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1994 DIGILAW 523 (BOM)

KRISHNAKUMAR KHORANA v. CHAIRMAN, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION

1994-09-12

M.L.PENDSE, S.M.JHUNJHUNWALA

body1994
JUDGMENT : Pendse, J. 1. The petitioner was appointed on January 11, 1965 as Junior Technical Assistant in the Chemistry Department of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. In September 1968, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Senior Technical Assistant. In year 1979, the petitioner was posted as Chemist and in year 1983 was designated as Senior Chemist and was working at Ankleswar. The basic salary of the petitioner was Rs. 2,400/- while the total pay packet was Rs. 4852/- On May 26, 1986, the petitioner was served with charge-sheet and the first charge was that the petitioner did not attend duties and remained absent between September 22, 1985 and December 26, 1985. The second charge was that the petitioner made various representations to the Chairman, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and to the Prime Minister without routing through proper channel and, therefore, violated the provisions of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The third charge was that the petitioner refused to accept the correspondence issued to him by Chief Chemist, under whom he was working and the last charge was that during the posting at the platform in Bombay Offshore Project, the petitioner neglected his duties. The petitioner filed his reply to the charges by denying the charges levelled. 2. The respondents then appointed Shri P. V. Rao, Chief Geologist as the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer, after holding sittings, submitted report on February 3, 1987 and found that the charges were established. The report made by the Enquiry Officer was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and on July 28, 1987, order was passed removing the petitioner from service. The petitioner preferred appeal as prescribed under the regulations before the Chairman, Oil and Natural Gas Commission but the appeal ended in dismissal by speaking order dated April 13, 1988. The order passed by the Appellate Authority is under challenge in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Shri Ganguli, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, raised three or four contentions to challenge the legality of the order of removal. The first submission of the learned counsel is that the enquiry was held behind the back of the petitioner and the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to present his defence. It is not possible to accede to the submission of the learned counsel. The first submission of the learned counsel is that the enquiry was held behind the back of the petitioner and the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to present his defence. It is not possible to accede to the submission of the learned counsel. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by letter dated August 2, 1986. After the charges were furnished to the petitioner, reply was filed on June 4, 1986. The Enquiry Officer issued three notices dated October 9, October 21, and November 20, 1986 and at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted at Bombay at the first two notices were sent at the place of work by hand delivery. The petitioner declined to accept both the notices. The last notice dated November 20, 1986 was sent by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due at the address furnished by the petitioner. The address given was "15/38 Jangpura Extension, New Delhi". The registered packet was returned unserved with the endorsement that the addressee is not known. Shri Ganguli submitted that the claim of the respondents that two notices were sent by hand delivery at the place of business should not be accepted. It is not possible to accede to the submission. The respondents have stated on affidavit that such notices were tried to be served on petitioner but the petitioner declined to accept the same and we do not find any reason to discard the claim of the respondents. Shri Ganguli then submitted that the notice sent by the Registered Post should have been sent at the address of the petitioner in Bombay and not at Delhi address. The submission over looks that on October 19, 1986, i.e., hardly one month before the registered notice was dispatched, the petitioner himself had made an application that his address during leave period will be "15/3B Jangpura, Extension, New Delhi". No fault therefore, can be found with the respondents for sending notice by Registered Post at New Delhi address. Shri Ganguli submitted that the leave sought by the petitioner was not sanctioned and consequently, the petitioner had not gone to Delhi and, therefore, the service of notice by Registered Post is without any effect. No fault therefore, can be found with the respondents for sending notice by Registered Post at New Delhi address. Shri Ganguli submitted that the leave sought by the petitioner was not sanctioned and consequently, the petitioner had not gone to Delhi and, therefore, the service of notice by Registered Post is without any effect. It is undoubtedly true that the petitioner was not in Delhi at the relevant time but the claim of the petitioner that he was not aware of the enquiry is difficult to digest in view of the refusal of the petitioner to accept the notices sent by hand delivery on two occasions. In our judgment, no fault can be found with the Enquiry Officer to proceed with the enquiry in absence of the petitioner. 4. The second contention urged by the learned counsel was that the Disciplinary Authority failed to give opportunity to the petitioner as contemplated under Regulation 37(4)(a)(i) of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Regulations. The Regulation, inter alia, provides that if the disciplinary authority having regard to findings on the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the major penalties in Regulation 34 should be imposed on the employee, then it shall furnish to the employee a copy of the report of the inquiry and findings on each of the articles of charge and the statement of findings with brief reasons. The Regulation further demands that the disciplinary authority shall give the employee a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed and calling upon to submit such representation as the employee may wish to make on the proposed penalty. Relying on this Regulation, Shri Ganguli submitted that as the respondents have failed to comply with the requirements of the Regulation, the order of removal is required to be struck down. Relying on this Regulation, Shri Ganguli submitted that as the respondents have failed to comply with the requirements of the Regulation, the order of removal is required to be struck down. Shri Sawant, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, pointed out that the provisions of Sub-Regulation (4) of Regulation 37 were amended with effect from August 3, 1985 and the amended sub-regulation (4) reads as follows :- "If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its finding on all ar any of the article of charge on basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clause (v) to (ix) of Regulation 34 should be imposed on the employee, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the employee any further opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed". Shri Sawant submits and, in our judgment, with considerable merits that as sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 37 was amended long prior to the passing of the order dated July 28, 1987 by the Disciplinary Authority, the reliance by the delinquent on an unamended Sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 37 is incorrect. Shri Ganguli, realising the force in the submission urged by the respondents, desperately contended that inspite of the amended regulation, it was incumbent upon the respondents to serve show cause notice in regard to imposition of penalty after furnishing the copy of the enquiry report to sustain the principles of natural justice. The submission cannot be accepted in view of the decision reported in 1993 2 CLR 1129 Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar. The majority judgment in paragraph 7 observed that the principle laid down in the judgment reported in 1991 1 CLR 61 Union of India v. Mohamad Ramzan Khan made the law expressly prospective in operation and provided that the orders of punishment which are passed by the Disciplinary Authority after November 20, 1990 shall be governed by the rules of furnishing of copy of the report and service of notice to the delinquent to show cause why penalty should not be imposed. The Supreme Court laid down that the proceedings pending in Courts in respect of orders of punishment passed prior to November 20, 1990 will have to be decided according to law prevailing prior to the said date and not according to the law laid down in Mohamad Ramzan's case reported in 1991 1 CLR 61. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to accede to the submission of Shri Ganguli that inspite of specific amended sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 37, the order of dismissal should be struck down on the principles laid down in Mohamad Ramzan's case. Shri Ganguli made an faint attempt to urge that though the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 4820/-, the petitioner should be treated as a workman and consequently, Sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 37 will have no application. The submission is only required to be stated to be rejected. The petitioner was holding the post of Senior Chemist and was drawing a salary of over Rs. 4,000/- and could not be by no stretch of imagination be treated as workman. If the petitioner thinks himself to be 'workman', then nothing prevented the petitioner from approaching Industrial Court or the Labour Court. 5. The last contention urged by the learned counsel is that the punishment of removal is extremely harsh, taking into consideration the charges levelled against the petitioner. Shri Ganguli submitted that the fact that the petitioner has remained absent for three months is not sufficient to remove the petitioner. The submission overlooks that the charge was not only of remaining absent but negligence in discharge of duty, addressing letters to the Prime Minister and other high dignitaries without forwarding them through proper channel and not accepting the notices issued to the petitioner by superior officers. The perusal of the report of the Enquiry Officer indicates that the petitioner was moody, disobedient and a reluctant worker. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1994 1 CLR 663 State Bank of India & Ors. v. Samrendra Kishore Endow & Anr. has laid down that it is not open for the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to determine what should be the appropriate punishment. The powers available to the Industrial Court u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act are not available in exercise of writ jurisdiction. v. Samrendra Kishore Endow & Anr. has laid down that it is not open for the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to determine what should be the appropriate punishment. The powers available to the Industrial Court u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act are not available in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is, therefore, not possible to dabble with the punishment imposed by the respondents. In our judgment, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the petition must fail. 6. Accordingly, rule is discharge but there will be no order as to costs.