K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) RULE. Mr. K. V. Shelat the learned A. P. P. appears and waives service of rule. Heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties. 1. 1 Petitioner-Mohmad Jahangir Pathan, who came to be tried by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1989 for the alleged offence punishable under Sec. 20 (b) (ii) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, was at the end of trial by judgment and order dated 29-12-1992 was convicted and sentenced to undergo R. I. for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1 lac, and in default, to undergo further R. I. for six months. By this Misc. Criminal Application, petitioner has moved this Court inter alia praying for condoning the delay of 324 days in filing the appeal before this Court. ( 2 ) MISS Kachhavah, the learned Advocate holding free-brief for the poor petitioner submitted that petitioner, at present, is an old man aged about 67 years. Not only that but after he came to be lodged in Jail, he has become totally handicapped as a result of paralysis attack. He is neither able to stand nor walk nor make any movement of his own unless physically lifted. According to Miss Kachhavah because of extreme poverty, handicapped condition and lack of knowledge about the period of limitation, the petitioner has not been able to file the present appeal in time, which has resulted into delay of 324 days. She under the circumstances submitted that mercy be shown to the petitioner and in the interest of justice delay in filing appeal be condoned and matter be decided on merits according to law. ( 3 ) ON perusing the trial Court record, it appears that at the relevant time, when the petitioner made application Exh. 5 dated 8-12-1992 to the learned trial Judge, praying for giving him free legal aid to defend his case, he was an old man aged 65 years. This application was granted by the learned Judge vide his order dated 9-12-1992 by appointing Mr. R. I. Patel, the learned Advocate. Further, on seeing the petitioner personally, he is found to be handicapped, unable to make any movement of his own. These three circumstances on face of it are eloquent enough to show that the petitioner is a poor, old and handicapped person. R. I. Patel, the learned Advocate. Further, on seeing the petitioner personally, he is found to be handicapped, unable to make any movement of his own. These three circumstances on face of it are eloquent enough to show that the petitioner is a poor, old and handicapped person. ( 4 ) NOW, no doubt the delay of 324 days is indeed quite a long delay which ordinarily cannot be countenanced lightly. However, at the same time, taking into consideration the circumstances pin-pointed in foregoing para No. 3, it is quite apparent that the same constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay in question. In our view the delay of 324 days can be attributed more to the circumstances entirely beyond the control of old, poor and handicapped petitioner than anything else. In fact, to be positive and specific, the delay in question could have been possibly avoided, had indeed little extra care was taken, firstly, on the part of the learned trial Judge and thereafter, on the part of learned Advocate who was appointed to defend the petitioner. In such type of cases, both the learned trial Judge as well as learned Advocate appointed to defend the poor accused are under social and moral obligation to see that they are not mechanically defended and that too only upto the trial stage but even thereafter during the time gap in between the order of conviction and sentence and thereafter till at the appellate stage, once again the free legal aid is given to them during the said interagum period the convict-accused are not left in learch, keeping them guessing and gropping in darkness regarding their future course of action to get justice from the appellate Court. Accordingly, we feel that while passing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence against the accused, in the first place, it should be the duty of the learned trial Judge to see that [i] he gets a certified copy of the impugned judgment within the shortest possible time, and [ii] for this, he should direct the staff and also occassionally inspect the register maintained for the purpose, with a view to see that the certified copy is supplied to the convict/accused at the earliest and to find out if the same is not supplied within reasonable time, to call for explanation and to take appropriate action against the person responsible, if need be. And in the second instance, it should be the duty of the learned trial Judge to see that [i] the accused is informed about his right to get free copy of impugned judgment and order of his conviction and sentence, [ii] that he has a right to file an appeal, [iii] that such an appeal lies in the appellate Court, viz. , high Court at Ahmedabad, [iv] that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the said appeal is 60 days, [v] that over and above 60 days, he can as well get further period of extension to file such an appeal, if the certified copy of the same is not ready and takes time for delivery, [vi] that at the appellate Court also free legal aid is available and that the address regarding the same be given. All these things should be informed in writing in the language understood by the convict, in the Court-room immediately after the order of conviction and sentence is recorded and read over to him. These are some of the foremost important duties and the social obligation which are desirable to be performed by every activist socialist Judge believing in true sense and spirit of imparting substantial justice. Similarly, the learned Advocate who is appointed to defend the poor accused should also bear in mind his duty to assist the cause of justice, viz. , that his role to defend the poor accused does not come to an end on the completion of the trial on the Court convicting and sentencing the accused. Similarly, the learned Advocate who is appointed to defend the poor accused should also bear in mind his duty to assist the cause of justice, viz. , that his role to defend the poor accused does not come to an end on the completion of the trial on the Court convicting and sentencing the accused. If the accused is acquitted, of course there is nothing further which is required to be done at his end, but in cases wherein the accused is convicted and sentenced, over and over the duty of the learned Judge pointed out hereinabove, it is also his duty - [i] to first of all see that the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is obtained and delivered to the accused in Jail; [ii] thereafter, on the basis of the same, once again remind the convict-prisoner of the period of limitation available for filing of the appeal and exactly before what date it should be filed before the appellate Court; [iii] he should also inform the convictprisoner that just like in Sessions Case, even in the appellate Court, free legal aid is available, and to give the address, and last but not the least, [iv] to give his opinion with reasons (if any) against the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence on the basis of which the same can be challenged before the appellate Court and [v] to hand over the said reasons as well as the trial Court case papers to the prisoner in Jail. If this much care is taken, both - at the end of learned Judge and the learned advocate appointed to defend the poor accused, then in that case, such cases of delay, as the one in the present case, can certainly be minimised, if not wholly avoided 1 Free legal Aid is not a matter of charity, it is an unquestionable privilege of poor citizens of this country. It is neither a ritual nor an idle formality, not a false satisfaction to be just flashed across the lips to be reflected on the paper, without honest, efficient, genuine follow-up action. This right of getting free legal aid of the poor citizen is in fact simultaneous and corresponding social and moral obligation - both of the learned trial Judge and the learned Advocate appointed to defend disable poor citizen in the best possible manner. This right of getting free legal aid of the poor citizen is in fact simultaneous and corresponding social and moral obligation - both of the learned trial Judge and the learned Advocate appointed to defend disable poor citizen in the best possible manner. Accordingly, the same has got to be carried out to its due logical extent by seeing that the needy citizen is provided legal aid in its true and strictest possible sense and accordingly looked after and supported to get justice right from the trial stage till the matter is carried to the appellate Court. Neither his ignorance of law nor the poverty nor his helpless handicapped position, nor the slipshod legal aid can ever be permitted to come in the way of poor accused in getting real and substantial justice, which we believe is his privilege under the Constitution. I) may incidentally be observed that in cases where the learned Advocate is appointed to defend the poor accused, the learned judge should see to it that before the actual trial begins, the said learned advocate has an opportunity to have an interview and to have conference with the accused in Jail so as to enable him to understand his case and collect necessary instructions from him to prepare defence and put necessary questions in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and/or examine the defence-witness before the Court. In fact, unless the appointed Advocate has a face-to-face discussion with the accused in Jail, it is indeed difficult to believe he would be in a position to defend the accused to the required satisfaction. ( 5 ) NOW turning to the facts of the present case, with a view to see that merely on the technical/procedural ground of delay of 324 days in filing the appeal, the petitioner is not denied his substantial right to justice, we have incidentally scanned through the prosecution evidence as produced and appreciated by the learned Judge in his judgment and on the basis of the same, prima facie, it appears that the petitioner has more than an arguable case to succeed, and what ought we know (of course, it is too, premature to say) that the petitioner may ultimately succeed. And if indeed our prima facie apprehensions turn out to be true and the accused deserves to be acquitted, then in that case, not to condone delay would indeed result into serious miscarriage of justice merely because we became slightly technical oriented in not condoning the delay by overlooking the merits of the case of substantial justice. Under the circumstances, justice cannot be permitted to be a matter of technicality and the person claiming the same was as if approaching the Court begging for the same. Every procedure is ultimately to help and not to hinder the cause of justice and in that view of the matter, we feel that to reject this application for condonation of delay merely on the technical ground that there is a delay of 324 days, it would not only be denial of justice but denial of justice at our hands, which can never be thought of. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, since the overall sufficient ground is made out, the delay deserves to be condoned and is condoned accordingly. ( 6 ) WE hope and trust that whatever observations we have made as regard the duty of the Court and learned Advocate appointed to defend the poor accused, would be paid proper heed, and needful would be done appreciating the spirit and object underlying the said observations. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we feel that this is one of those case which requires early final hearing and accordingly, Office is directed to list the same on Board in the next week. ( 7 ) IN the result, this application is allowed. Delay condoned. Rule made absolute. .