M. M. MIRDHE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed by the appellant who was plaintiff in the trial court against the judgment and decree dated 3-12-1986 passed by the iv additional city civil judge, Bangalore in o. s. no. 1921 of 1980 decreeing the suit of the appellant against defendants 1 and 4 only. ( 2 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the appellant andthe learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 fully and perused the records of the case. ( 3 ) THE appellant is a banking company constituted under thebanking companies (acquisition and transfer of undertakings) Act, 1970 and it filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 59,775-95 paise against All the defendants on the ground that the defendants approached the plaintiff-bank for a loan of Rs. 40,000/- for the purpose of their industry and it was sanctioned and the loan was availed of by the defendants on 5-12-1974, after executing the requisite documents. It is also further averred by the plaintiff that the loan was required to be repaid after 9 months at the rate of Rs. 500/- and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month. In spite of the repeated demands of plaintiff the defendants did not pay instalments and hence the plaintiff filed the suit. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS 2 and 3 have admitted that they are partners ofdefendant No. 1-firm which borrowed Rs. 40,000/- from the plaintiff. The execution of the document is also admitted, but defendant No. 3 has contended that he has executed the document only as a partner. Defendants 2 and 3 have further contended that firm-defendant No. 1 was dissolved under a dissolution deed under which defendant 4 took over All the assets and liabilities and thereafter defendants 2 and 3 are discharged from their liabilities. Their advocate on the basis of this contention among others have prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 5 ) THE defendant no. 4 remained ex parte. ( 6 ) TRIAL court on the basis of the contentions raised thefollowing issues: 1. What amount is due to the plaintiff towards the loan (rs. 40,000) advanced to the 1st defendant on 5-12-1974? 2. Whether defendants 2 and 3 prove that they are not liable to pay the amount due to the firm, the 1st defendant? 3. Whether defendant 2 proves that the claim is barred by time? 4. What amount is due to the plaintiff towards the loan (rs. 40,000) advanced to the 1st defendant on 5-12-1974? 2. Whether defendants 2 and 3 prove that they are not liable to pay the amount due to the firm, the 1st defendant? 3. Whether defendant 2 proves that the claim is barred by time? 4. What decree or order? ( 7 ) THE trial court has decreed the suit of theappellant-plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 59,485-58 paise against defendants 1 and 4 and it dismissed the suit as against defendants 2 and 3. ( 8 ) THE main contention of the appellant in this appeal is thatthe trial court could not have dismissed the suit as against defendants 2 and 3 and it ought to have decreed the suit of the appellant against them also. It is not disputed in this case that defendant no. 1 is a partnership firm and defendants 2 and 4 were its partners. It also cannot be disputed in this case as it is borne out by the records that on 28-7-1976 defendant no. 3 retired from the partnership firm under exh. D. 1. On that very day some time after exh. D. 1, defendant no. 2 also retired under exh. D. 4, leaving the entire firm to defendant no. 4 only. The contention of respondents 2 and 3 is that since they retired from the firm under exhs. D. 1 and d. 4 and the assets and liabilities of the firm had been taken over by respondent no. 4, they stand discharged, from any liability to the plaintiff-bank. It is also their contention that their retirement from the firm was brought to the notice of the plaintiff-bank by notices issued by them and the plaintiff-bank has by its conduct accepted the retirement of the said defendants from the partnership firm and that amounts to discharge under section 32 (2) of the indian partnership act (which will hereinafter be referred to as the act for short) and section 45 of the said act. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that though the plaintiff-bank had knowledge of the retirement of defendants 2 and 3 from the partnership firm, it has no acquiescence in the act of partners' retirement from the partnership firm and never discharged them from their liabilities to the plaintiff-bank. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that though the plaintiff-bank had knowledge of the retirement of defendants 2 and 3 from the partnership firm, it has no acquiescence in the act of partners' retirement from the partnership firm and never discharged them from their liabilities to the plaintiff-bank. The evidence on record of defendants discloses that under exh. D. 1-defendant No. 3, i. e. , respondent No. 3 retired from the partnership firm leaving the assets and liabilities to respondents 2 and 4. When he retired from that firm on that day, it will have to be seen whether he was discharged from any liability to any third party, as to the bank in this case. Section 32 (2) of the act reads as follows:"32 (2): a retiring partner may be discharged from any liability to any third party for acts of the firm done before his retirement by an agreement made by him with such third party and the partners of the reconstituted firm, and such agreement may be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the reconstituted firm after he had knowledge of the retirement. " ( 9 ) THE section makes it clear by the act of retirement apartner does not stand discharged from his liability to any third party. ( 10 ) IN halsbury's laws of england, fourth edition, at page107, para 187, the learned author has observed as follows:"no third person, even with notice, is concerned with the partners' own arrangements to discharge their debts. Where two partners enter into a joint speculation with a third person, and afterwards dissolve their partnership, the dissolution of the partnership does not prevent the third person who continues to rely upon their joint responsibility from holding them jointly liable. " ( 11 ) A reading of section 32 (2) makes it clear that a partnerwho retires from the firm does not thereby cease to be liable for the partnership debts and obligation incurred by the firm when he retires. Any time a partner can be discharged from the liability if there is such an agreement between the third party and the retiring partner and the partner of the reconstituted firm and such an agreement can be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the reconstituted firm, if he had knowledge of the retirement. Any time a partner can be discharged from the liability if there is such an agreement between the third party and the retiring partner and the partner of the reconstituted firm and such an agreement can be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the reconstituted firm, if he had knowledge of the retirement. Another event that happened in 28-7-1976 immediately after exh. D. 1, it appears that even defendant no. 2, i. e. , respondent no. 2 also retired from the firm under exh. D. 4. Exh. D. 4 refers to exh. D. 1 executed earlier wherein defendant no. 3 retired from the firm. The effect of exh. D. 4 is that even the remaining partner defendant no. 2 walked out of the partnership leaving the assets and liabilities to respondent no. 4. In fact the firm came to be dissolved on that day itself under exh. D. 4. When the firm is dissolved, what are the liabilities for the acts of the partners shown after the dissolution is laid down in section 45 of the act. It lays down that notwithstanding the dissolution of a firm, the partners continue to be liable as such to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the dissolution, until public notice is given of the dissolution. The law is very clear to the effect that the partner of the dissolved firm will continue to be liable to third party, i. e. , the bank here, for any acts of the firm before the dissolution. In this case it is not disputed that the liability for which the bank is seeking to hold respondents liable, is the liabilities incurred by the firm before its dissolution. Now the trial court has held that by virtue of section 32 (2) of the Act, respondents-defendants 2 and 3-stand discharged. Though under exh. D. 1 respondent no. 3 walked out of the firm, which is a few hours prior to exh. D. 4, exh. D. 4 under which even defendant no. 2 walked out of the firm dissolves the firm. In fact the defendant no. 1 firm came to be dissolved on 28-7-1976 itself. Though under exh. D. 1 respondent no. 3 walked out of the firm, which is a few hours prior to exh. D. 4, exh. D. 4 under which even defendant no. 2 walked out of the firm dissolves the firm. In fact the defendant no. 1 firm came to be dissolved on 28-7-1976 itself. Now the court will have to see whether after dissolution of the firm on 28-7-1976, the respondents 2 and 3 still remain liable to pay the dues to the plaintiff-bank incurred by the firm prior to its dissolution. It cannot be disputed in this case that the plaintiff-bank had the knowledge of the dissolution of the partnership firm. Exh. D. 1 is the copy of the dissolution deed which was sent to the plaintiff-bank. In fact it bears the seal of the plaintiff as exh. D. L (a ). The copy of the notice issued by the advocate of respondent no. 4 to the advocate of respondent no. 2 is at exh. D. 2. In exh. D. 2 the fact of the dissolution of the firm is clearly mentioned wherein it is stated that the firm came to be dissolved and respondent no. 4 has taken over the liability of out-going partners to pay the dues of the third parties. It is significant to note that the copy of this letter has been marked to the manager of the plaintiff-bank. Exh. D. 3 is a very significant document. It is a copy of the letter written by the plaintiff-bank to the state bank of India and copy marked to defendant no. 3. In that the plaintiff-bank has written as follows:"in continuation of our letter 35977/406 we confirm that Mr. K. Parthasarathy has resigned from the firm r. s. r. engineering works. He is no more a partner in the firm. " ( 12 ) EXH. D. 3 goes to show that the plaintiff-bank was verywell aware of the retirement of defendant no. 3 from the partnership firm. P. w. 2 has admitted in his evidence as follows:"it is true to say that along with exh. P. 5, I received the original of exh. D. 1. i verified and noted thereof. I did not think necessary to take any action on that, however, I noted that no further finance is to be made available to defendant no. 1 firm by virtue of dissolution. P. 5, I received the original of exh. D. 1. i verified and noted thereof. I did not think necessary to take any action on that, however, I noted that no further finance is to be made available to defendant no. 1 firm by virtue of dissolution. I also did not write a letter to 4th defendant. "this evidence coupled with the documents referred to above clearly proves that the plaintiff-bank was in the know of the retirement of defendant no. 3 from the firm under exh. D. 1 and the dissolution of the firm under exh. D. 4 and it is also the evidence of p. w. 2 that the plaintiff-bank was also supplied with copy of the dissolution deed, which contained stipulations regarding the arrangements made between the partners to the rights and liabilities of the third parties. Under exh. P. 5 defendant no. 4 has informed the plaintiff-bank that the firm is dissolved and he has taken over the firm solely with ownership rights. In spite of the copy of the dissolution being sent to the plaintiff-bank and the intimation sent by defendants 3 and 4 to the plaintiff-bank, the plaintiff-bank has not chosen to intimate any of the defendants about its intention of not accepting the arrangements made by the partners between themselves making respondent no. 4 liable for the dues of the plaintiff-bank. In our opinion the plaintiff-bank by its conduct has accepted the dissolution of the firm whereby respondent no. 4 took over the assets and liabilities of the firm and also undertook to discharge the liabilities incurred by the firm to the third parties prior to its dissolution. The plaintiff-bank is a nationalised bank. It cannot be expected to keep quiet if it had any objections to dissolution and was not agreeable to respondent no. 4 taking over the liabilities incurred by the firm prior to its dissolution. No doubt no public notice is given by any of the partners on behalf of the firm after its dissolution. But it cannot be disputed in this case that there was notice given of the dissolution of the firm. 4 taking over the liabilities incurred by the firm prior to its dissolution. No doubt no public notice is given by any of the partners on behalf of the firm after its dissolution. But it cannot be disputed in this case that there was notice given of the dissolution of the firm. Dealing with this aspect of the case Andhra Pradesh High Court in the ruling reported in thummala rama rao and others v chodagam venkateswara rao and others, has observed as follows:"that individual notice affords higher protection than public notice and that, when a person sought to be affected, had knowledge that the firm was dissolved, it creates a form of estoppel and it is not open to him to plead that there was no public notice. " ( 13 ) WE respectfully agree with the observations of theirlordships of the Andhra Pradesh high court. In this case also the plaintiff-bank had the notice of dissolution of the firm and now it is not open to the plaintiff-bank to contend that there was no public notice. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant contends that section32 (2) of the act is not attracted to the facts of the case. Our discussion while dealing with the effect of exh. D. 1 above shows that so far as defendant no. 3 is concerned, section 32 (2) comes into play and even if it is held that section 32 (2) does not come into play, this case will squarely come within the four corners of section 45 of the act in view of exh. D. 4 which is a document under which the partnership firm came to be dissolved. The trial court was right in dismissing the suit so far as respondents 2 and 3 are concerned. We do not find any grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree challenged in this appeal. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order: appeal is dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .