Muslim Religion only for the purpose of performing marriage and without having any faith or belief in the Muslim Religion is not permitted in Muslim Law. The learned counsel further pointed out that there is no iota of material on record even to indicate that Megha Mathur had developed faith and belief in the Muslim religion and had started performing religious ceremonies, reading Quran and paying namaz according to the requirement of the religion and she continued performing religious ceremonies, reading Quran and paying namaz according to Muslim Religion after her alleged conversion. ( 22 ) THE learned counsel further stated that without a valid conversion of a Hindu girl to Islam, a marriage by a Hindu girl with a Muslim boy, is ab initio illegal. He further contended that the alleged Nikahnama is by itself not the required evidence to establish a valid marriage in law. The facts relating to the number and the owner of the house in which the conversion and Nikahnama arc alleged to have taken place, have been emphatically denied. Even, the parentage of Mohd. Husnain has been denied. A description of Mohd. Husnain as next friend of the petitioner in the description of parties in the writ petition was wrongly made which has been got corrected in the course of hearing of this writ petition under orders of this Court. In view of the disputed facts relating to conversion and marriage of Megha Mathur a Hindu girl, with her next friend Mohd. Husnain, this is not a clear case in which issue of a writ of habeas corpus is called for. The alleged conversion of Megha Mathur to Muslim Religion only for the purpose of performing marriage with a Muslim boy without the material of her faith and belief in Muslim Religion and practice thereof before or after the alleged conversion, cannot be accepted on its face in the eye of law, to be a valid conversion. If the conversion of Megha Mathur to Islam is not a valid one, then the alleged married with a Muslim loses its foundation and cannot be accepted for a moment even for maintaining the interim direction. ( 23 ) THE learned counsel Mr. K. S. Bajpai read at length the provisions of Islamic Law relating to the valid marriage. According to Mr. Syed Amir Ali, who is considered to be an authority on Muslim Law, The validity of a marriage under the Muhammadan law depends on two conditions: first, on the capacity of the parties to marry each other; secondly, on the celebration of the marriage according to the forms described in the place where the marriage is celebrated or which are recognised as legal by the customary law of the Mussalmans. ( 24 ) THE learned counsel pointed out that Megha Mathur being mentally depressed and having disease of mental disorder could not be said to have the capacity to marry and as such, the Nikahnama even if got executed and signed by Megha Mathur, cannot be a valid document of marriage when she was not in a position mentally to understand the contents, purposes and consequences thereof. He further pointed out that besides, the alleged Nikahnama an invalid document there is no iota of any evidence or even averments in the writ petition that the celebration of the marriage was made at all and according to the forms prescribed and recognised according to Muslim Religion, in the place where the marriage was first celebrated or which was recognised as legal by the customary law by the Mussalman. I find substance in these arguments. ( 25 ) THERE is material on record on behalf of the opposite parties to show that Megha Mathur had an attack of mental disorder and depression on 8th August, 1993 and since then, she remained. in treatment for the mental depression. She used to have attacks of mental depression according to the diagnosis and prescription given by the doctors and she was ultimately referred to Mental Hospital Agra, where she has been receiving required treatment till the last day of arguments. The learned counsel Mr. B. K. Shukla, appearing for the petitioner, referred to the love letters of Megha Mathur and showed one original letter alleged to have been written by her blood and some photocopies of other latter. He pointed out that Megha Mathur had love affair, with Mohd. Husnain for five years prior to the alleged marriage. ( 26 ) I have carefully gone through these photocopies and find that Megha Mathur had become a victim for the last five years to the vagaries of adolescence and had been emotionally disturbed and due to this stale of her mind, it was but natural and physically consequential that she started having attacks of mental disorder. In this state of mind, any act done by her could not have been considered to be a normal act done by normal person after fully understanding the consequences of the act. Therefore, these letters do not create a conviction in the Court that the alleged marriage of Megha Mathur with Mohd. In this state of mind, any act done by her could not have been considered to be a normal act done by normal person after fully understanding the consequences of the act. Therefore, these letters do not create a conviction in the Court that the alleged marriage of Megha Mathur with Mohd. Husnain was a result of long understanding, free violation and sensible decision. No doubt, such an emotionally disturbed girl deserved immediate attention, care and medical treatment but it could not be given by anyone except by parents who came to know only on 8th August 1993, when she actually got attack of mental depression and had become abnormal in the house. Since then, her parents have been looking after her well and have consulted the experts of Mental Hospital at Agra and under whose supervision, she has been receiving treatment at Agra and is residing with her elder uncle, the real brother of her father who has settled down permanently at Agra after retirement. In these circumstances, the custody of Megha Mathur by the opposite parties as her parents or by her elder uncle at Agra, cannot be said to be illegal at all. In fact, in these circumstances, it is the most appropriate custody which can be possible in the case of a girl who has been emotionally and mentally disturbed and who is in dire necessity of proper treatment at proper place. ( 27 ) THE learned counsel Mr. Shukla submitted that even if the petitioners next friend Mohd. Husnain does not become entitled to her custody, the petitioner is herself entitled to be set at liberty for the reason that she is being illegally detained against her will and she is being tortured to divorce her husband and, therefore, a writ of habeas corpus, should be issued. In my opinion, the argument docs not carry force. A girl who has been emotionally disturbed for a long time and has started receiving attacks of mental disorder and depression, and has been receiving due and proper treatment at proper place at the expenses of her parents who can give the best and maximum of their lives to their daughter, should be snatched from parental care and should be brought on road in such a helpless condition and frame of mind without proper care, shelter and safety. She is only a student of B. A.-II. She is only a student of B. A.-II. Her alleged next friend Mohd. Husnain is also unemployed and is still himself without proper settlement in life. In the adversities of life, what to talk of a next friend or a friend indeed, even the blood relations hardly come forward to help the helpless. Therefore, this Court does not consider it in the interest of the petitioner Megha Mathur to set her at liberty, made her free, uncured, unsafe, helpless and open to be exploited by anyone including her so called next friend. ( 28 ) A writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a man to obtain possession of a woman alleged to be his wife, does nol issue as a matter of course, especially, when a man seeks the assistance of the court to regain the custody of a woman. Before a court can think of doing it, it must satisfy itself at least prima facie that the person claiming the writ, is in fact the husband and further, whether valid marriage between him and the woman could at all have taken place. ( 29 ) AS already mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, I have come to the conclusion that the alleged conversion of Megha Mathur to Islam only for the purpose of marrying her next friend Mohd. Husnain, was not a valid one on its face and as such, she was not permitted by Muslim law to marry a Muslim and secondly, she had no mental capacity to contract a marriage with any person. Even, the alleged marriage with the next friend Mohd. Husnain was prima facie illegal in as much as it was neither performed according to the legal requirements of Hindu law or according to the requirements of Muslim law. However, in view of the fact that the next friend Mohd. Husnain calling himself to be husband of Megha Mathur, has been vigorously prosecuting this writ petition, the issuance of a writ to set Megha Mathur free out of the control of her parents where are well looking after her interests and medical treatment, would involved a dangerous consequence to the life of the petitioner herself. Husnain calling himself to be husband of Megha Mathur, has been vigorously prosecuting this writ petition, the issuance of a writ to set Megha Mathur free out of the control of her parents where are well looking after her interests and medical treatment, would involved a dangerous consequence to the life of the petitioner herself. Therefore, in the interest of the life of the petitioner herself, the issuance of a writ is not called for and the parents cannot be required to produce her before the Court so long as she is not mentally cured and does not become a normal girl. It is for this reason that despite the insistence of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the interim direction of this Court to produce the girl before the court, this court did not find the necessity and propriety to enforce its earlier interim direction to produce the girl before the Court after seeing the reply of her parents and the relevant material relating to her especialized treatment of her mental disorder, because, no useful purpose could have been served by making necessary inquiries into the allegations of conversion and marriage when she was herself not mentally sound and she dip not know the legal requirements of law relating to conversion to Islam and to the marriage with a Muslim according to Muslim law. Even if had she been brought before the Court and answered the allegation in the affirmative, this Court would not have acted upon her affirmations, in view of the fact that she was not mentally normal and in view of the legal position that there was no valid conversion to I am and valid marriage according to Mohammadan law. Mere statement by a person that he or she has converted to Muslim Religion and has married a Muhammadan, can not be accepted unless and until the law recognises such a con version or marriage as valid. ( 30 ) IN the present case, the averments made in the writ petition about the alleged conversion and marriage do not merely depend on the statement of Megha Mathur but require the sanction of law which has been found wanting on the face of the averments made in the writ petition itself and on the basis of the material brought before the Court. The Court cannot enforce any conversion or marriage unless such conversion or marriage are found valid in law. ( 31 ) AS a result of discussion and for the aforesaid reasons, I find that the alleged conversion of the petitioner to Muslim Religion and Marriage with her next friend Mohd. Husnain are not valid in law. I further find that neither the petitioner Megha Mathur deserves to be set at liberty and out of the control of her parents in the state of her mental disorder and during the course of especialized treatment of her mental disease nor her next friend Mohd. Husnain is entitled to the custody of Megha Mathur. I further find that the custody ofthe parents of Megha Mathur and of her elder uncle at Agra, is most proper in the interest of the health and life of Megha Mathur and it cannot be termed as illegal or improper at all. I further find that this is not a clear-cut case where, the writ of habeas corpus should ordinarily issue and is not a fit case for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus where the custody of a woman, is claimed and sought by a man. ( 32 ) IN the result, this writ petition has no merit and is hereby dismissed. Writ Petition dismissed. .