JUDGMENT - M.L. DUDHAT, J. :---This criminal writ petition is filed by the present petitioner, who is the son of one Ishwardas Bechardas Patel, detenu detained under the impugned order of detention bearing F. No. 673/1/94-CUS-VIII dated 21st January, 1994 annexed to the petition as Annexure "A", issued by Mr. Mahendra Prasad, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi, respondent No. 2, under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. It is contended by Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that the aforesaid impugned order of detention is illegal and is in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, Mr. Agrawal and Mrs. Desai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, contended that the impugned order is valid and is within the ambit of Article 22(5) and, therefore, further prayed for the dismissal of this writ petition. 2. Before dealing with the legal arguments as advanced by both the sides, it is desirable to go through some facts which are relevant for the disposal of this writ petition. The impugned order of detention issued by respondent No. 2, dated 21st January, 1994, under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act was served on the detenu on 5th February, 1994. The aforesaid order is Annexure "A" to the petition at page 30. Along with the aforesaid order of detention, grounds of detention which are annexed to the petition as Annexure "B" at page 31 and list of documents which is Annexure "C to the petition at page 50, were also supplied to the detenu. In Annexure "B" it is contended on behalf of the respondent-Detaining Authority that the Enforcement Directorate of Bombay received information to the effect that the detenu was receiving huge amount of Indian currency which was to be distributed as Hawala payments in India. Relying on the aforesaid information, the Enforcement Department searched the premises of the detenu under section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 on 5th and 6th January, 1994. In the aforesaid search, the Enforcement Department seized Indian currency of Rs. 2,15,000/- and also certain incriminating documents. 3. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that after the said search, statements of the detenu were recorded under section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 on 6th and 7th January, 1994. In the aforesaid search, the Enforcement Department seized Indian currency of Rs. 2,15,000/- and also certain incriminating documents. 3. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that after the said search, statements of the detenu were recorded under section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 on 6th and 7th January, 1994. In the statement of the detenu the detenu stated that he is doing business at Angadia from 1974 along with his three brothers, Ambalal B. Patel, Kantilal B. Patel and Chaturbhai B. Patel, and that the detenu has also established branch offices at Ahmedabad, Rajkot and Kolhapur respectively. In his statement he further stated that on 5th January, 1994 Enforcement Officers searched the premises of M/s Patel Ishwardas Bechardas and that the amount of Rs. 2,15,000/- recovered during the search was meant for making Hawala payments on instructions from abroad parties. He has also stated that he is carrying on the aforesaid Hawala business in addition to Angadia business and that in Hawala business he used to make payments to various persons in India whose names and addresses the detenu used to receive from Abu Dhabi through Fax. The Detaining Authority also relied on certain documents seized in the search which were grouped in different bunches, namely, Bunch `A containing 21 loose sheets, Bunch `B containing envelopes and loose sheets containing 1 to 28 Items, Bunch `C containing 55 visiting cards and Bunch `D containing 50 loose sheets. After relying on the aforesaid documents and certain statements made during the investigation, the Detaining Authority, in para 12 of the grounds of detention, Annexure "B", came to the conclusion that the detenu, in violation of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, has been engaged in receiving and making payments unauthorisedly under instructions from a person resident outside India. It is further observed that the Detaining Authority is also satisfied that these unauthorised transactions indulged in by the detenu have affected the foreign exchange resources of the country adversely. Further it is stated in the said grounds of detention that if the detenu is released on bail in near future, he may again engage in future in the aforesaid prejudicial activities as earlier and, therefore, the Detaining Authority is satisfied that in view of the aforesaid facts it is necessary to detain the detenu under COFEPOSA Act, 1974. Further it is stated in the said grounds of detention that if the detenu is released on bail in near future, he may again engage in future in the aforesaid prejudicial activities as earlier and, therefore, the Detaining Authority is satisfied that in view of the aforesaid facts it is necessary to detain the detenu under COFEPOSA Act, 1974. In the grounds of detention it is also stated that the Detaining Authority has relied upon the documents mentioned in the list enclosed. A copy of these grounds of detention and copies of the documents relied upon translated in Hindi language known to the detenu were also supplied to him. The aforesaid order of detention is challenged by the present petitioner by this writ petition. 4. After rule was granted in this matter, this matter was referred to the Full Bench for its decision on three legal questions, namely - (1) Has the specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act also an independent power to revoke the order of detention in view of section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act read with section 21 of the General Clauses Act ? This question was decided in the affirmative by the Full Bench. (2) Are observations in Amir Shad Khan regarding power of revocation of specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act not binding on this Court ? This question was also decided in the affirmative. (3) Does failure to take independent decision on revocation of order of detention by the specially empowered officer under the COFEPOSA Act and merely forwarding the same with recommendation to reject, result in non-compliance with constitutional safeguard under Article 22(5) of the Constitution ? This question was decided in the negative. 5. After the aforesaid decision, the matter is referred to us for disposal on other legal grounds taken by the present petitioner. 6. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner, contended that against the order of detention, the detenu has a right to approach the Detaining Authority, Central Government and Advisory Board. 5. After the aforesaid decision, the matter is referred to us for disposal on other legal grounds taken by the present petitioner. 6. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner, contended that against the order of detention, the detenu has a right to approach the Detaining Authority, Central Government and Advisory Board. On 21st February, 1994, the detenu made representations through prison authorities addressed to the Detaining Authority and Advisory Board and in the aforesaid representations, a prayer was also made to the effect that the Detaining Authority may consider the representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 21 of the General Clauses Act and revoke the impugned order of detention. By a reply dated 22nd March, 1994 signed by the under Secretary to the Government of India the detenu was informed that his representation was considered by the Central Government and that the same was rejected. The reply was received by the detenu on 24th March, 1994. Mr. Karmali contended that the continued detention of the detenu has become invalid and illegal as the decision given by respondent No. 2 Detaining Authority was not communicated to the present detenu. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the rejection order dated 22nd March, 1994 signed by the under Secretary to the Government of India states that the detenus representations was carefully considered by the Central Government but it is regretted that the same has been rejected. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that earlier when the matter was before the Division Bench it was pointed by the respondent that on the representation addressed to respondent No. 2, respondent No. 2 made an endorsement to this effect : `May be rejected. Since respondent No. 2 has considered the representation as made by the detenu, his decision also ought to have been communicated to the detenu and failure on the part of the respondent to do so invalidated the continued order of detention. Though learned Counsel Mr. Karmali laid great emphasis on this point initially, in the subsequent part of his argument he contended on behalf of the petitioner that he did not intend to press this point in this writ petition and may argue on this point subsequently as and when occasion arises. 7. Mr. Though learned Counsel Mr. Karmali laid great emphasis on this point initially, in the subsequent part of his argument he contended on behalf of the petitioner that he did not intend to press this point in this writ petition and may argue on this point subsequently as and when occasion arises. 7. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner, firstly contended, in Ground No. (vi) of the petition, that along with the order of detention the petitioner was supplied with the documents at page Nos. 2, 15, 81 and 114. The said documents were illegible and, therefore, supplying such illegible copies of documents amounts to virtually furnishing no copies of the documents. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the documents supplied being part and parcel of the grounds of detention are in fact an integral part of the grounds and, therefore, non-furnishing of legible copies of the documents, in law, amounts to non-furnishing of the grounds of detention and, therefore, is violative of both the facets of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and also amounts to mala fide action in law and, therefore, the order of detention has become illegal, void and inoperative. In order to lay emphasis on this point, Mr. Karmali relied upon several authorities. Firstly he relied upon the ratio in (S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 362 wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that service of the grounds of detention is complete only when the grounds of detention are accompanied by documents which formed the basis thereof. Since the documents are the basis of the grounds of detention, if the documents are illegible, the order of detention is incomplete and, therefore, is liable to be set aside on this ground itself. Mr. Karmali also relied upon the ratio of the case in (Mehrunnisa v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 1861 wherein the Supreme Court held that non-supply of material documents referred to in the grounds of detention prevented the detenu from making effective representation and, therefore, rendered the order of detention invalid. In this case the Supreme Court also observed that the fact that the detenu was aware of the contents of the documents was immaterial. In this case the Supreme Court also observed that the fact that the detenu was aware of the contents of the documents was immaterial. Relying upon the aforesaid authorities, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that supplying illegible documents as mentioned earlier virtually amounts to non-supply of material documents and, therefore, as held in the aforesaid authorities, the order of detention is vitiated. Lastly, on this point Mr. Karmali relied upon the ratio of the case in (Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal)3, A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 550 and contended that in the order of detention passed in the present case, the Detaining Authority has come to a composite finding that the petitioner may again engage in future in prejudicial activities as mentioned in the order of detention if he is enlarged on bail and, therefore, even if there is material provided in the other documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority, still since the documents at pages 2, 15, 81 and 114 were illegible, one does not know as to what in fact weighed in the mind of the Detaining Authority while arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and, therefore, the continued order of detention has become illegal, void and inoperative. The respondents in their reply at page 64, para 6, contended that the illegible documents referred in ground (vi) were seized at the time of raid on 5th January, 1994 along with other documents. The documents, which were Fax messages, were faint even on the day on which they were seized. Further according to the respondents, even the detenus statement shows the reason as to why by passage of time the documents became faint. In view of this, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that since they seized illegible copies at the time of raid from the detenu, they have supplied the same copies along with the grounds of detention and, therefore, there is no mala fide intention on the part of the Detaining Authority in supplying illegible copies as referred to above to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. It is further contended by Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that these illegible copies are part of Bunch `A containing 21 loose sheets. It is further contended by Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that these illegible copies are part of Bunch `A containing 21 loose sheets. The detenu with reference to the said illegible documents in his statement stated that he was carrying on Hawala business since 1988 and the said illegible documents are Fax messages received from Abu Dhabi during the year 1992-93 and these messages were received on different dates; that under the instructions from abroad, the detenu made payments to the persons whose names, addresses and telephone numbers were available in these Fax messages and these Fax messages were received in his office from R.B. Communication Centre, 192/94, Kalbadevi Road, 1st Floor, Bombay-2. Mr. Agrawal further contended that in fact it is due to the statement made by the detenu and other witnesses that the investigating officers were in a position to decipher the messages and in view of this, there is no substance in the contention as advanced by learned Counsel Mr. Karmali on behalf of the present petitioner. We have seen the concerned documents. We have also gone through the relevant portions of the petition and the reply thereto and also seen the relevant statements. According to our opinion, it is true that certain documents as referred to in the petition were quite illegible but from the record it appears that at the time of raid when the documents were seized, these documents were also in illegible condition as they were Fax messages which were in faint condition and in fact it is because of the statement of the detenu that the investigating officers were in a position to decipher the messages. Taking the over all view of the matter, according to our opinion, no prejudice was caused to the detenu though certain documents as mentioned earlier were faint because it is not the case that the original documents were in legible condition and copies supplied of the said documents were faint. Apart from that, if the statements relied upon of the detenu are read in conjunction with these documents, there is no question of creation of any doubt in the mind of the detenu after reading these documents. Apart from that, if the statements relied upon of the detenu are read in conjunction with these documents, there is no question of creation of any doubt in the mind of the detenu after reading these documents. In view of these facts and circumstances of this case, according to our opinion, there is no substance in this argument as advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the case law relied upon by Mr. Karmali on this point is of no consequence. 8. Mr. Karmali further argued, relying on amended Ground No. (xii) of the petition, that the documents at pages 1, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, and 20 of Annexure `A to the seizure panchanama purported to have been placed before the Detaining Authority and purported to have been relied upon by the Detaining Authority, were themselves faint and illegible. Therefore, the Detaining Authority could not have applied its mind to the contents thereof and, therefore, the order of detention suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and casual and cavalier exercise of power by the Detaining Authority and, therefore, the order of detention has become ab initio void. The respondents have denied the aforesaid contention more particularly in the explanation given at page 70 in the affidavit of Mahendra Prasad, the 2nd respondent. While dealing with Ground No. (vi), we have already observed that in fact, though the documents mentioned above were in illegible condition, still the same were deciphered because of the statements given by the detenu and, therefore, these documents were explained in right perspective taking into consideration the statements of the detenu and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Detaining Authority was not in a position to apply its mind to the said documents and, therefore, according to our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. 9. It was further argued on behalf of the present petitioner in Ground No. (v) that though the order of detention was issued on 21st January, 1994, it was belatedly served on the detenu, as late as on 5th February, 1994 i.e. after a lapse of about 15 days though in fact during the said time the detenu was confined in judicial custody and was easily available to the respondents for effecting service of the impugned order. The petitioner, therefore, contended that this delay of 15 days in serving this order of detention on the detenu has rendered the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority not genuine and, therefore, the order of detention passed on such satisfaction is accordingly mala fide and null and void. The respondents relied upon the affidavit of respondent No. 2, more particularly para 5, to reply the aforesaid argument. It is stated in the aforesaid affidavit that a perusal of the grounds of detention and documents relied and supplied to the detenu, excepting the documents seized from the premises of the detenu, all other documents such as grounds of detention, panchanamas, summons English statements given by parties, Court papers, retractions, replies were in English, Urdu and were required to be translated through reputed translators and, therefore, xerox copies at all documents relied upon, including Hindi translation in 368 pages had to be taken, arranged, duly checked and page numbered thereafter. This work could be taken up only after 21st January, 1994, i.e. the date on which the order of detention was issued. Thereafter copies of the detention order and grounds of detention with the documents relied upon were to be sent to the Home Secretary, Government of Maharashtra. The said detention order and the grounds of detention along with the documents were received at Mantralaya, Bombay, on 2nd February, 1994 and on the same day the detention order and grounds of detention were served on the detenu. Taking into consideration the huge translation work involved as mentioned above, and also taking into consideration 4 intervening holidays on 22nd, 23rd, 29th and 30th January, 1994, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the time taken for service of the detention order and grounds of detention was hardly 9 days which further includes the time taken by the postal authorities for the delivery of the said detention order and the grounds of detention. According to the respondents, there is no delay on the part of the respondents. After going through the explanation given as aforesaid by the respondents relying upon the affidavit of respondent No. 2, we are of the opinion that in this case there is no undue delay in serving the order of detention and, therefore, there is no substance in Ground No. (v) taken by the petitioner in his petition. 10. Mr. After going through the explanation given as aforesaid by the respondents relying upon the affidavit of respondent No. 2, we are of the opinion that in this case there is no undue delay in serving the order of detention and, therefore, there is no substance in Ground No. (v) taken by the petitioner in his petition. 10. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel for the petitioner, thereafter strenuously argued on the ground which is taken by the petitioner by way of amendment, being Ground No. (xiv). In the aforesaid ground, the petitioner contended that apart from the documents which were allegedly seized from the premises of the detenu, which contained Gujarati writings, the document at pages 108 and 109, which contains the alleged statement of Poonamchand Gulabchand, is recorded in the Gujarati language. Similarly, the document at pages 112 and 113, which contains the alleged statement of Rameshbhai Prabhubhai Danji, is also recorded in Gujarati language. Further, the document at pages 117 and 118 which contains the alleged statement of Fakhruddin Nadimullah Shaikh, is recorded in the Urdu language and the alleged statement of Mahadev Dhaka Shigwan at pages 133-137 is recorded in the Marathi language. These aforesaid statements of various witnesses recorded in Gujarati, Urdu and Marathi languages, according to the petitioner, were relied upon by the Detaining Authority, while passing the order of detention. However, according to the petitioner, in para 5 of the counter affidavit affirmed by the Detaining Authority and filed in this High Court, it has been stated : "5. As regards para 4(v), it is submitted that the contentions made by the petitioner are denied. It is submitted that a perusal of the grounds of detention and relied on documents supplied to the detenu, excepting the documents seized form the premises of the detenu, all other documents such as, grounds of detention, panchanamas, summons, English statements given by parties, Court papers, retractions, replies etc., in English, Urdu were required to be translated through reputed translators and thereafter zerox copies of all documents relied on including Hindi translation in 368 pages had to be taken, arranged, duly checked and page numbered etc. These items of work could only be taken up after 21-1-94, the date of issue of detention order against the detenu." By relying on the aforesaid portion of the affidavit, the petitioner contended that the translations of the documents `other than those which were allegedly seized from the premises of the detenu were made after the issuance of the impugned order on 21st January 1994 and if that is so, the translations of the documents at pages 108, 109, 112 and 113 which were recorded in Gujarati language, of the document at pages 117 and 118 which was recorded in Urdu language, and of the document at pages 133-137 which was recorded in Marathi language, were not placed before the Detaining Authority in any language in which case the Detaining Authority could not have relied upon the said documents. The said impugned order of detention therefore, according to the petitioner, suffers from the vice of total non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority and casual and cavalier exercise of the power by the Detaining Authority and therefore the order of detention is mala fide and also null and void. In reply to the aforesaid contention, respondent No. 2 in para 3 of his additional affidavit in reply contended that in fact in the earlier affidavit, respondent No. 2 has also stated that excepting the documents seized from the premises of the detenu, all other documents such as grounds of detention, panchanamas, summons, English statements given by the parties, Court papers, retractions, replies in English, Urdu were required to be translated. However, it is stated in clarification that the word `Urdu used in the earlier affidavit appearing after the word `English is a sheer typographical error and, therefore, in fact, translations of all the documents was done before the issuance of the detention order. However, when the decision to detain was taken, English documents were required to be translated for the purpose of serving the same on the detenu. After taking into consideration the reply given by respondent No. 2 in the additional affidavit in reply, it is clear that the word `Urdu has inadvertently crept in the earlier affidavit. In the said affidavit, the reference was only to the documents in English. In view of this, there is no substance in the amended Ground No. (xiv) taken by the petitioner in his writ petition. In the said affidavit, the reference was only to the documents in English. In view of this, there is no substance in the amended Ground No. (xiv) taken by the petitioner in his writ petition. Apart from the aforesaid position, Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, contended that the gist of the statements of the statements of the detenu (Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel), Poonamchand and Rameshbhai Danji (both in Gujarati), Fakhruddin (in Urdu) and Mahadev Shigwan (in Marathi) was also supplied along with the order of detention, which clearly shows that these documents were already translated into English at the time of issuance of the order of detention. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument of the petitioner that at the time of issuance of the order of detention, statements of the aforesaid persons were not translated but were translated subsequently after the issuance of the said order. In view of this factual position, ratio of the case reported in 1986 Cr.L.J. 1610 and of the unreported judgment delivered on 6th February, 1986 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1107 of 1985 by Jahagirdar and Tated, JJ., is not relevant. 11. The petitioner further contended in Ground No. (vii) that in para 12 of the grounds of detention, the Detaining Authority has, inter alia, drawn the following conclusions:- "Even though the adjudication and prosecution proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, are likely to be initiated against you and even though you are at present in judicial custody, yet in the light of the fact that the accused are being released by the Honble Lower Courts and High Courts of various States on bail, it is most likely that the accused in this case, i.e. you may also be released on bail in near future and on getting enlarged on bail, you may again engage in future in the aforesaid prejudicial activities in the aforesaid or similar manner." (Underlines, supplied for emphasis)." The petitioner, therefore, submits that though the Detaining Authority has shown his awareness that the detenu was in judicial custody, yet the Detaining Authority has failed to have brought to bear on his mind and failed to have considered and failed to have recorded his satisfaction to the effect as to whether any reliable material was placed before him and whether in fact there is any basis for such conclusions. According to the petitioner, there must be reliable material so as to come to a reasonable belief that (a) there was a real possibility of the detenu being released bail and (b) on his being released on bail, in all probability, the detenu will indulge in the alleged prejudicial activities and whether the Detaining Authority felt that it was essential to detain the detenu to prevent him from doing so on account of compelling reasons. The petitioner contended that instead of addressing himself on the aforesaid counts, the Detaining Authority weilded his extraordinary power of preventive detention and proceeded to clamp down preventive detention on the detenu merely on the basis of an inference drawn by him to the effect that it was most likely that the detenu may be released on bail in near future and that on getting released on bail, the detenu "may" again engage in future in the aforesaid prejudicial activities in the aforesaid manner or similar manner. From this it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is merely sham and unreal and on this ground also the order of detention is liable to be set aside. To support the aforesaid contention, Mr. Karmali relied upon the ratio of the case in (Kamarunnisa v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1991 Supreme Court 1640, more particularly para 13 at page 1647, unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Cri) No. 604 of 1992 (Rivadeneyta Richardo Agustin v. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and others)5 and (Veermani v. State of Tamil Nadu)6, Judgments Today 1994(1) Supreme Court 350). In reply to the aforesaid contention, in the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2, at page 65, para 7, it is contended on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that there was material available before the Detaining Authority that there was likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. According to the respondents, the detenu was in judicial custody and might have been under the normal law of the land, released on bail by the Honble lower courts or higher courts. According to the respondents, further there was material to show the likelihood of the detenu indulging in prejudicial activities. According to respondent Nos. According to the respondents, the detenu was in judicial custody and might have been under the normal law of the land, released on bail by the Honble lower courts or higher courts. According to the respondents, further there was material to show the likelihood of the detenu indulging in prejudicial activities. According to respondent Nos. 1 and 2, seizure of highly incriminating documents read with the confessional statements and corroborative statements of the detenu and others gives compelling reasons which necessitated issuance of the order of detention under the COFEPOSA Act against the detenu. On this point, both the sides relied on the ratio of Kamarunnisas case (supra). Learned Counsel Mr. Karmali relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in para 13 to the effect that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody, secondly, if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and that on being released on bail he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and, thirdly, if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding the opposition to question it before a higher Court. The Supreme Court further held that it was well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in this case the Detaining Authority showed the awareness of the fact that the detenu was already in custody but there is no material before him that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and if released on bail, he would probably indulge in prejudicial activities and further that the authority felt that it is essential to detain the detenu to prevent him from doing so. On the other hand, Mr. On the other hand, Mr. Agrawal contended that the order of detention was passed after taking into consideration all the aforesaid essentials. Mr. Agrawal, to support his contention, more particularly relied on para 12 of the grounds of detention wherein it is stated that after going through the documents and the statements recorded, the Detaining Authority has no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the detenu was engaging in receiving and making payments unauthorisedly under instructions from a person resident outside India in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Further in the said para, it is also stated that even though the adjudication and prosecution proceedings under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 are likely to be initiated against the detenu and even though at the time of issuance of the order of detention the detenu was in judicial custody, yet in the light of the fact accused are being released by the Honble lower courts and High Courts on bail, it is most likely that the accused in this case may be released in the near future. Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, further contended that in these type of matters, after the investigation was over, there was all likelihood under the normal law of the land, of the detenu being released on bail and, therefore, this aspect, according to Mr. Agrawal, was also taken into consideration properly by the Detaining Authority. Further, according to Mr,. Agrawal, from the statements of the detenu and other companion statements recorded during the investigation and huge number of documents seized at the time of the raid, it is clear that from 1988 to 1994 when the raid was carried out, the detenu appears to have been engaged in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. In view of these number of transactions carried out from 1988, it was reasonable for the Detaining Authority to come to the conclusion that the detenu, if released, in all probability, would indulge in the same illegal activities prejudicial to the State in the same manner and, therefore, in view of the above, he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the detenu under the COFEPOSA Act for preventing him from indulging in these activities prejudicial to the augmentation of the countrys foreign exchange resources. After taking into consideration the reasonings given in para 12 of the grounds of detention by the Detaining Authority and after taking into consideration various entries as explained by the detenu himself, according to our opinion, there was sufficient material on record to show that even if the detenu was in judicial custody at the time of issuance of the detention order, there was a likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and in the event of his being on bail, in all probability, the detenu would have continued in the same prejudicial activities and in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the order of detention was passed. In view of this, according to our opinion, there is no substance in the argument as advanced by Mr. Karmali that in view of the ratio of Kamarunnisas case (supra), the continued order of detention has become bad in law. 12. Mr. Karmali thereafter strongly argued on the point of delay in considering the detenus representation by the appropriate authority, the ground which the petitioner has taken as Ground No. (viii). It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that against the order of detention, on 21st February, 1994 through jail, a representation was made by the detenu. The said representation was rejected on 22nd March, 1994 and was communicated in jail to the detenu on 24th March, 1994. According to the petitioner, there is a delay of about 11 days, i.e. from 4th March, 1994 to 15th March, 1994, and as per the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court in (Mahesh Kumar Chauhan v. Union of India)7, A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 1455, para 8 at page 1457 and para 17 at page 1458, (Vijay Kumar v. State of J. K.)8, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 1023, para 11 at page 1027 and (Abdur Sukkur v. State of W. B.)9, A.I.R. 1972 Supreme Court 1915, para 5 at page 1916, this undue and unexplained delay has vitiated the continued order of detention. Before going through the aforesaid case law for applying the same in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is desirable to go through the reply given by respondent No. 2 which is at page 67 of the paper book and the affidavit filed by R.T. Dhamne, Jailor Group II, Bombay Central Prison, which is at page 76 of the paper book. It is contended on behalf of respondent No. 2 that on 21st February, 1994, the detenu submitted representation through jail authorities addressed to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi and to the Chairman, Central Advisory Board, New Delhi. The representation was received by the COFEPOSA Unit of the Ministry on 4th March, 1994 through post. Parawise comments on the same were called for on the same day from the office of the Sponsoring Authority and the same were received on 15th March, 1994. On 16th March, 1994, the file was put up by the concerned Under Secretary to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) who considered the said representation of the detenu and further submitted the file on 17th March, 1994 to the secretary (Revenue). The secretary (Revenue) considered the representation on 17th March, 1994 and submitted it to the Minister of State (R E) who considered the representation on 18th March, 1994 and the same was submitted to the Finance Minister. The Finance Minister considered the representation and rejected the same on 18th March, 1994. Thereafter the file came back through proper channel to the COFEPOSA Unit on 22nd March, 1994. A Memorandum was issued to the petitioner accordingly on the same day, i.e. 22nd March, 1994. Thus taking the aforesaid facts into consideration, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no delay as contended by the present petitioner. We have gone through para 8 of the affidavit (at page 67) minutely. After taking into consideration the fact that in between there were 4 holidays and about 8 days were lost in postal communication, we are of the opinion that there was no delay in the decision taken by the appropriate authority on the representation preferred by the detenu and also that there is no delay in communicating the said decision to the detenu. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Karmali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, further contended that the appropriate authority failed to take into consideration certain vital documents in favour of the detenu as those documents were not sent to the Detaining Authority. In the petition in Ground No. (x) it is contended that after the raid was carried out in the detenus office on 5th and 6th January, 1994, on or about 7th January, 1994, Ms. Gurjar Steel had addressed a letter to the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Bombay, whereby the said firm claimed Rs. 1,50,000 seized from the office of the detenus firm as belonging to them along with the documents in support of their claim. The said letter is annexed as Annexure `D to the petition. To the aforesaid letter, on 19th January, 1994, the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, gave reply which is annexed as Annexure `E to the petition. According to the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the Sponsoring Authority to have placed the aforesaid two documents before the Detaining Authority and it was equally incumbent upon the Detaining Authority to have not only considered the said documents as the said documents were of vital nature and were likely to influence the mind of the Detaining Authority one way or the other but also to have furnished copies of the said documents to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. The petitioner, therefore, contended that non-placing of the aforesaid documents before the Detaining Authority and, consequently, non-consideration of the same by the Detaining Authority, have impaired severely the decision arrived at by the Detaining Authority and, therefore, the impugned order passed is in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. To support his case, Mr. Karmali has relied upon the cases of (State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini)10, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 208 and (Ayya Alias Ayub v. State of U.P.)11, A.I.R. 1989 Supreme Court 364 and argued that failure on the part of the Detaining Authority to take the aforesaid documents amounts to total non-application of mind. To the aforesaid averment, respondent No. 2, in his affidavit at page 68, contended that in fact at the time of the raid, Officers of Enforcement Directorate seized unaccounted amount of Rs. 2,15,000/-. To the aforesaid averment, respondent No. 2, in his affidavit at page 68, contended that in fact at the time of the raid, Officers of Enforcement Directorate seized unaccounted amount of Rs. 2,15,000/-. Further, when the detenu was asked to make a statement about the said amount found with him, he categorically stated that the same was received by him as per the instructions from Abu Dhabi for making further payments to persons. The letter dated 7th January, 1994 addressed by Gurjar Steel was referring to the accountable amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- which was not the subject-matter of the seizure and, therefore, it was not necessary to send the aforesaid documents to the Detaining Authority. According to our opinion, taking into consideration the fact that what was recovered at the time of raid was unaccounted amount of Rs. 2,15,000/- which, as per the statement recorded of the detenu, was meant to be distributed as per the instructions received from Abu Dhabi and, therefore, the letters dated 7th January, 1994 and 19th January, 1994 were not relevant from the point of view of consideration by the Detaining Authority. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, according to our opinion, there is no substance in the writ petition filed on behalf of the detenu and, therefore, the same is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Petition dismissed. *****