N. L. GANGULY, J. The petitioner was employed as a Junior Engineer in U. P. Textile Corporation Ltd. , Kanpur in 1982 the petitioner was given appointment on a consolidated salary of Rs. 550 p. m. plus residential accom modation. The post was, thereafter on 18-3-93 redesignated as Junior Engineer. Later the post was redesignated as Shift Engineer. It is said that the appointment of the petitioner as Junior Engineer which was again designa ted as Shift Engineer was a permanent post with the respondents. The respon dents have framed fundamental Bye-laws, 1978. "rule 3 (ij) permanent post means a post carrying a definite rate (consolidated, fixed, time-scale or other kind) of pay and created as a permanent post by the Board or by an authority exercising delegated powers. " It is also stated that the said post is permanent sanctioned post by the Board of Directors of respondent No. 1. 2. The petitioner said to have assumed charge on the post on 10-7-82 and therefore as per Rule 17 of the Recruitment and Promotion Bye-laws of 1978, the probation for direct recruitment as provided is for two years proba tion commencing from the date on which he assumed charge on the post. As per Rule 17 of the Recruitment and Promotion Bye-laws of 1978, the com petent authority had the discretion of extending the period of probation for one year only. Rule 19 of the said bye-laws provides that the petitioner shall be confirmed on his post at the end of the original or extended period of probations if the appointing authority is satisfied upon the report of the supervisor/officer or otherwise satisfied that the Probationer has made due use of his opportunities of service, has completed successfully such training as may have been prescribed and is otherwise fit for confirmation. 3. The petitioner stated and the fact is not denied that the post of Junior Engineer redesignated as Shift Engineer do not require any training. Since petitioner completed probationary period on 10-7-84, which was not extended by the respondents under the proviso to Rule 17 of the Bye-laws, the petitioner shall be deemed to have confirmed on the post of Junior Engi neer/shift Engineer at the end of the probationary period. 4. Since petitioner completed probationary period on 10-7-84, which was not extended by the respondents under the proviso to Rule 17 of the Bye-laws, the petitioner shall be deemed to have confirmed on the post of Junior Engi neer/shift Engineer at the end of the probationary period. 4. The petitioner stated to have received annual increment other than the name at the stage of efficiency bar of the petitioner was required to be granted upon completion of each year of satisfactory service and accordingly respondent No. 1 was granted annual increment of Rs. 50 and also Rs. 50 on rationalisation totalling to Rs. 100 w. e. f. 1-10-83. Further increment of Rs. 100 p. m. was granted w. e. f. 1- 10-84 and the pay respectively at the rate of Rs. 650 and Rs. 750 per month. 5. The petitioners service was terminated by the order dated 21/25-2-86, a copy of the same has been annexed as Annexure-5 with the writ petition. The petitioner has categorically stated that the department also deducted General Provident Fund from the pay of the petitioner and a good some has been deducted already from his salary as G. P. F. 6. The petitioner challenged the order of termination on two grounds. Firstly, that the order dated 21/25-2-86 is an arbitrary, capricious and passed under colourable exercise of power of the respondents. The petitioner being confirmed employee, could not be terminated by giving one months notice as he had the right to hold the post. The petitioners thirdly submitted that the post of Junior Engineer/shift Engineer is a permanent post which has not been abolished and there is no justification or administrative reason to terminate the petitioners services, as was done. 7. The petitioner also submitted that me petitioner being the permanent staff, whose conduct was satisfactory and good throughout, was arbitrarily removed while the persons junior to him were retained. Thus, there was violation of Rule of first com-last-go. 8. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Perusal of the appointment letter Annexure CA 1 with the counter-affidavit shows that the respondents had issued the appointment letter as a temporary service, terminable at one months notice from either side without assigning any reason, whatsoever or payment of one months salary in lieu of the notice period. 9. 8. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Perusal of the appointment letter Annexure CA 1 with the counter-affidavit shows that the respondents had issued the appointment letter as a temporary service, terminable at one months notice from either side without assigning any reason, whatsoever or payment of one months salary in lieu of the notice period. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed the provision of Bye-Laws No. 3 (xxiii) and (xxxiii-b) of the General Service Conditions Bye-laws of the Corporation which are quoted as under : " (xxii) "temporary employees" is he who has been appointed on a temporary post or in a temporary capacity on a permanent post. In other words, a temporary employee, is he who has been appoint ed temporarily or for a specified period, as the case may be. " 10. The fact that the petitioner was given an employment by the respondents as Junior Engineer/shift Engineer and the post on which the petitioner was working was a permanent post. The employment given to the petitioner though termed as a temporarily employment was on a permanent post whether could be terminated as a temporary employee of the Corpora tion. It is also not disputed that the appointment letter given to the petitioner was not for any specified period. The mere use of temporary employment in the appointment letter was not sufficient to treat him as a temporary employee, admittedly when he was given increment and the provident fund etc. was deducted from his salary. It is true that in the appointment letter, it was nowhere mentioned that the appointment was with a period of proba tion. Thus, according to recruitment and promotion Rule 3 after completion of two years of the service by the petitioner, he was deemed to be confirmed, 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of our Court reported in 1991 Selected Civil Decision page 117 A. K. Dutta v. U. P. State Spinning Mills Co. Ltd. and others. The case law cited fully applies to the present case of the petitioner. The bye-laws applicable in the present case and the present case is also of the same U. P. State Spinning Mills. The facts of the case are exactly similar to that of the petitioners case. Ltd. and others. The case law cited fully applies to the present case of the petitioner. The bye-laws applicable in the present case and the present case is also of the same U. P. State Spinning Mills. The facts of the case are exactly similar to that of the petitioners case. I do not find any factual or legal variance in the writ petition in hand with the judgment of the Division Bench (supra) which with all force apply to the present case. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents again submitted an argu ment that the service of the petitioner was as per terms and conditions con tained in the appointment letter which shows that the appointment was purely temporary. The submission of the learned counsel is not acceptable. In the Corporation where the petitioner was working the word temporarily has been denned in Rule 3 of Recruitment and Promotion Rules. It is also not for any specified period or a temporary post. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out the acceptance of the conditions in the appointment letter by the petitioner that the employ ment given was temporarily. This argument was also advanced in the Division Bench case cited by the petitioner and this argument was also repel led in Paragraph 9 of the judgment. 14. The fact that persons junior to the petitioner were retained while the petitioners services were terminated, has not been denied. In true sense, it has been said in Para 21 of the counter-affidavit that the working of Sri P. L. Premi and Sri J. C. Tripathi, could not be compared with that of the petitioner. The working of the two persons are quite satisfactory and cannot be compared with the petitioner as the nature and service is much different than the service of the petitioner. This paragraph though denied, do not give the correct version. It has not been denied that they are juniors than the petitioner and they are not working as Junior Engineer/shift Engineer. A vague answer has been given. On this ground also, the petition is liable to succeed. 15. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. A vague answer has been given. On this ground also, the petition is liable to succeed. 15. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order of termination impugned is illegal and unwarranted on the ground that he being regular permanent employee, could not be terminated in the manner, as was done by the respon dents, secondly the plea of the petitioner that he has been discreminated and junior persons to petitioner have been retained in violation of principle of first come last go, was not followed is also substantiated by the facts and circumstances of the case. I have no option but to set aside and quash the order of termination passed by the respondents terminating the petitioners services. 16. The writ petition is allowed with the direction to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Shift Engineer with all back emoluments within 3 months of filing the certified copy of this judgment. Parties to bear costs. Petition allowed. .