JUDGMENT - MANE A.D., J.:—There involves an interesting point of law in this writ petition. 2. This writ petition is directed against the rejection of nomination form of the petitioner by the Returning Officer, respondent No. 4 of Service Co-operative Society, Bhokar District Nanded (for short, the Society). The petitioner is the member of the society. The petitioner was the Chairman of the society. The respondent No. 4 is appointed as the Returning Officer to hold the elections to the Managing Committee of the Society. The petitioner submits that his nomination form was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the petitioner who was removed as the member of the said society by the Registrar under section 78(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short, the Act), was not eligible to be re-elected as a member of the society till the period of expiry of next full term of the Committee from the date on which he has been so removed. 3. In the context, it is necessary to set out a few facts which are germane to the question involved in this petition. The respondent No. 3, the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Taluka Bhokar, issued the show cause notice dated 6-4-1994 to the petitioner as the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the society in exercise of his powers under section 78(1) of the Act. By his order dated 17-5-1994 the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, superseded the Managing Committee of the society under section 78(1)(a)(i) of the Act. 4. That order of supersession was challenged by the petitioner and others in Writ Petition No. 1171 of 1994. In that writ petition this Court while disposing of the petition passed an order on 22-6-1994 directing the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies to hold the elections of the society within a period of 40 days from the date of finalisation of the voters' list of the society. It may be stated that though the petitioner challenged the order of supersession but by that time the term of the committee and the elected members of the committee had already expired and therefore, the petition came to be disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 5. It may be stated that though the petitioner challenged the order of supersession but by that time the term of the committee and the elected members of the committee had already expired and therefore, the petition came to be disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 5. In pursuance of the said directions the Respondent No. 4 published the election programme on 17-8-1994 as per the programme the date of filing the nomination form was from 18th to 24th August, 1994 and the date of scrutiny was fixed on 25-8-1994. 20th September, 1994 is the date of polling and declaration of results. 6. The Petitioner submitted his nomination form on 24-8-1994. On the date of scrutiny of the nomination forms, the respondent No. 4 rejected the nomination form filed by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was not eligible to be re-elected as member of the society till the expiry of the period of next full term of the Committee from the date on which he was so removed under section 78(1)(a)(i) of the Act. 7. Therefore, the important question which arises is whether the proviso to Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act applies in a case like the present. It would be convenient to extract the provisions of section 78(1) of the Act so far as relevant as follows : “78. 7. Therefore, the important question which arises is whether the proviso to Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act applies in a case like the present. It would be convenient to extract the provisions of section 78(1) of the Act so far as relevant as follows : “78. (1) If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the Committee of any society or any member of such Committee makes default, or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it or him by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interests of the society or its members or wilfully disobeys directions issued by the State Government, or by the Registrar for the purpose of securing proper implementation of co-operative policy and development programme approved or undertaken by the State Government or is otherwise not discharging its or his functions properly and diligently or where a situation has arisen in which the Committee or any member of such committee refuses or has ceased to discharge its or his functions and deligently and the business of the society has or is likely to come to a standstill, or where any member of such committee stands disqualified by or under this Act for being a member, the Registrar may, after giving the committee or the member, as the case may be, opportunity of stating its or his objections, if any within 15 days from the date of receipt of receipt of notice and after consultation with the federal society to which the society is affiliated, by order — (a) (i) remove the committee, and (ii) appoint a committee consisting of three or more members (who shall not be the members of the committees so removed) of the society in its place or appoint one or more Administrators who need not be members of the society but who shall not be the members of the committee so removed to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding three months so, however, that the total period does not exceed nine months in the aggregate : Provided that, the Registrar shall have the power to change the committee or any member thereof or the administrator or administrators appointed under paragraph (ii) at his discretion even before the expiry of the period specified in the order made under this sub-section; (b) remove the member and appoint any person as member of such committee in his place, or direct the society to elect or appoint a member in his place, for the remainder of the term of office of the member so removed: Provided that, member who has been so removed, shall not be eligible to be re-elected, re appointed or re-co-opted, as a member of the Committee till the expiry of the period of next one full term of the Committee from the date on which he has been so removed. (1A) ……………… (2) …………….. (3) ………….. (4) …………. (5) …………” There is no dispute that by the order dated 17-5-1994 the respondent No. 3 removed the committee under the provisions of section 78(1) (a)(i) of the Act as aforesaid. In order to appreciate if the proviso to Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 78 also applies to the case of removal of committee under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) to sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act, it would be appropriate to take into account the true principles of interpretation of the proviso. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of (A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran)1, 1992 (1) Supp. S.C.C. 304, it has been ruled that the proviso is an exception to the main Rule and it cannot be interpreted out of context or to wipe out the effect of the main rule. To be precise it was observed that : “A proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision which it has been enacted by the provision and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main except and deal with a case which actment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the Rule. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the Rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment or can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly nor set at naught the real object of the main object unless the words of the proviso are such that it has its necessary effect.” In (Administrator, Municipal Corporation v. Dattraya Dahankar)2, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1846, the Apex Court has observed that the mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. In other words, as held in (Shree Chamundi Mopeds v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras)3, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1439, the interpretation in consonance with the object and purpose of the Act is preferred. At the same time it must not be overlooked that the procedural law is meant to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. It is an accepted rule that an interpretation which furthers the ends of justice should be preferred (A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1763)4 (Sic). In this context, regard may further be had to the observations of Their Lordships in the case of (Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India)5, 1992 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 594, and to quote : “While interpreting a statute the consideration of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided and when the language is clear and explicit and the words used are plain and unambiguous, Court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense with reference to other Clauses of the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes/rules/regulations relating to the subject-matter. Added to this, in construing a statute the Court has to ascertain the intention of law making authority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and the underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language and applied as far as its explicit language admits consistent with the established rule of interpretation.” 8. It is pertinent to note that the proviso to Clause (b) in sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act does not have adjective 'further' so as to read 'provided further'. In the case of expression 'provided further' in a proviso the Supreme Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania's case (cited supra) has explained that the expression would mean that it is on strict compliance is an additional requirement of that substantive rule and the first proviso. The expression 'provided further' spells out that the first proviso cannot be read in isolation or independent of second proviso but it must be in conjunction with the second proviso. The very expression is absent in the proviso to Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act and therefore, the proviso will have to be read independent of the earlier proviso to Clause(a)(i) and (ii) to sub-section(1) of section 78 of the Act. If we read the proviso to Clause(b) to sub-section(1) as set above in isolation of the earlier proviso it is quite plain that this proviso would apply only in a case where a member of the committee is removed under Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act. In case of removal of committee as a whole, the proviso to Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act will not apply. This literal construction of the proviso is in consonance with and promotes the avowed object of the bar which it creates. 9. Keeping in view the principles of interpretation the proviso as hereinabove discussed, I have no hesitation to hold that when the language of the proviso is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso would apply only in case of “single member who is removed under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act”. 9. Keeping in view the principles of interpretation the proviso as hereinabove discussed, I have no hesitation to hold that when the language of the proviso is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso would apply only in case of “single member who is removed under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act”. It is that case only that the proviso to Clause (b) would operate and create a bar to the eligibility of a member to be re-elected before expiry of the period of next one full term from the date of removal of such member under Clause (b). In the present case admittedly the petitioner as individual member was not removed but the committee as a whole was removed under Clause (a)(i) to sub-section (1) of the Act. The construction of the proviso so as to apply also in case of the 'Committee', apart from being in conflict with the plain language of the proviso would also defeat the object of the legislation. However, it is not possible to give regard to the proposition that singular includes plural when the proviso does not contain the expression 'provided further'. It may be emphasized that it is a rule of legal policy that law should be altered deliberately rather than casually, the Legislature does not make radical changes in law “by side-wind but only by measured and considered provision.” The very object of the proviso in question is to exclude that member who has been removed and not the committee of the members removed under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) to sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act. 10. In the view that I take it follows that it was wrong to reject the nomination form of the petitioner when the bar created by the proviso to Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 78 of the Act does not apply in the case of the petitioner. 11. The result is that the writ petition is allowed. The order rejecting the nomination form of the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No. 4 is directed to accept the nomination form of the petitioner. Liberty to the respondent No. 4 to amend the election programme from the date of scrutiny onwards if he so requires. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----