JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the orders dated July 26, 1986 and August 3, 1987 passed by the Nazul Property Officer and the Treasury Officer, Tank, respectively which, according to the petitioner, amount to amending the Tonic State Khandan Rules, 1944 (for short, 'the Rules 1944'). 2. The petitioner is a society registered under the provisions of the Rajasthan Societies Act. It consists of members of the Khandan of His Highness, Nawab Amir-ud-Dowla, Ruler of the then State of Tonic. These members have been receiving Khandan Allowance under the 1944 Rules, which were framed for the first time, in the year, 1908, for grant of Cash Allowances and Jagirs to the members of the Khandan of Nawab Amir-ud-Dowla. In order to full fill the aims and objects, for which the rules were prepared, an amendment was brought in 1944 for properly maintaining the cizzat' and 'prestige' of the Ruling family. The amended Rules came into force on June, 1944. It has made a specific provisions as to who would be entitled for the grant of Khandan Allowances and at what rate. The provisions for succession and lapses of allowance have also been incorporated. 3. State of Tonic, as it then was, had integrated with "the first United State of Rajasthan" on May, 1, 1948. The Government of the aforesaid United State of Rajasthan sanctioned grant of the Khandan Allowance in favour of the descendants of Nawab Amir-ud-Dowla. 'The Second United State of Rajasthan' was then formed on April 7, 1949, with the merger of State of Tonk, but the 1944 Rules were allowed to continue. 4. After coming into force of the Constitution of India in 1950, the administration of Tonic was taken over by the Collector, but he had to act in accordance with the provisions of the Rules, 1944. 5. In the year, 1952, an order was passed by the Rajasthan Government, by which the Khandan Allowances as per Rules, 1944 were ordered to be discontinued. This order was challenged in the High Court by one Abdul Karim Khan in Writ Petition No. 251/51, which was finally allowed and the order of the State Government was set aside. 6. 5. In the year, 1952, an order was passed by the Rajasthan Government, by which the Khandan Allowances as per Rules, 1944 were ordered to be discontinued. This order was challenged in the High Court by one Abdul Karim Khan in Writ Petition No. 251/51, which was finally allowed and the order of the State Government was set aside. 6. The question whether the Rules of 1944 constitute a LAW or they were merely executive or administrative instructions issued by the Ruler of the State of Tonic, as he then was, came for consideration before a Division Bench in the case of Abdul Karim Khan, 1961 RLW p. 386 . 7. The Court held that these Rules were enacted by His Highness Nawab of Tonk, who was the sovereign Ruler of the State. The Rules were published in the State Gazette Extra-ordinary, issued on May 25, 1944, under the command of His Highness, the Nawab, by the Darbar-Secretary Mirza Amir Ali Khan. It was held that these Rules were not simply administrative or executive instructions issued by the Ruler. These Rules constituted law', made by the sovereign authority and had statutory force. 8. Another question considered was whether the State was justified in making any interference by executive orders. Referring to the United State of Rajasthan Administration Ordinance of 1948, it was held that Section 3 of that Ordinance provided that all laws, Ordinances, Acts, Rules, Regulations and Notifications having the force of law of the said State were ordered to continue to remain in force until repealed or amended by the competent authority. The State of Tonk, thereafter, merged in the second 'United State of Rajasthan', which was formed in April, 1949. The result was that Rules of 1944 continued to have force of law. 9. The Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950. Article 372 provides the continuance in force of existing laws and their adoption. According to it, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. The expression 'law in force' in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in a territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed. 10. The expression 'law in force' in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in a territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed. 10. The Nawab of Tonk being a sovereign authority of the State was also the supreme legislative authority for it. The Rules of 1944 having been passed by him in his sovereign capacity, and having thereafter been continued by two respective Ordinances 1948 and 1949, had full legal force when the Constitution came into operation, by virtue of its Art. 372. 11. Thus, it stands finally decided by a Division Bench Judgment of this Court that the Rules framed by His Highness, the Nawab of Tonk, and the rules framed by the Ruler cannot be amended or modified by executive instructions. They have the force of law. 12. The Rajasthan Legislature passed an Act on 13th July, .1958 known as Rajasthan Cash Jagir Abolition Act, 1958. The aim and object of the Act was to abolish the cash jagir etc. within the territory of Rajasthan State. However, there was a saving provision in the Act. Section 6(2) provided for exemption of any Act. In accordance with this, the State Government issued an order on 31st December, 1969, published in Rajasthan Gazette Part-I (Kha) dated February 12, 1970, whereby the provisions of the Act of 1958 were exempted in respect of persons who were governed by the Rules of 1944. This Rule of 1944 remained untouched and is a valid Rule even today. All the members of the petitioner-society, who were descendants of His Highness, Nawab Amir-ud-Dowla, are entitled for Khandan Allowance. 13. In 1979, the State Government increased the Khandan Allowance to a minimum of Rs. 40/- per month, keeping in view the Rules of 1944. 14. Even after the decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Karim Khan (supra), the Government has again passed and order on 26th July, 1986 on the administrative side directing the Treasury Officer to pay Khandan Allowance only to those persons, who are not in Government Service or who are not having the income of more than Rs. 500/- or who are not getting the old pension. It amounts to amending the Rules of 1944 by these administrative orders. Further, a consequential order was passed on 3rd of August, 1987. 500/- or who are not getting the old pension. It amounts to amending the Rules of 1944 by these administrative orders. Further, a consequential order was passed on 3rd of August, 1987. Both these orders are under-challenge in the present writ petition. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Government has no jurisdiction to issue such administrative orders, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Karim Khan (supra), which has not been over- ruled and holds the field even today. I find merit in the submission. 16. The points involved in this case have already been decided by the Court, holding that the Rules of 1944 are valid legislative rules. They are still in operation. They have neither been amended/modified nor repealed after coming into force of the Constitution of India. Moreover, they have been saved by Art. 372 of the Constitution and Section 6(2) of Rajasthan Cash Jagir Abolition Act of 1958. The Government has absolutely no jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders. Interference by the Government on administrative side amounts to amending the Rules by these executive orders, which is not permissible under the law. 17. The judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Karim Khan (supra) is based on the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court. Almost similar controversy had arisen in the case of Ameer-un-Nissa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and others, AIR 1955 S.C. 352 . The Court had the occasion to consider whether the `FIRMAN' issued by the Nawab of Hyderabad was having the force of law. It was held "Prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The `Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign, will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; may, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. The `Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign, will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; may, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular Firman held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later Firman at any time that the Nizam willed." 18. Prior to the integration of Hyderabad State within the Indian Union, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed supreme power. There were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. 19. In another case reported in AIR 1956 SC 60 Director of Endowments v. Akram All & Others , again, the legal force of FIRMAN issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad came for consideration. The earlier view in the case of Ammerunissa Begum reiterated that the Nizam of Hyderabad was a sovereign authority. Nobody could question the Firman which was issued by His Highness. His word was law. 20. In the case of Madhaorao v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 298 , the Court had considered whether `Kalam Bandis' of 1912 and 1935 issued by. the Ruler of Gwalior State upon which the right of Madhaorao to receive monthly payment by way of Bachat (balance) was guaranteed, had the force of law and would amount to an existing law under Article 372 of the Constitution. Following its earlier view in the case of Ammer-un- Nisha Begum (supra), it was held that there was no constitutional limitation upon the authority of the Ruler to act in any capacity he liked, he would be the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and supreme head of the executive. All his orders however issued, would have the force of law and would govern and regulate the affairs of the State including the rights of the citizens. 21. Following the law laid down in the above-mentioned cases, I hold that the Rules of 1944 still hold the field as "law in force" and the impugned orders dated July 26, 1986 and August 3, 1987 are hereby quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed without any order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed *******