JUDGMENT - CHAPALGAONKER N.P., J.:---This Second Appeal raises a short question about the competence of respondent Municipal Council, Sangamner, to levy octroi on the goods described as 'Kaccha Bidi' brought by the appellant in the municipal area. Admitted facts show that appellant is a company registered under the Companies Act and is bringing 'Kaccha Bidi' after they are manufactured out of the municipal limits of Sangamner into Sangamner Municipal Area, then roast it with some special procedure and pack it so that they can be sold for human consumption. Since Municipal Council was levying octroi on these goods, appellant filed a Civil Suit bearing number 367/1975 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangamner, for a perpetual injunction restraining Municipal Council, Sangamner from levying octroi on 'Kaccha Bidi' which the plaintiff was bringing in the municipal area. Municipal Council resisted the suit. The learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit by his judgment and decree dated 30th October 1980 firstly on the ground that the suit is not maintainable in the absence of any notice under section 304 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965 on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to prove that 'Kaccha Bidi' are not liable for octroi. An appeal was filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff in the District Court at Ahmednagar and the learned Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, was pleased to dismiss the appeal holding that the goods in question are liable for the levy of octroi tax. It is this decree which has been challenged in this Second Appeal. 2. Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff/appellant, submitted that word 'Octroi' has been defined in section 2(28) of the Maharashtra Municipal Council Act, 1965 to mean a tax on the entry of goods into a municipal area for consumption use or sale therein. According to Shri Dixit, the word 'use' has the same meaning which the 'consumption' has and admittedly these 'Kaccha Bidi' are not consumed within the municipal area of Sangamner Municipal Council. They are just processed and sent outside the municipal limits. Therefore, Municipal Council has no authority to levy any tax on these goods. No part of the disputed 'Kaccha Bidi' is utilized for human consumption or otherwise and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said goods are used in the municipal limits. They are just processed and sent outside the municipal limits. Therefore, Municipal Council has no authority to levy any tax on these goods. No part of the disputed 'Kaccha Bidi' is utilized for human consumption or otherwise and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said goods are used in the municipal limits. According to him, if the goods are processed and sent outside the municipal limits, they are only in transit and they cannot be subjected to the octroi by the Municipal Council from which they are passing through. Shri S.P. Deshmukh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant/respondent Municipal Council, defended the decree and submitted that word 'use' employed in the definition clause has been used in the wider sense and covers all kinds of use and the meaning is not necessarily confined to the use or consumption by which the goods are destroyed or used up. 3. Second List from Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India at Entry No. 52 authorizes the State Governments to provide legislations for levying taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. In exercise of these powers, Maharashtra, Municipal Councils Act, 1965 by section 105 authorizes the Municipal Councils in the State to impose taxes including an octroi and the definition of 'Octroi' as we find in Clause (28) of section 2 means a tax on the entry of goods into a municipal area for consumption, use or sale therein. Firstly we will have to take note of the fact that the legislature has besides the term 'Consumption' has also employed the term 'use' in the definition of 'Octroi'. We cannot presume that the legislature has redundantly repeated the word of the same meaning. A Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat in the case of (Jafarabad Municipality v. Kathiawar Industries Limited)1, A.I.R. 1969 Gujarat 344 was pleased to hold : "It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that the use contemplated in the word 'use' is other than consumption, for consumption would also be user in the natural meaning of the word 'use'. It is obvious having regard to the context that the use that is made chargeable is not the same as consumption. It is obvious having regard to the context that the use that is made chargeable is not the same as consumption. If use was no other than consumption the legislature would be exercising itself needlessly." A learned Single Judge of this Court considered the scope of the word 'use' in the case of (Washim Municipal Council, Washim v. Chaganlal)2, A.I.R. 1983 Bombay 437. The question before the learned Judge was when a person brings a truck in the municipal area and uses it for the business and gives it for hire within the municipal area for transport of goods even outside the municipal area, can it be said that the truck was being used within the meaning of section 2(28) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965. The learned Judge while interpreting Entry No. 52. List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution was pleased to observe in para 15-A of his judgment : "The simultaneous use of the word 'use' along with 'consumption' in the Entry, therefore, clearly indicates such use of articles or such application thereof as is different and distinct from 'consumption'." The learned Judge was pleased to hold that respondent therein was liable to pay octroi duty of the truck which he imported in the municipal area. 4. In the case of (M/s. Anwarkhan Mahboob Company v. The State of Bombay (now Maharashtra and others)3, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 213, Supreme Court was pleased to consider the question whether the processing of raw tobacco into bidi pattis by removing stem and dust can be termed to be 'consumption'. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe : "In the absence of any words to limit the connotation of the word "consumption" to the final act of consumption, it will be proper to think that the Constitution makers used the word to connote any kind of user which is ordinarily spoken of as consumption of the particular commodity." They were further pleased to observe : "This conversion of a commodity into a different commercial commodity by subjecting it to some processing, is consumption within the meaning of the Explanation to Article 286 no less than the final act of user when no distinct commodity is being brought into existence but what was brought into existence is being used up". Therefore, Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the word 'consumption' is not limited to the popular sense of getting it destroyed by the enjoyment of the commodity by any human being or any other creature. But it also covers the process by which the nature of the commodity changes and in that process the commodity in question can be said to have been used for creating another commodity. 5. Therefore, it follows that the respondent Municipal Council was justified in levying octroi on 'Kaccha Bidi' which was used in the manufacturing process and for preparing a finished product for the human consumption. Since I am holding that the Municipal Council was justified in charging the tax, injunction sought for by the plaintiff was rightly refused by the courts below. 6. In the result, Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed. -----