Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner who is the tenant of the premises bearing No. 243, Jawarlal Nehru Street, Tindivanam has challenged the order dated 14-6-1978 made in M.C.O.P. No. 7 of 1977 and as also the order dated 5-12-1984 in E.P. No. 186 of 1984 on the file of the Rent Controller, Tindivanam, first respondent herein. Second respondent is the landlord. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that in the petition for eviction filed by the landlord, the second respondent, a compromise decree was made on 14-6-1988 in R.C.O.P. No. 7 of 1977. In the decree that was made on a momo of compromise by the parties, it was stated inter alia that in as per the reasons set forth in the memo of compromise, eviction can be ordered. There is no dispute about the fact that in the petition for eviction filed, reasons for eviction was set out, the reason being bona fide requirement of the premises for the running of the business by the second respondents son. Four years time was given to vacate the premises and for handing over vacant possession. The tenant having not vacated the premises, the landlord had filed an execution petition and delivery was ordered by the executing court on 5-12-1984. It must be noted here that the tenant had not raised in the execution proceedings, the objection now put forth that the decree is a nullity. The Executing Court had no occasion to consider the plea, now raised by the petitioner. 3. It is common ground that the landlord, before the compromise memo was filed had given oral evidence. He has stated in his deposition that the shop was required bona fide for the use of his son to run his business and the landlord is not in possession of any other shop suitable for this purpose. There is no cross examination by the tenant in this regard, before the trial Court passed the decree for eviction, in the memo of compromise, the tenant has accepted that the decree of eviction could be made for the reasons set forth in the petition. This admission in the memo of compromise is also capable of being considered as his acceptance of the reasons put forth by the landlord in seeking eviction and the bona fide nature of the claim and the ground for eviction. 4. This admission in the memo of compromise is also capable of being considered as his acceptance of the reasons put forth by the landlord in seeking eviction and the bona fide nature of the claim and the ground for eviction. 4. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that not withstanding the compromise memo, the decree passed is a nullity as the Court, according to the learned counsel, has failed to apply its mind and the decree could not be made on the mere consent. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in Srimathi Kaushalya Devi and others. v. K.L. Bansal ( 1969(1) S.C.C. 59 ) and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Manmal and another ( 1970(3) S.C.C. 181 ), wherein the Court considered the provisions of the Ajmir Act and held that mere consent cannot form the basis for attributing satisfaction to the Court of the grounds for eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. 5. Learned Counsel for the second respondent invited my attention to the subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1311), Nagindas v. Dalpatram (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471), Jai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22) and to the ruling of this Court in Babiammal and others v. The Rent Controller (1991 T.L.N.J. 160). 6. In the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to by learned counsel for the second respondent in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22 (cited supra) it is stated that mere consent alone will not confer any jurisdiction on the Court to pass a valid decree or eviction. It is further held in the aforesaid decision that, when a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution, the executing court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law and if the pleadings and other materials on the record make put a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction. A compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid solely because it is a compromise, and if there are other materials, the executing court will have to give effect to it. 7. A compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid solely because it is a compromise, and if there are other materials, the executing court will have to give effect to it. 7. I have already referred to the fact that the landlord in his petition had pleaded the need for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for his sons use. He has further given evidence on oath in support of his plea. His evidence has not been challenged. The tenant has not offered any evidence to rebut the evidence given by the landlord. On the other hand, the tenant has accepted the fact that the reasons set forth by the landlord in his petition are accepted by him and in view of the same, he has agreed to vacate the premises within four years time. 8. I am therefore of the view that there were sufficient materials to pass the decree for eviction and that therefore, the Court was not disentitled from passing the decree for eviction. The decree made by the court is not a nullity and it is executable. 9. The execution application filed by the landlord is therefore, maintainable and the executing court has not committed any error in directing delivery of possession. It should also be noted here that the objections based on the alleged nullity was not raised before the executing Court. If the tenant, had any serious objection to the execution of the decree, he should have put forth the same before the executing court. However, it is not necessary to examine this aspect further as I have held that the decree made by the Court is not a nullity. 10. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed. On the petitioner filing an undertaking within two weeks from this date, he will be granted six months time to vacate the premises and hand over peaceful possession of the same. No costs.