JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an Award of the Industrial Court, dated September 30, 1985, made in Reference (IC) No. 18 of 1983, a reference u/s 73-A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The petitioner is a registered Trade Union recognised as the representative Union in the Co-operative Banking Industry within the local areas of Shirol and Hatkangale in Kolhapur District, and Miraj Taluka of District Sangli. The petitioner pertained raised an industrial dispute on behalf of the employees by a Charter of Demands dated November 1, 1981. The industrial dispute raised by the petitioner, inter alia, to Pay Scales, Special Allowances, Dearness Allowance, House rent Allowance, Other Allowances, Medical Aid and Expenses, Transfer, Seniority List, Promotions and Retrospective Effect. The industrial dispute was processed under the conciliation machinery under the Act and resulted in Reference (IC) No. 18 of 1983 being made to the Industrial Court for its arbitration u/s 73-A of the Act. The parties appeared before the Industrial Court and led evidence on their respective cases. After considering the material placed on record, the Industrial Court made an Award dated September 30, 1985. Though the Award pertains to 10 demands, the petitioner challenges only some of the directions in the Award which shall be referred to in the course of the judgment. 3. Before considering the challenges to the directions made in the Award, it is necessary to notice that after the Charter of Demands was sent, the First Respondent-Bank had voluntarily agreed to grant an ad-hoc rise of Rs. 100 to each of the employees as an interim measure pending the processing of the demands. Subsequently, after the reference was made to the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, the petitioner made an application for interim relief before the Industrial Court. In the said application the petitioner demanded that, in addition to the amount of Rs. 100 already voluntarily paid by the First Respondent-Bank, the First Respondent be directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 150 per month as an interim ad-hoc increase in the wages with effect from November 3, 1981. The said application was disposed of by a Part I Award dated June 26, 1984, on the basis of an agreement between the parties. 150 per month as an interim ad-hoc increase in the wages with effect from November 3, 1981. The said application was disposed of by a Part I Award dated June 26, 1984, on the basis of an agreement between the parties. By the Part I Award, it was directed as follows: "The second party Bank shall pay the employees Rs. 100 per month from November 1, 1981 as wages in addition to the amount of Rs. 100 per month already granted by the Bank to the Employees as Interim Relief. The amount so paid shall be taken into consideration while calculating the final burden. The amount shall be paid fo the employees within 3 weeks from the date of this order." 4. The first challenge to the Award is that, as against Rs. 250 rise which was demanded by the wage Scales and Dearness Allowance demands put forward by the petitioner with effect from November 1, 1981, the Award results only in an increase of Rs. 250 per employee per month from July 1, 1983. The contention of Ms. Sarnaik, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, is two- fold. Firstly, she contends that the First Respondent Bank is a 'B' Class Bank and, therefore, the Tribunal erred in not awarding Wage Scales and Dearness Allowance as applicable to 'B' Class Banks. Secondly, she contends that the material on record clearly shows that there was enough justification for granting retrospective effect to the Award from November 1, 1981 (ie., from the date of the demand), but the Tribunal erred in granting retrospective effect to the Award from July 1, 1983, the date of reference. As to the first point, Ms. Sarnaik fairly conceded that there is no material placed before the Court, below or here, on the basis of which it could be ascertained whether the First Respondent was a 'B' Class bank. In fact, I asked Ms. Sarnaik as to what were the criteria on the basis of which Banks are categorised into different classes, so that on the basis of the financial data of the Bank reproduced in paragraph 10 and 11 of the Award, an effort could be made to ascertain if the Bank did fall into 'B' Class as contended by her. In fact, when the matter reached for hearing on September 8, 1994, Ms. In fact, when the matter reached for hearing on September 8, 1994, Ms. Sarnaik expressed difficulty that since the Union is from Kolhapur and she was not in possession of the relevant information, she might need a few days time. I acceded to her request and posted the matter for hearing today. She tells me today that, despite intimation sent to the Union, no information has been received on this count. The net result is that there is no material on record, before the Tribunal below or before this court, form which it could be ascertained whether the First Respondent-Bank falls into 'B' Class of Banks. In the absence of relevant material, it is not possible to accept the contention, nor it is possible to fault the reasoning of the Tribunal on this score. 5. Turning to the second aspect of the argument, on the question of retrospective effect, Ms. Sarnaik contends that even before the reference was made to the Industrial Court, the Employer had voluntarily conceded an interim rise in wages to the extent of Rs. 100 per month per employee with effect from November 1, 1981 and further conceded before the Industrial Court an additional increase of Rs. 100 per month per employee on the condition that it will be taken into consideration while calculating the final burden. This concession, according to her, clearly bears out the case put forward by the Petitioner Union that the retrospective effect as to the Wage Scales and Dearness Allowances ought to be given from November 1, 1981. She also drew my attention to the direction of the Industrial Court in paragraph 52 of the Award dealing with the retrospective effect. In this Paragraph after having taken note of the fact that the First Respondent was paying the employees Rs. 200 per month as interim relief from November 1, 1981, the Industrial Court held, "the amounts so paid are to be taken into consideration while calculating the benefits to be paid to the employees. So while paying the amounts of benefits to the employees the Bank shall be entitled to take into consideration the amount already paid to the employees." The grievance of the Union, contends Ms. So while paying the amounts of benefits to the employees the Bank shall be entitled to take into consideration the amount already paid to the employees." The grievance of the Union, contends Ms. Sarnaik, is that, while for the purpose of retrospective effect the date taken into consideration is the date of the reference ie., July 1, 1983, the interim relief already granted by virtue of Part 1 Award, dated June 26, 1984, has been allowed to be set-off from the amounts payable under the Award. This puts the employees into double jeopardy and, in effect, reduces their wages payable during the period November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983. There appears to be substance in this contention which I shall deal with later. 6. The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the direction contained in the award with regard to the promotion is unjustified. The petitioner Union had demanded promotions to the higher position should be given strictly in accordance with seniority. The Industrial Court disagreed with this demand and directed that the promotions shall be on the basis of Seniority, Educational Qualifications and Merits. Ms. Sarnaik contends that the Educational Qualifications have been left undefined and, therefore, the award is vague and indefinite. The contention is misconceived. Instead of leaving the promotions to be granted only on the basis of the criterion of the Seniority, the Tribunal has added two other criteria, namely, Educational Qualification and Merit. The direction of the Industrial Court, in effect, is that the cumulative effect of the comparative merits of the candidate within the zone of consideration, based on these three criteria must be taken into consideration for the purpose of granting promotion. It, of course, goes without saying that, if under the rules there are any pre-requisite qualifications as to the length of service or otherwise, any employee who does not fulfil them cannot fall into the zone of consideration at all. In my view, the direction made by the Industrial court on this demand is proper and needs no interference. 7. The next point of attack on the Award is that the Industrial Court while, making its Award on the demand as to "Medical Aid and Expenses" has given a direction that, if the First Respondent should be entitled to deduct, that amount of compensation from the amount payable under the Award. Ms. 7. The next point of attack on the Award is that the Industrial Court while, making its Award on the demand as to "Medical Aid and Expenses" has given a direction that, if the First Respondent should be entitled to deduct, that amount of compensation from the amount payable under the Award. Ms. Sarnaik's contention is that the First Respondent is not covered under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore, this direction is unreasonable. This contention is also misconceived. The Industrial Court has made sure that, even if there is a legislative amendment resulting in application of Workmen's Compensation Act to the First Respondent, then the amount of statutory compensation shall be set-off from the reimbursement directed under its Award in Paragraph 38. I see nothing unreasonable in the direction requiring interference with it. 8. The next grievance ventilated by the petitioner is regarding the Award on Night Duty Allowance and sweeping Allowance. Though the Industrial Court has rejected these two demands on the ground that there was no justification made out, I asked Ms. Sarnaik whether this fact was correct and she fairly conceded that it was so and further that she was not able to give any justification about that demands even here. She faintly contended that, because the First Respondent was erroneously not classified as a 'B' Class bank, the Industrial Court went on to reject the two demands erroneously. I have already held that it is not possible to accept this contention of classification of the First Respondent as a 'B' Class Bank. The contention must, therefore, fail. No fault can be found with the Industrial Court on this count. September 30, 1994 9. Turning to the contention as a retrospective effect, it is the grievance of the Petitioner that the Tribunal erred in taking the view that the retrospective effect should be invariably granted from the date of reference and, therefore, the Tribunal granted retrospective operation only from July 1, 1983. The Petitioner contended that the demands were made on November 1, 1981 and the petitioner union was agitating that the revision in the conditions of service should be made operative from that date. During the course of this agitation, the First Respondent Bank agreed to give an interim relief of Rs. 100 per month. The Petitioner contended that the demands were made on November 1, 1981 and the petitioner union was agitating that the revision in the conditions of service should be made operative from that date. During the course of this agitation, the First Respondent Bank agreed to give an interim relief of Rs. 100 per month. Since the petitioner was not satisfied with it, an application was moved before the Tribunal for interim relief at the rate of Rs. 250 per month. This application came to be disposed of by Part I Award, dated June 26, 1984, which has already been reproduced. 10. Mr. Chopda, learned Advocate for the First Respondent, contends that since the petitioner is a party to the consent Award on the issue of interim relief, it is precluded from challenging the Award on retrospective effect made by the Tribunal. He invokes the provisions of Section 96(3) of the CPC and submits that just as an appeal against a consent decree is barred by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by principles analogous thereto or by doctrine of estoppel or res judicata or by principles analogous thereto, the Petitioner must be estopped from challenging the Award in so far as it directs retrospective effect from July 1, 1983. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Katikara Chintamani Dora and Others Vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu and Others, rendered in connection with the provisions of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my view, the contention is unsound and cannot be accepted. In the first place, Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, by itself, is not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. Even if the principles behind it are applicable, what is challenged in the present writ petition is not Part I Award, dated June 26, 1984, but the final Award, dated September 30, 1985, in so far as it makes July 1, 1983, as the date from which retrospective effect shall be given to the revised conditions of service. The judgment of the Supreme Court, in my view, has no application to the facts of the present petition. 11. Mr. The judgment of the Supreme Court, in my view, has no application to the facts of the present petition. 11. Mr. Chopda then contended that the Tribunal had discretion in giving retrospective effect to the directions in the Award and, once the discretion has been validly exercised, this Court should not interfere with such exercise of discretion. True, normally this Court is reluctant to interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion as long as the discretion is within the parameters of law and the bounds of jurisdiction. However, if the process of exercise of judicial discretion creates a situation resulting in manifest injustice, this court not only can, but ought to, exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to remedy the manifest injustice. I repeatedly asked Mr. Chopda if his client was willing to accept the retrospective effect from November 1, 1981, in which case the interim Award would take care of the situation between November 1, 1981 and June 30, 1983. Understandably, after taking instruction, he stated that it was not possible to accept the said suggestion. In other words, it is his contention that whatever was given by way of interim relief for the period from November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983, could be set off from the benefits flowing from the award subsist on and from July 1, 1983, even though for the aforesaid period no benefits under the Award would accrue to the employees of the First Respondent. In my judgment, this is not only anomalous, but also incongruous. It cannot be forgotten that the workmen were clamoring for revision of the conditions of service from November 1, 1981 and they were kept at bay, firstly, by voluntary offer of Rs. 100 per month and, thereafter, the application for interim relief was disposed of by agreeing to another Rs. 100 per month as interim relief. This would mean that from November 1, 1981 the parties were conscious that there was a need of revision of conditions of service, but that the parties were unable to agree upon the exact quantum thereof. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal fails to take this into consideration while giving retrospective effect to the revised conditions of service. If the Tribunal had granted retrospective effect from November 1, 1981, then there would have been no difficulty. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal fails to take this into consideration while giving retrospective effect to the revised conditions of service. If the Tribunal had granted retrospective effect from November 1, 1981, then there would have been no difficulty. Granting retrospective effect only from July 1, 1983 results in the workmen having to refund the amounts that they were paid for the period November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983 and leaves them high and dry without any relief for the said period. In my judgment this is manifest injustice to the workmen and cannot be countenanced. I am, however, not inclined to direct that the award be made operative from November 1, 1981, as it might conceivably throw a large burden on the First respondent about which there is not even a grossest estimate before me, nor was before the tribunal. The other alternative is to remedy the anomaly by modifying the Award to ensure that the amounts paid as interim relief during the period November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983, are not required to be refunded by the workmen. As a matter of fact, I am informed at the Bar that the total monetary burden of the revised conditions of service also comes approximately to Rs. 200 per month. In these circumstances, it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. 12. In the result, petition is partly allowed and the directions contained in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the impugned Award are modified to the extent that the workmen shall not be required to refund the amounts paid to them during the period November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983, as interim relief. 13. Mr. Chopda informs the Court that the amounts paid to the employees during the period November 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983, have already been deducted from the final amounts payable to the employees and that considering the large amounts that might have to be refunded by the First Respondent to the concerned employees, sufficiently long time be granted for compliance. Direction in this order to be complied with not later than February 1, 1995. 14. Rule accordingly made partly absolute with no order as to costs. 15. Certified copy expedited.