Honble KOKJE, J.—The appellant aggrieved by the dismissal of writ petition by the learned Single Judge has filed this appeal. (2). The appellant was granted a mining lease in the year 1983 under an agreement executed on June 12, 1983 and registered on August 22, 1983. The respondent No. 5 Babulal Gupta who was also desirous of grant of same area of mining lease, had also applied for grant of lease on October 22, 1982 and January 19,1983. Both these applications were rejected and the said respondent No.5 Babulal Gupta filed two appeals before the Additional Director Mines, Udaipur. The appeals were also dismissed on August 12,1983. A further appeal was also taken to the State Government which was decided on July 3, 1984. The appeal was partly allowed and operation of the area not covered by the lease agreement in favour of the appellant was directed to be granted to said respondent No.5 Babu Lal Gupta. Not satisfied with the partial success of the appeal, the respondent No.5 preferred a revision application under S. 13 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (for short the Act of 1957 hereinafter). Vide order dated March 12, 1987, the Central Government allowed the revision application and set aside the Order granting lease in favour of the appellant-original petitioner. The case was remanded to the State Government for passing appropriate order on the application of respondent No.5 on merits. This Order of the Central Government Was challenged in the Writ Petition, before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge by the order under appeal held that no interference was called for in the order of the Central Government and dismissed the writ petition. This is how the matter has come up in appeal before us. (3). The area covered by the disputed lease was a part of the area granted by the mining lease in favour of one Rajesh Vardia during the period January 31, 1976 to December 17, 1979. According to the appellant that area became available for re-allotment on October 18, 1979 when it was declared free by the State Government. On July 12,1982, one Babulal Modi was declared eligible for entering into an agreement of mining lease with the State Government in respect of the portion of this area. An intimation of this grant was received by said Babulal Modi on August 16, 1982. On July 12,1982, one Babulal Modi was declared eligible for entering into an agreement of mining lease with the State Government in respect of the portion of this area. An intimation of this grant was received by said Babulal Modi on August 16, 1982. Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (for short the Rules hereinafter), which were in force at the relevant [time, provided that where a lease was granted or renewed under the Rules, a formal lease in Form No. 8 shall be executed within three months from the date of receipt of the sanction by the applicant and if no such formal lease is executed within that period, the order granting lease shall be deemed to have been revoked. There is proviso to the aforesaid Rule enabling an authorised officer of the State Government to permit execution of the formal lease within a reasonable time after the expiry of the aforesaid period of three months, if he is satisfied that there were sufficient reasons to believe that the grantee was not responsible for the delay in the execution of the formal lease. (4). The appellants contention is that on January 4, 1983 an entry was made in the register of mining lease showing the concerned area available for re-grant! After this, on January 19,1983 respondent No.5 Babulal Gupta applied again for the same area which he had applied for on October 20, 1982. On the next day, appellant Ajeet Singh applied for mining lease in respect of the part of the area. On February 24, 1983, respondent No.5 Babulal Guptas first application dated October 20, 1982 was rejected as premature. On April 26, 1983 appellant- Ajeet Singh was sanctioned the lease for area applied for. On April 29, 1983 respondent No.5 Babu Lal Guptas second application dated. January 19, 1983 was rejected. On August 12, 1983 a formal lease deed was executed in favour of appellant Ajeet Singh. (5). The Central Government held that the grant of mining lease in favour of Babu Lal Modi came to an end on October 12, 1982 when the period of three months from the date of sanction of lease expired. January 19, 1983 was rejected. On August 12, 1983 a formal lease deed was executed in favour of appellant Ajeet Singh. (5). The Central Government held that the grant of mining lease in favour of Babu Lal Modi came to an end on October 12, 1982 when the period of three months from the date of sanction of lease expired. The Central Government also held that Rule 56 of the Rules did not apply in the case as it only applied to the cases where a] formal lease deed has been executed and possession of the area is given to the lessee. The learned Single Judge of this Court upheld the Order and dismissed the petition. (6). On the question of the first application of respondent No.5 Babu Lal Gupta dated October 20, 1982 being premature there appears little difficulty. Admittedly, sanction of the tease wt communicated to Babu Lal Modi on August 16, 1982. Three months period from this date expired on November 15, 1982. Any application prior to the lapse of right of Babu Lal Modi to get a formal lease deed executed in his favour would be premature. The language of Rule 19 clearly snows that the date of revocation of the grant or sanction of the lease would be the date on which the three months period within which the lease had to be executed, expires. The lease has to be executed under the rule within three months from the date of receipt of the sanction by the applicant. Therefore, months period from the grant or sanction would expire on expiry of three the date of receipt of sanction by the applicant and not from the date of issue of grant or sanction itself. (7). As regards second application of Respondent No.5, Babulal Gupta dated January 19, 1983, the objection was that it was made Within 15 days of the date on which entry] was made in the Mining Register under R. 56 of the Rules and was therefore, premature. If this objection is upheld the appellant alone remains in the field having applied on January 20, 1983, on the 16th day of the entry made under R. 56 of the Rules. If this objection is upheld the appellant alone remains in the field having applied on January 20, 1983, on the 16th day of the entry made under R. 56 of the Rules. It was pointed out by the appellant that the State Government had admitted in its reply to the Writ Petition that entry in the register of mining lease showing the area as available for regrant was made on January 4, 1983 and copy of the order dated January 4, 1983 declaring the area being available for regrant was also annexed to the reply of the State Government as Annexure R/2. It was, therefore, contended that in compliance with R. 56, entry as to the area being available for regrant was made on January 4, 1983 and hence the area would be available for regrant on expiry of 15 days from January 4, 1983. Any application made on January 19,1983 would therefore be premature and the first date on which the application could be made was January 20, 1983 on which date the appellant had applied. We need not go into the question whether under R. 56 any application made within 15 days of the entry in mining lease register would be premature as we are of the view that R. 56 has no application to this case for reasons stated hereinafter. (8). A bare reading of R. 56 of the Rules would show that it has no application to the cases where a formal lease-deed was not executed. For the application of the Rule the area must have been previously held under mining lease or rent-cum-royalty lease. The rule requires that any entry in the mining lease register declaring the area to be available for regrant shall be made at lease three months before the date of expiry of original lease or within 15 days from the receipt of the determination order as the case may be. This clearly indicates that the rule applies to duly executed lease only and does not apply to a case where lease-deed is not executed. In a case of lapse of sanction or a right to the grant of a lease because of deemed revocation of the sanction or grant under R. 19 of the Rules, compliance with Rule 56 is not necessary. In a case of lapse of sanction or a right to the grant of a lease because of deemed revocation of the sanction or grant under R. 19 of the Rules, compliance with Rule 56 is not necessary. That is the plain meaning of the language of the Rule and it is salutary rule of interpretation that when the language of the provision is plain and inambiguous, there is no scope for addition or subtraction of words to put a different construction. on it. (9). It was also contended that even though R. 19 of the Rules provides for deemed revocation some form of notice to concerned members of the public is necessary as in distribution of public largess equal opportunity to compete has to be given to all concerned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, both the contending parties had applied for grant of lease and no one has complained of any prejudice because of ignorance of the area being available for regrant. (10). Actually, the appellant himself has pointed out that an entry of availability of the area for regrant was made in the mining lease register on January 4, 1983. There was therefore, substantial notice of the area being available to the concerned Public and at least to the appellant and respondent- No.5. It is not therefore, necessary to go into the question this case. (11). It was also contended that the Central Government had remanded the whole matter for fresh decision setting aside lease in favour of the appellant even in respect of area not applied for by respondent No.5 Babu Lal Gupta. We wonder if there remains any thing for the decision by the State Government in view of the fact that the lease was granted to the appellant on August 18, 1983 for a period of ten years expiring on August 17, 1983. Since this aspect was not argued before us, we will leave it to the State Government to decide, if the case still survives, the claim of the appellant in respect of area not covered by the application of respondent No. 5 - Babulal Gupta. (12). The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observations. There shall be no order as to costs. (13). (12). The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observations. There shall be no order as to costs. (13). Per Honble YADAV, J. - I have an opportunity to go through the judgment rendered by my learned brother Honble V.S. Kokje, J. Though I respectfully concur with the penultimate conclusion arrived at by his Lordship in directing the State Government for reconsideration of grant of lease of disputed marble mines area situated in village Tripura Sundri in Banswara District between the petitioner-appellant Ajit Singh and respondent No.5 Babulal Gupta, but I am not able to persuade myself to subscribe the view expressed by learned. brother that the application dated 20.10.1982 moved by respondent No.5 for grant of disputed marblp mining area was pre-matured. According to me if said view is accepted, it will lead to anomalous result and direction to State Government for reconsideration on merit would become an empty formality. (14). Since the controversy involved in the present special appeal is of general importance attracting grant of largess with the people of State of Rajasthan and also indirectly involve loss of revenue to State, therefore, it required thread bare discussion. (15). It is well to remember that a pervasive and constant vigilance over the activities of the Government is desirable in order to preserve the constitutional frontiers of legality and every activity of the Government, which has public element in it including granting largess to the people of State in shape of mining leases. (16). Put the facts briefly in cronological order are as follows: (17). Mining lease for mineral marble at village Tripura Sundri in district Banswara in dispute was granted in favour of Rajesh Vadia, which was cancelled by Assistant Mining Engineer, Banswara on 12.10.1979 and after cancellation of the said lease, the area in dispute was declared free by notification dated 18.10.79 (Annexure R-l) to the return filed on behalf of the respondent No.2,3 and 4. After aforesaid notification Annexure R-l, one Shri Babu Lal Modi applied on 1612.81 for grant of mining lease of disputed area and the Mining Engineer, Udaipur vide \ his order dated 12.7.82 has sanctioned lease to him. The grant of lease dated 12-7-82 is alleged to have been received by Shri Babu Lal Modi on 16-8-82 (Annexure 1-A) to the writ petition. The grant of lease dated 12-7-82 is alleged to have been received by Shri Babu Lal Modi on 16-8-82 (Annexure 1-A) to the writ petition. It is pertinent to mention that Annexure 1-A to the writ petition was conspicusly neither pleaded nor brought to the notice of any of the Tribunals. This Annexure 1-A is brought on record first time in the writ petition. (18). As Shri Babu Lal Modi did not execute the lease within three months from the date of receipt of sanction for grant of lease, hence it is alleged that the order granting lease was revoked and the area in dispute was again declared free for re-graint of mining lease by the Mining Engineer, Udaipur by his order dated 4-1-83 Annexure R-2 to the return filed by respondents No. 2,3 and 4. It is strange to note that in paragraph 3 of the reply given by respondents No. 2,3 and 4 although it is stated that entry to the effect was made in the register of the mining leases maintained in the office of the Mining Engineer, Udaipur but the date of entry in the said register is not mentioned. (19). Shri Babu Lal Gupta, respondent No.5 submitted an application oh 20.10.82 for grant of lease of the disputed area which was rejected by Mining Engineer, Udaipur by his order dated 24.2.83 on the ground inter-alia that the area for which the application was submitted was not free for grant of Mining lease due to the fact that the area for which application was filed was conflicting with the other areas and some of the areas was falling in the dumping ground area, therefore, in these circumstances, mining lease was not granted to Shri Babulal Gupta. It is stated that in para 4 of reply filed by respondents No.23 and 4, it is not stated that application of Shri Babu Lal Gupta (respondent No.5) dated 20.10.82 was rejected as it was found to be prematured. No reasons or explanation are given as to why initial order in question dated 24.2.83 and order dated 29.4.83 rejecting the applications of respondent No.5 dated 20.10.82 and 19.1.83 are not filed along with writ petition which, order passed by Additional Director, Mines in appeal is filed as Annx.4 to the writ petition, order passed by the State Government is filed as Annx. 5 to the writ petition and order passed by the Central Government is filed as Annx. 6 to the writ petition. (20). Shri Babu Lal Gupta, respondent No.5 again applied for grant of lease of disputed area on 19.1.1983 and the petitioner- appellant also applied for grant of lease on 20.1.83 which was sanctioned to him on 26.7.83 and mining lease was executed in his favour on 12.8.83. The aforesaid mining lease in favour of the petitioner-appellant was registered on 18.8.83. (21). Aggrieved against the rejection of his application dated 20.10.82 by Mining Engineer, Udaipur on 24.2.83 and against the rejection of his subsequent application dated 19.1.83 by the aforesaid authority on 29.4.83 the respondent No.5 filed two appeals before the Additional Director, Mines, Udaipur under Rule 44(1) of the Rules, which were dismissed on 12.8.83. (22). Again aggrieved against the dismissal of his aforesaid two appeals on 12.8.83 by the Additional Director, Mines, Udaipur, the respondent No.5 filed a second appeal before the State Government under sub-rule (2) of Rule 44 of the Rules, 1977 which was partly allowed on 3.7.84. The State Government vide its order dated 3.7.84 sanctioned the grant of mining lease partially in favour of respondent No.4 but rejected remaining part of disputed area and upheld the allotment of lease in favour of petitioner appellant Ajit Singh. (23). Not satisfied with partial success, the respondent No.5 filed a revision under Section 30 of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act before the Central Government and the Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred under the aforesaid section set aside the order granting mining lease to the petitioner-appellant and allowed the revision filed by the respondent No.5 by its order dated 12.3.87 Annex. 6 to the writ petition. The Central Government set aside the order of the Mining Engineer, Udaipur dated 24.2.83: order of Additional Director (Mines), Udaipur dated 12.8.83 and the order of the State Government dated 3.7.84 by which the application of respondent No.5 dated 20.10.82 was dismissed and the case was remanded to the State Government for passing an appropriate order on the applications of the petitioner. (24). Aggrieved against the order dated 12.3.87 passed by the Central Government a civil misc. (24). Aggrieved against the order dated 12.3.87 passed by the Central Government a civil misc. writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner-appellant before learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge after examining the counter, rejoinder, affidavits and also after giving full-fledged hearing to the parties, dismissed the writ petition on 4.4.91. (25). Aggrieved against the decision of learned Single Judge, the present special appeal has been filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. (26). With the consent of the parties, the argument on merits was heard at admission stage. Main thrust of the argument of learned counsel for petitioner appellant is that in the present case provisions of Rule 56 of Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred as Rules of 1977) are attracted. Since a mining! lease is already executed and registered in favour of petitioner-appellant while countering to it, the learned counsel for the respondent No.5 submitted that in the present set of circumstances, the provisions of deemed revocation as contemplated under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977 are attracted. (27). Thus, this court is called upon to interpret and to iron out the creases between Rule 19 and Rule 56 of the Rules of 1977. (28). As a matter of fact field occupied by Rule 19 of the said Rules of 1977 is altogether different than the field occupied by Rule 56. Rule 19 can be pressed into service where grant is sanctioned to an applicant and from the date of receipt of sanction, no formal lease is executed in form No.8 within a period of three months, the sanction granting the lease shall be deemed to have revoked. While rule 56 can be pressed into service if in pursuance of sanction of grant of mining lease factually lease deed is executed. Under Rule 19 in pursuance of grant of mining lease factually where there is failure to execute lease deed within a period of three months from the "date of receipt of the sanction by the applicant leads to automatic deemed revocation of the sanction granted and it does not require any order to be passed either by State or its officer to effectuate the result of automatic deemed revocation. While under Rule 56 there may be two situations, firstly in those cases where term of lease expires within at least three months before the date of expiry of the original lease or secondly in those cases where term of lease is not expired but by order of a competent authority it is determined in such cases within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the determination order an entry is required to .be made in the register of mining leases. In both the aforementioned cases, under Rule 56 entries are to be made in the register of mining leases within two different period mentioned above. In both these cases, under Rule 56, mining area will be available for regrant of mining lease provided 15 days had elapsed from the date of such entry in the register of leases. (28). A close scrutiny of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977 would reveal that statute had used plain language, which cannot be argued to be ambiguous, therefore, the court has no option but to give effect to the clear language in the statute book about deemed revocation which does not permit passing of a formal order either by the State Government or by its officer. Court cannot afford to aid or substract something under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977. It is not postulated under Rule 19 about passing of a formal order for revocation of sanction under Rule 19. Since deemed revocation is a creation of statute itself, it cannot be permitted to be substituted by the requirement of any formal order to be passed either by the State Government or by its officer. (29). The fundamental question which arose for consideration in the present case is as to whether the deemed revocation under Rule 19 is to be computed within three months from the dale of grant of sanction or from the date of receipt of the sanction by the applicant. According to plain language used about. the deemed revocation in the Statute, the period of three months about deemed revocation is to be computed from the date of receipt of sanction by the applicant and not from the date of sanction. According to plain language used about. the deemed revocation in the Statute, the period of three months about deemed revocation is to be computed from the date of receipt of sanction by the applicant and not from the date of sanction. Thus, under Rule 19, the area would be available for re-grant immediately after expiry of three months which is to be computed from the date of receipt of the sanction by the applicant and not from the date of sanction. (30). Upto this stage, there is no ambiguity in Rule 19 but the difficulty arises about interpreting the proviso added to the aforesaid Rule 19 which creates uncertainty about its application and scope which required to be ascertained with the intent of the statutory provision. The basic question would be as to whether the proviso added to Rule 19 can be permitted by the Court to defeat the basic intent expressed by the statute in the substantive provisions of Rule 19 about deemed revocation? Answer would be no. (31). In support of aforesaid interpretation that proviso added to Rule 19 cannot be allowed to defeat the intent expressed by the statute about deemed revocation, the following passages from Chapter X (Provisos, Exceptions, etc.) from the book Legislation and Interpretation, edition 1989 pages 256, 357 and 358 written by famous jurist late Shri Jagdish Swaroop are quoted in extenso:- "The courts should decline to read into an enactment words which are not there, and which would alter its operative effect because of the provisions to be found in the proviso. The proviso is something subordinate to the main clause and, generally, what is contained in the proviso is not to be imported by implication into the clause. When a reference is made in the proviso to what is enacted in the section to which it is appended, one would not ordinarily read it unless so compelled to include anything contained in the proviso itself. When a reference is made in the proviso to what is enacted in the section to which it is appended, one would not ordinarily read it unless so compelled to include anything contained in the proviso itself. As Lord Watson said : "I am perfectly clear that if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to be occur in it you cannot derive those provisions by implication from a proviso." xxx xxx xxx "A proviso, which is in fact and in substance a proviso, can only operate to deal with a case which but for it would have fallen within the ambit of the section to which the proviso is a proviso. The section deals with a particular field and the proviso excepts or takes out or carves out from the field a particular portion and therefore, it is perfectly true that before a proviso can have any application, the section itself must apply." xxx xxx xxx "It is equally true that the provision cannot deals with any other field than the field which the section itself deals with. The duty of the court also must be to give to the proviso as far as possible a meaning so restricted as to bring it within the ambit and perview of the section itself." Now the question to be determined would be as to what is that field of application of the proviso added to Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977. In fact, the proviso can be pressed into service where the State Government or any officer authorised by the Stale Government to grant lease on its behalf, is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons to believe that the grantee is not responsible for the delay in execution of the formal lease. The State Government or that officer, as the case may be, may permit the execution of formal lease within a reasonable time after expiry of the aforesaid period of three months. (32). The aforesaid provision cannot be interpreted and contrued in isolation from other provisions envisage under the Rule of 1977. The State Government or that officer, as the case may be, may permit the execution of formal lease within a reasonable time after expiry of the aforesaid period of three months. (32). The aforesaid provision cannot be interpreted and contrued in isolation from other provisions envisage under the Rule of 1977. As held in the preceding paragraphs, the proviso added in Rule 19 cannot be permitted to defeat the statutory intent expressed under the said Rule 19 about deemed revocation but the aforesaid proviso can be made workable only if under Rule 60 such applicants who have not contributed any delay in execution of formal lease within a period of three months the State or its officer may grant short permit to such applicants. (33). Thus, where the State Government or its officer authorised to grant lease on its behalf, is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant grantee is not responsible for delay in the execution of formal lease, they will be at liberty to grant short term permit as contemplated under Rule 60 to such grantee applicant pending the execution or registration of lease agreement. Since there seems to be ambiguity in the proviso added under Rule 19, therefore, the intention of statute is made clear by making subsequent provision under Rule 60. If the present interpretation is accepted, the substantive provision envisage under Rule 19 as well as the proviso added to the said rule, both would be made workable without defeating or without creating violence to the main rule 19 of aforesaid. (34). In the present case, it is undisputed that sanction was granted for granting lease to Shri Babu Lal Modi on 12.7.82, who admittedly failed to get a formal lease in Form No.8 executed within three months, therefore, the order dated 12.7.82 granting the lease to him shall be deemed to have been revoked without any formal order passed by the State Government or its officer automatically from the date of receipt of sanction by Shri Babu Lal Modi. (35). (35). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant, the grant dated 12.7.82 was received by Shri Babu Lal Modi on 16.8.82, Annexure 1-A to the writ petition, therefore, the period of three months for deemed revocation is to be computed from the date of receipt of sanction order by him and not from the date of sanction itself that is 12.7.82. As such according to the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant the deemed revocation would come into existence on 16.11.82 and not on 12.10.82 as argued by learned counsel for the respondent No.5. Thus, the application dated 20.10.82 moved by respondent No.5 for regrant of mining lease for disputed mining area was premature and has been rightly rejected by the Additional Director, Mines, Udaipur vide An-nexure-4 to the writ petition on 12.8.83 and second appeal filed by respondent No.5 before the State Government was partly allowed and maintained the grant of petitioner-appellant vide; Annexure-5 to the writ petition dated 3.7.84. Counsel for the petitioner-appellant further submits that Central Government in exercise Of its powers under Section 30 of Minor Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act by impugned Annexure-6 to the writ petition dated 12.3.87 illegally and arbitrarily set aside the aforesaid well considered order and capriciously remanded the application dated 20.10.82 of the respondent No.5, to the State Government for consideration on merits. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No.5 has submitted that the petitioner appellant has not put forth his claim on the basis of Annexure 1-A to the writ petition regarding receipt of sanction on 16.8.82 by Shri B.L. Modi. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.5 that petitioner-appellant has never raised objection before any of the Tribunals that deemed revocation has come into existance on 16.11.82 hence the application dated 20.10.82 of respondent No.5 is premature. A disputed question of fact, which has not been raised by the petitioner-appellant before any of the Tribunals cannot be permitted to be raised in writ petition. (36). It is settled law that under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court should consider only the materials which were made available to the Tribunals and fresh and further materials which were not before the Tribunals should not be allowed to be raised before the Court exercising writ jurisdiction. (36). It is settled law that under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court should consider only the materials which were made available to the Tribunals and fresh and further materials which were not before the Tribunals should not be allowed to be raised before the Court exercising writ jurisdiction. New plea or facts based on disputed question cannot be allowed to be raised. It is not understandable as to how this paper Annexure 1-A to the writ petition dated 13.12.82 came into possession of petitioner-appellant only at the stage of filing writ petition. It is strange to note as to how and why the question of deemed revocation dated 16.11.82 was not argued and placed before any of the Tribunals for such a long intervals. It is my try as to how Annexure 1-A dated 12.8.83 passed by Additional Director (Mines), Udaipur has given detailed reasons for rejecting the application dated 20.10.82 of respondent No.5 which is already quoted in preceding paragraphs but never said a word that said application is pre-mature. Since the matter is to be decided by the State Government afresh after remand, therefore, it would not be proper to make further comments on Annexure 1-A to the writ petition regarding its credibility and reliability. However, this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot permit the petitioner-appellant to place before this Court a fresh material Annexure 1-A which was not placed before any of the Tribunals. The plea which was neither raised nor argued before the Tribunal, cannot be allowed to be raised and argued under Article 226 of the Constitution. the aforesaid view taken by this Court is fortified by the two decisions of apex court reported in Avery India Limited vs. Second Industrioal Tribunal W.B., & Others (1) and Karnani Properties Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Others (2). There are catena of decisions of various other High Court in support of the aforesaid proposition, which need not to be referred in order to maintain brevity. (37). The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is that the petitioner placed on record the circular dated 10.12.76 Annexure-7 to the writ petition whereby a policy was formulated and directives were issued that in the event of non execution of the deed within stipulated period by the grantee the area should be declared free for regrant. (37). The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is that the petitioner placed on record the circular dated 10.12.76 Annexure-7 to the writ petition whereby a policy was formulated and directives were issued that in the event of non execution of the deed within stipulated period by the grantee the area should be declared free for regrant. Although the aforesaid circular was issued under Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 but according to learned counsel since the Rules of 1959 and Rules of 1977 are pari materia, therefore, even after repeal of the Rules, 1959 by virtue of Section 27 of Rajasthan General Clauses Act circular issued under repealed provision of 1959 continued to be in force unless they are inconsistent with the new rules. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on five decisions of apex court reported in Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Raj. & Others (3), Lalit Mohan Deb & Others vs. Union of India and Others (4), Union of India vs. Chandra Mohan Nigam & Others (5), State of Gujarat vs. Akhilesh C. Bhjargava and Others (6), Comptroller & Auditor General of India & Ors. vs. Mohan Lal Mehrotra & Ors (7). In these decision, Honble Supreme Court ruled that it is true that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules but if the rules are silent on any particular point, Government can fill up gaps and suppliment the rules and issue instructions not in cnsistent with the statutory rules already framed. (38). After giving thoughtfull consideration to the aforesaid argument, it is apparent that these decisions given by their lordships instead of supporting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant run counter to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant in as much as held earlier in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the provisions of Rule 19 of the rules, 1977 are attracted where there is provision for deemed revocation. The present circular Annexure-7 to the writ petition contemplates substituting deemed revocation by an order which cannot be permitted being inconsistent with the statutory Rule 19 of the Rules, 1977. (39). The present circular Annexure-7 to the writ petition contemplates substituting deemed revocation by an order which cannot be permitted being inconsistent with the statutory Rule 19 of the Rules, 1977. (39). At the risk of repetition, it is reiterated that in the present case, Rule 56 cannot be pressed into service because only -sanction was granted for the disputed mining area in favour of Babu Lal Modi on 12.7.82 and in furtherance of which no formal lease deed in form No.8 could be executed, therefore, Rule 19 of the Rules, 1977 are attracted in the present case, while according to the provisions of Rule 56 of the Rules, 1977 it can be pressed into service where in pursuance of sanction a full fledge mining lease is executed and registered. (40). The learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has strenuously argued that the provisions of Rule 56 of Rules, 1977 are attracted in the present case in view of para 3 of the reply filed by respondents No.2 3 and 4 where these respondents responsible to sanction and execute mining lease-deed has admitted about entry in the register of lease kept in the office of Mining Engineer, Jaipur. The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel is falicious in as much as firstly, the provisions of Rule 56 are not attracted in the present case as held earlier and secondly, a perusal of para 3 of the reply Tiled by the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 goes along way to prove that the respondents No.2, 3 and 4 although had admitted that the mining area in dispute was declared free for regrant for the mining lease by the Mining Engineer, Udaipur vide his order dated 4.1.83 Annexure R-2 to the reply and a entry was made in Register of mining lease but in the said paragraph no date is mentioned as to on which date entry in the register of mining lease was made in pursuance of the order dated 4.1.83 Annexure R-2 to the reply. No extract of entry from the register of mining leases is filed to show the date on which entry in the said register was made. No extract of entry from the register of mining leases is filed to show the date on which entry in the said register was made. The alleged admission in the aforesaid paragraphs to the effect that an entry was also made in the register of mining leases maintained at the office of Mining Engineer, Udaipur is not sufficient to confer right to the petitioner appellant to obtain the lease of disputed mining area on the basis of his application dated 2 0.1.83 while the respondent No.5 had also moved application for re-grant of disputed mining area on 19.1.83. Non discloser of date of entry in the register of mining lease by respondents No.2, 3 and 4 in their reply would be fatal to the merits of the case of the petitioner-appellant. (41). There is yet another reason to reject the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel in as much as the provisions of Rule 56 of Rules, 1977 through a flood of right and reveals that 15 days time is to be computed from the date of entry in the register of mining lease and not from the date of declaration made by the competent authority about availability for regrant on 4.1.83. In para 3 of the reply filed by the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4, thereis. discloser of the date of declaration about availability for regrant on 4.1.83. In para 3 of the reply filed by the respondents No. 23 and 4, there is disclosure of the date of declaration at out availability of regrant but the date of entry in the register has not been disclosed which is material to examine as to whether the application dated 20.1.83 made by the petitioner-appellant for regrant and applications made by the respondent No.5 on 19.1.83 were matured or immatured. If entry was made in the register on 4.1.83 in pursuance of order dated 4.1.83 Annexure R-2 to the reply then the application of respondent No.5 dated 19.1.83 and the application made by the petitioner-appellant on 20.1.83 would be matured and if the entry in the register was made on any subsequent date, then it is to be decided by the State Government as to whether these two applications were matured or immatured. (42). (42). It is hereby ruled that entry in the register of the mining lease maintained under Rule 10 of the Rules of 1977, which is made available for inspection after paying inspection fee is a ministerial act. The entry in the register is required to be made at least three months before the date of expiry of the original lease or within 15 days from the date of receipt of determination order. It is mistry in the present case when the order dated 4.1.83 Annexure R-2 was received on the counter window where the register of mining lease is kept for entry. It is also unknown when the entry in the register in the present case was made. (43). However, it is made clear that in case of deemed revocation under Rule 19 of the Rules, 1977 no entry in the register of mining lease is contemplated. (44). Another question canvassed on behalf of the petitioner appellant is that if no entry is made in register of mining lease in case of deemed revocation then how the people desirous to participate in re-grant, will come to know that the mining area is available for re-grant. It is held that to meet the requirements of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977 about public notice for re-grant, there is specific provision under Rule 21 of the said Rules of 1977. (45). Since Rule 21 is in sequence, therefore, for purposes of public notice about availability for regrant, aforesaid rule may be pressed into service which is fair, just, reasonable and equittable in comparison of public notice about availability for regrant by inspecting register of mining leases which is a ministerial act. However, it would be expedient to observe that in addition to the Rule 21, it would be reasonable, just, fair and equittable if the availability of re-grant by auction or tender is also published in two local daily news papers having circulation in State of Rajasthan to apprise the people of the State to participate and compete in distribution of largess in granting mining lease. If this procedure is adopted then it will reduce litigation between the parties and will also enhanced the prospect of revenue and royalty to the State Government. (46). If this procedure is adopted then it will reduce litigation between the parties and will also enhanced the prospect of revenue and royalty to the State Government. (46). It is observed that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving the largess such as grant of mining leases falls within the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the procedure prescribed under Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (now Rules, 1986) required to be fair, just, reasonable and equitable. Thus it is essential that the procedure prescribed by law depriving a person from largess i.e. granting of mining lease must conform to the norms of justice and fair play. Procedure which is unjust and unfair in the circumstances of the case attracts the vice of unreasonableness thereby vitiating the law which prescribe that procedure. How reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. In the circumstances of the case, the Constitutional vires of making entry in register of mining lease which is a ministerial act under Sec. 10 (2) from inspection of which the availability of regrant of mining area is treated to be public notice to complete, is whether just, fair, reasonable and equitable is left open to be decided in some other case. (47). In these prevailing circumstances where there are crises of confidence, will it be reasonable, just, fair and equittable to rely on an inspection of an entry in the register of mining leases which is ministerial act for availability of re-grant treating it to be public notice to compete. . (48). Lastly, the learned counsel for petitioner-appellant submitted that mining area for which lease deed is executed on 12.8.83 and registered on 18.8.83, in favour of petitioner-appellant is more than the mining area applied by respondent No.5. The respondents No. 2,3. and 4 in paras 2 and 4 of their, reply clearly stated that it is not possible for them to verify and identify the area since there are no marking like K L N T or R S T K in the map annexed with the writ petition. Therefore, this question of mining area raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is a disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into under Article 226 but it is left open to be decided by the State Government. (49). Therefore, this question of mining area raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant is a disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into under Article 226 but it is left open to be decided by the State Government. (49). This Court trust and believe that the State Government will decide the present dispute between the petitioner-appellant as well as respondent No.5 keeping in view that fairness is a fundamental principle of good administration. It is evolved by Courts to ensure the vast power in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised. Fairness is also a principle to ensure that the statutory authority must arrive at a just decision either promoting the interest or affecting the interest of a citizen of this country. Fairness should be treated as a basic and fundamental test for proper and good administration. (50). In view of aforesaid discussion, the instant special appeal is dismissed and it is held that observations of learned Single Judge against which the present appeal is filed to the affect that in the present case provisions of Rule 56 are attracted does not hold water and as such dis-approved. The State Government is directed to decide the present lis between the petitioner-appellant and respondent No.5 after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to them in view of the observations made above on merits. (51). Order of Court : for the reasons stated seporately in our respective judgments,this appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.