D. P. WADHWA ( 1 ) THIS appeal (L. P. A. 91/86) is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby he allowed the writ petition filed by the first respondent and quashed the order dated 13 January 1986 of the second respondent Delhi Development Authority (D. D. A.) and also issued a direction that the first respondent was entitled to have its application for sanctioning of building plans to be considered on the basis that it related to an area of 4. 03 acres. ( 2 ) WHEN the writ petition was filed by the first respondent Arvachin Shiksha Samiti (for short the Samiti ), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there were three respondents who are now respondents 2,3 and 4 in this appeal. They are respectively D. D. A. , Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Education, and the Delhi Administration. The appellants, who number two, were impleaded in the writ petition on their application as co-respondents. The name of the first appellant is as given in the title and that of the second is Shri Ram Lila Committee, Vivek Vihar, Delhi. ( 3 ) THE disputes pertain to the certain piece of land in the trans Yamuna colony called Vivek Vihar developed by the D. D. A. and earlier known as Jhilmil Tahirpur Residential Scheme (for short the colony ). The zonal development plan of the zone where the colony is located was approved by the Central Government under section 9 (2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (for short the Act ). The lay out plan of the colony was approved by the D. D. A. in 1966. ( 4 ) THE Samiti is running a school in the colony. Initially it was a primary school and started in a rented accommodation in the colony. This was in the year 1973. In 1978 it was upgraded to middle school and was allotted one acre of land in the colony. Another piece of adjacent land measuring 0. 43 acre was allotted to the Samiti in 1982. In 1984 the school was upgraded to secondary school. On 25 June 1985 D. D. A. allotted a further area of 2. 60 acres to the Samiti which was again adjacent to the land earlier allotted. The total area of land, thus, allotted to the Samiti measured 4. 03 acres. 43 acre was allotted to the Samiti in 1982. In 1984 the school was upgraded to secondary school. On 25 June 1985 D. D. A. allotted a further area of 2. 60 acres to the Samiti which was again adjacent to the land earlier allotted. The total area of land, thus, allotted to the Samiti measured 4. 03 acres. It is third allotment of 2. 60 acres which is under challenge. In the letter dated 25 June 1985 of the D. D. A. to the Samiti the split up of the cost of the land was mentioned. Of the whole of the land so allotted, land measuring 2. 03 acres was allotted for play field, the ground rent being at the rate of rupee one per annum. Rest of the land was for construction of school building. Out of the third allotment of 2. 60 acres, land measuring 0. 57 acre was meant for building purposes for which the D. D. A. charged ground rent at the provisional rate of Rs. 6 lakhs per acre. We may clarify that though in the allotment letter the land allotted in the third phase measured 2. 60 acres, but in the plan prepared at the time of handing over possession it was mentioned that the area handed over was 2. 69 acres instead of 2. 60 acres. The appellants who were representativebodies of the residents of the colony and were also holding ram Lila objected to the third allotment of the land and represented to the D. D. A. seeking cancellation of the allotment. Physical possession of the disputed land had been handed over to the Samiti on 15 July 1985. The D. D. A. then wrote letter dated 25 July 1985 to the Samiti stating that the plot of land measuring 2. 60 acres which had been allotted and handed over to it partly for institutional building and partly for playground, there should be no temporary or permanent structure including compound wall fencing constructed thereon till the matter regarding allotment was reviewed by the Vice-Chairman, D. D. A. The appellants also represented to the Chairman, D. D. A. , who is the Lt. Governor, Delhi. The D. D. A. cancelled the allotment and informed the Samiti by letter dated 13 January 1986 which is as under :- "sub:- Allotment of land for play field. Governor, Delhi. The D. D. A. cancelled the allotment and informed the Samiti by letter dated 13 January 1986 which is as under :- "sub:- Allotment of land for play field. Dear Sir, With reference to your letter No. ABB/vv/ 85/1203 dated 4. 11. 85, on the subject noted above, I am to inform you that the matter has been reconsidered. In view of the prevailing circumstances and taking in view the totality of the situation it has been decided to revoke the allotment of land for play field and locate an alternative plot elsewhere for the Arvachin Shiksha Samiti. You are, therefore, requested to hand over physical possession of 2. 69 acres of land to the A. E. (Instll.), DDA on 20. 1. 86. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Dy. Director (Institutional)" ( 5 ) IT appears, on this basis that the land now with the Samiti measured 1. 43 acres, D. D. A. rejected its building plans for further construction. All this led to filing of the writ petition by the Samiti. As noted above, the writ petition was allowed. D. D. A. also appealed. Its appeal is L. P. A. No. 33/87. Both these appeal, one by the residents association and Shri Ram Lila Committee and the other by the D. D. A. , have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. ( 6 ) MR. Lahiri appearing for the appellants (LPA 91 /86) had four propositions to advance. 1. Allotment of disputed plot of land was contrary to master plan and zonal plan as envisaged under the Act. No plan other than the master or zonal plan is statutory in character. Finding of the learned Single Judge that the lay out plan of the colony is a statutory one, is not correct. 2. There could not be any promissory estoppel or estoppel by conduct. There could never be an estoppel against statute even otherwise no case of any estoppel was made out by the Samiti. Further, no estoppel can operate in favour of one citizen to the detriment of the other. 3. Finding of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the D. D. A. and the Delhi Urban Art Commission (also constituted under an Act of Parliament ) have no power in respect of building plans in respect of the colony, is not correct. 4. 3. Finding of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the D. D. A. and the Delhi Urban Art Commission (also constituted under an Act of Parliament ) have no power in respect of building plans in respect of the colony, is not correct. 4. Principles of natural justice had not been violated inasmuch as before cancelling the allotment the D. D. A. considered the representations of both appeallants and the Samiti. ( 7 ) MR. Lahiri said on these four points the writ petition of the Samiti which was allowed was wrong. ( 8 ) CONTENTION of Mr. Rohtagi appearing for the Samiti was that cancellation of the disputed land was without notice and in breach of principles of natural justice and further that the land was in fact meant for a school and had been correctly allotted to the Samiti for the purpose and allotment could not have been revoked. He said he would not join issue with Mr. Lahiri that D. D. A. and Delhi Urban Art Commission had no power to sanction building plans in the colony. As a matter of fact this issue was never raised even by the Samiti. It itself rather sought directions to the D. D. A. to sanction the building plans. The learned Single Judge himself went into the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act and also of the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and the building bye laws framed thereunder, and held as under "as power to sanction building plans has not been given to the Delhi Development Authority, either by section 12 or 13 of the Act, or any other provisions thereof, any rule, bye-law, regulation, which contrary to the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, purports to give power to the Delhi Development Authority to "sanction building plans" would, to that extent, be ultra vires the Delhi Development Act. "he further observed as under :- "i am informed by Mr. N. K. Aggarwal, Dy. Director (Planning), Delhi Development Authority, that the procedure for "sanctioning the building plans" adopted by the D. D. A. is that the plans which are submitted to the D. D. A. for being sanctioned, are first scrutinised by the D. D. A. and they are sent to the Urban Arts Commission for approval. On being so approved, the building plans are sanctioned. On being so approved, the building plans are sanctioned. It also appears to me that this procedure adopted by the Delhi Development Authority in connection with "sanctioning of building plans", which has been mentioned by Mr. N. K. Aggarwal in Court, is not in accordance with the law, as consultations with persons or authority, not postulated by the provisions of Sections 12 (3) (i) and 13 (1) and (3) of the Delhi Development Act, are not permissible, on a parity of reasoning which has been adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors, (1967) 1 S. C. R. 77, Prakash Chand Maheshwari and anr v. The Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar and anr, 1971 (1) S. L. R. 632, and General Manager North East Frontier Railway v. Sachindra Nath Sen, (1970)2s. C. R. 65. There is no mention of the Urban Arts Commission in the Delhi Development Act. Reference to the Urban Arts Commission by the Delhi Development Authority for purposes of sanctioning of building plans, is not postulated by the Delhi Development Act. No submissions have been urged before me regarding the constitution and the powers of the Urban Arts Commission and, therefore, nothing can be said herein about that. "having, thus, held that D. D. A. had no power to sanction the building plans, the learned Single Judge nevertheless issued a direction that the Samiti was entitled to have its application for sanction of the building plans to be considered by the D. D. A. This is in contradiction in terms of what the learned Single Judge had held about the jurisdiction of the D. D. A. We, therefore, do not find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that D. D. A. has no powers to "sanction building plans". ( 9 ) THE grounds of challenge by the Samiti, as noted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, are as under :- "the petitioner (Samiti) contends that in view of the fact that all that needed to be done, had been done by the petitioner (Samiti) in the shape of making payment to respondent No. 1, D. D. A. , the D. D. A. having received payment of the money it was entitled to receive for the land in question in accordance with its letter dated 25. 10. 10. 1985, money having been retained by the D. D. A. , the D. D. A. is prevented by principles of promissory estoppel from going back on the allotment (ground (c) of the amended writ petition]. It is also contended by the petitioner (Samiti) that there were no grounds at all for reviewing the decision to allot the land to the petitioner (Samiti), and in any case the decision to revoke the allotment, has been taken behind the back of the petitioner (Samiti ). That the principles of natural justice have been violated as the decision to revoke has been without any notice to show cause why the allotment should not be cancelled, and that the decision to revoke suffers from legal mala fides inasmuch as it has been taken on the basis of representations of a society of plot owners of Vivek Vihar, as also on the representation of Shri Ram Lila Committee of Vivek Vihar, Delhi, who have no right to object to the allotment of land to the petitioner (Samiti ). "the learned Single Judge held that the writ petition, being for enforcement of property rights and based on plea of promissory estoppel, was, therefore, maintainable and he rejected the preliminary objection of the D. D. A. that the writ itself was not maintainable. He held as under : "in view of what is stated above, the petitioner has established that estoppel by conduct and promissory estoppels have arisen in its favour, owing to letter of allotment dated 25th June, 1985, payment of money on 1st July, 1985, and delivery of possession of the land on 15th July, 1985, that the D. D. A. has made statutory representations regarding the use of the land which has been allotted, that the land is intended to be used for the purposes reserved therefor under a statutory plan being plan No. DDA/967-JHLM- (R)-6/p-477, (which is for the purposes of their own convenience called lay-out plan by the d. D. A. "this plan No. DDA/967-JHLM- (R)-6/p-477 which is a lay out plan "approved by the D. D. A. " has been held to be statutory by the learned Single Judge and he held that the allotment of the land was in accordance with this plan and could not, therefore, be revoked. He held that the use of the land was permissible only in connection with purposes of a Higher Secondary School and this land could not be used for any other purpose. He also held that in the absence of any show cause notice to the Samiti the allotment of the land could not have been cancelled. Relying on a decision of a Bench of this Court in Vishal Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corporation and others, 22 (1982) DLT 151, the learned Single Judge also held that Samiti had got proprietorial rights in the land allotted to it of which possession had also been delivered to it. In this connection he also referred to Article 300a of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. " ( 10 ) WE have examined the judgment of this Court in Vishal Builders case and we find that is not quite relevant to the present case. That was a case where leasehold rights in a plot of land had been purchased in auction by Vishal Builders who paid whole of the auction money and also got possession of the land. Thereafter, after getting no objection from the D. D. A. and having got the plans sanctioned it started construction on the plot and completed the building. Lease deed had yet not been executed. However, the M. C. D. issued a notice for assessment of the property tax and assessed the same to property tax. The argument was that in the absence of any lease deed Vishal Builders could not be made liable to pay any property tax. This contention was repelled. The court observed that it was never the case of Vishal Builders that the auction of the plot in its favour was illegal or that D. D. A. had ever raised any objection to the auction. No advantage can be drawn from this judgment to support the plea of the Samiti that Samiti had become the owner of the land though lease deed had not been executed. It is difficult to hold that D. D. A. cannot cancel an allotment if it is against law or public policy particularly when even lease deed has not been executed. Of course, any such action by the D. D. A. has to be informed by reason. It is difficult to hold that D. D. A. cannot cancel an allotment if it is against law or public policy particularly when even lease deed has not been executed. Of course, any such action by the D. D. A. has to be informed by reason. ( 11 ) THERE has been a great deal of discussion in the judgment if the lay out plan is statutory. A Bench of this Court in Shanti Devi Gupta and others v. D. D. A. and others (CWP No. 3369 of 1992, decided on 8 April 1994) has held that lay out plan could not be statutory document under the Act or part of the Master or Zonal plans. D. D. A. has always maintained that lay out plan is never a statutory document. In the Master Plan for Delhi 2001, which was published on 1 August 1990, lay out plan means a sub-division plan indicating configuration and sizes of all use premises. As per dictionary meaning a configuration is an arrangement or group of things. ( 12 ) IT may at once be noticed that D. D. A. while cancelling/revoking the allotment of land in question also offered to the Samiti an alternative plot for the purpose of playfield. ( 13 ) NO question of promissory estoppel arises in the present case as no representation was made by the D. D. A. on the basis of which Samiti acted or changed its position to its detriment. The Samiti only paid price of the land and as per records of the D. D. A. possession was also given to it. It was by letter dated 25 June 1985 that the Samiti was asked to pay price of the land and the physical possession of the 1and is stated to have been handed over to the Samiti on 15 July 1985. However, on 25 July 1985 the D. D. A. informed the Samiti that the matter regarding allotment of land to it was being reviewed by the Vice Chairman, D. D. A. , and till then no temporary or permanent structure including compound wall/fencing could be raised. As noted above, by letter dated 13 January 1986 to the Samiti, the D. D. A. cancelled the allotment and said that it was decided to locate an alternative plot elsewhere for the Samiti for playfield. As noted above, by letter dated 13 January 1986 to the Samiti, the D. D. A. cancelled the allotment and said that it was decided to locate an alternative plot elsewhere for the Samiti for playfield. Between 15 July 1985, when the possession of the plot of land was handed over to the Samiti, and 25 July 1985, when the allotment was sought to be revoked, Samiti could not have done anything on the land. Price demanded by the D. D. A. as per letter dated 25 June 1985 was paid by the Samiti on or about 1 July 1985. The residents association after having come to know of the allotment of the land to the Samiti represented. It said the allotment was in violation of the Master/zonal Plan and also contrary to the needs of the residents and the children of the colony. Various contentions have been raised as to how the allotment of the land to the Samiti is illegal which have been controverted by the Samiti. For the reasons hereinafter noted we do not wish to go into that as that might prejudice the case of either of the parties since we are remanding the matter back to the D. D. A. to further consider the matter. No question of any promissory estoppel would arise in this case for the D. D. A. to reconsider the matter. ( 14 ) WHAT, however, we find is that the grievance of the Samiti is correct that it has not been given proper hearing before the allotment in its favour was revoked by the letter dated 13 January 1986. D. D. A. has said that the allotment was revoked "in view of the prevailing circumstances and taking in view the totality of the situation. " But that leads us nowhere and Samiti is right in its submission that there existed no reasons on record from where it could be inferred as to how the allotment of the land in its favour was illegal. We examined the relevant file of the D. D. A. The Samiti was, no doubt, aware of the grounds of challenge by the residents association to the allotment of land in its favour. A meeting had been fixed for the purpose in the D. D. A. Samiti had even objected to the representation made by the residents association. We examined the relevant file of the D. D. A. The Samiti was, no doubt, aware of the grounds of challenge by the residents association to the allotment of land in its favour. A meeting had been fixed for the purpose in the D. D. A. Samiti had even objected to the representation made by the residents association. Notings dated 18 October 1985 on the file would show that the case was discussed with the representatives of the school (Samiti) and the residents association on 1 October 1985 and it was impressed upon both the parties to come to a logical solution and to inform the same, but it was noted that nothing had been received from the residents association in that regard. The matter was being examined and then a note on 29 October 1985 is as under :- "discussed. No further action for the time being. "then it would appear residents association wrote a letter dated 4 December 1985 on which the Lt. Governor, who is the Chairman of the D. D. A. , recorded his note on 12 December 1985 as under :- "kindly look into this case. This school may be given a plot elsewhere and the land in question may be given to the Association for maintaining. Report may kindly be sent byl2. 12. 85. "on this, Secretary D. D. A. recorded as under on 16 December 1985 :- Commissioner (L) is kindly aware of the background of the case. Now since it has been decided that the land in question is not to be allotted for play-ground to Arvachin Shiksha Samiti. The allotment already approved by L. G. on 4. 6. 85 (page 124/n) may kindly be-concelled. The possession of the land will continue with D. D. A. and it may not be desirable to allot it to the Residents Welfare Association because it will set up a precedent and we will be flooded with similar requests from other Associations On this basis, it would appear, the impugned letter dated 13 January 1986 revoking the allotment was issued to the Samiti. ( 15 ) A great deal of argument by the Samiti way based on the plea that the impugned action was taken at its back. Samiti certainly had a right to fair hearing. As to what would be fair hearing depends upon the facts and circumstance s of each case. ( 15 ) A great deal of argument by the Samiti way based on the plea that the impugned action was taken at its back. Samiti certainly had a right to fair hearing. As to what would be fair hearing depends upon the facts and circumstance s of each case. Principle of natural justice do not require any elaborate enquiry as envisaged by the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of a case. It is difficult to put the principle of natural justice in a strait jacket. What the law requires is that the parties should be made aware of the circumstances against him and he be heard in the matter and the authority should give reasons for its decision. In the present case it could not be said that reasons even existed on the file. Though opportunity had been given to the Samiti to represent its case which is quite fair and the Samiti was well aware of the issues involved in the case, yet when we are setting aside the impugned order on the ground that it lacks reasons, it may well be that all the parties are heard again. Hearing does not necessarily mean an oral hearing and again that would depend upon the facts of each case. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 S. C. 965, the Supreme Court observed as under :- "natural Justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety, being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural - justice can be complained of. Unanatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter. ". ( 16 ) FROM the record we find that the Samiti filed a civil suit in the court of the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi, against the residents association and its office bearers. This is Suit No. 780/85 and was pending in the court of Mr. D. R. Jain, Sub Judge, Delhi. ". ( 16 ) FROM the record we find that the Samiti filed a civil suit in the court of the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi, against the residents association and its office bearers. This is Suit No. 780/85 and was pending in the court of Mr. D. R. Jain, Sub Judge, Delhi. Plaint in the case was presented on 7 October 1985. Samiti sought a restraint on the defendants from dispossessing it from the land in question. It would appear that the defendants wanted to hold Ramlila and Dussehra celebrations on the land which, according to them, they had been holding there ever since the establishment of the colony. An application for interim relief by the Samiti was dismissed by order dated 11 October 1985. Against that, the Samiti filed an appeal before the Senior Sub Judge who by order dated 14 July 1986 modified the order of the learned Sub Judge. The appellate court after considering the whole of the matter came to the following conclusion :- "9. Now the question if the injunction is refused should the respondent be permitted to use the land in the manner they like particularly when the appellant has paid a sum of Rs. 4,88,626. 00 to the D. D. A. I find in such a case the appropriate order should be neither the plaintiff should be permitted to use the land nor the defendant should be permitted to use the land until the question of allotment of the land is finally decided by the D. D. A. or the documents transferring the title of the land is finally executed by the D. D. A. in favour of the plaintiffs. Until this is done the land should be allowed to be under the control of Horticulture Department as has been done by the D. D. A. vide their letter dt. 13. 3. 86, if either of the parties want to use it for temporary purpose may be for School function by the appellants, may be Ram Lila and other function by the respondent they can do it either (by) taking permission from the D. D. A. or after taking permission from the trial Court but this temporary use in any case shall not be granted for more than 20 days at a time. In this way both parties shall restrain themselves from using the land or doing anything on the land. In this way both parties shall restrain themselves from using the land or doing anything on the land. However, this order shall not effect the children of the locality to use the land or the children of the School to play on the land of their own without any activity on the part of the School on the land. Appeal is allowed accordingly. The order of the trial court is modified accordingly. Parties are left to bear their own costs. "it is not clear to us as to what ultimately happened to this suit filed by the Samiti. ( 17 ) WE would, therefore, while maintaining decision of the D. D. A. communicated to the Samiti by its letter dated 26 July 1985, set aside the order of the D. D. A. communicated to the Samiti by letter dated 13 January 1986. We will remand the matter back to the D. D. A. to reconsider the whole matter in accordance with the law. The decision by the D. D. A. in the matter shall be taken expeditiously. Meanwhile, In the interregnum period we will direct that the order passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, and as noted above, shall be made applicable except that parties need not come to this Court for any permission, and further for the use of the land by the appellants and the children of the colony an appropriate opening will be made in the boundary wall by the D. D. A. Both the appeals are, accordingly, allowed to the extent mentioned above and the impugned judgment is set aside. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.