JUDGMENT- B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J. :---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India directed against an order of the Industrial Court dated 6th April, 1987, made in Complaint (ULP) No. 808 of 1985, under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner was carrying on the activity of manufacturing Aluminium and Brass watch straps in its factory. The activity of manufacturing Watch Straps was closed down with effect from 17th July, 1982 and by a notice displayed on 16th July, 1985, the Petitioner declared that its factory had been closed down with effect from 17th July, 1985, and the workers were advised to collect the closure compensation and other dues from a particular place any time after 17th July, 1985. The copies of the notice were also sent to several statutory authorities like Inspector of Factories, Commissioner of Labour, Regional Director E.S.I.C., Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Inspector of Police, Jogeshwari, Bombay-60, and Assistant Commissioner of Police, Andheri Division. The Second respondent Union challenged the closure of the factory by its Complaint (ULP) No. 808 of 1985 under section 28 read with Items 1(b), 5 and 6 of Schedule II and Items 1(a), (b), (d), 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The case made out by the Second respondent in its complaint to the Industrial Court was that there was in fact no closure and that the closure was a mala fide device adopted by the petitioner to lock-out the workmen for a prolonged period in order to break their resistence so that the petitioner could successfully implement its design of mala fides on the workmen. Thus, it was alleged by the Union that it amounted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of the provisions under Items 1(b), 5 and 6 Schedule II and Items 1(a), (b), (d), 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The Industrial Court tried the complaint and raised the following issues and answered them as under :- "I S S U E S : 1. Whether the complainant union proves that respondents threatened a lock-out or closure if the workers organised any Union? 2. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents refused to bargain collectively in good faith with it? 3. Whether the complainant union proves that respondents threatened a lock-out or closure if the workers organised any Union? 2. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents refused to bargain collectively in good faith with it? 3. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents continued the lock-out deemed to be illegal under this Act? 4. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents discharged or dismissed employees (i) by way of victimization, (ii) not in good faith, but in colourable exercise of the employers rights or (iii) for patently false reasons? 5. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents indulged in acts of force or violence? 6. Whether the complainant union further proves that the respondents failed to implement Award, Settlement or Agreement? 7. To what reliefs the complainant union and its workers are entitled to? F I N D I N G S : 1. No. 2. No. 3. Yes. 4. No. 5. No. 6. Yes. 7. As per the order." It would at once be seen that the Industrial Court has given a clean chit to the petitioner on the first issue by holding that the second respondent Union had failed to prove that the petitioner threatened a lock-out or closure if the workers organised any Union. It was also held that the second respondent had failed to prove that the petitioner had refused to bargain in good faith with the Union. The second respondent Union also failed to prove brazen acts of victimization which are alleged. Surprisingly, after having recorded its findings on all these issues in favour of the employer, the Industrial Court held that the act of closing down the manufacturing activity of Watch Straps amounted to continuation of a lock-out deemed to be illegal under the Act so as to fall within Item 6 of Schedule II of the Act and further that it would amount to an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. These are the only two issues held against the petitioner and it would, therefore, be necessary to look at the reasoning of the Industrial Court for so concluding. 3. Though the Industrial Court has, from the judgments cited before, it, correctly appreciated the disctinction between the closure and lock-out, however, the Industrial Court failed to apply the culled out principles to the facts before it. 3. Though the Industrial Court has, from the judgments cited before, it, correctly appreciated the disctinction between the closure and lock-out, however, the Industrial Court failed to apply the culled out principles to the facts before it. The concepts of closure and lock-out are essentially distinct and, in a way, mutually inconsistent. In a situation of closure, the employer unequivocally tells his workmen that he is giving up his business activity and terminating the contracts of employent betwen himself and the workmen. Whether it is bona fide or mala fide is besides the point. Different consequences may perhaps flow therefrom, depending upon the bona fides of the closure. As long as there is no cessation of the vinculum juris of the contract of employment, it would not be possible to postulate that there has been a closure. Once the termination of service is admitted, however mala fide, however motivated with the intent to victimise the workmen the closure is, the closure does not thereby become non est. It is conceivable that the Industrial adjudication might give appropriate relief against such motivated acts of the employer, but as held by the Supreme Court in (Kalinga Tubes Ltd. v. Their Workmen)1, A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 90 the closure by itself would not become non est. Again, once the closure is admitted, meaning thereby that the vinculum juris has been snapped, then conceptionally there cannot be a lock-out. For, a lock-out occurs when the employer does not put an end to the contract of the employment, but refuses to give work to his workmen in order to dictate his terms to them or truckle them by economic deprivation. (See in this connection the case of (Feroz Din and others v. State of West Bengal)2, A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 363. Because this vital distinction between these two situations was not kept in the forefront when the Industrial Court analysed the evidence before it, it was fallen into error. 4. The Industrial Court seems to have been overwhelmed by its impression that the petitioners motivation for the closure was to cut down its financial burden. Because this vital distinction between these two situations was not kept in the forefront when the Industrial Court analysed the evidence before it, it was fallen into error. 4. The Industrial Court seems to have been overwhelmed by its impression that the petitioners motivation for the closure was to cut down its financial burden. In fact, (as seen from the observation in paragraphs 21 and 23 of the impugned order) the representative of the second respondent union contended that the closure of the manufacturing activity and the consequent termination of services of the affected workmen was contrary to section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and amounted to retrenchment of the workmen, which would amount to illegal lock-out of the factory and further that the petitioner had adopted the said device or pretence to terminate the services of the workmen and, therefore, it was not bona fide closure for reasons beyond the control of the employer. On these contentions, I fail to fathom how the Industrial Court could have recorded a finding that there was a lock-out, and that too, a continuous lock-out deemed to be illegal under the provisions of the Act. 5. The evidence on record clearly shows that prior to 1975-76 the Employer was carrying on some activity by way of annodizing and electroplating work. This activity was not being done by the Employer at the material time, during which time the Employer was merely carrying on the activity of manufacturing Aliminium and Brass Watch Straps. On the ground that this activity was economically unviable, the petitioner closed down its factory on 16th July, 1975. Originally, the partnership of the petitioner consisted of eight partners. After about a year and half, some time in August 1986, two of the partners formed another partnership in the name of S.R. Enterprises and started the activity of annodizing and electroplating. The facts on record show that the machinery essential for the manufacturing of Watch Straps like power press, hand press, drill machine, etc. were not being used in the re-started activity of annodizing and electroplating. (In fact, pending the complaint, all such machines earlier used in manufacturing of Watch Straps were disposed of by the petitioner). While the petitioner used to employ about 23 workmen prior to its closure on 17th July, 1985, hardly four workmen were engaged on the work of electroplating which commenced from August, 1986. (In fact, pending the complaint, all such machines earlier used in manufacturing of Watch Straps were disposed of by the petitioner). While the petitioner used to employ about 23 workmen prior to its closure on 17th July, 1985, hardly four workmen were engaged on the work of electroplating which commenced from August, 1986. It is undoubtedly true that the evidence on record shows that the wages paid to the workmen doing the electroplating work were slightly lower than the wages which were paid to the workmen prior to the closing of the Unit. Perhaps, it was possible to infer from the conduct of the petitioner that the primary motivation in closing the Unit was to cut down wage costs. Even if one could stretch a point and hold that such act on the part of the Employer was mala fide, it is difficult to uphold the finding of the Industrial Court that such mala fide closure ipso facto amounted to lock-out so as to fall within the vice of Item 6 of Schedule II of the Act. In my view, the evidence on record clearly shows that the closure was effected from 17th July, 1985, services of the workmen were dispensed with, a limited activity of electroplating was started by two of the erstwhile partners in a different name and only four workmen were employed. From these circumstances, it was impossible to draw an inference that a closure itself was non est or that the contract of employment with all the erstwhile workmen was continued or that there was a lock-out, much less an illegal lock-out, as found by the Industrial Court. 6. The finding on the other issue, namely, that there was failure to implement terms of Settlement, Award or Agreement is inextricably connected with the finding of an unfair labour practice under Item 6. The Industrial Court seems to have fallen into error in assuming that because there was a mala fide closure and termination of the services of the workmen with a view to cut the wage costs, it must be deemed to be an illegal lock-out and, because it was deemed to be illegal lock-out, since the wages were not paid during the period of the said lock-out, there is failure to implement the Award, Settlement or agreement during the relevant period. In my view, this finding also must fall to the ground. In my view, this finding also must fall to the ground. Since the finding of the Industrial Court that there was an illegal lock-out cannot be upheld, what logically flowed therefrom viz. that there was an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 10 of Schedule IV of the Act, also cannot be upheld. Thus, the only two issues on which the Industrial Court held against the petitioner having been decided erroneously, the findings on the said issues are liable to be reversed. Thus there is merit in the petition which is liable to be allowed. 7. In the result, the petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. The impugned order of the Industrial Court is quashed and set aside. The complaint of the second respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****