Judgment :- Thomas, J. How far the pristine doctrine "feeding the grant by estoppels" would apply to the facts of this case, is the question of law which arises in this appeal. Appellant herein was the second defendant in the suit. He is aggrieved by the decision of the learned single judge who dismissed his first appeal. 2. The facts can be succinctly stated as follows: Appellant is one of the seven children of one Joseph and his wife Victoria. The suit property (situate at Fort Cochin) belonged to the said Joseph and his brother one Rev. Fr. Wilson (who was the first defendant in the suit) as they inherited it from their father. In the year 1969 the said Joseph and Rev. Fr. Wilson together executed a settlement deed (Ext. Al ) as per which the suit property was gifted in favour of Victoria. But after Victoria's death in 1978 a deed of revocation was executed jointly by Joseph and his brother Rev. Fr. Wilson in the year 1979 (Ext. B4). Thereafter, Rev. Fr. Wilson alone transferred all his rights in the suit property (as per Ext. B5) in favour of Columbus (one of the sons of Joseph and Victoria - who is the third defendant in the suit). Almost a year later, the appellant (who was arrayed as the second defendant in the trial court)executed an instrument styling it as release deed (Ext. B7) as per which all the rights of the appellant were transferred to Columbus. 3. It was in the above background that a suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff (who was another son of Joseph and Victoria). The position reached with the decision of the learned single judge in the first appeal is the following: Ext. B4 revocation deed was held to be of no legal validity and hence the gift in favour of Victoria remained valid. So all the seven children of Victoria became jointly entitled to the suit property on the death of Victoria. The preliminary decree was, therefore, granted to the plaintiff declaring his I/ 7th right in the suit property. However, learned single judge observed that appellant's right of I/ 7th share will be subject to Ext. B7 release deed. 4. Grievance of the appellant now is that learned single judge has not specified the extent of erosion of his rights affected by Ext. B7. However, learned single judge observed that appellant's right of I/ 7th share will be subject to Ext. B7 release deed. 4. Grievance of the appellant now is that learned single judge has not specified the extent of erosion of his rights affected by Ext. B7. According to the appellant, Ext. B7 release deed could not have impaired his rights beyond his 1/14th share in the suit property because when Ext. B7 was executed, everybody including himself thought that he had only 1/14th right in the property. It was so thought on the premise that Ext. Al gift deed did not come to reality and it remained revoked. But when that premise was knocked off, his remaining 1/14th share surfaced to the fore and he got a right to have that share separated in the partition. 5. The question of law is, therefore, formulated on the following premise: Ext. B7 was executed by the appellant under the impression that he had only 1/14th share in the property which he inherited as one of the sons of his father and hence Ext. B7 release deed has not affected his remaining 1/14th share which he inherited as heir of his mother Victoria. This, according to the appellant, is because Victoria became the sole owner of the suit property with the resuscitated gift deed (Ext. A1) and on her death appellant became entitled to 1/7th share and hence he is now entitled to 1/14th share since the other 1/14th share was given away by Ext. B7. 6. Before we consider the above aspect, we may observe that Ext. B7 is an out right release of all his rights in the suit property as on the date of the document. The recitals in the deed are clear enough to indicate that the executant intended to release all his right, title and interest in the suit property hook, line and sinker. In Ext. B7 deed appellant had acknowledged receipt of a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- from the third defendant while releasing his rights in the property and he further reiterated that the entire rights of the executant had been made over to the execute bell, book and candle. 7. S.43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the act) reads thus: "43. 10,000/- from the third defendant while releasing his rights in the property and he further reiterated that the entire rights of the executant had been made over to the execute bell, book and candle. 7. S.43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short 'the act) reads thus: "43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in property transferred.-Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property, and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property, at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists". 8. The section embodies the equitable doctrine of "feeding the grant by estoppel". It is immaterial for its application that the transformer acted bona fide and not fraudulently in making the representation. The section as it originally stood postulated that only if there was erroneous representation of the granter that the section would apply. But by the amending Act 20 of 1929 the words "fraudulently or" were also added in the section by placing them just before the word "erroneously". Hence the position is that for the application of the doctrine it is not essential that the grantor should have had no title at all. Even in a case where the grantor had only a limited right the doctrine would come into play. 9. Even if it is assumed that appellant's title to 1/7th share in the property became clear only when the court declared that the revocation was invalid, the principle embodied in S.43 of the Act would apply and the appellant is estopped from claiming any right in the suit property thereafter. 10. Learned counsel tried to circumvent the aforesaid hurdle by contending that S.43 would not apply to release deed as a release is different from a transfer. He cited the decisions in Board of Revenue v. Murugesa (AIR 1955 Madras 641), C.C.R.A., Board of Revenue v. Tvl.Inca Cables (P) Ltd., (AIR 1982 Madras 113) and Balwant Kaur v. State (AIR 1984 All. 107) in support thereof. 11. In all the above decisions the question was considered with reference to the Stamp Act and the liability to pay stamp duty on the document involved. 107) in support thereof. 11. In all the above decisions the question was considered with reference to the Stamp Act and the liability to pay stamp duty on the document involved. The scope of the word "release" as envisaged in the Stamp Act concerned was gone into for determining whether higher stamp duty should have been paid. But no such question really arises in this case and hence we do not think that the ratio involved in those decisions in the context of Stamp Act could profitably be imported to the facts of this case. 12. S.5 of the T.P. Act defines a transfer of property as an act by which a living person "conveys property" to one or more other living persons. The meaning of property in the section would embrace even the right or interest of the transferor in the property. The meaning of the word "property" has to be understood in its widest sense (vide Vasudev v. Pranlal- AIR 1974 SC 1728). When we consider Ext. B7 in the above sense we can deduce that there was transfer of property from the appellant to the third defendant in spite of the nomenclature used in Ext. B7. The effect of the instrument was that it conveyed the property of the executant in favour of the execute therein. 13. In T.Mammo v. K.Ramunni (AIR 1966 SC 337) it was held that "a registered instrument styled a release deed releasing the right, title and interest of the executant in any property in favour of the release for valuable consideration may operate as a conveyance, if the document clearly discloses an intention to effect a transfer." This was followed by the Supreme Court in Kuppuswami v. Arumugam (AIR 1967 SC 1395) in which the Supreme Court observed that a release can be usefully employed as a form of conveyance by a person having some right or interest to another having a limited estate. Gokulakrishnan, J. (as he then was) construed a deed of release as a deed of transfer in which the releaser after getting a price transferred his right, title and interest in. a half share of a particular item of landed property in favour of the release (vide MuniappaPillaiv. Periasami-1975(1) MLJ 236). A similar view was adopted by a single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Harish Chandra v. Chandra Shekhar (AIR 1977 All. a half share of a particular item of landed property in favour of the release (vide MuniappaPillaiv. Periasami-1975(1) MLJ 236). A similar view was adopted by a single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Harish Chandra v. Chandra Shekhar (AIR 1977 All. 44) in which a release deed was executed by a sister in favour of her brothers. Learned Judge, by following the Supreme Court decision in Kuppuswami's case (cited supra), held that it was a conveyance despite the nomenclature of the instrument. From the above discussion, we can answer the question of law raised in this case against the appellant and consequently we dismiss this appeal. No costs.