ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. This is a petition filed by a vendee who purchased a piece of land measuring 3.187 Hectares through registered sale-deed duly registered on 22-6-1974. 2. Soon after this purchase the State Legislature enacted Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (for short the Adhiniyam, 1976). The respondents 1 to 4 resorted to the provisions of this Act. They filed an application for setting aside the sale-deed executed by them in favour of the petitioner. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Guna after hearing the parties dismissed the application on 22-10-1982. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 sought a review of the order dated 22-10-1982. This review petition was opposed. The Sub-Divisional Officer, however, reviewed his own fearlier order dated 22-10-1982. It came to a conclusion that the sale-deed dated 22-6-1974 was void. 3. Against the above order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector, Guna. The appeal was dismissed. He directed issuance of a warrant for delivery of possession in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 4. 4. In the present petition, the petitioner prays that the orders passed by the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 be quashed. 5. I have gone through the record. The appellate authority dealt with the question of review only. Nothing has been said on the merits of the controversy. A short reference made to the sale does not fulfil the test of quasi judicial order which is supposed to disclose process of reasoning. 6. This requirement was laid down in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606 , in following terms :- "The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Article 136.* It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word "rejected" or, "dismissed". In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal. Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of the others, as it must and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government, this Court, in appeal may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a "speaking order" is called for." Similar view was expressed in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 . It was observed : "It is said that this principle is not uniformly followed by appellate Courts, for appeals and revisions are dismissed by appellate and revisional Courts in limine without giving any reasons. There is an essential distinction between a Court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by consideration of policy or expediency; but, an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand-point of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by consideration of policy or expediency; but, an executive officer generally looks at things from the stand-point of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appellate Courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the appellate or revisional Court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate Court or there' are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and does not give any reasons. That apart, when we insist upon reasons, we do not prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons. The extent and the nature of the reasons depend upon each case. Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional tribunal shall give its own reasons succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be agreeing with those reasons. What is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal. The nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the present case, neither the State Government's nor the Central Government's order discloses the reasons for rejecting the application of the appellant. In the circumstances, the Central Government's order is vitiated, as it does not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision application of the appellant." See also State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh, AIR 1972 SC 2083 and Siemens Engg. and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 . 7. As the order passed by the appellate authority does not fulfil the above test, the order Annexure P/3 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the Collector to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 . 7. As the order passed by the appellate authority does not fulfil the above test, the order Annexure P/3 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the Collector to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The question whether the review was competent or not if raised before him, shall also be dealt with by the Collector, Guna. 8. The petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid directions.