Judgment :- First defendant is the appellant. Second defendant is the father of the first plaintiff and husband of the second plaintiff. First plaintiff being a minor is represented by his mother the second plaintiff. The suit is filed to set aside two sale deeds, Ext. A2 and A3, executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. The property comprised in Exts. A2 and A3 has an extent of 101/2 cents which forms part of 30 cents obtained by the 2nd defendant under Ext. Al will dated 8-11-1952. Ext. Al will was executed by Kesavan Kunjukrishnan in favour of the second defendant who is the testator's brother's son. Plaintiffs' case is that second defendant was given only a life interest as per Ext. Al and so he was not competent to alrenate the property and that the alienations in favour of the first defendant are invalid. First defendant's contention is that second defendant has got absolute right as per Ext. Al will and the condition regarding restraint of alienation is invalid. It is alternatively contended by the first defendant that even assuming that second defendant has only life interest as per Ext. Al that right is transferable and so first plaintiff cannot claim any right in the property so long as the second defendant is alive. 2. The trial court declared the title of the first plaintiff over the plaint schedule property finding that Ext. A2 and A3 sale deeds are void and that the second plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the property for and on behalf of the first plaintiff from the first defendant. First defendant is restrained by a permanent injunction from putting up any buildings in the plaint schedule property and from committing any acts of waste thereon. The judgment and decree of the trial court have been confirmed by the lower appellate court. 3. The question that arises for consideration is whether as per Ext. Al will the second defendant is given only a limited interest viz. life interest or that he has been given absolute right and if so, the condition regarding restraint of alienation is valid. To resolve the controversy the recitals in Ext. 3. The question that arises for consideration is whether as per Ext. Al will the second defendant is given only a limited interest viz. life interest or that he has been given absolute right and if so, the condition regarding restraint of alienation is valid. To resolve the controversy the recitals in Ext. Al have to be considered in the light of the observations made in Gnambai Ammal v. Raju Ayyar (AIR 1951 SC 103) wherein the Supreme Court held: "The cardinal maxim to be observed by Courts in construing a will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testator. This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if he had been better informed or better advised. To construing the language of the will, the Courts are entitled and bound to bear in mind other matters than merely the words used. They must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which arc often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure. "the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair'. But all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by particular testator in that document. So soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the Court is to carry out the intentions as expressed, and none other. The Court is in no case justified in adding to testamentary dispositions. In all cases it must loyally carry out the will as properly construed, and this duty is universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every religion or rank of life". 4. In Ext. Al, it is recited that A schedule property is set apart to the second defendant on account of love and affection and that there is a direction to the second defendant's father that the property should be given unconditionally to the second defendant when he attained the age of 20 years. 4. In Ext. Al, it is recited that A schedule property is set apart to the second defendant on account of love and affection and that there is a direction to the second defendant's father that the property should be given unconditionally to the second defendant when he attained the age of 20 years. Specific recital is also there to the effect that after second defendant's life properly will devolve on the persons whom he wants to be benefited or to his children. It has to be borne in mind that the will was executed at a time when second defendant was one year old. That may be the reason why choice is given to the second defendant to settle the property to any one he likes or to his children. As per Ext. Al, A-schedule property is given to the second defendant and B to F schedules to others. B-schedule property is given to second defendant's lather and mother for their life. There is further recital to the effect that after their death the property would devolve on their children excluding the second defendant. In view of the recitals in Ext. Al, it is apparent that the testator bequeathed to the second defendant his whole interest in the property and it cannot be said that only a life interest was intended to be conveyed. As sufficient indications are there in Ext. Al to hold that it is not a life interest that was bequeathed to the second defendant the courts below were not justified in holding that second defendant obtained only life interest as per Ext. Al. 5. S.95 of the Indian Succession Act envisages that where a testator bequeathed property to a person, such person (legatees) would be entitled to the entire interests of the testator. But when the testator has manifested in the will to give the legatee only a limited interest in the property, he cannot claim any right more than what the testator had intended. In a case where the legatee was given only a restricted interest, S.95 makes the position clear that he will not get the whole interests of the testator. The presumption always is that where a testator bequeaths a property to another without mentioning what interest he intends to confer on the legatee the latter gets absolute interests of the former. 6. The presumption always is that where a testator bequeaths a property to another without mentioning what interest he intends to confer on the legatee the latter gets absolute interests of the former. 6. Once absolute interest is created under a will and then it contains clauses restraining alienation or enjoyment such clauses will be invalid and only because of such restrictive clauses the bequest does not become bad. InRameshwar Bakhsh v. BalrajKuar (AIR 1935 PC 187) the Privy Council held: "Where an absolute estate is created by a will in favour of the devisee, the clauses in the will which are repugnant to such absolute estate cannot cut down the estate, but they must be held to be invalid". It is also useful to refer to Fatima Saroliini Suresh & others v. Saraswathi Amma & others (1985 KLJ 433) wherein a Division Bench of this Court held: "It will not be inappropriate to proceed on the basis that Ss.10 to 14 of the T.P. Act and the corresponding provisions of the Indian Succession Act are but statutory recognition of principles even otherwise well-settled. To impose a total restraint on transfer of property or to impose ailes which keep it out of circulation offend public policy, irrespective of whether such conditions are imposed by a deed of transfer, a will or a simple contract. A contract opposed to public policy is unenforceable; and in this view of the matter, the restrictive clauses in Ext. A2 have to be held as inoperative". 7. Though such repugnant conditions in a will have to be ignored, a condition subsequent or a condition precedent added to a bequest cannot be ignored. While interpreting Ext. Al will it is not possible to hold that it contains a condition subsequent or a condition precedent. As Ext. Al in categoric terms states that second defendant on attaining the age of 20 should be given A-schedule property and as it further slates that he has unfettered disposing power it is evident that the will (Ext. A1) is not saddled with any condition precedent or subsequent. That being so, plaintiffs case that second .defendant was given only a life interest as per Ext. Al and so the alienation by him to the first defendant is bad is not tenable. As absolute right is given to the legatee as per the will the clause restraining alienation is invalid. That being so, plaintiffs case that second .defendant was given only a life interest as per Ext. Al and so the alienation by him to the first defendant is bad is not tenable. As absolute right is given to the legatee as per the will the clause restraining alienation is invalid. There is no merit in the contention of the plaintiffs that as per the will second defendant has only a life interest and so Exts. A2 and A3 assignment deeds are null and void. 8. In view of the above finding, the alternate contention of the appellant does not arise. The courts below were not justified in decreeing the suit i n favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside. The suit stands dismissed. The appeal is allowed. No costs.