Judgment : Though the writ miscellaneous petitions relating to these three writ petitions, which are connected have alone been posted today for disposal, by consent of all parties, I heard all the counsel on the main writ petitions themselves and accordingly I am disposing of the main writ petitions. 2. No doubt, disposal of these main writ petitions will not automatically dispose of one writ miscellaneous petition posted in the list, that is W.M.P.No.15625 of 1994 in W.P.No.9432 of 1994 since the said W.M.P. seeks punishment for perjury said to have been committed by the 1st respondent in the said writ petition. Hence the said W.M.P. will have to be posted separately later. 3. All these writ petitions are by Nadar Mahajana Sangam S.Vellaichamy Nadar College, at Nagamalai Pudukottai, Madurai. The said Sangam is a registered society under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and the Society is represented by its Secretary S.V.S.Sundaramurthy. In all the three writ petitions, respondents 1 to 5 are same. In W.P.Nos.8056 and 8909 of 1994 there are only five respondents while in W.P.No.9342 of 1994 there are two more respondents, viz., respondents 6 and 7. Though these respondents also have been served, if appears that they have not entered appearance. The other five respondents are respectively represented by their counsel. .4. W.P.No.8056 of 1994 seeks to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 24. 1994. W.P.No.8909 of 1994 also seeks to quash another order of the 1st respondent passed on the same date, viz, 24. 1994. The text of the two orders, both dated 24. 1994 is virtually same. As per the said text, the 1st respondent directs the 5th respondent, who is the Principal of the abovesaid college to hold election to the Managing Committee of the abovesaid Sangam after convening the Special General Body by giving one month’s notice. The said order is purported to have been made under Sec.28 of the Act. For giving the abovesaid direction to the 5th respondent for holding the election, the 1st respondent gives only one reason, viz., 137 members of the abovesaid Society including respondents 3 and 4 have requested the 1st respondent to hold election for the Managing Committee for the two year period from 4. 1994 to 33. 1996 after convening the Special General Body of the Society. 1994 to 33. 1996 after convening the Special General Body of the Society. Hence, the abovesaid direction was given to the 5th respondent. Therefore, the 1st respondent directs the 5th respondent to convene the Special General Body, after giving the members one month’s notice and conduct the election for the abovesaid Managing Committee. No doubt, it is also stated in the abovesaid order that since there are differences of opinion between two parties (that is, between the writ petitioner on the one hand and respondents 3 and 4 on the other hand), 5th respondent should hold elections smoothly and report to the 1st respondent. 5. Then in W.P.No.9342 of 1994, the prayer is to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 15. 1994. The said order is purported to have been passed under Sec.36(9) of the Act. It says that the 1st respondent’s office has not received any report regarding the elections held for the Managing Committee of the Society right from 1986, but that on 112. 1993 both the rival groups claimed to have convened General Body of the Society and conducted election for the Managing Committee and thereby according to the rival groups, two different Managing Committees have been elected. The said order further proceeds to say that there was no possibility for the General Body to elect two different Managing Committees on the same day. Therefore, according to the said order, there is necessity for convening the General Body again and elect a new Managing Committee. It also proceeds to say that such a request was made by the above referred to 137 members and that is why the earlier order dated 24. 1994 was passed directing the 5th respondent to hold the election. This order concludes that till the said election is conducted and completed pursuant to the abovesaid direction dated 24. 1994 there is necessity for an interim Managing Committee. Hence the said order appointed the 5th respondent himself as the sole one man ad hoc committee of management until a new Managing Committee is elected pursuant to the earlier direction dated 24. 1994. 6. Now, the submission, before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the abovesaid three impugned orders by the 1st respondent are without jurisdiction. According to him, neither Sec.28 authorises the 1st respondent to pass the above referred to two impugned orders dated 24. 1994. 6. Now, the submission, before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the abovesaid three impugned orders by the 1st respondent are without jurisdiction. According to him, neither Sec.28 authorises the 1st respondent to pass the above referred to two impugned orders dated 24. 1994, nor the above referred to Sec.36(9) authorities him to pass the above referred to impugned order dated 15. 1994. In this context apart from drawing attention to the abovesaid relevant sections learned counsel also drew my attention to Sec.34-A of the Act. .7. On the other hand, leaned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 argues that the 1st respondent has got jurisdiction to pass the abovesaid impugned orders. The said counsel also argues that even assuming that the abovesaid impugned orders dated 24. 1994 could not be characterised as an order under Sec.28, it should also be treated as an order passed under Sec.36(9). 8. Learned counsel for the 5th respondent, the Principal of the College, represents that as Principal of the College, though the fifth respondent would prefer to remain neutral between the rival groups he would order to assist the court, submit that the interpretation sought to be put by learned Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 on Sec.36 (9) of the Act is correct. 9. I have considered the rival submissions. The whole question depends on the interpretation to be put to the latter portion of Sec.36(9) of the Act, (which has been introduced by a very recent amendment which came into force from 4. 1994) and more particularly in the light of Sec.34-A, which was also simultaneously introduced with effect from the same date 4. 1994. 10. Initially, I may dispose of the other simple question as to whether Sec.28 of the Act would empower the 1st respondent to pass the above referred to impugned orders, both dated 24. 1994. Sub-secs.(l) and (2) of Sec.28 of the Act, which are alone relevant, run as follows: "(1) The Committee may at any time call an extraordinary general meeting of the registered society and shall call such a meeting within such period as may be prescribed after receipt of a requisition in writing from such number of members of proportion of the total number of members as may be specified in the by-laws of the registered society. (2) If an extraordinary general meeting is not called in accordance with such requisition, the requisitionists shall have power to call such meeting themselves." The committee referred to in Sec.28(l) is the governing body of the registered society as per Sec.2(a) of the Act. So as per Sec.28(l), the said committee alone can call an extraordinary general body meeting of the society after receipt of the prescribed requisition in writing mentioned in the said sub-section. The 1st respondent has no power under Sec.28 to appoint 5th respondent or any person to convene the said meeting even though there is the prescribed requisition. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned orders dated 24. 1994 are certainly not within the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent pursuant to Sec.28. No doubt, as stated above, the contention of the learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 is that the abovesaid impugned orders dated 24. 1994 should be taken as orders passed under Sec.36(9) itself, though the said orders are said to be orders under Sec.28. 11. In this context, the relevant provisions under Sec.36 may be seen. Sub-secs.(1), (2) and (9) of Sec.36 of the Act runs as follows: "(1) The Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of a majority of the members of the committee of a registered society or on the application of not less than one-third of the members of that registered society, or, if so moved by the District Collector, hold, or direct some person authorised by the Registrar by order in writing in this behalf to hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financinal condition of that registered society. .(2) An application to the Registrar under Sub-sec.(l) shall be supported by such evidence as the Registrar may require for the purpose of showing that the applicants have good reason for applying for an enquiry. .(9) The result of the inquiry shall be communicated to the registered society and to the applicants, if any, and if the Registrar is satisfied that the result of the inquiry does not warrant action under Sec.37 he may issue such direction to the registered society, or any member of the registered society as the Registrar may deem fit." Thus, it is found that Sec.36 gives the power to the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of a registered society in regard to its constitution, working and financial condition. Sec.36(2) specifically provides that an application to the Registrar under Sec.36(l) shall be supported by such evidence as the Registrar may require for the purpose of showing that the applicants have good reasons for applying for an enquiry. But in the present case, before passing the above referred to impugned orders dated 24. 1994 strictly speaking no application was received by the 1st respondent, requesting to hold any such enquiry contemplated under Sec.36(1). All that could be gathered from the said impugned orders is that 137 members of the society requested the 1st respondent to hold fresh election to the Managing Committee of the petitioner-Sangam after appointing an observer or election officer to hold the election. Immediately on receipt of such a requisition from the abovesaid 137 members staightaway, the 1st respondent has chosen to pass the abovesaid impugned orders dated 24. 1994. He purports to pass the said orders under Sec.28, which does not at all give him any such power to pass such an order. 11-A. The impugned orders dated 24. 1994 cannot also be taken as order under Sec.36(9) also. First of all, he has not held any enquiry contemplated under Sec.36 nor it appears any evidence was let in by the abovesaid requisitionists for (he purpose of showing that they have good reasons for applying for an enquiry under Sec.36. Therefore, necessarily the abovesaid orders, both dated 24. 1994 have to be quashed. 12. Coming to the above referred to impugned order dated 15. 1994 it has to be seen whether it could be sustained under Sec.36(9) of the Act The latter part of Sec.36(9) says that "if the Registrar is satisfied that the result of the inquiry does not warrant action under Sec.37, he may issue such direction to the registered society, or any member of the registered society, as the Registrar may deem fit. Sec.37 provides for cancellation of registration of a society. Sec.37 provides for cancellation of registration of a society. It says: "When an inquiry has been held under Sec.36 the Registrar may, if he is satisfied, .(a) that the registered society has contravened any of the provisions of this act or the rules made thereunder: or .(b) that the registered society is insolvent, or must necessarily become so: or .(c) that the business of any such registered society is conducted fraudulently or not in accordance with the by-laws or the objects specified in the memorandum filed with the Registrar under Sec.6, after giving in such manner, as he thinks fit, previous notice in writing to the registered society, specifying briefly the grounds of the proposed cancellation and after giving an opportunity to the registered society to show cause why the cancellation should not be made, cancel the registration of the registered society......" 13. In interpreting the. latter part of Sec.36(9) of the Act, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if as a result of the enquiry, the Registrar finds that the case does not fall under clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Sec.37, he cannot think of cancelling the registration of the society. He may however give suitable directions to the society to correct any irregularities committed by the society. According to the said Counsel this latter part of Sec.36(9) cannot at all authorise the 1st respondent to appoint an ad hoc committee for managing the society or to give any direction to hold fresh election to the Managing Committee of the Society. According to the said learned counsel when there is a dispute as regards the two rival elections which are said to have taken place on 112. 1993 and the said dispute is the subject-matter of litigation in civil suits O.S.No.361 of 1994 and O.S.No.369 of 1994, the 1st respondent, who admittedly has no authority to decide the rival contentions regarding the abovesaid elections that took place on 112. 1993, has no power to straightaway appoint on ad hoc committee consisting of 5th respondent alone to manage the society or to direct him to hold fresh election for electing the new management. In this connection only, learned counsel drew my attention to Sec.34: A, which was also introduced with effect from the same date, viz., 4. 1994. It provides for supersession of the Managing Committee of the registered society. In this connection only, learned counsel drew my attention to Sec.34: A, which was also introduced with effect from the same date, viz., 4. 1994. It provides for supersession of the Managing Committee of the registered society. Such power of suprsession under Sec.34-A of the Act is given to the Government if in its opinion, "(i) the committee of any registered society is not functioning properly, or (ii) the affairs of any registered society are mismanaged, or (iii) the registered society’s activities are not in furtherance of the objects of the society, or (iv) the committee of any registered society has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, or wilfully disobeys or wilfully fails to comply with any lawful order or direction issued under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder. “ According to learned Counsel, such a power has been given only to the Government and Sec.34-A cannot be interpreted in such a way that similar power is also given to the Registrar. 14. On the other hand, the counter argument by the abovesaid respondents is that the power given under Sec.36(9) and Sec.34-A of the Act are independent powers and simply because Government is given power under Sec.34-A to supersede a committee, it cannot be said that the Registrar cannot exercise a similar power under Sec.36(9) of the Act. 14-A. On bestowing serious thoughts over the abovesaid rival contentions, I see great force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am of the view that the interpretation, which the said learned Counsel is seeking to put on the abovesaid latter part of Sec.36(9) of the Act, is the correct one, particularly taking into account what is contained in Sec.34-A whereby supersession power is given only to the Government. The 1st respondent, when he comes to know that rival elections have taken place, as stated above on the same day, he cannot simply brush aside the correctness or otherwise of both the elections and direct to hold a fresh election, when it is clear that he cannot himself try the abovesaid dispute as to which of two elections is true and valid, and that the said question has to be gone into only by a civil court. Though it appears that rival groups have not gone to court to establish their rival claims regarding the said elections that took place on 112. 1993, some third parties’ have already agitated the said question by filing two different suits. In such a situation, the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to simply brush aside the elections alleged to have taken place on 112. 1993 and direct to hold a fresh election or to appoint suo motu a single man committee of management as has been done in the present case. I am of the view that such direction by the 1st respondent is not contemplated at all in the latter part of the abovesaid Sec.36(9). By no stretch of imagination such an interpretation could be put to the said latter part. That apart, even according to the said latter part, direction, if at all, could be given by the 1st respondent only to the registered society or any member of the registered society.” In the present case, the direction has been given to 5th respondent, the principal of the college, who is not a member of the registered society. The said principal may be ex officio member of the Managing Committee of the society, but admittedly, he is not a member of the society. So, even in this regard, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 15. That apart, after the first two impugned orders dated 24. 1994, the 3rd impugned order has been passed by the 1st respondent suo motu on 15. 1994. If really the original impugned orders dated 24. 1994 are also to be construed as orders passed under Sec.36(9) (as contended by counsel for respondents) he having once passed the order on 24. 1994, cannot once again pass another order some days later and that too, suo motu, without any fresh move by the above referred to 137 requi-sitionists. If really he had completed the enquiry on or before 24. 1994 and had made known the result of his enquiry by passing the order dated 24. 1994, he cannot himself pass another order after some days, and that too, without holding fresh enquiry. 16. Reliance also was sought to be placed on Indian Overseas Bank v. R.Sathyamurthi, 1994 Writ L.R. 108. But that decision has no application at all to the present case. 17. 1994, he cannot himself pass another order after some days, and that too, without holding fresh enquiry. 16. Reliance also was sought to be placed on Indian Overseas Bank v. R.Sathyamurthi, 1994 Writ L.R. 108. But that decision has no application at all to the present case. 17. In the light of what is stated above, the 1st respondent has no power under Sec.36 (9) to order a fresh election to the Managing Committee of the society in question or to appoint the 5th respondent as the sole ad hoc Managing Committee till the said fresh election is held. Accordingly, I hold that the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to pass the above referred to impugned order dated 15. 1994 also. 18. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed as prayed for. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.