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1994 DIGILAW 509 (BOM)

MOTIRAM DEVJI BAWANKAR v. R. R. BHAVSAR, PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT

1994-09-07

B.N.SRIKRISHNA

body1994
JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J.—This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an Award of the Labour Court dated September 10, 1986 made in Reference (IDA) No.725 of 1985 under provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. The Petitioner was an employee of the Second Respondent working in its factory at Goregaon, Bombay, as a Turner. He had put in service of about 2-1/2 years and his last drawn salary was Rs. 27.87 per day. According to the petitioner, he had applied for leave on December 11, 1984 and sought leave upto January 3, 1985, and this leave was orally sanctioned by the Foreman of the factory. He thereafter reported for duty on January 3, 1985, but was not allowed to resume work. On January 4, 1985, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice alleging that he had absented himself without leave and permission and calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The petitioner replied the show cause notice by his letter dated January 4, 1985 and denied that he had absented himself without permission. He alleged that he had earlier applied for leave on September 25, 1984, that leave was refused to him on the ground that one of the co-workers had already proceeded on leave and that he had been assured that, after the said workman came back to work on December 9, 1984, the petitioner would be granted leave on December 11, 1984. The petitioner also alleged that on December 11, 1984, he had applied for leave and the said application was given to V.N. Nair, through Foreman H.P. Singh, and he did not make any order in writing. Accordingly, the petitioner proceeded to his native place from December 12, 1984 and, when he came to resume his duty on January 3, 1985, the Foreman of the factory, H.P. Singh, orally directed the petitioner to report for duty on January 4, 1985. However, on that day, the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duty, but was served with the show cause notice. In these circumstances, the petitioner denied that he was absent from duty and requested for cancellation of show cause notice. However, on that day, the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duty, but was served with the show cause notice. In these circumstances, the petitioner denied that he was absent from duty and requested for cancellation of show cause notice. For some strange reason, no enquiry appears to have been conducted into the show cause notice issued to the petitioner alleging the misconduct on his part, nor was any order of termination issued to him in writing. The petitioner was, however, not allowed to resume work. The petitioner demanded reinstatement in service with full back wages and continuity of service. His demand having not been conceded, the industrial dispute was processed by the conciliation machinery and ultimately referred to the Labour Court, Bombay, vide Reference (IDA) No. 725 of 1985. 3. Before the Labour Court, the evidence led was mostly oral. The explanation for not giving a charge-sheet and not holding a domestic enquiry as given by Govind Nanabhai Nagar, Proprietor of the Second Respondent, was that before he wanted to take proper action according to law, he had already received letter from the Labour Commissioner and hence no enquiry was held against the petitioner, nor any action taken against him. He admitted that the petitioner had submitted an application on December 11, 1984 seeking leave from December 12, 1984, although he could not say whether the leave was prayed for upto January 3, 1985. He also admitted that the application was lying on his table when he went to his office. It was his case that no other officer had authority to grant leave as he was the only person empowered to grant leave. He also admitted that on January 4, 1985 the petitioner complained to the Government Labour Officer on January 11, 1985. The witness also admitted the letter of demand to which he did not give any reply and further that the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duties even after the letter of demand that no charge-sheet was given, nor any enquiry held against the petitioner. The witness also admitted the letter of demand to which he did not give any reply and further that the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duties even after the letter of demand that no charge-sheet was given, nor any enquiry held against the petitioner. Curiously, in written statement filed by the Second Respondent, in paragraph 13, the contention taken up was that the petitioner had remained unauthorisedly absent from duties since December 12, 1984 and thus had voluntarily abandoned his service and that the petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement in service as "it was a clear case of voluntarily abandonment of service" on his part. In the face of these pleadings, the learned judge of the Labour Court rightly framed an issue as to whether the Second Respondent proved that the petitioner remained absent from December 12, 1984 and voluntarily left the service. However, he answered the issue only partly by saying that the petitioner remained absent from December 12, 1984 and did not answer the second part of the issue-whether the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned the service. 4. Despite service, it is unfortunate that no one appeared for the Second Respondent when the matter was heard. I have been taken through the Award by Mr. Bapat, learned Advocate for the petitioner, and, after having perused the Award, I find the Award to be self-contradictory, to put it very mildly. In paragraph 23 of the Award, the Labour Court clearly recorded a finding that it could not be said that the workman had voluntarily left the service. With this finding, in the face of the admissions given by Govind Nanabhai Nagar, Proprietor of the second respondent, it was clear that, though the second respondent had not issued a letter of termination in writing, the petitioner had been refused work all along from January 4, 1985, without taking any disciplinary action according to law or without termination of service in accordance with any known legal mode. If that be so, then the act of the Second Respondent in persistently refusing employment to the petitioner, by oral order, would certainly amount to illegal termination of service of the Petitioner. If that be so, then the act of the Second Respondent in persistently refusing employment to the petitioner, by oral order, would certainly amount to illegal termination of service of the Petitioner. In these circumstances, it is difficult for me to appreciate the finding recorded by the Labour Court in paragraph 25 as: "In fact, the services of the workman were not terminated by the Company and, therefore, the reference is not legal and valid and not maintainable." 5. In my view, the finding of the Labour Court that the reference is not tenable is wholly erroneous and cannot be upheld. It is unfortunate that by a misdirection in law the learned judge of the Labour Court has refused relief to the workman leading to the situation that the workman who was illegally removed from service in 1985 is without relief till today. In my view, the evidence on record clearly points to a case of illegal termination of service without following any procedure and, therefore, there should have been no difficulty for the Labour Court to answer the reference in favour of the workman and grant him relief as prayed for. The Award is clearly perverse and needs to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 6. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, rule made absolute and the impugned Award of the 7th Labour Court, Bombay, dated September 10, 1986, made in Reference (IDA) No. 725 of 1985, is hereby quashed and set aside. The second Respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with full back wages and continuity of service from January 4, 1985. The reinstatement and the payment of back wages shall be implemented not later than 7th November, 1994, failing which the back wages payable for the earlier period, as well as the wages accruing thereafter, shall attract interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum, without prejudice to any other liability which the Second Respondent may incur for non-compliance with the order of this Court. 7. Rule made absolute accordingly. The second Respondent to pay the costs of this petition quantified at Rs. 700/- 8. Certified copy expedited.