JUDGMENT 1. - This petition has been filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for setting aside the orders of the Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Srikaranpur dated January 02, 1988 taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 323, 342 and 392, I.P.C. against the accused-petitioner and also of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar dated August 27, 1991, confirming the said order and for quashing the proceedings in which the said order had been passed by the Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Srikaranpur. 2. The facts of the case giving rise to this petition may be summarised thus. In October, 1986, the non-petitioner No. 2 Ajmer Singh, filed a complaint under Sections 323, 341 and 394, I.P.C. against the accused-petitioner with the allegations in short, that at about 11 P.M. on 23.10.86 the accused-petitioner knocked the door of his house, he opened the door, the accused-petitioner and 4-5 constables who then accompanied him forcibly put him in the truck and took him away. He was mercilessly beaten and his gold `Kada', watch and Rs. 440/-were snatched away. A report was lodged in the Police Station, Kesrisinghpura and letters were also written to the higher authorities of the Central Government and State Government but with no avail. He then filed complaint in the Court of the Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Srikaranpura. It was sent under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. to the S.H.O., Kesrisinghpura. Police did nothing. Thereafter, another complaint was filed on July 18, 1987 with similar averments. The learned Magistrate recorded the statements of the complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and his witnesses under Section 202, Cr.P.C. By order dated January 02, 1988, he took cognizance under Sections 323, 312 and 392 I.P.C. against the accused-petitioner and bailable warrant for Rs. 100/- was issued against him. Against this order, revision petition No. 21/88 was filed in the court of the Sessions Judge, Sriganganagar. It was transferred and heard by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar. On the date of hearing, none was present for and on behalf of the accused-petitioner. After hearing the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the revision petition was dismissed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar by his order dated August 27,1991. 3. It was transferred and heard by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar. On the date of hearing, none was present for and on behalf of the accused-petitioner. After hearing the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the revision petition was dismissed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar by his order dated August 27,1991. 3. It is stated in para No. 4 and para No. 9 of the petition that on the date of hearing i.e. on August 27, 1991, lawyers were on strike and as such the petitioner's counsel could not appear before the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar when the revision petition was taken up for hearing. At the commencement of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the points raised in this petition have not been dealt with in the impugned order as the Advocates were on strike and as such petitioner's counsel could not appear before the learned Sessions Judge No. 1, Sriganganagar when the revision petition was taken up for hearing. 4. The basic question for consideration in this case is whether on the aforesaid ground the petition should be decided on merits. This question has already been decided on merits. This question has already been decided in D.B. Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 227 of 1991 moved in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 411/91 Hari Ram Sharma v. R.S.E.B. & Others decided on May 21, 1992 by the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The relevant paragraphs of this decision run as under: "The question that arises for decision is as to whether the lawyers can be allowed to hold the courts at ransom and put their working out of gear by taking a decision to boy-cot the courts at any time according to their wishes and convenience without caring for their duty not only towards the courts buy also towards the clients who had engaged them and whether such absence on their part at the time of hearing of the cases can be considered to be a sufficient cause for restoration of the matters dismissed in default. Our answer to this question is clearly in the negative. One of us (N.C. Kochhar, J.), vide order dated 27.2.1991, while deciding S.B. Civil Misc. Our answer to this question is clearly in the negative. One of us (N.C. Kochhar, J.), vide order dated 27.2.1991, while deciding S.B. Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 77/90 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 43/78 "Maula Bux (deceased through legal representatives) v. Sonallal", after discussing the decisions of the Apex Court in cases " Rafiq & Anr. v. Munsi Lal & Anr." ( AIR 1981 SC 1400 ) and " Smt. Lachhi Tiwari & Ors. v. Director of Land Records & Ors." ( AIR 1984 SC 41 ) , has held that the cases dismissed in default cannot be restored as a matter of course and in absence of any sufficient cause. We find no reason to take a view other than the one taken by one of us in the above said decision. As noticed above, the facts in the cases in hand are clear that the absence of the learned counsel for the applicants on 16.9.1991 was intentional and not because of any bonafide mistake on his part. We, therefore, hold that there was no sufficient cause for the absence of the learned counsel for the applicants on 16.9.1991 when the above said cases were dismissed in default and no cases has been made but for restoration of both the cases. Consequently, these applications are dismissed." I am bound with this decision of the Division Bench. 5. It has been observed in S.J. Choudhary v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1984 S.C. 618 at page 619 para 3 , as follows : "We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate is finding it difficult to attend the court from day-to-day. It is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial from day- to-day. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed." Section 482, Cr.P.C. runs as under : "482, Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed." Section 482, Cr.P.C. runs as under : "482, Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." Under the above-quoted provisions, the High Court may pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to an order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Admittedly, the case does not fall under the first clause. The question for consideration is whether under the aforesaid facts and circumstances it is expedient and necessary to invoke the second and third clauses. As a matter of fact, invoking power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. under the aforesaid facts and circumstances would amount to abuse of the process of this Court and it is not necessary to decide them to order to secure the ends of justice. The points raised can still be urged before the trial Court at the appropriate stage. Second and third clauses are also not attracted in this case. 7. Accordingly the petition moved under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is dismissed. *******