JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:--Several misconceptions require to be brushed aside, particularly by the trial courts while dealing with matrimonial proceedings which constitute a separate class of litigation. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the normal technicalities that are involved in the sifting and evaluation of the evidence and the degree of proof insisted upon in other forms of proceedings are required to be considerably diluted and modified and a more understanding and helpful attitude adopted in the handling of these matters. This is a field where the problem of physical and mental trauma is predominant, where the parties are under severe strain, handicaps and limitations; where the incidents are essentially of a highly personalised nature, often times very private and, consequently, where the evidence is necessarily restrictive. The general rules of corroboration, supportive evidence, etc., though applicable, are required to be mellowed down and the evidence of the parties themselves is about all the material on the basis of which the Court will have to act, Modern legal thinking also subscribes to the view that where the relationship has irretrievably broken down, a Court ought not to refuse a decree except for very good reasons, because it would relegate the parties to a position of limbo and would only add to the human suffering. 2. Much research has been done, both in the field of medicine and psychology, and in the last two decades in particular after the research of Maters and Johnson, while dealing with cases of impotency, the predominant consideration is not physical incapacity which courts are often guided by, but another all important angle, namely, the fact that non-consummation of the marriage, could be due to several circumstances which contribute to a situation whereby both the spouses, though physicaly and mentally potent in the normal sense, find it impossible to achieve a satisfactory sexual relationship. The concept of relative impotency which prescribes that a person suffering from no handicap whatsoever still feels inhibited or incompetent vis-a-vis the particular sexual partner is now an accepted ground for a decree in a matrimonial Court. The concept of relative impotency which prescribes that a person suffering from no handicap whatsoever still feels inhibited or incompetent vis-a-vis the particular sexual partner is now an accepted ground for a decree in a matrimonial Court. It is this aspect of the matter that requires serious consideration because reliefs in cases of matrimonial breakdown must be speedy and simple and parties should not be pushed through long drawnout legal battles and then forced to approach the Appellate Court after years of prolonged agency merely because of insensitive and hypertechnical approaches on the part of judicial officers. It is equally essential in these cases that the relief granted be moulded within the framework of the record and that even where the original prayer cannot be granted, the Court consider the next best alternative. 3. Both these appeals have been preferred by the wife and are directed against a common judgment and order of the Family Court, Pune, dated 20-3-1991. The parties to the proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and the appellate-wife before us had filed a petition under section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act praying for a decree of nullity on the ground that the respondent-husband was impotent at the time of the performance of the marriage and continued to be so as on the date of the presentation of the petition. The respondent-husband had filed a counter-petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act whereby he had contended that the appellant-wife had withdrawn from the matrimonial home and his company without just and reasonable course. The learned trial Judge recorded evidence and decided both the petitions together. He held that the ground of impotency that had been pleaded by the appellant-wife is undsubstantiated; whereas at the same time he recorded the finding that the respondent-husband was entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Being aggrieved by this decision, the appellant-wife has preferred these two appeals. We have heard learned Counsel on both sides in the two appeals, perused the entire material that was before the trial Court as also the judgment of that Court and we propose to dispose of both the appeals through a common judgment. 4. It is unnecessary for us to refer in meticulous detail to the evidence that was recorded before the trial Court. 4. It is unnecessary for us to refer in meticulous detail to the evidence that was recorded before the trial Court. We, however, consider it necessary to advert to one important circumstance that was relied upon very heavily by Shri Manudhane, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-wife wereby learned Counsel has brought to our notice the fact that even though the appellant-wife before the trial Court had made a specific charge against the respondent-husband of impotency and had substantiated her plea through medical evidence that the respondent-husband had declined to submit himself to medical examination at the stage of the trial. Subsequently, when the appeals were taken up for hearing, an application was presented to this Court under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requesting that the trial Court be directed to record additional evidence. This application came to be allowed by the Divisions Bench before which the appeals were then placed and the matter was remanded to the trial Court. The evidence of three doctors, which we shall refer to presently, as also the medical certificates that were issued by them have been taken on record after which the present appeals have been listed for hearing. Shri Manudhane submitted that it is a matter of consequence that the respondent-husband, even though he had an opportunity and even though he had been directed by the trial Court, did not submit himself to medical examination at the relevant point of time and that it would make appreciable difference as far as the evaluation of this evidence that was recorded at a subsequent point of time is concerned. We shall deal with that aspect of the matter at the stage of evaluating the arguments adduced by learned Counsel on the question of impotency. 5. In support of her contention that the respondent-husband was impotent at the time when the marriage was performed and continued to be so at the time when the suit was instituted, the appellant-wife, Vandana, has given evidence before the trial Court. She has very clearly stated that the marriage between her and the respondent-husband lasted for a few months and that they lived together. She has very clearly stated that the marriage between her and the respondent-husband lasted for a few months and that they lived together. She has set out the numerous instances when the couple were secluded from other persons, there were ample opportunities for privacy and she has also indicated in her deposition that she herself had made several attempts towards inducing the respondent-husband to consummate the marriage. In sum and substance, she has set out very candidly in her deposition that quite apart from the express desire on the part of the respondent-husband to avoid the consummation of the marriage, that on the stray occasions when some week attempts were made by him that he had completely failed to have sexual intercourse with her. Vandana has been cross-examined and nothing appreciable has emerged in the course of her cross-examination. Apart from this, she has examined Dr. Achyut Umranikar, who has stated in his evidence that he had examined the appellant-wife, Vandana, and that he found, among other things, that even though she was sexually normal in all respects that the hymen was intact. Shri Manudhane, on the basis of this evidence, has strenuously contended before us that the appellant-wife had no reason whatsoever to make a false charge of this type and that, more importantly, her evidence before the Court inspires absolute credibility, that it has withstood the test of cross-examination and that in these circumstances that it is more than fully corroborated by the evidence of the doctors and that, consequently, the learned trial Judge was certainly in error in not having passed a decree on the basis of this evidence. It is the further submission of learned Counsel that if the judgment of the trial Court were to be carefully persued that one would find that, in fact, the learned Judge has hardly considered the evidentiary credibility of the appellant-wife, instead of which he has followed the faulty procedure of straight a way evaluating the husbands evidence and has preferred to accept that evidence in preference to that of the appellant-wife. Shri Manudhans is, perhaps, justified in pointing out to us that, it is not through juxtaposition of the evidence that one is required to weigh the material, but in a case of the present type, the law is well-settled that where the petitioner gives evidence that is reliable and credible and, more importantly, where it is supported by other cogent evidence that a Court would be duty bound in accepting that evidence. One needs to take cognizance of the fact that in matrimonial proceedings, extraneous evidence is inconsequential for the obvious reason, namely, that eyewitnesses are something almost unimaginable and other parties are either reluctant or unreliable and, under these circumstances, the evidence on which the Court has to act upon is the material adduced by the spouses themselves. 6. Shri Salvi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband submitted with equal perservervance that the respondent-husband is a lawyer by profession, that there are allegations made against him to the effect that he is supposed to have been trying to extort money from the petitioner-wife and her relations. There are allegations that he has ill-treated his wife Vandana. Shri Salvi submitted that having regard to the totality of these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that the relationship between the parties having deteriorated that the present charge against the husband is absolutely false and fabricated. On the question of impotency, Shri Salvi has relied very heavily on the evidence that was recorded before the trial Court and he has pointed out to us that the respondent-husband has given evidence with equal credibility and that he has been supported by two doctors, the first of them being Dr. Ramkrishna Marathe, who had carried out the semen test which he found to be normal. He has examined Dr. Subhash Patki, who has stated that the respondent-husband was at the relevant time suffering from acute hernia and he was, therefore, required to undergo surgical treatment. Shri Salvi thereafter drew our attention to the evidence of the three doctors which has come on record after the remand. The first of them is Dr. Umbarkar, who has carried out a through physical examination of the husband and who has stated that he was found to be absolutely normal in all respects and that there was no physical deformity of any type found on his person. The second medical practitioner is Dr. The first of them is Dr. Umbarkar, who has carried out a through physical examination of the husband and who has stated that he was found to be absolutely normal in all respects and that there was no physical deformity of any type found on his person. The second medical practitioner is Dr. Bapat, who has done a clinical semen examination and he has also given the husband a clean chit. More importantly, Shri Salvi relied on the evidence of Dr. Bapat who has done the semen examination of the respondent-husband and has opined that there is nothing whatsoever on the basis of which he would hold that the respondent-husband suffers from any mental reservation or that there is anything manifest in his personality on the basis of which one could conclude that he is impotent. The totallity of this evidence, according to Shri Salvi, would indicate that the respondent-husband is an absolutely potent person and, under these circumstances, he contended that this overwhelming medical evidence must undisputedly be held sufficient to completely out weigh the material placed before the trial Court by the appellant-wife. 7. We have heard learned Counsel at considerable length and we have evaluated the material placed before us very carefully. The ingredients of law require that on the point of impotency, the party making the allegation is required to satisfy the Court through cogent and reliable evidence that the charge is, in fact, good enough. We have already referred to the evidence of the appellant-wife, which we consider to be absolutely reliable, and we do not see any infirmity whatsoever in the medical evidence adduced by Dr. Umranikar. Cumulatively, the appellant-wife on the basis of this material would be entitled to a decree under section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act in so far as the she has demonstrated conclusively that for no fault of hers the marriage was not consummated, she has also demonstrated that inspite of reasonable efforts put in by her that the respondent-husband had not consummated the marriage. Under these circumstances, last aspect of the matter that assumes considerable importance is the fact that the respondent-husband did not rebut this evidence through adequate material before the trial Court. Shri Manudhane in the course of his arguments relied on a passage from Craydon on Divorce, 9th Edition, page 110, wherein the learned Author has drawn a distinction between "incapacity and wilful refusal". Shri Manudhane in the course of his arguments relied on a passage from Craydon on Divorce, 9th Edition, page 110, wherein the learned Author has drawn a distinction between "incapacity and wilful refusal". Shri Manudhane has accepted the proposition that normally there is a presumption in favour of normalcy and potency and he submits that the appellant-wife in this case had discharged the burden cast on her in establishing that inspite of cohabitation for a sufficiently long period and for no fault whatsoever on the part of her that the marriage was not consummated. This is apart from the positive evidence in support of her charge that the plea of impotency is established. 8. At this stage, Shri Manudhane has made a serious grievance with regard to the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge which, in our considered view, is fully justified. Shri Manudhane submitted that having regard to the position that obtains in law and, more importantly, in medical science that the learned trial Judge was wrong in observing that if one of the parties is to be believed that the other is required to be disbelieved. He submitted that medical science and legal jurisprudence have both accepted the position that as far as impotency is concerned that there are numerous instances where two perfectly normal human beings are found to be virtually impotent vis-a-vis each other; whereas they might be perfectly potent vis-a-vis another person. It is on the basis of this position that Shri Manudhane submits that the evidence before the Court can be perfectly reconciled. He does not dispute the position that the respondent-husband may be found to be physically and otherwise potent, but he states that the limited grievance of his client was that he was not potent vis-a-vis her right through the period when he was married to her and was required to perform his matrimonial obligations. It is in this view of the matter that he submits that the decision of the trial Court is required to be not only set aside but that it is required to be modified and a decree passed on the ground of relative impotency. 9. We need to mention at this stage that we are completely satisfied from the evidence before us that the appellant-wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground of relative impotency of the respondent-husband. 9. We need to mention at this stage that we are completely satisfied from the evidence before us that the appellant-wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground of relative impotency of the respondent-husband. Having regard to this position, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the rest of the material with regard to the allegations and counter-allegations on the ground of cruelty and the several other charges that were levelled by each of the respective spouses. 10. Shri Manudhane has drawn our attention to a few decisions which we consider necessary to refer to. Firstly, he has relied on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of (Ushman v. Inderjit) 1, A.I.R. 1977 P. H. 97, wherein the learned Judge had examined a case on more or less identical facts to the present one and held that if the marriage is not consummated inspite of a reasonable period of cohabitation that a presumption of impotency arises. In the present case, we do find that the charge has been proved, quite apart from the presumption, through positive evidence. 11. Next, Shri Manudhane has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (Bux Singh v. Joint Director, Consolidation) 2, A.I.R. 1986 Allahabad 156, wherein the Court has analysed the requisite ingredients of a charge of impotency. The Court has also gone into the question of what would be the reasonable excuse for non-consummation. In the present case, it was sought to be contended that the medical condition of the husband, namely, hernia, was a possible causative factor for the non-consummation. Unfortunately, the doctors did not support this view in their evidence and Shri Manudhane is right in relying on this decision which conclusively states that in such cases of non-consummation where there is no reasonable ground set out that an adverse inference must follow. Shri Manudhane has thereafter drawn our attention to two decisions, the first of them being in the case of (Mary Kurian v. T.T. Joseph) 3, A.I.R. 1980 Ker. 131; and the second being in the case of (J. Anthony v. M.S. Ammal) 4, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 103. In both these cases, the courts were concerned with a situation where the party against whom charges were made either refused or omitted to submit to a requisite medical examination. 131; and the second being in the case of (J. Anthony v. M.S. Ammal) 4, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 103. In both these cases, the courts were concerned with a situation where the party against whom charges were made either refused or omitted to submit to a requisite medical examination. The Court did hold, and in our considered view very rightly, that in such instances, an adverse inference would have to be drawn. 12. Shri Manudhane relied on a decision of the Nagpur High Court (as it then was) in the case of (Kishore Sahu v. Snehprabha Sahu) 5, A.I.R. 1943 Nagpur 185, wherein the Court had occasion to consider the nature of the evidence that would be requisite for the passing of a decree. Undoubtedly, in matrimonial proceedings where the charges may be of a serious nature, the nature and quantum of evidence is a matter of some consequence. In a well-considered decision, the Division Bench held that where the evidence inspires complete confidence, the incriminating evidence of a spouse would be sufficient for the passing of a decree. We are in complete agreement with this view. Shri Manudhane then drew our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of (H. v. H.) 6, A.I.R. 1928 Bombay 279, which dealt with the aspect of relative impotency. This decision, in our considered view, is one of some importance in so far as, as indicated by us earlier, even if the medical evidence conclusively establishes that the party appeared to be potent for all intents and purposes of that examination that a decree on the ground of relative impotency could still be passed, if it was demonstrated that the offending spouse was impotent vis-a-vis the complaining party during the period of cohabitation when they were married to each other. 13. Lastly Shri Manudhane has drawn our attention to a passage from Modis text book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Twenty-first Edition page 341, wherein the learned Author has extracted the well-set principles in which a party can be said to be impotent. A distinction has been drawn between impotency and sterility. It would be useful to extract the passage in question. "Impotence is defined as physical incapacity of accomplishing the sexual act, while sterility means inability for procreation of children. A distinction has been drawn between impotency and sterility. It would be useful to extract the passage in question. "Impotence is defined as physical incapacity of accomplishing the sexual act, while sterility means inability for procreation of children. Impotence in sales is the persistent inability to develop or maintain a penile creation sufficient to conclude coitus to organsm and ejaculation. It should be remembered that the term impotence or sexual incapacity in forensic medicine connotes physical incapacity to accomplish the sex act. Impotence has been described in Halaburys Laws of England to be such a state of mental or physical condition which makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility. An impotent individual need not necessarily be sterile, nor a sterile individual impotent, though both conditions may sometimes be combined in the same individual." 14. On the basis of the material placed before us and on a clear and careful examination of the position that emerges in law, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant-wife is entitled to a decree of nullity on the ground that the respondent-husband was impotent qua the appellant-wife during the period when he was married to her and at the time when the suit was instituted. In this view of the matter, the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge is set aside. There shall be a decree of nullity in favour of the appellant-wife and the marriage solemnized between the parties on 31-5-1990 shall stand annulled. We do not consider it necessary to pass any orders on the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent-husband and the same stands dismissed. Both the appeals are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Appeals disposed of accordingly.