B. P. BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) -THIS is an application for stay filed in an appeal preferred by the appellant, Pijush Kanti Sen against the order passed by the learned trial Judge on 21st March, 1992. The writ application was filed by one Sri Gautam Pan who is a guardian of a student reading in Burikhali Khetramohan Institution, P. S. Bawria, District-Howrah challenging the validity of the resolution for the reinstatement of the appellant as Assistant Teacher of the said school. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that the appellant was an accused in a murder case which took place on 7th October, 1982 and the appellant was convicted for life imprisonment in connection with the said murder under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code on 25th March, 1985. After the said conviction the appellant was appointed as a teacher in the said school as a probationer on 21st May, 1985 and after lapse of two years, he was confirmed and made permanent as Assistant Teacher in the said school. It is not known how he could discharge his duties as a teacher of the said school even after his conviction. It is stated that the said conviction of the appellant was affirmed in appeal by this Court and ultimately, it appears that the appellant had surrendered in September, 1987' for serving out the unexpired portion of the sentence which was imposed on conviction. The service of the appellant as an Assistant Teacher was terminated by the Managing Committee of the said school on 18th August, 1990 at the ground of his conviction which was duly approved by the West Bengal Board of Secondary, Education as required under the rule. It is also stated that after the service of the appellant was terminated the resultant vacancy was duly filled up in accordance with the rule. It appears that on the basis of a petition addressed to the Chief Minister, State of West Bengal, submitted by the father of the appellant, Sri Deboprosad Sen, praying for premature release of his son, convict Pijush Kanti Sen who was undergoing imprisonment in Dum Dum Central Jail and suffering imprisonment, an order was passed in the name of the Governor in the form of resolution No. 25072-J dated 13th November, 1991. The said resolution and order by which the unexpired portion of the sentence for imprisonment for life passed upon the said convict was remitted and directed for immediate release is as follows :"read a petition addressed to the Chief Minister of West Bengal submitted by Shri Deboprosad Sen praying for premature release of his son convict Pijush Kanti Sen (No. 2500-A) of the Dum Dum Central Jail, who was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life a/s 302/34 of the I. P. C. on 25. 3. 85 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Howrah in sessions Trial No. 1st July, 1984. "ordered that the jail authorities and the petitioner be informed that in exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 161 of the constitution of India, the Governor has been pleased to remit the unexpired portion of the abovementioned sentence of imprisonment for life, passed upon the above named convict Pijush Kanti Sen and to direct his immediate release from custody. "after the appellant was released from the jail on the strength of the said order of the Governor Sri Pijush Kanti Sen preferred an appeal against the order of termination of his service by the Managing Committee dated 18. 8. 90 before the Appeal Committee of the Board. It appears that the appeal committee of the Board entertained the appeal and passed the following order on 21. 2. 92:"the appellant and Secretary to the school are present, Heard the parties. The case of the appellant is that he was implicated in a court case and compelled to leave the station on 20. 11. 87. Without giving any intimation his services were terminated with effect from 18. 1. 90. He prays for reinstatement. The secretary has no objection to reinstating the appellant with effect from the date of termination of his service i. e. with effect from 18. 8. 90. He may, therefore, be reinstated with effect from that date. But he will not get any pay or allowance for the period from 18. 8. 90 to the date of his joining. But this period should be counted for fixation- of his pay notionally, after taking into consideration any increment that might have fallen due during this period. This period should be counted towards all future benefits. Hence ordered that the appeal be allowed. The appellant is reinstated in his post with effect from 18. 8. 90. But this period should be counted for fixation- of his pay notionally, after taking into consideration any increment that might have fallen due during this period. This period should be counted towards all future benefits. Hence ordered that the appeal be allowed. The appellant is reinstated in his post with effect from 18. 8. 90. He shall be allowed to join the school with immediate effect. He shall not get any pay or allowances from 18. 8. 90 till he joins the school. This period should however be taken into consideration while fixing his pay notionally and shall be taken into consideration or for all future benefits. While fixing his pay any increment that might have fallen due should be taken into consideration. He is also allowed to give option for new pay scale. " ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the order of the appeal committee declaring the order of termination made on the grouted of his conviction in connection with the murder case with effect from 18. 8. 90 as illegal, the Managing Committee of the said school passed a resolution reinstating the appellant in the post of Assistant Teacher and allowed him to resume his duties as Assistant Teacher of the said school for imparting education to the students. At this stage, the writ petitioner, Guiram Pan claiming to be a guardian of a student reading in the said school filed a writ application whereupon the learned trial Judge passed an interim order on 16th March, 1992 restraining the appellant from joining the said school and performing the duties of a teacher in the said school. Thereafter an application was filed by the appellant for rejecting the writ application and vacating the interim order passed on 16th March, 1992 by the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge was not inclined to vacate and/or vary the interim order and fixed the matter for disposal as a contesting application. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned trial Judge refusing to vacate the interim order this appeal was preferred and an application was also filed for stay of operation of the order of the learned trial Judge. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned trial Judge refusing to vacate the interim order this appeal was preferred and an application was also filed for stay of operation of the order of the learned trial Judge. ( 4 ) THE case of the appellant was that after the order of the Governor passed under Article 161 of the Constitution he should be treated as a free citizen of India and should be entitled to get and enjoy all the benefits of a free citizen. ( 5 ) LAW is well settled that under Article 161 of the Constitution of India the Government have the power to grant pardons, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. In the instant case the appellant has not been granted perdon under Article 161 of the Constitution of India. What was done was that the unexpired portion of the sentence for imprisonment for life passed upon the appellant had been remitted. There is difference between the grant of pardons and remission of sentence of any convict under Article 161 of the Constitution. The effect of pardon had been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 653 wherein it was observed that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender and when pardon is full, it releases the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender and when pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence of the guilt, so that in the eye of law the offender is as innocent as if, he had never committed the offence. " So the pardon if granted after conviction removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. " So the pardon if granted after conviction removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. The effect of remission was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendra Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334 wherein it was observed that "now it is not disputed that in England and India the effect of a pardon or what is sometimes called a free pardon is to clear the person from all infamy and from all consequences of the offence for which it is granted and from an statutory or other disqualifications following upon conviction. It makes him, as it were, a new man (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. VII Third Edition, p. 224 para 529 ). But the same effect does not follow on a mere remission which stands on a different footing altogether. In the first place, an order of remission does not wipe out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on the execution of the sentence, though ordinarily a convicted person would have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An order of remission thus does not in any way interfere with the order of the court, it effects only the execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the convicted person from his liability to undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the court though the order of conviction and sentence passed by the court still stands at it was "and further observed that the effect of the order of remission is to wipe out that part of sentence of imprisonment which has not been served out and thus, in practice to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. In law the order of remission merely means that the rest of the sentence need not be undergone, leaving the order of conviction by court and the sentence passed by it untouched and the order of remission passed in this case though it had only the effect that appellant was released from jail before he had served the full sentence of imprisonment but that does not in any way affect the order of conviction and sentence passed by the court which remains as it was. So, on the strength of the order of remission it cannot be said that the order of punishment and conviction has been blotted out. Under the circumstances, we arc of the view that when the order of conviction passed by the court and the sentence passed remained untouched and which remains as it is, the appellant is not entitled to restore to all his civil rights as claimed by the appellant. It is difficult to appreciate how the appeal committee of the Board could pass an order of reinstatement in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case when conviction of the appellant as a murderer stood as it is, reinstating as a teacher with effect from the date of termination when he was under conviction and was in Jail. The appeal committee of the Board has not disclosed any reason or ground for setting aside the order of termination of service of Ole appellant which was passed on the ground of conviction. The appeal committee of the Board, it appears, had only reinstated the appellant into the service. The appeal committee while granting or refusing relief is bound to disclose reasons for decision. It appears that the member of the appeal committee had no occasion to apply their mind on the question whether the order of termination of service of a teacher who was found to have committed a murder and who had been convicted, was illegal and consequently, he should be reinstated. It is only after declaring the order of termination or dismissal illegal, an order of reinstatement could be passed. In the instant case, without saying anything with regard to the merit of the order of termination and/or ground of termination and without considering the case at all, simply an order of reinstatement was passed, which is peculiar. It is needless to point out that the School authority and the appeal committee of the Board had acted in a manner which does not appear to be in the interest of education at all. Even trough we are not called upon to decide the validity and/or legality of the order excepting the order of the learned trial Judge, yet it is necessary to point out the scope of the power of the Governor under Article 161. Even trough we are not called upon to decide the validity and/or legality of the order excepting the order of the learned trial Judge, yet it is necessary to point out the scope of the power of the Governor under Article 161. In Kehar Singh (supra) it was held that the power under Article 72 of the Constitution the President is entitled to examine the record of evidence of a criminal caw and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of relief falling within that power and that the Supreme Court was of the view that the president was entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it had been judicially concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court. In the matter of exercise of prerogative power of mercy and remission of sentences under Article 161 the Governor has to exercise power on the advice of the State Government and that the advice of the Government does not bind the Head of the State. It is on the basis of the advice given by the council of Ministers, the Governor has to act that the Governor has to pass the order. This is the view of the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) WE are of the view that it is not necessary to consider the effect of section 433a of the Cr PC, as we me of the view that the appellant is not entitled to relief in this appeal and we cannot allow the appellant to discharge the powers and functions of a teacher of a school imparting education to the students. We have to bear in mind that the interest of the education is the paramount consideration. The effect of remission cannot be equated with the pardon as hereinbefore stated. If it leas a case of grant of pardon by the Governor in accordance with the provision of the constitution in that event the appellant was entitled to restore all his civil rights but not other- wise. After the appeal committee of the Board had passed an order on 21-2-92 the Managing Committee of the school passed a resolution and on the strength of the resolution he was allowed to join but ultimately that was stayed by the order of the learned trial Judge. After the appeal committee of the Board had passed an order on 21-2-92 the Managing Committee of the school passed a resolution and on the strength of the resolution he was allowed to join but ultimately that was stayed by the order of the learned trial Judge. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that it was not the case of granting of pardon by the Governor under Article 161 but it was a case of remission of sentence under Article 161 and such remission has been considered by the Supreme Court and that the remission under Article 161 of the Constitution of India did not in any way effect an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Court in the said criminal case which remained as it is and prima facie we are of the view that the appellant is not entitled to get restoration of his civil rights as in the case of grant of pardon by the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Judge and accordingly, the application for stay is rejected. ( 8 ) IN view of the above order we think that no useful purpose will be served in keeping the appeal pending. Accordingly, by consent of parties the appeal is treated as on days list and is dismissed on the above terms. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Let Xerox copy of this order be given to the parties on the usual under taking. Appeal dismissed.