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1994 DIGILAW 504 (SC)

State of Kerala v. K. A. Vasan S/O Ayyappan

1994-04-13

B.L.HANSARIA, R.M.SAHAI

body1994
ORDER : Criminal Appeal No. 786 of 1981 R.M. Sahai, J. - The respondent, who was a salesman, was convicted and sentenced under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short ?the Act?) read with Rule 44(g) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (for short ?the Rules') on the ground that he sold adulterated ice candy to the Food Inspector. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. In appeal, the conviction was maintained but the sentence was reduced to three months' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500. In revision the High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent. The High Court held that since ice candy was nothing but water and water was excluded from the purview of the definition of food? as given in Section 2(v) of the Act, the respondent was not liable to be convicted. 2. Although it is very doubtful if the finding of the High Court that ice candy is nothing but water is sustainable in law, we do not propose to deal with it as it has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that even if ice candy is held to be food the reports submitted by the Public Analyst indicated that the ice candy contained artificial sweetener, that is, saccharin which was not prohibited to be used during relevant period, therefore, the respondent was not liable to be convicted. 3. From the report submitted by the Public Analyst it is clear that his opinion that the ice candy was adulterated, was based on presence of artificial sweetener in the sample. And that sweetener it is stated was saccharin. Rule 44(g) of the Rules framed under the Act read as under at the relevant time : "44. Sale of certain admixtures prohibited.? Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 43 no person shall either by himself or by any servant or agent sell ? (g) any article of food which contains artificial sweetener except saccharin or in the preparation of which any such artificial sweetener has been used." What was prohibited thus was artificial sweetener but not saccharin. In 1982 the definition of ice candy was notified to mean as under : "A.07.04.01. (g) any article of food which contains artificial sweetener except saccharin or in the preparation of which any such artificial sweetener has been used." What was prohibited thus was artificial sweetener but not saccharin. In 1982 the definition of ice candy was notified to mean as under : "A.07.04.01. Ice candy means the frozen ice produce [which may contain fruit, fruit juices, cocoa, nuts, citric acid, permitted flavours and colours. It may also contain permitted stabilisers and/or emulsifiers not exceeding 0.5 per cent by weight.] It shall contain sugar not less than 10 per cent by weight. It shall not contain any artificial sweetener." By this definition the prohibition in use of the artificial sweetener in ice candy was imposed completely. No exception was made for saccharin. But when the occurrence took place, ice candy was defined as below : "A.07.04. Ice candy means the frozen ice produce containing sugar, with or without the addition of the permitted colouring or flavouring substances." 4. Since this was an incident before 1982 it was the aforesaid definition and Rule 44(g), as it then was, which were applicable and in view of the clear provisions as it then existed the respondent, even on the report of the Public Analyst that ice candy contained saccharin, could not have been convicted under the Act. 5. In the circumstances the appeal fails and is dismissed although for different reasons than that given by the High Court. Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1984 6. Since the question of law which arises for consideration in the appeal is identical to the question decided by us in Criminal Appeal No. 786 of 1981, namely, if the respondent was liable to be convicted for use of saccharin in ice candy prior to 1982, this appeal also fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.