JUDGEMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---The petitioners are tenants against whom an order of eviction was passed by the Addl. Rent Controller, Sub-Division Salcete, Margao, Goa in Case No. BLDG/ARC-I/17/1986 which was confirmed by the Administrative Tribunal in Eviction Appeal No. 40/93 by judgment dated 30-6-1994. Both these orders are under challenge in this writ petition. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners mainly based his argument by stating that there is no sufficient pleading in the petition to constitute the ingredients required for eviction under section 22(2)(f) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) namely the non-occupation of the suit premises for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. Elaborating the argument the petitioners' counsel drew my attention to paragraph 7 of the application filed by the respondent No. 1 before the Rent controller which is extracted below:- "The suit premises is kept closed since April 1981. The opponents who are legal representatives of the said late Mariano Gonsalves ceased to use the suit premises since then." Citing this paragraph, learned counsel for the petitioners emphatically argues that the pleadings are not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for ordering eviction under section 22(2)(f) of the Act. Though he has fairly agreed to some extent the pleadings of the petitioners also suffer from this infirmity. The pleadings of the petitioners in reply to the original petition before the Rent Controller is equally cryptic, for example, in para 5 of the written statement reads as follows: "Para No. 7 is denied. The suit premises are very much used by the Respondents; and occupied by the respondents." It appears that both parties seem to withhold valid information required for adjudicating the case from the Court. The case of the respondent is that the petitioner No. 1's husband was the original tenant who was a professional tailor who was using the premises for his livelihood till his death in 1981. It is further the case of the respondent which has come out in evidence is that his children who are minors and his wife are not doing any business in the premises and therefore it should be deemed that the premises are not being used for more than four months continuously without reasonable cause. It is further the case of the respondent which has come out in evidence is that his children who are minors and his wife are not doing any business in the premises and therefore it should be deemed that the premises are not being used for more than four months continuously without reasonable cause. On the other hand, the evidence led on behalf of the petitioners discloses that petitioner No. 1 is going everyday to the premises and keeping it open and sitting through out the day doing nothing and comes back in the evening. This is the way in which she uses the shop. 3. I am afraid this kind of pleadings and evidence by either side will not be sufficient to prosecute the application for eviction properly and legally. It has come out in evidence as I said earlier that the premises are not used as it was used by the petitioner's husband. The petitioner is trying to establish that the building is not kept closed as alleged by the respondent. It is kept open, but for what purpose and how the premises are put to use; whether any commercial activity is going on or any profession is being practised in that building is lacking in the pleadings and also in the evidence. There are no valid and sufficient material for the authorities below to take a decision either way. With the available evidence both the courts below, unmindful of whether such evidence will be sufficient to pass an order of eviction, passed the impugned orders. One important aspect has not been examined by the authorities which is usually relevant in a case like this is whether the premises continued to be used for useful and commercial purpose by the tenant even after the death of the original tenant. In this context learned Counsel for the respondent drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (M/s. Babu Ram Gopal and others v. Mathra Dass)1, A.I.R. 1990 S.C., 879. Even though the case decided was whether a landlord is entitled to a decree even if the tenant has re-occupied the premises before the eviction proceeding was commenced, following observations made by the Supreme Court in this context is very relevant for our purpose. Para 3 of the judgment reads thus: "Mrs. Even though the case decided was whether a landlord is entitled to a decree even if the tenant has re-occupied the premises before the eviction proceeding was commenced, following observations made by the Supreme Court in this context is very relevant for our purpose. Para 3 of the judgment reads thus: "Mrs. Urmila Kapoor appearing in support of the appeal contended that the appellant has all along been in possession of the shop which was never vacated and merely for the reason that the shop remained closed for a temporary period he cannot be said to have ceased to occupy the same. The argument is that the appellant's occupation of the shop was never interrupted as it was in his effective control, although closed and secured under the appellant's lock which nobody ever disturbed. We do not find ourselves in a position to accept the interpretation of the section as attempted on behalf of the appellant. The reason of including the clause (v) in section 13 (2) is to ensure that buildings, which are scarce in number specially in the towns, necessitating rent control legislation, do not remain unused at the instance of tenants who do not actually need them. A tenant who is in possession of a building in the legal sense only cannot be said to be in occupation thereof for the purpose of section 13(2)(v); otherwise a question of his eviction as envisaged in that section would not arise. ...." The dictum laid down in the above decision leads us to the conclusion that the tenant is required to prove in an application for eviction on the ground of cessation of occupation, that not only he kept open the building always, but it was put to material use for conducting any business or profession. 4. Unfortunately this aspect of the case has not been examined by the courts below in its correct perspective. Therefore, I am of the view the matter has to be reconsidered by the Rent Controller in the light of the above discussion. 5. Therefore, the orders passed by the courts below are set aside and the Rent Controller is directed to enter a finding whether the building which was said to be kept open by the petitioner always from the death of her husband is actually put to use for any commercial purpose or professional purpose whereby depending upon their livelihood. 5. Therefore, the orders passed by the courts below are set aside and the Rent Controller is directed to enter a finding whether the building which was said to be kept open by the petitioner always from the death of her husband is actually put to use for any commercial purpose or professional purpose whereby depending upon their livelihood. I make it clear that the inquiry of the Rent Controller should be limited to this aspect alone. For that purpose the parties are at liberty to amend their pleadings and to adduce evidence both oral and documentary. 6. In the result, the writ petition is allowed subject to the above observations. There shall be no order as to costs. Parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controller at 10.30 a.m. on 30.1.1995. Case remanded.