ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, a limited relief is claimed. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was not justified in fastening the liability on the petitioner and absolving the Insurance Company in the matter of grant of interim compensation. 2. There is no doubt that this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in this matter. In the case of M.D., Naveen Duniya v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1991 MPLJ 114 = 1990 JLJ 766 , it was held that under Article 227 of the Constitution power can be exercised and interference can be made with interim orders when they are passed arbitrarily. The same view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Dwarika v. Biso and Ors., AIR 1990 MP 258 . 3. The manner in which the accident took place is of no relevance for the purpose of this petition. The only question is whether at the time of passing of the interim award, the Tribunal could make a detailed inquiry with a view to determine as to who is liable to pay interim compensation. 4. This matter was considered by this Court in Mohammad Ilias v. Bodhani Bai and Ors., 1991 JLJ 2 . The view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and Karnataka High Court was taken into consideration and it was observed that at the time of determining no fault liability it is not necessary to go into a detailed investigation of facts. Paras 5 and 6 are relevant and are reproduced below :- "5. The nature of enquiry under Section 92-A is also very limited. The question whether or not the Company is liable to pay compensation for different reasons is to be dealt with and decided in the course of hearing of the main application under Section 110-A of the Act. Thus, up to that stage, if on summary inquiry, the finding is that vehicle was involved in the accident and was insured, the Award under Section 92-A has to be made in favour of the claimant requiring the Insurance Company to pay the given amount of the claim forthwith. Thus, up to that stage, if on summary inquiry, the finding is that vehicle was involved in the accident and was insured, the Award under Section 92-A has to be made in favour of the claimant requiring the Insurance Company to pay the given amount of the claim forthwith. Any objection as to the ultimate liability of the Insurance Company may thereafter be investigated and enquired into while dealing with the main application and making award in terms of Section 110-B including the liability of the Insurance Company. Such has been the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Beasa Devi, 1985 ACJ 1 and also by the Karnataka High Court in Mohammad Iqubal v. Bhimaiah, 1985 ACJ 546. This view so taken by two High Courts has found favour with this Court as well and adopted and followed by two Single Bench decisions in M.A. No. 50 of 1985, Komalchand v. Maniklal and Ors. decided on 24-7-1986 and in Civil Revision No. 625/85, Nandoo alias Nand Kishore v. R. M. Shukla decided on 26 4-1985. In the latter decision, a reference has also been made to the definition of the term 'liability' appearing in Section 93(ba) which says that "liability" whenever used in relation to the death of or bodily injury to any person includes liability in respect thereof under Section 92-A. This definition was also included in the Act by Act No. 47 of 1982. According to sub-section (2) of Section 95, the liability of a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the limits specified in its different sub-clauses. The no fault liability is also a liability arising out of the accident. There appears, therefore, no reason why this liability should also not be fastened on the insurer in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 95 read with the definition of 'liability' under Section 93 (ba). 6. The no fault liability is also a liability arising out of the accident. There appears, therefore, no reason why this liability should also not be fastened on the insurer in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 95 read with the definition of 'liability' under Section 93 (ba). 6. The futher question then is : "what happens if ultimately on investigation and enquiry and after participation by the Insurance Company in the proceedings initiated by an application under Section 110-A of the Act, the Insurance Company is found not liable at all?" This will mean that the Tribunal fastens no 'liability' in relation to death or of bodily injury to any person, including the liability in respect thereof under Section 92-A and arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Certainly in that event, by making an Award under Section 110-B, the Tribunal though holds the owner of the vehicle liable shall have to discharge the insurer from all liability arising out of the accident in respect of death or bodily injury to any person. The Insurance Company in such an event shall be entitled to a direction for reimbursement of liability discharged by it consequent upon an order for payment of compensation under Section 92-A. It was observed in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Minguel Lourence Correia and Ors., 1986 ACJ 646, that in the event of Tribunal holding that the Insurance Company has proved such objections and under the law avoided its responsibility to indemnify the owner of the vehicle totally, then, the Tribunal in the final Award, by virtue of the provisions of the sub-section (4) of Section 96 of the Act, would direct the owner of the offending vehicle to pay to the Insurance Company the amount which the Insurance Company has paid to the claimants in pursuance to the Award made under Section 92-A of the Act. These conclusions are drawn by the Bombay High Court on the basis of observations made by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Beasa Devi's case (supra). I am in complete agreement with the view so taken." 5. In view of the law laid down by this Court in Mohammad Bias's case (supra) the interim order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal holding that the Insurance Company is not liable for payment of interim compensation cannot be sustained. 6. I am in complete agreement with the view so taken." 5. In view of the law laid down by this Court in Mohammad Bias's case (supra) the interim order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal holding that the Insurance Company is not liable for payment of interim compensation cannot be sustained. 6. This petition is allowed. The Insurance Company is equally liable to pay the amount of interim compensation.