ORDER Shacheendra Dwivedi, J.--1. The petitioner has preferred this revision challenging the order passed by the learned trial Court dated 28.2.94 thereby cancelling his bail and committing him to custody for the breach of the condition of bail allowed to him by that Court. 2. The petitioner and three other accused persons were apprehended in Crime No. 191/92, registered for the offences, which were registered under sections 394 and 307 of I.P.C., but section 302 I.P.C. was subsequently added as injured Rajendra Singh had succummed to the injuries later. The accused-petitioner was allowed bail on 8.4.93 under section 439 Cr.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhind, on one of the conditions that the petitioner shall not leave the boundaries of District Bhind, without prior permission of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhind. 3. Later on, the learned trial Court received the information that the petitioner along with his other associates committed an offence under section 394, I.P.C. on Datia-Seondha road within the jurisdiction of P.S. Tharet, District Datia. The allegations were that the miscreants looted the property from one Dayanand while he was going driving a tractor. The tractor was stopped and his wrist watch along with the cash money was looted on 11.12.93. The report was lodged by Dayanand with Police Station-Tharet. Tehreupon the Police became active and on the information of the informer, the petitioner was arrested from Kanjoli forest of Datia district, while he possessed a country made pistol (katta) with five live cartridges and the looted wrist watch. The petitioner was later released on bail by the Datia Court. The copies of relevant papers were filed in the trial Court. Under the circumstances, the Court found that the petitioner had committed the breach of the bail-condition by going beyond the bounderies of district Bhind, without the prior permission as was prescribed, and as such the bail was cancelled. 4. It is vehemently contended by the petitioner's counsel Shri K.S. Shrivastava that before cancelling the bail, since the Court held no inquiry, the petitioner has been seriously prejudiced as it was not conductive of a fair trial. The very object of Criminal Procedure Code is to ensure a fair trial of the accused persons. 4. It is vehemently contended by the petitioner's counsel Shri K.S. Shrivastava that before cancelling the bail, since the Court held no inquiry, the petitioner has been seriously prejudiced as it was not conductive of a fair trial. The very object of Criminal Procedure Code is to ensure a fair trial of the accused persons. The provisions of the Code are so framed that every criminal trial should begin with the valuable presumption of the innocence of accused very fairly but the fair trial has to have the two objects in view, i.e. it must be fair to the accused but must also be fair to the prosecution. When the Court while releasing the accused on bail found it fit to impose a condition that he would not leave the district without a prior permission of the concerned judicial authority so that the trial proceeds uninterrupted. The breach of the condition by the accused would entail the curtailment of his freedom for the continuance of a fair trial. 5. The conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of an innocent is the object of every criminal trial. When a Court finds that the conduct of an accused is likely to obstruct a fair trial which may lead to failure of justice, the Court may cancel the bail allowed to him. All the procedural laws, whether civil or criminal are meant to serve the higher purpose of justice. The order of granting or cancelling the bail is an integral part of such procedure. 6. In the facts of the case, I have found no substance in the contention advanced. It is the satisfaction of the Court for the reasons on which the bail may be cancelled. If there be overwhelming material available to the Court for its satisfaction for the cancellation of bail, then a summary inquiry is not necessary. It would depend on the facts of each case and no definite formula can be evolved. 7. The material fact has not been denied by the petitioner that Police Tharet had arrested him in a criminal case and that he was released on bail under the order of Datia Court. The copy of Datia Court proceedings was also placed before the trial Court. The alleged offence committed in the district of Datia was investigated by police Tharet of that district and the petitioner was found possessing incriminating material. The copy of Datia Court proceedings was also placed before the trial Court. The alleged offence committed in the district of Datia was investigated by police Tharet of that district and the petitioner was found possessing incriminating material. That an inquiry ought to have been held, does not carry any meaning. It would depend on the facts of such case whether a summary inquiry was necessary. If Court was satisfied from police investigation it may not be necessary to hold any inquiry as the accused will have only a right of hearing. The order of cancellation of bail is based on police inquiry which provided the material satisfaction to the trial Court. 8. The police investigation in the present case was sufficient for the prima facie satisfaction of the trial Court that the petitioner had committed the breach of the condition of bail. He was afforded the necessary opportunity of hearing. In these circumstances, no fresh or a detailed inquiry by the Court was required to be held before cancelling his bail. 9. The petitioner's counsel has placed reliance on the authority of T.N. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar ( AIR 1958 SC 376 ), R.K. Nabachandra Singh v. Manipur Administration (AIR 1964 Manipur 39), Bhagirath Singh v. State of Gujrat (1984 MPWN 277) and Bansilal v. State of M.P. ( 1984 MPWN 354 ). In Hussain's case (supra), the Apex Court was considering the scope of inherent powers for the cancellation of bail, but even in the authority their Lordships found that bail allowed to a n accused could be cancelled by the Court on the satisfaction that conduct of the accused was likely to stall the proceedings of trial. The dictum laid down in the authority means counter to the contention advanced by the petitioner. In Nabachandra's case (supra), the bail cancellation order was set aside by Manipur Court on the consideration of the facts of that case. The other cited authorities are also distinguishable on facts and are of no consequence to the petitioner. 10. Apart from the breach of the bail condition, the alleged facts also disclose prima facie the misuse of bail by the petitioner by committing another offence while on bail and the learned trial Court in the circumstances committed no illegality in its discretion in cancelling the bail. The impugned order is not warranted to be interfered with by this Court. 11. The impugned order is not warranted to be interfered with by this Court. 11. The petition has, therefore, no substance and is dismissed.