JUDGMENT - V.A. MOHTA, J.:-This is a reference by the learned Single Judge (Srikrishna, J.) to resolve the conflict of opinion as to interpretation of section 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Act). 2. In (Gajanand v. Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh)1, Bom. C.R. 259 (R.A. Jahagirdar, J.) and in (Dattatraya Pandi Kharote v. Pandurang Maruti Jadhav)2, 1991 Bom. R.C. 60 (Ashok Agarwal, J.) have held that the provision applies only to the premises taken on lease for residental use. In (Madhukar Vishnu Sathe v. Vithoba Ramji Thorat)3, A.I.R. 1992 Bombay 272 (V.V. Kamt, J.) has taken a view that the provision would apply also to premises taken for commercial use. 3. Factual matrix lies in a narrow compass and it is this : Lakshminarayan Deo Public Trust, Swaminaryan Mandir, Dhule (the landlord) had let out for commercial use the shop premises to deceased Bhavarlal Sukhlal Soni (tenant). The tenant secured another commercial premises in the town and on that basis a suit for recovery of possession of the premises under Clause 13(1)(1) was filed by the landlord. The trial Court dismissed the suit taking a view that section 13(1)(1) is not attracted in cases of tenancy for commercial puposes. The said order of dismissal was set aside in appeal on the basis of the case of Madhukar Vishnu Sathe (supra). Aggrieved thereby, this petition was filed by the legal heirs of the tenant. During the course of hearing, the learned Single Judge noticed the above conflict of opinions and hence referred the question to a larger Bench. The Hon'ble Chief Justice has been pleased to place the petition itself before us for final disposal. 4. We reproduce for ready reference the relevant portion of section 13(1)(I) : "13. When landlord may recover possession:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sections 15 and 15-A, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied- (a) to (k) ... ... (I) that the tenant after coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence." 5. The task of interpretation of the above provision uninfluenced by any judgment appears to be easy on applying the plain language formula. It is apparent that the clause applies only to the premises let out for residence. The task of interpretation of the above provision uninfluenced by any judgment appears to be easy on applying the plain language formula. It is apparent that the clause applies only to the premises let out for residence. The object being to make available to landlords all residential premises really not needed by the tenants due to building, acquiring or being allotted a "suitable residence". Though unhappily worded the above legislative intention is clearly discernible. It could not have been the legislative intention to evict the tenant of commercial premises because he secured other suitable residence. In a search of legislative intent, absurdities have always to be avoided. 6. Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is almost similar to section 13(1)(I) of the Act. In the case of (S. Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal and others)4, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1288, section 14(1)(h) has been interpreted on the lines indicated above. In the said decision, following observations in the case of (Dr. Gopal Dass Varma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj and another)5, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337, have received approval (page 340) : "If the premises from which ejectment is sought are used not only for residence but also for profession how could section 13(1)(h) come into operation? One of the purposes for which the tenancy is acquired is professional use, and that cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of premises which are suitable for residence alone, and it is the suitability for residence alone which is postulated by section 13(1)(h). Therefore, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to hold that tenancy which has been created or used both for residence and profession can be successfully terminated by merely showing that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence". 7. It is true that the above interpretation leaves the commercial leases completely out of the ambit of these provisions but it is a matter of legislative policy. Residential premises and non-residential premises have been made to stand on different pedestals in many Rent Control Legislations and there is nothing unusual about it. 8. Even in Madhukar Vishnu Sathe, (supra), the learned Single Judge has observed that in the first blush the impression can be carried that the provisions are meant only for premises let out for residential purposes. 8. Even in Madhukar Vishnu Sathe, (supra), the learned Single Judge has observed that in the first blush the impression can be carried that the provisions are meant only for premises let out for residential purposes. But the learned Single Judge has based his view on the interpretation given to the word "residence" in Clause 13(1)(c) of the Act by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Anirudhha Ramkrishna Karlekar v. Smt. Jankibai Raghunath Bodekar)6, 1990 Mh.L.J. 299, which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court ( 1991(1) S.C.C. 649 ). Clause 13(1)(c) reads thus : "that the tenant or any person residing with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes; or that the tenant has in respect of the premises been convicted of an offence of controvention of any provision of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 394 or of section 394-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act." The Division Bench has held that having regard to the language employed in the provision and its object, it could not have been the legislative intention to exclude the commercial leases from the clause pertaining to eviction on the ground of nuisance or annoyance or use for immoral or illegal purposes. Keeping that object in view the words "any person residing with the tenant" have been widely construed so as to include also a person carrying on business with the tenant. The later part of the provision pertaining to the contravention of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, though restricted to the City of Bombay, indicates that the clause as a whole was not meant only for residential purposes. Section 13(1)(I) and 13(1)(c) are not in pari materia and it is quite unsafe to interpret one with reference to decisions dealing with the other. Section 13(1) enumerates several independent grounds of eviction and each has a different purpose. Arguments by analogy in matters like this can be - as in the instant case - misleading. Section 13(1)(I) and 13(1)(c) are not in pari materia and it is quite unsafe to interpret one with reference to decisions dealing with the other. Section 13(1) enumerates several independent grounds of eviction and each has a different purpose. Arguments by analogy in matters like this can be - as in the instant case - misleading. It is true, as submitted by Shri Dalvi, learned Counsel for the respondents, that normally the same word appearing in different part of one statute should be given the same meaning, but all depends upon the context, legislative purpose being the predominent consideration. 9. Under the circumstances, in our view, Madhukar Sathe, (supra) does not lay down law correctly and Dattatraya Pandit and Gajanand (supra) have correctly laid down the law. Reference answered accordingly. 10. The whole petition has been transferred to us for final disposal. The inevitable consequence of the above answer to the reference is to allow the petition and to quash and set aside the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Dhule and to restore the order for possession passed by the 2nd Jt. Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Dhule. 11. The petition is allowed and rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.