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1994 DIGILAW 532 (MP)

Lata Saluke v. Shivaji Rao Saluke

1994-07-27

TEJ SHANKAR

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JUDGMENT Tej Shankar, J. 1. This revision petition has been preferred against order dated 18-3-1994 passed by Smt. Manjusha Namjoshi, Seventh Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in a petition Under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The parties have appeared before me and have prayed that the revision petition be heard on merits at the initial stage. It has, therefore, been heard on merits and is being disposed of. 3. The facts necessary for the disposal of this revision petition are that a petition was moved by Shivaji Rao, Saluke against Smt. Lata Saluke for divorce which was being contested. During the pendency of the original petition the present petitioner Smt. Lata Saluke moved an application Under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for interim maintenance. That petition was allowed by the impugned order dated 18-3-1994. The learned Trial Court allowed a sum of Rs. 450/- per month from the date of the order upto the date of final decision. The petitioner being aggrieved from the order directing payment of interim maintenance from the date of the order has come up in this revision. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that Under Section 24 interim maintenance ought to have been granted from the date of the petition and the learned Trial Court has committed an error in not properly exercising its discretion. He contended that a perusal of Section 24 shows that it provides for "Maintenance pendente lite and expense of proceedings". The learned Counsel contended that in view of this title the maintenance ought to have been awarded from the date of petition. He tried to interprete the word pendente lite, in support of his contention he relied on 1975 J.J. Note 43 (Shobhana v. Sharad Shridhar). In that case a Division Bench of this Court held that the word pendente lite means from the date of the institution of the lis, to the date of its termination. This observation was made on the facts of that case. There the Trial Court with the consent of both the parties ordered that the husband shall pay to wife Rs. 200/- for the expenses of the litigation and Rs. 150 per month as maintenance pendente lite till the final disposal of the proceedings. The question arose as to what pendente lite meant and as such this Court held as aforesaid. The other authority relied upon is 1988-MPLJ-17. 200/- for the expenses of the litigation and Rs. 150 per month as maintenance pendente lite till the final disposal of the proceedings. The question arose as to what pendente lite meant and as such this Court held as aforesaid. The other authority relied upon is 1988-MPLJ-17. Reference has been made by the learned Counsel to para 2 at page 18 where the question was as to whether the Court had jurisdiction to award expenses pendente lite and this question was answered in the affirmative. However, it was held in that authority specifically that it was in the discretion of Trial Court to make an order of interim maintenance from a particular date. The learned Counsel for the non-applicant contended that in the present case the Trial Court has exercised discretion and this Court sitting in revision cannot look into the matter whether the discretion has been properly exercised or not. He referred to AIR 1989 M.P. 242 Dashrath Yadav v. Saroj. That was a case under Section 25. It was held in that case that the order of interim maintenance has to be made effective from the date of application. It was also held that the Court has to pass an order from the date of application or from the date of the order. 5. I have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. The only point as said above is as to whether it was mandatory for the Court to pass an order for interim maintenance from the date of the application or it was discretionary. The next question is as to whether the discretion was properly exercised and this Court sitting in revision can go into that question. 6. As regards the first question the point as to whether the interim maintenance should be passed from the date of application does not find support from the provisions of Section 24 itself. It has also been held in the aforesaid authority of 1989-MPLJ-16 that it is discretionary that the Court to make an interim order from a particular date. Just to my mind, the contention of the learned Counsel that the order be passed from the date of application does not appear to be correct. I respectfully do not agree with the learned Counsel on this point. 7. Just to my mind, the contention of the learned Counsel that the order be passed from the date of application does not appear to be correct. I respectfully do not agree with the learned Counsel on this point. 7. As regards the next question, if we peruse the impugned order we find from the date the order was passed and the case was heard both the parties gave statement before the Court that there was no necessity of cross examination on affidavits and the present petitioner offered if the non-applicant was prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 500/- per month as interim maintenance an order be passed. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff gave a statement that the income was about Rs. 2,000/- per month and his daughter also lives with him, he could pay a sum of Rs. 400/- per month. It means that statement was given on the date when the order was passed. After taking into consideration this fact the Court passed an order granting Rs. 450/- per month interim maintenance. To my mind, the order clearly speaks that it was passed on the basis of the statement given by the parties at the time of hearing. In this view of the matter, to my mind, the learned Trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in awarding the interim maintenance from the date of the order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the discretion was not properly exercised. The revision petition has no force. It is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.