JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an order of the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, made under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. The Petitioner, a young and enthusiastic woman, was working as a winder in the factory of the First Respondent from November 20, 1977. At the time of employment she had passed first year Commerce Examination and being an ambitious young lady, she simultaneously pursued her education and in the year 1979 she obtained B. Com Degree. After obtaining the degree, perhaps the Petitioner felt it infra dig to do manual work as winder and requested the First Respondent Management to give her a post of Clerk as she was educated. Though, from the year 1979, the Petitioner was given clerical work, it appears that her substantive post remained that of winder and at no point of time she was promoted to work as a Clerk. On February 3, 1980 the Petitioner was retrenched from service. On May 31, 1980, the First Respondent sent her communication to report back for work, which was received by her on June 3, 1980. On June 4, 1980, the Petitioner resumed her duty, but the First Respondent refused to give her work as a Clerk. When the Petitioner addressed a letter, dated June 4, 1980, the First Respondent agreed to give her work as winder. The Petitioner made a representation dated, June 14, 1980 to the First Respondent in which she alleged that she had been working as an office Clerk from May 5, 1979 to February 3, 1980 and that after she was allowed to resume work from June 5, 1980 she had not been given her legitimate and rightful post of office Clerk, but illegally called upon to do the work as a winder. She, therefore, sought relief of reinstatement in service as office Clerk and wages commensurate to work as office Clerk. Her request not having been conceded, she moved the Labour Court, Kolhapur, by her Application (B.I.R.) No. 34 of 1981 (the exact date of the application is not on record, nor the learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner is in a position to give the exact date of the application, though it is pointed out that the application was filed sometime in the year 1981. In the application, the case made out by the Petitioner is that the First Respondent, by its action of not giving her clerical work from June 5, 1980 had violated Schedule Ill, Item 6 of the Act and Section -9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The substantive prayers made in the application were that the Petitioner be given her post as a Clerk and the wages of the clerical post, apart from the costs. 3. The Labour Court tried the application and, by its lengthy order, dated February 28, 1983, allowed the application and directed the First Respondent's Management to give her not winder's job, but clerical job which she was doing previously and to pay her previous salary with any additions which may thereafter have accrued by way of allowance. The Labour Court also directed the First Respondent to give her full back wages for the interregnum and Rs. 100 as costs. 4. The First Respondent appealed against the order of the Labour Court by its Appeal (IC) No. 3 of 1983. It was contended by the First Respondent that, inasmuch as the Petitioner's substantive post was that of a winder, the Petitioner has no right to claim the post of a clerk, though the Petitioner's request for doing clerical work has been voluntarily conceded partly in view of her having obtained required academic qualification. It contended that the application was untenable as the substantive prayer in the application amounted in essence to a prayer for promotion, which was not the subject matter of any of the industrial matters enumerated in the Standing Orders or of Schedule III to the Act, and, therefore, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was also contended in the appeal that in any event the application was hopelessly time barred and was liable to be dismissed. The Industrial Court accepted both these contentions and by the impugned order allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Labour Court, Kolhapur, dated February 28, 1983, and dismissed the Petitioner's original application. Hence the present writ petition. 5. I have been taken through the record and the judgments of the two Courts below by Ms. Kuzhimadathil, learned Advocate for the Petitioner. Hence the present writ petition. 5. I have been taken through the record and the judgments of the two Courts below by Ms. Kuzhimadathil, learned Advocate for the Petitioner. After Hearing her at length, I remain unimpressed by the contention that the order of the Industrial Court is erroneous in law or that it needs to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The Industrial Court has rightly pointed out that there was a clear misdirection in law by the Labour Court in misconstruing the provisions of law invoked by the original application made by the Petitioner. The Industrial Court rightly pointed out that, despite the fact that the evidence showed that some clerical work had been given to the Petitioner, yet, she had not been appointed to the substantive post of a clerk, nor she was paid the salary of clerk throughout her service. Correctly interpreting the tenor of the application made by the Petitioner before the Labour Court, the Industrial Court took the view that the prayer therein, in essence, amounted to a claim for promotion, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court as not being an industrial matter failing within the Schedules I and III of the Act. Alternatively, the Industrial Court also considered the application as if it was an application complaining of an illegal change. Here also, it is pointed out that the application was beyond time and no attempt had been made to persuade the Labour Court to condone the limitation by showing adequate reasons. On both counts, the Industrial Court was satisfied that the application was not tenable and dismissed the application. 6. Ms. Kuzhimadathil, learned Advocate for the Petitioner, contends that the approach letter was sent on June 14, 1980 and, therefore, the application filed before the Labour Court was within time. The contention of Ms. Kuzhimadathil that the approach notice was sent under the proviso to Section 42 of sub-section (4) of the Act, which provides that any employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the Employer under Standing Orders, or any industrial dispute arising out of the application or interpretation of Standing Orders or an industrial matter specified in Schedule III (except Item (5) thereof), shall make an application to the Labour Court only after having approached the Employer for the desired change in the prescribed manner. The Petitioner was not seeking any change in respect of Items (i) and (ii) enumerated in sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Act. As far as Item (iii) therein is concerned, the claim for promotion not being a matter failing within Schedule Ill, the provisions of Section 42 (4) had no application to the Petitioner's case. Considering the over all facts, namely, that the Petitioner was substantively employed as a winder, but carried out clerical work for some time and was paid only the wages of winder throughout, it is difficult to accept that the application could be construed as an application complaining of an illegal change from June 5, 1980. Even if it was possible to do so, it is apparent that the application, not having been filed within three months from the date of the cause of action, was barred by limitation. Though it is contended by Ms. Kuzhimadathil tha the Petitioner was unable to move the Labour Court within a period of limitation because of financial condition, there does not appear to be a whisper about it in the original application nor was any attempt made to lead any evidence before the trial Court to satisfy the trial Court that such was the situation. As a matter of fact, before the trial Court the Petitioner did not ever raise the alternative contention that the application should be construed as an application within the meaning of Section 78 sub-section (1) (C) of the Act. The Petitioner chose to stand by her contention that it was an application desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter failing within Schedule III. This contention having beer rejected by the Industrial Court, and in my view rightly, there was hardly any relief which could be given to the Petitioner. 7. The Industrial Court has rightly pointed out that, if at all, the Petitioner could perhaps claim additional remuneration for the clerical work she was doing from May 4, 1979 to February 3, 1980 for which she could move the Labour Court under the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and not by an application u/s 78 (I) of the Act. 8. In these circumstances, it is not possible to say that the Industrial Court has in any way erred in setting aside the order of the Labour Court and dismissing the application of the Petitioner. 8. In these circumstances, it is not possible to say that the Industrial Court has in any way erred in setting aside the order of the Labour Court and dismissing the application of the Petitioner. I see hardly any reason to interfere with the Appellate order of the Industrial Court. The petition is without merit and is liable to be dismissed. 9. Petition is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.