JUDGMENT (ORAL) Vaidya, J. - On 25th October, 1993, the Sessions Judge, South Goa, Margao, held the appellant guilty of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and under his order dated 25.10.1993 he convicted him of that offence and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, in default, to suffer further R.I. for 6 months. 2. Having felt aggrieved by this decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal contending that his conviction as well as the quantum of sentence awarded to him were not warranted by law and that the learned Sessions Judge had failed to appreciate the evidence in a manner that was according to law. It is contended further that though the evidence of the panchas and the Police Officers examined at the trial was discrepant and not worthy of safe reliance for several reasons, the same was relied upon by the learned sessions Judge. It was also contended that the learned Sessions Judge had ignored the fact that the muddemal articles were not properly identified before the Court nor was it conclusively established before the Court that whatever was allegedly seized from the appellant was indeed Brown Sugar, as was contended by the prosecution. The argument advanced before us substantially related to the non-identification of the muddemal property before the Court, though several contradictions in the evidence were sought to be relied upon as material contradictions on account of which the evidence deserved to be disbelieved. It is prayed on behalf of the appellant that this appeal be allowed and the conviction and the sentence awarded to the appellant be set aside. 3. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the case in question was proved by independent witnesses and the credibility of the said witnesses was never impugned effectively despite prolonged cross-examination. He submitted that the evidence of the two Police Officers, namely, P.W. No. 1 Head Constable Kerkar and P.W. No. 5 Police Sub-Inspector Gaonkar was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence of the panchas and that, therefore, the guilt was rightly brought home to the appellant. He submitted that the evidence of the two Police Officers, namely, P.W. No. 1 Head Constable Kerkar and P.W. No. 5 Police Sub-Inspector Gaonkar was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence of the panchas and that, therefore, the guilt was rightly brought home to the appellant. It was submitted that when the conviction for the offence was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge, he had no option but to award to the appellant the minimum prescribed sentence of 10 years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. 4. With the assistance of the learned Counsel arguing the matter before us, we have very carefully gone through the entire evidence on record. We think that the point regarding the non-identification of the muddemal property which was made out on behalf of the appellant really goes to the root of the case because we are convinced that the evidence on the point of identification adduced by the prosecution was not at all satisfactory. 5. Before adverting to that issue, we may point out, at the outset, the manner in which the trial proceeded against the present appellant. P.W. No. 1, Head Constable Kerkar, was examined on 23rd August, 1991 and his cross-examination was reserved on that day for reason which is not recorded on the deposition. His cross-examination was resumed on 3rd September, 1991 and was concluded on that day. The Roznama shows a note that the cross-examination was reserved because the Court time was over on 23rd August, 1991. Thus, there was no ground whatsoever to adjourn the case for further cross-examination to 3rd September, because, nothing is made clear as to why the deposition of the witness could not be recorded on day-to-day basis till it was completed. The second witness, namely, the Junior Scientific Officer in the Directorate of Food and Drugs Laboratory, Smt. Maria Caldeira, was examined in part on 16.9.1991 and was thereafter recalled on 18th August, 1993 for identification of muddemal. Her cross-examination was concluded on 18.8.1993. The third witness, panchas Hegde, was examined on 4.10.1991, but his examination-in-chief was left incomplete on that day and he was re-called for further examination-in-chief on 28th November, 1991. The Roznama shows that the case was adjourned to 28.10.1991 because the Court time was over on 4.10.1991. Again, no reason is recorded as to why the witness could not be examined immediately on 5.10.1991 for conclusion of his evidence. The Roznama shows that the case was adjourned to 28.10.1991 because the Court time was over on 4.10.1991. Again, no reason is recorded as to why the witness could not be examined immediately on 5.10.1991 for conclusion of his evidence. The Roznama shows that on 28.10.1991 the witness had remained absent and he had therefore to be brought before the Court by issuing a warrant against him. The witness was thereafter examined on 28.11.1991 but again, his cross-examination was reserved upto 17th December, 1991. The deposition does not record any reason for such a long adjournment for cross-examination. The Roznama shows that the reason recorded was that the Court was busy in recording evidence in some other custody matter on 28.11.1991. The cross-examination of this witness was concluded on 17.12.1991 but again, the witness was re-called on 18th August, 1993 on which date further examination-in-cheif and further cross-examination were recorded. Witness No. 4, second pancha, was examined on 3.2.1991 and his cross-examination also was concluded on the same date. The Roznama records a reason that this witness could not be examined on 17.12.1991 because he was not present on that day. Summons for this witness was applied for thereafter on 3rd January, 1992 and thereafter the evidence of this witness was recorded on 3.2.1992. Again, this witness was re-called for further examination-in-chief and cross-examination on 18th August, 1993. 6. It may be noted here that the prosecution had submitted (vide Exh. 9) on 4.4.1990 a list of 3 witnesses viz. one panch P.W. 3 Hegde and two police officers (P.W. 1 H.c. Kerkar and P.W. 5 P.S.I. Gaonkar). Another list was submitted (Vide Exh. 10) on 10.6.191 which included P.C. Kumarpant who was ultimately never examined in Court. Exhibit 12 is the third list dated 9.9.1991 under which P.W. 2 Caldeira was sought to be summoned. Exhibit 21 dated 26.12.1991 is the next list which included P.C. Dalvi, who was never examined at the trial. Exhibit 23 dated 28.9.1992 and Exhibit 24 dated 23.10.1992 are lists for summoning first informant and P.S.I. Gaonkar, respectively. The record does not contain any list seeking summons to second panch P.W. 4 Ghode. Thus there was no effort to call all witnesses at one time and complete the case with day-to-day hearing. 7. Exhibit 23 dated 28.9.1992 and Exhibit 24 dated 23.10.1992 are lists for summoning first informant and P.S.I. Gaonkar, respectively. The record does not contain any list seeking summons to second panch P.W. 4 Ghode. Thus there was no effort to call all witnesses at one time and complete the case with day-to-day hearing. 7. It is surprising to note that though these material witnesses were examined, as stated above on various dates, at the trial, the package in which the muddemal was produced before the Court at the commencement of trial (vide list Exh. 2) was not opened at all on the dates on which those witnesses were examined. The evidence on the 5th witness, P.S.I. Gaonkar, recorded on 17.7.1993 shows that it was in the course of his examination-in -chief that the package containing the muddemal was opened for identification of the muddemal property before the Court. Apparently enough, no reason is recorded as to why this package containing muddemal articles was not opened when the material alleged eye witnesses were examined by the Court much earlier. The muddemal was never shown to P.W. 1 H.C. Kerkar for identification and the remaining witnesses were recalled after 17.7.1993 on various dates for the identification. 8. Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a mandatory provision that in every injury or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the case beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. The emphasis of this Section cannot be overlooked and must not be overlooked by any Judicial Officer who tries a criminal case, much less by the higher Officers, like the Sessions Judges presiding over the Sessions Court, where serious offence are being tried day in and day out which, in the event of conviction, result sometimes in sentences which uproot the convicted person totally and grossly form the set up of his life. 9. 9. The mandatory provisions of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure assume much more importance now in the light of the recognition of the right of the accused for speedy trial as a part of fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In Hussainara Khatoon Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna1, the Supreme Court observed that speedy trial is of the essence of criminal Justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. "It is interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights." Again, in the same ruling the Supreme Court proceeded to observe if a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21." (Emphasis supplied) True it is that the Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations in the light of the fact that the persons with whom they were dealing in the case in question were detained in jail for long. However, the observations have wider implication as well when trials of the accused persons tend to be prolonged trials on account of repeated adjournments and, that too, at intervals of larger period, so as to afford an opportunity to the prosecution to fill up lacunae left by witnesses examined earlier. 10. The need to try sessions cases on day -today basis has been emphasized by this very Bench in several rulings. 10. The need to try sessions cases on day -today basis has been emphasized by this very Bench in several rulings. In Criminal Appeal No. 11/B/1982 decided as far back as 1st March, 1984, in which the accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 426 and 379 I.P.C. all read with Section 34 I.P.C. the Division Bemch of this Court depreciated in unequivocal terms the piecemeal trial. It was observed "It appears that there is a very unhealthy practice prevailing in lower Courts to grant adjournments just for asking ignoring the imperative need to conduct the trials from day-to-day. The Courts in particular see nothing wrong in granting such adjournments. This is an inexcusable lapse on their part. It is hoped that such lapses will not recur in future and the Courts will conduct trials from day-to-day." Again, in Shri Raghunath Gaonkar v. State2, a Single Judge of this Bench had pointed out, "The procedure of trial by Sessions has been introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code with a particular purpose. When serious offences are tried by the Sessions Judge, he must hold the Sessions from day-to-day and if the case is to be adjourned beyond the next following day, Section 309 of Cr. P.C. 1973 gives power to the learned Sessions Judge to adjourn the case for reasons to be recorded by him in writing. The legislature has thus expressed its desire that the sessions case should go on day by day and should not be adjourned as far as possible…..When a Sessions case is opened, it is always necessary that it is finished, before the learned Sessions Judge takes another matter, unless the circumstances are so compelling and exceptional in nature and he cannot finish up the case and he has to turn to another matter." In this case, adjournment of a sessions case to one and a half month was strongly depreciated by this Bench. 11. Looking to the facts of the present case noted above, we feel that the problem of day-to-day trial has got to be approached from yet another point of view. The law enjoins upon every witness a duty to obey witness summons and to appear before the Court as required, may be for giving oral evidence or may be for production of documents. The law enjoins upon every witness a duty to obey witness summons and to appear before the Court as required, may be for giving oral evidence or may be for production of documents. Both the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure incorporate therein this legal duty of the witness. It is needless to point out that though this is a legal duty according to the aforesaid Codes of Procedure, the foundation of that duty lies in social obligation of a gentleman to disclose before the Court the facts pertaining to a case which are within his knowledge or to produce a document or a thing which is in his custody. The procedures prescribed by law provide for ways and means for securing the obedience to the witness summonses issued by them. Compulsive proceedings such as, issuance of warrants, etc. also could be resorted to under the law for securing the compliance of a summons to a witness. Apart from the witnesses cited by the rival parties in a proceeding, Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers a Court to summon material witnesses or to examine persons present in the Court at any stage of an enquiry, trial or other proceedings. Refusal to take the summons or refusal to answer relevant questions put to a witness is also made penal. When the Court are so manned with the powers to enforce the legal duty thrust on the witnesses to attend the Court, it is necessary on the part of the Courts themselves to ensure that by requiring a witness to attend the Court again and again in pursuance of a summons or summonses, no harassment is caused to the witnesses. The extent of the social obligation, which since stands converted into a legal obligation, has certain implicit limitations on it and the Courts have to consider, one day or the other, whether or not, the action of the Court in requiring the witness to attend the Court again and again for one case and, that too, at intervals which ranged over a period of two to three years, as in the present case, is really well warranted. Human memory is very short and as the time passes one is prone to forget the facts which were observed at one point of time and more so; the niceties of the events. Human memory is very short and as the time passes one is prone to forget the facts which were observed at one point of time and more so; the niceties of the events. Memorising the facts, with all the details that are expected of the witnesses in a trial at the Court of law, after a long duration is, by itself a problem almost for each and every witness. The gravity of that problem aggravates when he is required to give evidence in the Court not only after a long duration but on several dates in a trial which is conducted in a piecemeal manner. True it is that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not lay down how many times a witness should be asked to attend the Court for giving evidence in one particular case and how long should be the duration for which the obligation of the witness to give evidence in that case would continue to subsist. The point is very well left by the Code to the discretion of the Courts and it is needless to emphasize that such a discretion must be exercised by the Courts for purposes of avoiding the harassment to the witnesses. It is needless to point out that repeated attendances in Courts imposed on a witness as a part of legal duty do result in waste of time and loss of his own earnings. Indeed, it is waste of working hours and consequently of national wealth, Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia Anr. v. State of Bombay3, the Supreme Court described the period of five years of pendency of a case in a Court as "a very telling illustration of waste of public time and private funds". What is said by the Supreme Court in the context of parties to a litigation can be said with much more force about the time spent by the witnesses, again and again, under compulsion, in attending repeatedly the Court to give evidence in a proceeding. It must also be borne in mind that parties to a litigation may have some pecuniary or other type of interest in a case, but the witness attends the Court only to discharge social obligation of a gentlemen. 12. It must also be borne in mind that parties to a litigation may have some pecuniary or other type of interest in a case, but the witness attends the Court only to discharge social obligation of a gentlemen. 12. We were told that there were various reasons due to which the Sessions Courts, as also the subordinate Courts, in the territory of Goa State, were not able to take up the matters for day-to-day trials. Formerly, there was "a monthly board system" for posting the cases. Later on, it was modified by "weekly board system" and particular days of a week were allotted for a particular category of work. We were told that there were only two Sessions Judges in the State of Goa till recently when some Additional Judges were posted to assist them. The Sessions Judges had, we are told, multifarious jurisdiction such as the Motor Accident Tribunal cases, TADA cases, corruption cases, regular civil work, regular criminal work, NDPS cases, the work of appellate Motor Vehicle Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act, land acquisition matters, besides the pressure of the administrative work with which the Sessions Judge is loaded. We were told that it was, therefore, impossible for the Sessions Judges to take up matters on day-to-day basis. If there is any such defect in the system, that system must be rectified because as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatton's case (supra), a system which cannot ensure a speedy trial can hardly be said to be 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure. Practically there is no Court in the State of Maharashtra as well, were the pressure of work is not far beyond the control of the Presiding Judge but that does not enable a Judge to give a go-by to the mandatory direction given in Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code or other similar provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure to have tried a case once opened on day-today basis. The Courts are meant necessarily for administration of justice and if that object is likely to be defeated by adopting a system or a procedure, the ways and means must be mended so as to ensure that the justice is ensured to the parties. 13. The Courts are meant necessarily for administration of justice and if that object is likely to be defeated by adopting a system or a procedure, the ways and means must be mended so as to ensure that the justice is ensured to the parties. 13. True it is that, in the present case, the learned Counsel for the appellant did not take in his appeal memo specifically a contention that the appellant was prejudiced because of such piecemeal trial. The prejudice to the accused on that count was inted at in the arguments. Again, it is apparent from the evidence recorded itself that whatever was not told on certain material points, when P.W. 1 H.C. Kerkar and P.W. 2 Hegde (pancha No. 1) were examined was brought on record through the second pancha and P.S.I. Gaonkar, who were examined much after the closure of the evidence of the first panch witness. The unwarranted and unjustified long adjournments of the case, time and again, after recording of the evidence of every material witness on the point of seizure, could not exclude the possibility of tutoring of every sub-sequently examined witness, in the light of the depositions of the witnesses examined earlier. It is really very unfortunate that a Judicial Officer of the level of a Sessions Judge should have missed a mandatory direction contained in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that was meant for ensuring a fair procedure at a trial and should have adopted a procedure which resulted in failure or miscarriage of justice. 14. We have expressed in sufficiently strong words our resentment about the practice of adopting a procedure of such piecemeal trial and, that too, particularly in a sessions case. There is no point in issuing a general direction to the Sessions Judges to conform with the provisions contained in Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code because we believe that the Sessions Judges are well aware of that provision. We only hope that they do not continue hereafter with their practice, for whatever reasons it may be of resorting to piecemeal trials which can possibly lead to miscarriage of justice. We only hope that they do not continue hereafter with their practice, for whatever reasons it may be of resorting to piecemeal trials which can possibly lead to miscarriage of justice. The defects in the- present systems as were point out to us and to which we have referred above could be of two categories those which were within the control of the High Court and those which needed remedy at the hands of the State Government. The defects which can be remedied by the High Court can certainly be brought, in an appropriate manner, to the notice of the High Court for remedying them. The defects which can be cured only by the State .Government will have to be brought to the notice of the State Government for redressal and should the State Government fail in discharging its duty in that behalf, efforts will have to be made to have those defects redressed through a judicial process to compel the State to redress those wrongs. We hope that the State Government, if the defects are pointed out to them, would take appropriate measures to redress the wrongs perpetrated on account of large pendency of cases, protraction of trials and delayed justice and the circumstances, if any, which make impossible for the Courts the completion hearings of cases with day-to-day hearings. 15. With these observations we may now turn to the appreciation of the evidence recorded in this case. On the background of the discussion made above, we may first point out how, in the present case, the witnesses coming on sub-sequent dates for examination-in-chief or for cross-examination, as the case may be, have modified the versions over the versions given by the earlier witness so as to cause a gross prejudice to the defence of the accused. The first witness Head Constable Kerkar had told in his very examination-in-chief that formerly, he was attached to the Anti Narcotic Cell functioning at Panaji but at the relevant point of time he was posted at Margao Town Police Station. He told that, previously, he was informed that the appellant in the present case was dealing with Narcotics and on the date of the offence or thereabout, he had received an information that the appellant/accused had gone to Calangute to claim supplies of Narcotics. He told that, previously, he was informed that the appellant in the present case was dealing with Narcotics and on the date of the offence or thereabout, he had received an information that the appellant/accused had gone to Calangute to claim supplies of Narcotics. His version on the point tends to make one believe that the appellant accused was a confirmed dealer in Narcotics and that a specific information about his activities on the date of the offence had been received. He did not tell in his examination-in-chief that he had kept his superior officer, namely P.W. 1. Gaonkar, informed of his information so as to enable P.S.J. Gaonkar to take appropriate steps as required by Section 41 or 42 of the N.D.P.S. Act for tracing the Narcotic Drugs. On 23.8.1991, in the cross-examination at the fag end, he admitted that though he had received the information on the date of offence at about 3.00 p.m. he had not made an entry in any book at the Police Station about the information so received and he had not informed any of his superiors that he had received such an information. When the cross-examination was resumed on 3rd September, 1991, he came out with a modified version that the appellant/accused was being kept under surveillance for one week before the present incident on account of the information which the police had received about his dealings in Narcotics and the Police were keeping him under a discreet watch, following him in the town of Margao. On this background, the witness proceeded to tell that he was keeping a watch for the accused near a hotel called Gaylin Hotel and when the accused was seen there, he was stopped and accosted. He went on to add that when accosted, the accused admitted that he possessed Narcotics. In the cross-examination the omission came on record on the point that there was no mention in the Police Statement of the fact that the accused had admitted the possession of Brown Sugar. The witness did not tell in his examination-in-chief that he had ever reported to P.S.I. Gaonkar that the accused had admitted the possession of Brown Sugar. But such a theory came on record later on. 16. P.W. 3 was panch Hedge who was examined on 4.10.1991 after a considerable lapse of time. The witness did not tell in his examination-in-chief that he had ever reported to P.S.I. Gaonkar that the accused had admitted the possession of Brown Sugar. But such a theory came on record later on. 16. P.W. 3 was panch Hedge who was examined on 4.10.1991 after a considerable lapse of time. According to this witness also, P.S.J. Gaonkar, who had called the panchas, had not told the panchas that they had found a person who was admitting the possession of the drugs but what he had told was that there was a man suspected for carrying the drugs. The second pancha, P.W. 4 Ghode, whose examination-in-chief commenced on 3.2.1992, did not tell even what P.W. 3, panch Hedge, had told because, according to him, P.S.I. had told him that the Police had caught a man and the panchas were requested to accompany the Police Officers to see the man and to see whatever would happen at the spot. P.W. 5 P.S.I. Gaonkar, started his deposition with the averment that Head Constable Kerkar had told him at the Police Station that he had intercepted the present appellant/accused near Gaylin Hotel and that he had admitted the possession of drugs. It is thus seen how the story has been modified on this important aspect. Apart from the question whether or not, such an alleged admission could be proved by the prosecution at the trial, and. whether or not, the Sessions Judge should have admitted in evidence the so-called alleged admission of the accused before Head Constable Kerkar, the fact relevant at this moment is only that on account of the lapse of time between the recording of the depositions, the P.S.I. got an opportunity to modify the version to suit the prosecution case. 17. The second point on which the prosecution witnesses have modified their versions on different dates is pertaining to the offer of personal searches by the members of the raiding party to the accused. P.W. 1 Head Constable Kerkar, told that when the P.S.I. had arrived with the panchas and the policeman at the scene of offence near Gaylin Hotel, the P.S.I. had told the accused that he was going to search the person of the accused for drugs and that the accused was entitled to search the persons of all of the members of the raiding party. P.W. 3, panch Hedge, told that when he reached the spot alongwith P.S.J., he had seen two men holding a third man by both of the arms but he did not tell that the P.S.I., or for that purpose, any other policeman, had ever asked the accused to take personal searches of the members of the raiding party. The panchanama Exhibit 18 was never read over of the trial over to the pancha Hedge the panchanama stated that the members of the raiding party had offered the accused the personal searches of the member of the party. When pancha Ghode came before the Court on adjourned date, he came with a modified version that the Police Officer had asked the accused to search the bodies of the members of the raiding party, if the accused had entertained any doubt, and had further added that the accused had then declined to take personal searches of the members of the raiding party. The thrust of the version of P.W. 5, P.S.I. Gaonkar, who came to the witness box at a later date, was still different. According to him, on reaching the scene of offence, he had informed the accused, in the presence of the panch witnesses, that the police wanted to take his personal search for the possession of drugs and the Police had offered themselves for their search by the accused but he had declined to do so. In the same breath, he told that as the accused had admitted the possession of the drugs, he (P.S.I.) had conducted his personal search in the presence of the panch as. Now, if there was an accused who had admitted the possession of the drugs as told either by Head Constable Kerkar or by, P.S.I. Gaonkar, the question that arises is, why the Muddemal was not recovered from the accused on his production in the presence of panchas and why there had to be a formal search of the accused for the purposes of detection of the Muddemal. It appears that both the police witnesses wanted to have the benefit of the so-called alleged admission of the accused as well as search allegedly taken by them in the presence of panchas. 17. The third point on which the prosecution story has been improved from witness to witness is about the sealing of the Muddemal articles. It appears that both the police witnesses wanted to have the benefit of the so-called alleged admission of the accused as well as search allegedly taken by them in the presence of panchas. 17. The third point on which the prosecution story has been improved from witness to witness is about the sealing of the Muddemal articles. Admittedly, nothing was sealed on the scene of offence itself. According to both Head Constable Kerkar and P.S.I. Gaonkar, the accused was brought to the Police Station along with the Muddemal. There is a minor discrepancy in that also as to who had carried the Muddemal from the scene of offence to the Police Station and placed it on the table. But, even if one is inclined to ignore it as a minor contradiction, the major contradiction is about sealing of the articles. According to Head Constable Kerkar, after the detection of two packets of Brown Sugar on the person of the accused, both were carried to the Police Station and there a sample from the bigger one was collected in another packet. He told that the envelope in which the sample was kept was sealed but he did not tell that any wax seal was posted op it. On the other hand, he told that the signatures of the panchas were collected on it, meaning thereby, as far as we can understand, that a label signed by panchas was used for sealing the envelope. Then he told that the remaining quantity out of the bigger packet and the other smaller packet containing Brown Sugar were put in another envelope and the same was sealed. He told further that the empty cigarette packet in which the bigger packet was found was put in the third envelope, though he did not remember whether that envelope was put in another envelope or whether it was put in the same second envelope. When the pancha narrated all this in his examination-in-chief the Muddemal property, though it was before the Court, was not shown to him for identification, so no clarification could be obtained from the witness on that point. As already pointed out, the Muddemal was before the Court right from the beginning of the trial as is evidenced from Exhibit 2, namely, the list of Muddemal articles with which the Muddemal was produced. As already pointed out, the Muddemal was before the Court right from the beginning of the trial as is evidenced from Exhibit 2, namely, the list of Muddemal articles with which the Muddemal was produced. Therefore, there is no room to say that a Muddemal was not shown to the witness on that day because the same was not before the Court. 18. Ghode was examined before the Court but there is no material to show that the panchanama was read over to him white he was in the witness box. The Muddemal was also not shown to him in the examination-in-cheif for the purposes of identification. About the sealing, he told in his deposition that sample was taken out of the bigger packet containing Brown Sugar and the same was put in a separate packet. He did not tell initially how many packets in all were made on the seizure of the articles at the Police Station. But thereafter he was shown three sealed envelopes and then he told in general terms that all those three envelopes were seized on the same occasion in his presence. The packets had to be shown to him because, as per his version, he had put in all two signatures only on the packets containing the Muddemal. When the three envelopes were shown to him he identified his signatures on all the three. His deposition did not contain a version that wax seals were posted on any of the packets in which the Muddemal was seized in the presence of the panchas at the Police Station. When panch a Hedge was cross-examined in the year 1993, he was shown Muddemal article No. 2 for identification and he told that the same was found in an empty cigarette packet. He identified his signature on M.O. 2 but did not specify whether the same was of the sample or the same was some other packet. He was then shown M.O. 3 and then, he told that that was the packet in which one gram of Brown Sugar which was collected by was of a sample, was packed. Then he was shown M.O. 5 which contained an empty polythene bag. That bag bore his signature at point No. 1. But he did not tell what was collected in that empty polythene bag. Then he was shown M.O. 5 which contained an empty polythene bag. That bag bore his signature at point No. 1. But he did not tell what was collected in that empty polythene bag. When he was shown M.O. 4 he told that that contained only an empty cigarette packet. 19. When the second pancha was examined in 1993, he was shown M.O. 4 which, according to him, was Four Square empty cigarette packet. Then he was shown M.O. 2 which contained a polythene bag containing some powder which was alleged by the Police to be Brown Sugar. But, he did not tell whether the same was collected by way of a sample or whether the same was some other packet. When he was shown M.O. 3 which contained a packet which had powder in it, he told that it was found in the jerkin which the accused was wearing. But, again, he did not identify the same with reference to the seal made at the time of attachment. According to the version in the cross-examination of this witness there were in all five envelopes that were sealed. When further cross-examined, he admitted that he was unable to say whether the seals put up by the Police in his presence were the same seals appearing on the Muddemal articles Nos. 2, 3 and 5 and that all that he could do was identification of his own signatures thereon. If we refer, in this context, to the list of Muddemal articles Exhibit 2, we find that the fifth articles was a sealed envelope received from the Drugs Controller vide report dated 31.3.1991. The said envelope could not, therefore, bear the signature of the panchas unless the envelop bearing the signatures of the panchas was retained intact in that envelope. 20. P.S.I. Gaonkar was the last witness to be examined, but in his entire deposition he did not tell whether or not, any wax seal was affixed by him on any of the Muddemal articles in the presence of the panchas to ensure that the articles would not be tampered with. 20. P.S.I. Gaonkar was the last witness to be examined, but in his entire deposition he did not tell whether or not, any wax seal was affixed by him on any of the Muddemal articles in the presence of the panchas to ensure that the articles would not be tampered with. True it is that P.W. 2, witness Caldeira, and the report prepared by her refer to the seal that appeared on the Muddemal article which was referred to them but her entire evidence does not show whether she referred to any wax seal or the label under the signatures of panchas with which the panchas claimed to have sealed the Muddemal article. In her cross-examination only she told that she had identified the articles with reference to the wax seal. The letter under which the Muddemal was forwarded to her was Exhibit P.W. 2/B and it bore two wax seals, one of the P.S.I. and another of the Circle Police Inspector. It is, therefore, not possible to make out with reference to which of those seals, witness Caldeira could identify the Muddemal. Thus, on the whole, a great confusion appears in the evidence on record as regards the identification of the Muddemal with reference to either the labels bearing the signatures of the panchas which were made at the Police Station or the wax seals which appeared to have been made sometime in the course of the investigation. The learned Counsel for the defence submitted that though the raid was made on 11.1.1989, nobody has deposited as to the place where the Muddemai in question was deposited thereafter. Not a single witness had stated anything about the deposit of the Muddemal articles at a particular safe place. The sample appears to have been sent to the Chemical Analyser on 25.1.1989. Mr. Singh submitted that the possibility of tampering with the Muddemal, in the absence of fixation of wax seals in the presence of the panchas, could not be ruled out in this case. True it is that P.W. 2 had found that the sample sent to her for analysis was found, on analysis, to be a drug. There is not much infirmity on that point but the question is about the identity of the sample and the powder allegedly seized from the accused on the scene of offence or at the Police Station. 21. There is not much infirmity on that point but the question is about the identity of the sample and the powder allegedly seized from the accused on the scene of offence or at the Police Station. 21. By and large the prosecution story as a whole looks doubtful to us, particularly because of the manner in which the raid was organized. In the first place, if at all there was a specific information to the police for quite sometime before the incident that the accused was a peddlar in drugs, the raid could have been organized on him, under Section 41 or 42 of the N.D.P.S. Act. But instead of doing that, the benefit of a surprise raid is being taken by utilizing the provisions contained in Section 43 of the N.D.P.S. Act. The theory made out by Head Constable Kerkar and P.S.J. Gaonkar about the admission of the accused regarding Muddemal property also has got to be looked upon with a pinch of salt. True it is that the panchas in this case appear to be persons occupied in different occupations, but the discrepancies which have arisen in their evidence, may be on account of lapse of time or may be on account of piecemeal recording of their evidence or may be due to any other reason, have rendered their evidence a weakness on account of which we are obliged to say that the evidence is not very convincing to prove the guilt to the accused. 22. Mr. Singh wanted to urge the noncompliance of the mandatory provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act, as an additional ground in favour of the appellant. But in view of the fact that on facts, we do not find the evidence very dependable, we do not think it necessary to advert to all those points which he indicated and wanted to press in service. 23. In view of all these conclusions, we think that the appeal must be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and the sentence awarded to the appellant are set aside. He be set at liberty if not required in any other case, forthwith. The fine, if any, paid by him shall be refunded to him. 24. 23. In view of all these conclusions, we think that the appeal must be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and the sentence awarded to the appellant are set aside. He be set at liberty if not required in any other case, forthwith. The fine, if any, paid by him shall be refunded to him. 24. Before parting with this case, we must mention that we are not aware of the steps, if any taken by the Judiciary in this stage or by the Registry in the High Court towards remedying the problems of which we were made aware in the course of hearing this appeal and on account of which, it had become difficult for the Judicial Officers in the subordinate Courts in Goa State to abide by the mandatory provisions of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We, therefore, recommend to the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Administrative Judges that the Additional Registrar (Inspection) in the Registry of the High Court at Bombay may be asked to investigate into the matter with a view to (a) determining the workload in each of the subordinate Courts with reference to the unit systems which is being adopted in the High Court at Bombay for measuring the workload of each subordinate Court, (b) determining with reference to such workload, the strength of Judicial Officers required at each judicial station in District and Sessions Court, as also in other subordinate Courts, (c) determining the staffing pattern for subordinate Courts in the State of Goa on the basis of the principles contained in the report of the Committee specially appointed by the Government and the High Court to make recommendations on the staffing pattern to be adopted in the State of Maharashtra for the subordinate Courts and (d) suggesting such other measures as might be necessary in the direction of improvement of the conditions of the working of the Judiciary in the State. We also recommend to them that on receiving such a report from the Additional Registrar (Inspection), steps to be taken in pursuance thereof or otherwise, as may be deemed necessary, for improvement of the conditions in subordinate Judiciary in the State of Goa may be considered for implementation. 25. We also recommend to them that on receiving such a report from the Additional Registrar (Inspection), steps to be taken in pursuance thereof or otherwise, as may be deemed necessary, for improvement of the conditions in subordinate Judiciary in the State of Goa may be considered for implementation. 25. We direct the Special Officer of the Goa Bench to refer the matter to the Registry at Bombay for the aforesaid, purposes along with a copy of this Judgment. JUDGMENT (ORAL) Dr. E.S. Da Silva, J. 26. I am in agreement with the finding of acquittal recorded by my learned brother in favour of the accused/appellant. I have nothing else to add to the sound principles emphasized by my learned brother on the exact position of law with regard to the necessity of ensuring to the accused an expeditious criminal trial. I am, however, unable to share some of the observations made in his judgment with regard to non-compliance by the Sessions Judge of the provisions of Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code in this case arid, however, would like to add a few observations in order to set the record straight. I fully appreciate the anxiety and the concern voiced by my learned brother to the effect that all the accused in criminal cases should be given a fair and an expeditious trial. I am also aware that Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is meant to achieve exactly that goal to the extent that it provides that a criminal trial once started should proceed on a day-to-day basis as far as possible. However, with due regard I am of the opinion that the record' shows that the concerned Sessions Judge has, in the special set of circumstances occurring at the relevant time, substantially complied with the said provision both in letter and in spirit either in respect of a reasonable opportunity to be given to the prosecution to make his witnesses available as well as regarding adjourned dates fixed for continuation of the trial. 27. Indeed this Court is bound to take Judicial notice of the fact that in the State of Go a there was only one Sessions Judge in the year 1989 in charge of the entire South Goa District who was cumulatively holding the post of the District Judge which admittedly carriers with it a very heavy burden of administrative work. 27. Indeed this Court is bound to take Judicial notice of the fact that in the State of Go a there was only one Sessions Judge in the year 1989 in charge of the entire South Goa District who was cumulatively holding the post of the District Judge which admittedly carriers with it a very heavy burden of administrative work. Besides this Court is also expected not to overlook that a large number of additional functions had to be handled by this Judicial Officer, he being also a TAD A Judge, a Member of various Boards such as COFEPOSA, NSA, NDPS and at the same time Presiding Officer of several Tribunals like the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which by itself could be said to be on its own a full-time job and also the State Appellate Motor Vehicles Tribunal. 28. This being the position it follows that a Sessions Judge of South Goa at Margao, in the year 1989, had to attend not only the work of criminal trials but also the workload of other type of matters as well, a substantial part whereof, including bail applications, temporary injunctions, etc. being also urgent in nature, could not be neglected and, on the contrary, had to be diligently looked into by the Judicial Officer. Thus, in the fairness of things, it is impossible for me to find any fault on a Sessions Judge grossly under staffed and under such pressure of work being unable to hold a criminal trial on a day-to-day basis. Hence the question of his having failed to take a proper care of the prosecution's inability to produce its witnesses in time as well as the fact of his having virtually given up his control over the conduct of the case and leaving it to the mercy of the prosecution to have it conducted in a piecemeal way does not seem to arise at all. I am therefore not in a position to support the view taken by my learned brother that the unwarranted and unjustified long adjournment of case after the recording of evidence of the first witness and before the examination of the accord second panch witness could not exclude the possibility of the second pancha being tutored in the light of the deposition of the first panch witness that was already recorded. Apart from the fact that, in my Judgment, there is actually no such unwarranted and unjustified long adjournment of the case between the evidence of the two panchas, the fact remain that this possibility could occur even if the gap between the depositions of the two panchas had been a short one inasmuch as the law nowhere enjoins that both panchas should be examined by the trial Court on the same day. Further no specific plea was raised by the appellant in this regard and at no time it was even contended on his behalf that the appellant was unduly prejudiced in any manner whatsoever on 'account of such piecemeal trial. 29. Besides the system of a monthly Board which was followed by all the subordinate Courts in this State consequent upon a Judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this very Court to which my learned brother made a mention as a result whereof dates of final hearing and other matters were being given in anticipation in relation to different types of cases to be allotted on particular days of the week both in respect of civil and criminal cases was discontinued by an administrative order of the High Court in view of the strong objections arid representations addressed by the advocates to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice due to their alleged inability to attend cases in one Court for several continuous dates, thus practically rendering it impossible for any Judicial Officer to conduct any criminal trial or for that matter any other proceedings on day-to-day basis. 30. The above observations are solely meant to avoid future misunderstandings about the position existing presently in Goa by sparing all the Judicial Officers of this State from further embarrassment before the High Court With regard to ex facio violation of the letter of the law. Needless to say that the same are not intended to suggest or encourage the Judicial Officers not to strictly adhere to the spirit of Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I again reiterate that to the extent that it is factually possible in the given circumstances, Section 309 should be sought to be complied with by all the criminal Courts both in letter and spirit. Appeal allowed. 1. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360. 2. Cri. Misc. Application Nos. 190/1992 191/1992; Both Decided on 25.9. 1992. 3. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 97.