Judgment :- 1. The appellant in Second Appeal No.26 of 1983 is a public trust and it is plaintiff in O.S.No.367 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvarur. The respondents in the second appeal are defendants 1 to 3 in the said suit. The petitioner in W.P.No.274 of 1983 is the second defendant in O.S.No.367 of 1980 and the petitioner in W.P.No.544 of 1983 is the third defendant in the said suit. The first respondent in both the writ petitions is the plaintiff in O.S.No.367 of 1980. As the subject matter and the parties to the second appeal and the writ petitions are common, they are disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to in the judgment in Second Appeal No.26 of 1983 as per their array in O.S.No.367 of 1980. 2. The suit O.S.No.367 of 1989 was filed by the plaintiff-trust for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, namely, an extent of 3 acres in R.S.Nos.305/2,301/ 9 and 291/6 in Sengalipuram Village, Nannilam Taluk. The case of the plaintiff-trust is as follows. The suit properties belong to the plaintiff-trust. They were leased out to the first defendant by the plaintiff in the year 1968 and he was cultivating the same till Fasli 1389. During Fasli 1389 a suo motu enquiry was taken undertheTamilNaduPublicTrusts(Regu-lation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Special Deputy Collector, Tiruvarur and by order dated 27.8.1979 the Special Deputy Collector declared that the first defendant was holding more than the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area of 5 standard acres and directed him to surrender the excess land of 3 acres to the plaintiff-trust. The first defendant voluntarily surrendered the excess land of 3 acres to the plaintiff trust on 5.2.1980 and to that effect he has executed a surrender letter in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff took possession of the suit properties on 5.2.1980 from the first defendant and there after the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. As defendants 1 to 3 attempted to trespass into the suit properties the plaintiff filed the suit for permanent injunction. 3. The plaintiff took possession of the suit properties on 5.2.1980 from the first defendant and there after the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. As defendants 1 to 3 attempted to trespass into the suit properties the plaintiff filed the suit for permanent injunction. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 filed separate written statements raising identical contentions which are as follows: The first defendant is a lessee under the plaintiff trust in respect of the suit properties. He has sub-let item No.1 to the second defendant on 15.6.1979 and itemNos.2and3 to the third defendant on 10.6.1979 and lease deeds were also executed in triplicate. Defendants 2 and 3 are cultivating tenants in respect of the suit properties contributing their persona! labour and they are entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955. In the middle of the year 1979, a notice was sent to the first defendant by Special Deputy Collector, Tiruvarur. The first defendant did not attend the enquiry conducted by the Special Deputy Collector. However, on 5.8.1980 the plaintiff’s agent wanted a surrender letter to be shown to the authorised officer for closing the proceedings before him. Hence the first defendant signed* a blank paper in two places. The plaintiff trust never took possession of the suit properties pursuant to the surrender letter purported to have been executed by the first defendant on 5.2.1980. Defendants 2 and 3 are recorded as cultivating tenants in the record of tenant rights proceedings. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. 4. The trial court on the basis of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction prayed for by the plaintiff and consequently decreed the suit O.S.No.367 of 1980. As against the judgment of the trial court defendants 2 and 3 filed an appeal A.S.No.57 of 1982 before the Sub Court, Mayiladuthurai. The appellate court, on a consideration of the entire materials on record found that the plaintiff did not take possession of the suit properties pursuant to the surrender letter dated 5.2.1980, that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit properties on the date of suit and consequently allowed the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 and dismissed the suit O.S.No.367 of 1980. As against the judgment of the appellate court, the plaintiff trust has filed the Second Appeal No.26 of 1983. 5. The suit O.S.No.367 of 1980 was filed on 1.9.1980. Earlier on 27.8.1979, the Special Deputy Collector (Public Trust), Tiruvarur, passed an order under Sec.7 of the Act holding that the cultivating tenant M.Chinnadurai the first defendant in O.S.No.367 of 1980 was in possession of more than the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area of 5 standard acres and further directed that the excess lands to be reverted to the plaintiff trust. By the said order the plaintiff trust was directed to take possession of the lands let out to Chinnadurai. As against the said order of the Special Deputy Collector dated 27.8.1979 the tenant Chinnadurai filed an appeal in A.P.No.19 of 1981 before the District Revenue Officer (Appellate Authority), Thanjavur. Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy -defendants 2 and 3 in O.S.No.367 of 1980 filed petitions in A.P.No.19 of 1981 to get themselves impleaded as parties in A.P.No.19 of 1981 contending that they are sub-tenants under Chinnadurai the first defendant in O.S.No.367 of 1980 and that they are in possession of the suit properties. The appellate authority by its order dated 17.3.1982 dismissed the appeal A.P.No.19 of 1981 and the petitions filed by Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy. Thereafter, Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy-defendants 2 and 3 in O.S.No.367 of 1980 filed petitions before the Record Officer R.T.R. and Additional Tahsildar, Nannilam for inclusion of their names as cultivating tenant in the approved record of tenant’s rights in respect of R.S.Nos.305/2, 301/9 and 291/6. The case of Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy is that Chinnadurai became a tenant in respect of the lands in question from the trust in the year 1968 that the said Chinnadurai sub-leased the said lands to Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy under lease deeds dated 15.6.1979 and 10.6.1979 and that they are cultivating the said lands as sub tenants under Chinnadurai, contributing their physical labour and therefore their names have to be included as tenants in the record of tenancy rights. The Record Tahsildar, Nannilam by separate orders dated 29.9.1980 allowed the petitions filed by Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy and included their names as cultivating tenants in the record of tenant rights in respect of the lands in question. As against the order of the Record Tahsildar, the plaintiff trust filed an appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority dismissed the appeals on 15.2.1982. As against the order of the Record Tahsildar, the plaintiff trust filed an appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority dismissed the appeals on 15.2.1982. Thereafter, the plaintiff trust filed revision petitions against the orders of the appellate authority before the District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur the fourth respondent in both the writ petitions, in R.P.Nos.26 and 27 of 1982. The fourth respondent by the common order dated 9.11.1982 allowed the revision petitions filed by the plaintiff trust and set aside the orders of the appellate authority and the Record Tahsildar, Nannilam holding that the lease deeds executed by Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy in favour of the original tenant Chinnadurai are not valid and that Chinnadurai had no right to sub lease the lands in question to Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy in view of Sec.7 of the Act. Aggrieved by the common order of the first respondent, dated 9.11.1982 allowing the revision petitions filed by the plaintiff trust, Thangarasu and Kaliyamurthy have filed Writ Petition Nos.274 of 1983 and 544 of 1983 respectively. 6. Second Appeal No.26 of 1983: Mr.K.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the plaintiff trust contended that the appellate authority having found that the first defendant had signed the surrender deed dated 5.2.1980 marked as Ex.A-2 is not justified in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not take actual possession of the suit properties pursuant to the surrender deed executed by the first defendant that defendants 2 and 3 alone are in possession of the suit properties and that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit properties on the date of suit. The learned counsel further contended that when the recitals in Ex.A-2 show that the first defendant had surrendered possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff-trust, he cannot be permitted to let in evidence to prove that he did not as a matter of fact surrender the suit properties to the plaintiff trust and on the basis of Ex.A-2 and other evidence on record, the appellate court ought to have held that the plaintiff trust was in possession of the suit property on the date of suit. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiff trust relied on the decision in Sevenska Handeisbanken v. M/s.Indian Charge Chrome and others, (1993)6 J. T. 189. However, I am unable to accept the above contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff trust. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiff trust relied on the decision in Sevenska Handeisbanken v. M/s.Indian Charge Chrome and others, (1993)6 J. T. 189. However, I am unable to accept the above contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff trust. As already stated, the suit was filed by the plaintiff trust, for a bare injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the suit properties. Therefore, the plaintiff has to prove that it was in possession of the suit properties on the date of the suit. No doubt, the recitals in the surrender deed Ex.A-2 show that the first defendant surrendered possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff on 5.2.1980. The first defendant has also in his written statement admitted that he signed only a blank paper which was utilised for the preparation of Ex.A-2. However, there is absolutely no evidence to show that pursuant to Ex.A-2 there was actual delivery of possession of the suit properties by the first defendant to the plaintiff and that from 5.2.1980, i.e. the date of surrender and on the date of suit the plaintiff was in possession of the suit properties. The plaintiff in order to prove possession of the suit properties pursuant to the surrender deed Ex.A-2 placed reliance on Exs.A-3, A-4, A-7, A-8 and A-10. Ex.A-3 is the entry at page 216 of the account book maintained by the plaintiff. No reliance can be placed on Ex.A-3, because the person who wrote Ex.A-3 has not been examined to prove the entry marked as Ex.A-3. The appellate court rightly refused to place reliance on the entries in the account books of the plaintiff marked as Exs.A-4, A-7 and A-8, because the Tamil words in Exs.A-4 A-7 and A-8 were written by one person, whereas the other entries in the account book were made in the handwriting of another book were made in the handwriting of another person, which clearly go to show that the entries marked as Exs.A-4, A-7 and A-8 are subsequent interpolations and no explanation is offered by the plaintiff trust for the difference in the handwriting relating to Exs.A-4, A-7 and A-8. Ex.A-10 clearly destroys the case of the plaintiff that it is in possession of the suit properties from 5.2.1980, that is the date of surrender. Ex.A-10 clearly destroys the case of the plaintiff that it is in possession of the suit properties from 5.2.1980, that is the date of surrender. Ex.A-10 is the entry dated 16.10.1980 in respect of the lease paddy account received from Sengalipuram Village including the suit lands. The name of the first defendant is entered in Ex.A-10 as against the date 16.10.1980. Above the name of the first defendant in Ex.A-10 the name of another person Itesi has been mentioned and the quantum of lease paddy received is mentioned as 12 kalam and Rs.28 and against the first defendant’s name something has been written and subsequently the same has been erased which would show that the entries if allowed to remain in the account books would be unfavourable to the plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff has erased the entries. The plaintiff has not offered proper explanation as to why the plaintiff trust has erased the entries appearing against the name of the first defendant, which would go to show that the accounts of the plaintiff trust are not properly maintained and it is not kept in the regular course of business. In the above circumstances, the appellate court rightly refused to place any reliance on the account books maintained by the plaintiff trust. The fact that the name of the first defendant appears in the account book of the plaintiff as against the date 16.10.1980, long after the alleged surrendered on 5.2.1980 and for which there is no proper explanation on the part of the plaintiff only go to prove that the first defendant did not actually surrender possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff trust on 5.2.1980. The appellate court, on a careful examination of the entries in the account books marked as Exs.A-3 to A-9 found that the said entries were interpolated later on by tampering with the account books and rightly refused to place any reliance on Exs.A-3 to A-9. Another document which would disprove the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff-trust was in possession of the suit properties on the date of suit is Ex.A-14. Ex.A-14 is the lease deed alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff trust in favour of one Arulanandhu Udayar in respect of the suit properties. Neither the lessee nor the lessor has been examined to prove Ex.A-14. Ex.A-14 is the lease deed alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff trust in favour of one Arulanandhu Udayar in respect of the suit properties. Neither the lessee nor the lessor has been examined to prove Ex.A-14. Ex.A-14 and Ex.A-15 show that the suit lands were leased out to one Arulanandhu Udayar on 4.5.1980 under Ex.A-14 and that under Ex.A-15 the said Arulanandhu Udayar surrendered the suit properties to the plaintiff trust on 20.6.1980. The case of the plaintiff trust on the basis of Exs.A-14 and A-15 is that the suit properties were in possession of Arulanandhu Udayar as tenant from" 4.5.1980 to 20.6.1980. However, Exs.A-5 and A-6 entries in the account book maintained by the plaintiff would show that the cultivation expenses in respect of the suit properties have been incurred by the plaintiff trust by doing Pannai cultivation even during the period 4.5.1980 to 20.6.1980. Exs.A-5 and A-6 falsify the case of the plaintiff that the suit properties were let out to Arulanandhu Udayar on 4.5.1980 under Ex.A-14 and the said Arulanandhu Udayar surrendered possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff trust on 20.6.1980. Exs.A-14 and A-15 only go to show that the said documents were brought into existence subsequently in an attempt to prove its case that the plaintiff trust is in possession of the suit properties pursuant to the surrender deed Ex.A-2. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate authority rightly refused to place reliance on Exs.A-14 and A-15 on the ground that they were created later so as to prove the case of the plaintiff that they are in possession. On the other hand, the orders marked as Exs.B-2 and B-8 would go to show that defendants 2 and 3 are in possession of the suit properties. The appellate authority in paragraphs 23 to 27 of its judgment has given cogent and convincing reasons for not accepting the oral evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 with regard to the possession of the suit properties by the plaintiff after 5.2.1980 till the date of filing of the suit. Defendants 2 and 3 have examined themselves as D.Ws. 1 and 2. D. W.5 also speaks about possession of the suit properties by the defendants 2 and 3 during the relevant period. The specific evidence of D.Ws. Defendants 2 and 3 have examined themselves as D.Ws. 1 and 2. D. W.5 also speaks about possession of the suit properties by the defendants 2 and 3 during the relevant period. The specific evidence of D.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 is that they are in possession of the suit properties as sub-tenants under Chinnadurai pursuant to the lease deeds Exs.B-1 and B-6 executed by defendants 2 and 3 in favour of the first defendant. D.W.3 is the Village Thalayari of Sengalipuram and his evidence is that defendants 2 and 3 alone are in possession of the suit properties for two or three years prior to his giving evidence before the trial court. The plaintiff has not examined any person belonging to the suit village to prove its case regarding possession. On a consideration of the entire material on record, the appellate court authority in paragraph 31 of the judgment recorded a finding with regard to possession as follows: "31. On a consideration of the oral evidence on record also I am inclined to hold that the plaintiff trust has not proved the possession of the suit . properties in pursuance of Ex.A-2. But on the other hand there is evidence on record to show that the defendants would have continued to be in possession of the suit properties even after Ex.A-2. I do not agree with the plaintiff has established possession of the suit properties in pursuanceofEx.A-2 and after 5.2.1980. Inpara.13 of the lower court’s judgment, it is mentioned that the plaintiff-trust has maintained that the plaintiff has maintained regular accounts under Exs.A-3 to A-9. But for the reasons stated above by me, the same cannot be said to be regular accounts maintained by the plaintiff trust and the same are concocted and invented only for the purpose of the suit. On a consideration of the evidence available on record I am inclined to hold that the plaintiff has not proved possession of the suit properties on the date of suit and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for in the suit." I see no infirmity in the said finding of the appellate court, as it is based on acceptable court, as it is based on acceptable evidence both oral and documentary. The decision in Sevcnska Handeisbanken v. Ml S.Indian Charge Chrome and others, (1993)6 J.T. 189 , relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-trust is clearly distinguishable on facts and the principles laid down in the said decision have no application to the facts of the present case. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal. There is no merit in the second appeal and the second appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. 6. Writ Petition Nos.274 and 544 of 1983: Mrs.Prabha Sridevan learned counsel for the petitioners in the writ petitions contended that the first respondent trust granted a lease of about three acres in favour of one Chinnadurai in the year 1968 who had been cultivating the same till Fasli 1389, that the said Chinnadurai had granted a sub-lease in respect of the lands in question in favour of the petitioners, and that the petitioners have been cultivating the lands contributing their physical labour and therefore, they are entitled to get their names recorded as cultivating tenants in the record of tenant’s rights. The learned counsel further contended that though the Special Deputy Collector (Public Trust), Tiruvarur by his order dated 27.8.1979 declared the three acres of the trust lands as surplus in the hands of the cultivating tenant Chinnadurai no steps have been taken by the trust to recover possession, that the petitioner as sub-tenants under Chinnadurai are in possession of the lands in question pursuant to the valid lease deeds executed by them in favour of the said Chinnadurai that they are contributing their physical labour in the cultivation of the lands in question and that they are cultivating tenants within the meaning of Sec.2(5) of the Act and therefore, the fourth respondent/revisional authority is not at all justified in holding that the petitioners are not entitled to be recorded as cultivating tenants in the record of tenancy rights in respect of the lands in question and the order of the fourth respondent challenged in these writ petitions are liable to be quashed. 7. There is no merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. There is no merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Sec.2(5) of the Act defined cultivating tenant as follows: (5) "cultivating tenant" (i) means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; and (ii) includes: (a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement; or (b) the heir of such person if the heir contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land; or (c) a sub-tenant if he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land; (iii) does not include a mere intermediary or his heir." The two main ingredients to become eligible for registering ones name as cultivating tenant in the approved record of tenancy rights are; (1) that there should be a valid tenancy agreement either express or implied in favour of the tenant (2) that the land should be in his possession and he should do personal cultivation by contributing his own physical labour or that of his members of his family. In the present case, so far as the second ingredient is concerned the petitioners satisfy the same, because, there is sufficient material available on record to show that the petitioners are in possession of the lands in question. In A.S.No.57 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Court, Mayiladuthurai, the civil court on the basis of the evidence placed before it, has held that the petitioners who are appellants in the said appeal are in possession of the suit properties. While disposing of the Second Appeal No.26 of 1983, I have confirmed the said finding of the civil court in A.S.No.57 of 1982. There is also evidence available in these proceedings to show that the petitioners are doing personal cultivation contributing their own physical labour. Coming to the first ingredient, the fourth respondent has pointed out that the evidence let in by the petitioners with regard to the lease deeds executed by them in favour of the original tenant Chinnadurai is contradictory. There is also evidence available in these proceedings to show that the petitioners are doing personal cultivation contributing their own physical labour. Coming to the first ingredient, the fourth respondent has pointed out that the evidence let in by the petitioners with regard to the lease deeds executed by them in favour of the original tenant Chinnadurai is contradictory. Even assuming that the petitioners have proved that the lease deeds dated 15.6.1979 and 10.6.1979 have been executed by them in favour of Chinnadurai, I am of the view, that the said lease deeds are not valid and under the lease deeds referred above, Chinnadurai cannot convey any right in favour of the petitioners for the following reasons; As already pointed out, on 27.8.1979 the Special Deputy Collector, Tiruvarur inhisproceedingsN.76/MNL/dated 27.8.1979 passed an order under Sec.7 of the Act holding that the tenant Chinnadurai possessed more than the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area of 5 standard acres and directing that the excess extent of 3 acres of the trust lands in S.Nos.305/2,301/9 and 291/6 be reverted to the first respondent trust. The appeal filed by the said Chinnadurai before the appellate authority, Thanjavur in A.P.No.19 of 1981 was dismissed on 17.3.1982. It is seen from the order of the Special Deputy Collector (Public-Trust), Tiruvarur, dated 27.8.1979 that Chinnadurai was granted lease of Survey Numbers 305/2, etc. by the trust on 1.6.1968. The finding of the Special Deputy Collector in the said order is that the tenant Chinnadurai apart from the trust lands leased out to him, possessed 20-301/ 2 acres of dry and 5-921/2 acres of wet lands in both joint and separate patta which comes to 6-84 standard acres, which is in excess of the cultivating tenant ceiling area of 5 standard acres. No doubt, the 4th respondent while allowing the revision petitions erroneously proceeded on the basis that Sec.7(1) of the Act will apply to the case of Chinnadurai and that the excess lands held by Chinnadurai as cultivating tenant reverted back to the trust with effect from the notified date that is 1.4.1963. Sec.7(1) of the Act will not apply to the excess land possessed by Chinnadurai as cultivating tenant because, admittedly, Chinnadurai, was granted lease-of the lands in question by the trust only 1.6.1968 long after the notified date. Sec.7(1) of the Act will not apply to the excess land possessed by Chinnadurai as cultivating tenant because, admittedly, Chinnadurai, was granted lease-of the lands in question by the trust only 1.6.1968 long after the notified date. However on that ground it is not necessary to remand the matter to the 4th respondent because the mistake committed by the fourth respondent does not in anyway affect the correctness of the ultimate conclusion arrived at by him. As the lease in favour of Chinnadurai was granted by the Trust on 1.6.1968, the provision that will apply to the facts of the present case is Sec.7(2) of the Act. Sec.7(2) of the Act reads as follows: "(2) Where, on or after the notified date, any cultivating tenant under any public trust acquired by sale, lease, gift, exchange, surrender, agreement, settlement or otherwise, any land which together with the other land, if any already held by him, exceeds in the aggregate the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area, the possession of the land which is held by the public trust and which is in excess of the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area shall with effect from the date such acquisition, revert to the public trust, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf. According to Sec.7(2) of the Act if a cultivating tenant acquires any land after the notified date and if as a result of such acquisition the lands in his possession exceeds the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area, the excess land in the possession which belong to the public Trust should revert back to the lessor trust. Chinnadurai who possessed lands more than the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area had no right to sublease the excess lands in his possession to the petitioners, because such excess lands in his possession, which belong to the public Trust had already reverted to the 1st respondent-Trust. Chinnadurai become a tenant under the trust on 1.6.1968. The finding of the Special Deputy Collector in his order dated 27.8.1979 is that apart from the lease hold lands belonging to the trust Chinnadurai owned patta lands measuring 6.84 standard acres which is over above the cultivating tenant’s ceiling limit. It is not the case of the petitioners that Chinnadurai sublet the lands in question and the petitioners executed the lease deeds in his favour even before he acquired the lands in excess of the cultivating tenant’s ceiling limit. It is not the case of the petitioners that Chinnadurai sublet the lands in question and the petitioners executed the lease deeds in his favour even before he acquired the lands in excess of the cultivating tenant’s ceiling limit. Therefore, it has to be held that Chinnadurai sub let the lands in question to the petitioners under the lease deeds dated 15.6.1979 and 10.6.1979 when he was having lands in excess of the cultivating tenant’s ceiling limit, that is after the excess land of 3 acres held by Chinnadurai reverted back to the first respondent-trust, by virtue of Sec.7(2) of the Act. After the excess land in the possession of Chinnadurai as a cultivating tenant, reverted back to the trust on his acquiring lands in excess of the cultivating tenant’s ceiling limit by virtue of Sec.7(2) of the Act, he had no manner of interest in the lands 30 reverted back to the Trust and he cannot convey any right in favour of the petitioners, under the lease deeds dated 15.6.1979 and 10.6.1979. Consequently, it has to be held that there is no valid tenancy agreements in favour of the petitioners pursuant to which they are in possession of the lands in question. On this ground alone the petitioners are not entitled to get their names recorded as cultivating tenants in the record of tenancy rights in respect of the lands in question. 8. Another in surmountable obstacle in the way of the petitioners getting their names included as cultivating tenants in the record of tenancy rights is Sec.l5-A of the Act. Sec.l5-A of the reads thus: “15-A. Trustee or authorised officer to lake possession of land reverting to public must: (1) Any person in possession of the land reverting to the public trust under Sec.7 or Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.15 shall be deemed to have been evicted and the trustee of the public trust shall take possession of the land immediately. Sec.l5-A of the reads thus: “15-A. Trustee or authorised officer to lake possession of land reverting to public must: (1) Any person in possession of the land reverting to the public trust under Sec.7 or Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.15 shall be deemed to have been evicted and the trustee of the public trust shall take possession of the land immediately. (2) (i) If the person who is deemed to have been evicted under Sub-sec.(1) fails to deliver possession of the land to the trustee or obstructs the trustee or from taking possession of such land or, (ii) if the trustee fails to take possession of the land under Sub-sec.(l) the authorised officer may, after using such force as may be necessary for the purpose, take possession of the land himself on behalf of the public trust and deliver possession of such land to the public trust.” As already pointed out the Special Deputy Collector, by his order dated 27.8.1979 held that the original tenant Chinnadurai possessed both patta lands and trust lands more than the cultivating tenant’s ceiling area of 5 standard acres and consequently the Special Deputy Collector ordered that an extent of 3 acres of trust lands comprised in S.No.305/2, etc. be reverted to the first respondent trust under Sec.7 of the Act. The appeal filed by Chinnadurai against the order of the Special Deputy Collector dated 27.8.1979 in A.P.No. 19 of 1981 was dismissed by the appellate authority on 17.3.1982 therefore, the order of the Special Deputy Collector, dated 27.8.1979 directing the reversion of the excess lands of three acres in S.No.305/2, etc. to the first respondent trust under Sec.7 of the Act has become final. In such circumstances, when the lands in question reverted back to the trust under Sec.7 of the Act, by reason of the order of the Special Deputy Collector, dated 27.8.1979. Sec. 15-A of the Act stands attracted and in view of the provisions contained in Sec.15-A(1) the petitioners who are in possession of such lands which reverted back to the first respondent trust, shall be deemed to have been evicted. The expression “any person” in Sec.l5-A(l) will include not only the original tenant under the trust but also the persons like the petitioners, who claims to be in possession of the lands trust, as sub-tenants pursuant to the lease agreements with original tenant. The expression “any person” in Sec.l5-A(l) will include not only the original tenant under the trust but also the persons like the petitioners, who claims to be in possession of the lands trust, as sub-tenants pursuant to the lease agreements with original tenant. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners are in possession of the lands in question as sub-tenants under Chinnadurai pursuant to valid tenancy agreements, once when the order dated 27.8.1979 directing the reversion of the excess lands to the trust under Sec.7 of the Act was passed the petitioners who are in possession of such lands reverted back to the public trust shall be deemed to have been evicted and the trustee of the public trust is entitled to take possession of the lands immediately from them. Sec.15-A(2), further provides that if the persons who are deemed to have been evicted under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.15 fails to deliver possession of the land, the authorised officer may, after using such force as may be necessary for the purpose take possession of the land himself on behalf of the public trust and deliver possession of such land to the public trust. Thus, even if we accept the entire case of the petitioners that they are in possession of the lands pursuant to the tenancy agreements executed by them in favour of the original tenant Chinnadurai in view of the order of the Special Deputy Collector, dated 27.8.1979 directing the reversion of the lands in question back to the first respondent trust the petitioners shall be deemed to have been evicted from the lands in question by virtue of Sec.l5-A(1) of the Act and the authorised officer by exercising the powers under Sec. 15-A(2) is empowered to take possession of the lands on behalf of the trust and deliver possession of such land to the first respondent-trust. 9. In the above circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioners who are deemed to have been evicted from the lands in question with effect from 2 7.8.1979 by virtue of the order of the Special Deputy Collector under Sec.7(1) of the Act and who are liable to be evicted by the authorised officer in exercise of the powers under Sec.15-A(2)(ii)of the Act, are not entitled to get their names included as cultivating tenants in the record of tenancy rights in respect of the lands in question. Therefore, the impugned orders of the fourth respondent dated 9.11.1982 setting aside the orders of the record officer and the appellate authority, admitting the claim of the petitioners to register their names as cultivating tenants in the approved record of tenancy rights in respect of the lands in question, is legal and correct, though not for the reasons contained in the impugned order of the 4th respondent, but for the reasons stated above in this judgment and the impugned common order is not liable to be quashed. The petitioners are not entitled to any relief in these writ petitions and they are liable to be dismissed. Though the petitioners cannot get their names included in the record of tenancy rights as cultivating tenants in respect of the lands in question, they can be evicted from the lands in question only in the manner provided in Sec.15-A(2)(ii) of the Act and therefore the plaintiff-trust in O.S.No.367 of 1980 is not entitled to a decree for permanent injunction in the said suit against defendants 2 and 3. 10. In the result, the second appeal as well as the Writ Petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no’ order as to costs. 11. It is represented by Mrs.Prabha Sridevan learned counsel for defendants 2 and 3 that by order dated 26.8.1981 in C.R.P.No.2778 of 1981, the plaintiff-trust was appointed as Receiver pending disposal of the suit and the plaintiff continued to be the receiver till date. It is needless to say that the said order passed in C.R.P.No.2778 of 1981 will have effect only till the disposal of the second appeal.