Judgment 1. THIS is an peal against the judgment and order dated 29th May, 1992 passed by the learned trial judge dismissing the writ application in which the validity of the order of requisition under Section 3 (1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and acquisition) Act, 1948 made in respect of premises No. 44 Chowringhee Road was challenged. 2. THE Premises No. 44, Chowringhee Road, now known as Jawaharlal nehru Road, Calcutta, belongs to the appellants. The said premises was leased out by the Official Trustees of West Bengal for a period of 99 years commencing from 1st April, 1961 to Kalinga Tubes Ltd. the erstwhile lessee of the said premises. On 1.4.1961 Kalinga Tubes Ltd. took possession of the said premises together with the old building and structure standing thereon and after demolishing the old buildings an I buildings and structures had constructed a two storied buildings with basement on the southern side of the premises alt a cost of more than Rs.15 lakhs. The ground floor of the said two-storied building occupied by Bank of India and the first floor was occupied by the said Kalinga Tubes Ltd. and now by the appellant. In March 1977, the said Kalinga Tubes Ltd. applied to the corporation of Calcutta for construction of a four-storied building with basement and the remaining portion of the said premises and to extend the construction of two further storeys on the existing building. The Calcutta corporation duly sanctioned the plan in March 1978. On or about 11th December, 1981, the High Court at Orissa approved the amalgamation of Kalinga Tubes Ltd. with Indian Metals and ferro Alloys Ltd. the appellant herein and as a result Kalinga Tubes Ltd. ceased to exist and all the assets and liabilities Kalinga Tubes Ltd. developed upon the appellant. The appellant duly applied and had its name mutated in the records of the Corporation of Calcutta. The appellant also issued letters to the Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Government of West Bengal, to make necessary changes in its Sales Tax Records. 3. THE appellant thereafter was constructing a four- storyed premises. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation served a notice under Section 401 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 on or about 9th September, 1985 for demolition of a portion of the structural work thereunder construction. 3. THE appellant thereafter was constructing a four- storyed premises. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation served a notice under Section 401 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 on or about 9th September, 1985 for demolition of a portion of the structural work thereunder construction. Thereafter, by an order dated 5th May, 1986, the District building Surveyor, Calcutta Municipal Corporation, directed the appellant to demolish a portion of the said premises. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Municipal Building Tribunal and by an order dated 24th June, 1986, a stay was granted over the demolition. It is admitted that only structural works were done, but finishing work such as floor, finishing of the wells, putting of doors and window penes and/or bath-rooms were not completed. 4. ON 7th November, 1986, some persons allegedly representing the officers from the Sales Tax Department, Government of West Bengal, came to the office of the appellant to check and investigate the books of accounts of the appellant. They demanded that no one should leave the office premises, nor should make any telephone call, until investigation was completed. At the relevant time, Mr. R. N. Chatterjee, the senior most officer in the office was out of office on official work and upon his return he noticed that several persons were moving around on different floors of the unfinished construction of the said premises. On returning to his office at about 4. 30 p. m. Mr. Chatterjee was also detained by those persons purporting to represent as Sales Tax Officers, On enquiry Mr. Chatterjee ascertained that his colleagues in the office were unaware as to who these persons were who were moving around in the unfinished portion of the premises. On Mr. Chatterjee's insistence that he should be allowed to go to the Hochi Min Sarani Gate to find out the real state of affairs, he was obstructed and thereafter allowed to go with Mr. Ratnam and two purported Sales Tax Officers. On arriving at the Hochi Min Sarani Gate Mr. Chatterjee enquired from the Darawan as to who were the persons who were moving around the different floors. Mr. Chatterjee found that large number of persons were standing at the gate and there were several persons standing inside the premises, who claimed that they were the officers of the Commercial Tax department Government of West Bengal and the said. Chatterjee enquired from the Darawan as to who were the persons who were moving around the different floors. Mr. Chatterjee found that large number of persons were standing at the gate and there were several persons standing inside the premises, who claimed that they were the officers of the Commercial Tax department Government of West Bengal and the said. Premises have been requisitioned by the Government of West Bengal and given to the commissioner, Commercial Tax, Government of West Bengal. No identity cards or papare or documents were produced by the said purported Sales tax officers. On Mr. Chatterjee's demanding such papers, he was informed that he may visit the office of the Commercial lax officer on 10th November, 1986 when the said impugned order of requisition of the premises would be shown. At about 5 p. m. on 7th November, 1986, the officer-in-charge, Park Street Police Station also arrived at the said premises and threatened Mr. Chatterjee not create any disturbance or obstruction in making possession of the said premises. Inspite of several demands made by Mr. Chatterjee, the said officer-in-charge did not and refused to produce any order which authorised the Commercial Tax Officer to take possession of the said premises or to allow the said officer-in-charge to render assistance in such action. it was ascertained by round the appellant's officers that the persons who were moving/round the different floors came from the office of Commissioner, Commercial Tax, West Bengal and that on that date at about 5 p. m. officer-in-charge of Park Street Police station arrived in the said premises and threatened the officers of the appellant not to create any disturbance or obstruction in taking over possession of the said premisses. It is the case of the a appellant not to create any disturbance or obstruction in taking over possession of the said premises. It is the case of the appellant that inspite of several demands and request made in this behalf, no copy of the order of requisition was shown or served upon the appellant company or any of its officers. On that date a sign-board on the outer wall of the second floor of unfinished construction was hung up showing the office of the Commissioner of the commercial Tax, West Bengal. On that date a sign-board on the outer wall of the second floor of unfinished construction was hung up showing the office of the Commissioner of the commercial Tax, West Bengal. Immediately thereafter some furniture were placed on the first floor of the said premises and the respondent No. 3 put the padlock on the gate of the said premises and also posted police pickets outside the said gate. On enquiry it was found that (the said premises was requisitioned by an order dated 7th November, 1986 by an order passed by the Collector under the provision of Section 3 (1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for the purpose connected therewith and there to viz. for accommodation of government Offices". It was evident from the said order of requisition dated 7. 11. 86 that a copy of the order was purported to have been affixed was addressed to M/s. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., the lesses. The said order of requisition was challenged by the appellant in an application under Act. 226 of the Constitution of India of the Constitution and the said writ application in Matter No. 1801 of 1986 was heard by the learned trial judge and the learned trial Judge by order dated 29th May, 1992 held that the authority concerned had formed a bonafide opinion about the necessity of the requisition of one hand in question for the purpose mentioned in section 3 (1) of the said Act and that it appears that the premises in question had been validity and properly requisitioned under the said Act and dismissed the writ application. 5. MR. 5. MR. Somendra Chandra Bose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended in the first place that the order or requisition was made on total non-application of mind and it was believed to have done at the behest and in collusion with the official trustees in view of the following facts disclosed in the pleadings that on or about 23rd November, 1981 the official Trustees purported to terminate the said lease dated 24th September 1962 but the same was challenged by M/s. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., and thereafter by the petitioner No. 1 who filed a Title suit No. 322 of 1981 against the official Trustee of West Bengali in the Court of the subordinate judge, Bhubaneswar challenging inter alia the purported illegal termination. In the said suit an interlocutory application was made by the plaintiff and the ld. Subordinate Judge was pleased to pass an order-restraining the Official Trustee from interfering with the construction work at the said premises and from giving effect to the purported notice of termination dated 23rd November, 1981. 6. THEREAFTER, in February, 1983 the Official Trustee had instituted a suit in this Hon'ble Court being suit No. 66 of 1983 against the petitioner no. 1 claiming inter alia an order of injunction restraining the petitioner no. 1 from assigning or transferring the said lease dated 24th September, 1982. In the Interlocutory application in the said suit filed by the Official trustee this Hon'ble court was pleased not to pass any order. Although the construction work of the said premises was going on smoothly in accordance with the sanctioned plan yet he Official Trustee on his own and to harass the petitioner no. 1 complained in writing on 14th may, 1985 and 8th September, 1985 to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that unauthorised constructions were being made by the petitioner no. 1 in the said premises and to take action accordingly. The Official Trustees never cared either to visit the said premises or to ascertain the correct fact. It was at the instances of the Official Trustee that the Calcutta Municipal corporation served the notice for stoppage of fur her work in the said premises and notice of demolition of alleged unauthorised construction as a result whereof the work of construction had corns to a stand still since august 1985. It was further submitted by Mr. It was at the instances of the Official Trustee that the Calcutta Municipal corporation served the notice for stoppage of fur her work in the said premises and notice of demolition of alleged unauthorised construction as a result whereof the work of construction had corns to a stand still since august 1985. It was further submitted by Mr. Bose that the purpose for which the property was requisitioned falls beyond the scope or ambit of the provision of Section 3 (1) off the said Act which provides that "3. Power of requisition, (1) If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates in different areas or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being an industrial or other area excluded by State Government by a notification in this behalf, by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas, or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto the state Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further orders an appear to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning. Provided that no land used for the purpose of religious worship or used by an educational or charitable institution shall be requisitioned under this section. " 7. IT was further submitted that requisition could only be made under the provision of the said Act for the purpose specifically mentioned in the said Act as the said Act was enacted providing for speedy requisition of property under certain cases. It was submitted that the scope of West Bengal Act II of 1948, was different from the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision)Act (Act v of 1947. The purpose for which requisition can be made under west Bengal Act II of 1948 is specifically mentioned in the said Act. In this particular case the purpose for which the said property was requisitioned was for "for the purpose of maintaining supplies and service essential to the life of the Community" and for purpose connected thereto viz. for accommodation of the government offices. In this particular case the purpose for which the said property was requisitioned was for "for the purpose of maintaining supplies and service essential to the life of the Community" and for purpose connected thereto viz. for accommodation of the government offices. It was submitted that the expression "for purposes connected there with and incidental thereto" must have a direct nexus with the main object of the requisition, viz. maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Therefore, the respondent is to satisfy the Court that the purpose mentioned in the notice, i.e. accommodation of Government offices is such which by itself is for maintaining supply and services essential to the life of the Community. It is submitted that the First Land Acquisition Collector who had requisitioned the property has suited in the affidavit in opposition filed by the First Land Acquisition Collector before the learned trial Judge that the proposal was "for speedy acquisition of this premises no. 44 Chowringhee road now known as Jawaharlal Nehru Road in Ward No. 63 Police station park Street for accommodating some Sales Tax office at the said premises. It appears from the enquiry report that the said premises was found adequate and spacious enough to meet the need of the Sales Tax department. It further appeared that the appropriate sanction towards the acquisition had also been approved by the Finance Department with the consent of Chief Minister, West Bengal for acquisition of the said premises. I had caused the preliminary enquiry recording the purpose of the said proposal and adequacy of the space available to meet the said requirement and after being satisfied with the public purpose behind such acquisition I had issued notice under Regulation of the said premises. 8. IT was further pointed out in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the requiring authority by Assistant Commissioner of Commercial tax that the Commissioner of Commercial Tax intimated in the report dated 16th May, 1983 the Finance Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal for the requirement of an additional area of 1.50 lakh sq. ft. of office space in Calcutta area whereupon the order and on the basis of such requisition made on 16.5.83 the order of requisition was passed on 7th November, 1986. It was further stated in the said affidavit that "the respondent no. of West Bengal for the requirement of an additional area of 1.50 lakh sq. ft. of office space in Calcutta area whereupon the order and on the basis of such requisition made on 16.5.83 the order of requisition was passed on 7th November, 1986. It was further stated in the said affidavit that "the respondent no. 3 required additional space in Chowringhee area which is the centre of business activity. The object of the ultimate requisition of the said requisitioned premises "and that the premises in the present state could be used by officers of the Sales Tax Department and that "the said requisitioned premises in its unfinished state was intended to use for the purpose. "in this connection it was pointed out that before the Division bench in connection with the stay matter an affidavit was affirmed by the second Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta in which it was stated that due to exigency of event prevailing on relevant time the State Government has chosen to apply the West Bengal Land (Acquisition and Requisition)Act, 1948 for acquisition of the premises no. 44 Chowringhee Road instead of applying the lower proceeding prescribed by Land Acquisition Act. It was further stated on affidavit that "emergent situator has arisen due to specified time has been fixed for setting up Sale Tax Tribunal and considering its urgency of the requirement of premises befitting to its status premises no. 44 Chowringhee Road was selected. " Apart from that the said requisition order was initiated considering the fact that the said building was under construction and after requisition the government requires sometime to complete the said building and to accommodate the sales Tax Tribunal and other offices at the said premises. Similar affidavit was affirmed by the Assistant. Commissioner of Commercial Tax before the division Bench on affidavit that "the West Bengal Tax Tribunal which is now functioning from a building owned by P. W. Department on Salt Lake may be shifted if the premises no. 44 Chowringhee Road can be available to the Finance Department, the Government of West Bengal at whose instance this proceeding has been initiated. The present accommodation is inadequate to function properly and the situation of the offices are not at all well connected by existing public conveyance which causes great inconvenience to the public and to the employees. 44 Chowringhee Road can be available to the Finance Department, the Government of West Bengal at whose instance this proceeding has been initiated. The present accommodation is inadequate to function properly and the situation of the offices are not at all well connected by existing public conveyance which causes great inconvenience to the public and to the employees. "On the basis of the fact disclosed by Respondent to finis behalf it was submitted that there was no emergent situation for invoking the provision of the Act, 1948 for immediate requisition of the premises in question. It was next submitted that the purpose which was specified in the order under Section 3 (1) of the said Act was not the real purpose. The object was to acquire the property circumventing the provision of the Land Acquisition Act and that it was further alleged that the condition precedent for exercise of power of requisition under Section 3 (1) of the said Act was wholly non-existent. Mr. Bose further submitted that shifting of a particular department of commissioner of Commercial Tax does not and cannot amount to services and supplies essential to the life of the community as the expression has a definite connotation. Under the scheme of the Act the power of requisition could only be exercised only in case of specified purpose and that too for a speedy action. Mr. Bose submitted that the Commercial Tax Offices cannot be said to for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life on the community and that it does not also come within the scope and ambit of the expression "for purpose connected therewith and incidental thereto. "It was further submitted that the order of requisition which was made not served admittedly oh the occupier as mandatorily required to be done under the provision of Section 3 (2) of the Act which provides that; 3 (2) "an order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier." Mr. Bose submitted that the need for giving pre-decisional hearing in respect of such requisition is a must relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , Madan Gopal vs. District Magistrate. AIR 1972 SC 2656 and decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of Mysore vs. J. B. Bhatt reported in AIR 1975 SC 596 . It was submitted that if the necessity for taking action under the said Act was so urgent that there was no time and/or scope for giving any notice or hearing in that event such urgency or immediate is justiciable. It was submitted in the facts and circumstances case where an unfinished construction in respect of which a proceeding for demolition is pending before the Calcutta municipal Corporation and the condition of which do not permit functioning of any office of the premises in view of the fact there is no door floor window, electric connection and which cannot be used for any purpose as it can never be used for either human habitation tar storage of valuable documents and records. It was submitted on the face of the record that it was clear that the stand taken by the respondents that there was no time and/or scope for giving any opportunity was on the face of it contrary to the fact. In this connection reference was made to the case of Sachindra Mohan nandi vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1971 SC 861 where one of the points was considered by the Supreme Court that there is no express provision to make a representation whereupon the supreme Court observed, "but there is no bar to a representation being made after the order is served under Section 3 (2) of the Act." In this connection reference was made to the decision of a Division bench judgment of this Court: in this case of Sattya Narayan Nathani vs. State of West Bengal reported in CWN 420 wherein it was held that in order to justify the requisition of a particular premises, the respondent must show that the Government have made every possible effort in the account to secure accommodation and such efforts had failed or that it was essential that accommodation of the government servant should be given in Calcutta or at that particular place. Mr. Mr. Bose has also referred to a decision in the case of Howrah mills Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1988 (1) CLJ 367 as also of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Re nington Rand v. Howrah Mills, reported in 1991 (1) CLJ 295 and of Sped Fateaj Ali v. State of West Bengal reported 93 CWN 992 wherein the scope of sanction 3 (1) of the said act was considered in detail and found that in order to make a valid order of requisition the purpose for which requisition was made should be a purpose specifically mentioned in the section. It was not a case of acquiring or requiring a property for a public purpose. Land could be acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act or other Acts. But for the purpose of this act the power of requisition could not be invoked save and except the purpose specifically mentioned in the act in question. Mr. Aninda Mitra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community, earning of revenue is essential. Commercial Tax directorate for whom the said premises have been requisitioned, collects approximately 70% of the total revenue of the State Government. All welfare schemes and expenses for maintaining supplies; and services essential to the life of community, are not by the State Government of West Bengal out of the commercial tax collected by the Commercial Tax directorate. Setting up of this additional office in Central Calcutta is essential for collecting revenue by the Commercial Tax Directorate and will be conductive to and serve the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community. 9. THE existing accommodation are inadequate and requirement of additional area of over 1.5 lac sq. ft. of office space in Calcutta is necessary. It was further submitted that setting up of an office of the commercial Tax Directorate is connected with and incidental to the of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community. Unless Commercial Tax Directorate have additional office space they cannot achieve and meet the target revenue and the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community cannot be achieved. Unless Commercial Tax Directorate have additional office space they cannot achieve and meet the target revenue and the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community cannot be achieved. In this case reference was made to a decision of this c6urt in the case of Subrata Mukherfee v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1982 calcutta 430 where setting up of a police station was held to be a purpose connected and services essential to life of the community and for creation of better living condition. It was submitted by Mr. Mitra that unfinished building can be requisitioned under the said Act. It was submitted that the building has been constructed upto a storeyed and is capable of being used as office of the Sales Tax department in its present state. Furthermore, the intention of the State was to acquire the premises under West Bengal Act II of 1948 and thereupon, to complete the building in all respects. It was further submitted that the requisition is a step towards acquisition of the property. It was submitted that where the two statutes cover the same field, there is no constitutional bar to prevent the application of one or the other. In this connection it was submitted that both the Land Acquisition act and W. B. Act II of 1948 provide for speedy acquisition. Section 17 of la Act provides for acquisition of land by dispensing with the notice U/s. 5a. The State Government has chosem W. B. Act II of 1948 under which immediate possession can be had thereafter, the property can be acquired speedily and thus, the decision was quite valid and there was no illegality in such matters. It was further submitted by Mr. Mitra that the appellant would not suffer any prejudice because the amount of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and under West Bengal Act II of 1948 are same. With regard to service of notice is concerned it was submitted by Mr. Mitra that service of notice had been made by way of affixation and as per rule 3 (b) of the rules the question of service of notice is not valid ground for setting aside the order of requisition. 10. With regard to service of notice is concerned it was submitted by Mr. Mitra that service of notice had been made by way of affixation and as per rule 3 (b) of the rules the question of service of notice is not valid ground for setting aside the order of requisition. 10. FROM the facts of this case it is clearly evident that in the year 1983 the Commercial Tax Department approached the Government for acquisition of some suitable property and that on the basis of the requisition made in the year 1983 this order of requisition was passed under Section 3 (1) of the said Act on 7th November, 1986 and that the original purpose of acquisition was for shifting of the office accommodating some commercial tax office and subsequently, it was stated that it was re quired for shifting west Bengal Taxation Tribunal which was functioning effectively in the Salt lake in the building owned by the P. W. Department. Whether or not the property could be acquired under provision of the Section 3 (1) of the said act would depend upon the construction of Section 3 (1) of the said Act. In howrah Mills Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1988 (l)CLJ 455 which was affirmed by the Division Bench, the question was whether manufacturing of typewriter machine comes within the scope and ambit of "supplies and services essential to the life of community". It was held that "in the order of requisition it was stated that the said requisition was made for the purpose of providing facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community and for creating employment opportunities to the people. Admittedly, the respondent no. 5 was in occupation of the property and was continuing in manufacturing of typewriter machine there. The first question which calls for consideration by this court is whether the typewriter machine is required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The word essential means according to Block's Law Dictionary, in dispensibly necessary important in the highest degree requisite," that which is required for the continued existence of a thing." Typewriter machine is required for the purpose of typing and the use of the typewriter machine could lot be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. I am afraid that I cannot give such a wide meaning to such a word which would be beyond the scope and object of the act. The words 'supplies and services essential to the life of the community cannot be given such a wide meaning. A word in statute has to be interpreted in manner which carry out the intention of the legislature in its true prospective. Reading the preamble of the said Act it is made abundantly clear that the power under Section 3 could only be invoked for the purposes specifically mentioned therein and that it is difficult to hold that manufacture of typewriter machine is a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community inasmuch as, community as a whole could not require typewriter machine as essential supplies and services to the community even if it is easily or fresly available. Whether a particular thing is required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community has to be construed according to its need for proper enjoyment of life. Reference may be made to the provision of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 wherein certain foods and articles which are treated to be essential for the community as such. Foodstuff, fuels and other articles required for the community as a whole are essential commodities but certainly cosmetic cannot be said to be essential commodities. The word 'essential services has its own meaning and the services which are essential for the people like water-supply, electricity, supply of milk, hospital service etc. without the people at large cannot normally go. All and sundry services cannot be said to be an essential services in the instant case, the words 'supplies and services' are qualified by the word essential, so all supplies and services cannot be said to be essential unless it can be shown that it is indispensably necessary for the community. Accordingly, 1 hold that typewriter machine cannot be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community as provided under Section 3 of the said Act Further the question is whether the said requisition, could be supported by any of the purposes mentioned in the Section 3 of the said Act. It was also stated in the said order of requisition, the same was issued also for the increasing employment opportunities for the people establishing commercial estates and industrial estates, inasmuch as in the industry is very much in existence and because of its continued existence, the power under Section 3 of the said Act had been exercised. In view in fact, none of the alternative clauses available to the State Respondent for exercising the power of requisition under Section 3 of the said Act could be invoked in this case. From the purposes and scheme of the said Act I am unable to give a meaning of section 3 of the said Act, which would open a flat gate for the respondents for exercising power under S. 3 in each and every case. When powers are circumscribed under statute, the power has to be exercised for the purpose for which statute was passed. All powers have got its limit when the legislature thought it fit that the power of requisition could only be exercised in some limited cases, the power has to be exercised to fulfil purpose for which it was enacted. . . . . Incidentally. It may be mentioned that under the ordinary law of acquisition, namely Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acquisitioned but before an acquisition is made for a company, certain statutory requirements cannot be bye-passed by invoking the summary and emergency power under the impugned Act. The impugned act could only be invoked for specified purposes. Under the provision of the impugned Act, the property could be requisitioned if the situation and/or the purpose is mentioned under the Act, is fulfilled and thereafter, if it is necessary to keep the property, in that event, the same may be acquired. The purpose of the Act is for speedy requisition in order to meet the situation. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances under which the power has been exercised in the manner, was beyond the scope of section 3 of the said Act. The purpose of the Act is for speedy requisition in order to meet the situation. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances under which the power has been exercised in the manner, was beyond the scope of section 3 of the said Act. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme court in the case of H. D. Vora v. States of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 S. C. 866 wherein it was held that if he Government wants to take over the property for an indefinite period of time, the government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose for which the premises any required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition if passed, would be a fraud upon statute, for the Government would be requisitioning premises when they really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character." Similar view was taken with regard to the scope or ambit of Section 3 (1) of the said Act in the case of Syed Fateaj Ali vs. State of West Bengal reported in 93 CWN 992. In the instant case, the question is whether shifting or establishment of a particular department of the Commissioner of Commercial Tax can be said to be for the purpose of rendering services and supplies essential to the life of community. The word 'essential" means in dispensibly necessary important in the highest degree without which a society cannot run. True Commissioner of Commercial Tax office is engaged in releasing revenues for and on behalf of the State Government and without revenue a government cannot run but in order to construe the power of the State Government to requisition under Sect on 3 (1) of the said act, we have to bear in mind that the words "supplies and Services" are qualified by work "essential". Establishment of a police station or for maintaining supplies of essential food stuff come within the purview of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, Supplies of water, maintenance of communication, transport, power, light, postal and telegraph services are essential services. It is hard to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra that with the help of revenue a government it has to maintain supplies and services to the life of the community and as such it must be held to be incidental orancilliary to the supplies and services essential to the life of the community. If the expression "incidental or ancillary arc things which follow from the main object. Anything required for maintaining supplies and services can come within the ambit of incidental or ancillary thereto. But the collection of revenue for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services cannot be said to be incidental or ancillary for the purpose of supplies and services essential to the life of the community or in the other words. If such contention is accepted in that event it would amount to putting the art before the horse and that expression incidental or ancillary thereto must have a direct and proximate nexus for the purpose of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Establishment of a police station is an essential service and constructing quarters for police personnel are incidental or ancillary to the purpose of establishing a police station. Similarly, for the purpose of hospital if nurses and doctors quarters are required to be constructed it would be incidental or ancillary to the purpose of establishment of hospital. Accordingly, considering the purposes specifically mentioned in section 3 (1) of the said act it is difficult to hold that such purpose comes within the specified purpose. When there were several Acts in the field giving power to acquire property and when under the instant act for the purpose of speedy requisition power has been conferred upon the state government to requisition proper property for some specified purposes in a summary manner in that event on the basis of well settled principle it cannot be held that the property could be requisitioned even though same had been given strictly within the scope or ambit of the purpose mentioned therein. Admittedly, the property was requisitioned for a permanent purpose. Admittedly, the property was requisitioned for a permanent purpose. Law is now well settled by decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Vora vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 wherein it was held that if the government wants to take over a property for indefinite period of time the government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the government only for a public purpose which of transitory character. If public purpose for which the premises are required is of perinnial or permanent in nature or character from the inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition would be a fraud upon the statute, for the government would be requisitioning the premises when they really speaking they want the permises for acquisition the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character, the principles laid down by the supreme Court in that case is fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and that admittedly, the power of requisition was exercised for a permanent purpose which was permanent and perennial from the very beginning and that the order of requisition was passed about 3 years after rquisition was made for acquisition of the property. Under the Scheme of the Act when the property is required to be requisitioned for a temporary purpose and it transpires to the government that the property would be required for a definite period in that event the period which was originally requisitioned for a temporary purpose because of the existence or continuance of the purpose for which the property could be acquired, subsequently u/s 4 (2) of the Act. If the order of requisition is bad the order of acquisition does not become automatically valid. 11. WHEN the legislature had Cleanly laid down the specific purposes for which the property could be requisitioned, the State Government had to form an opinion on the basis of the relevant materials on record that the property in question was required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. In the instant case, it appears that the State Government had travelled beyond the power conferred under the statute. In the instant case, it appears that the State Government had travelled beyond the power conferred under the statute. It was stated on behalf of the State that the purpose was a public purpose. Under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acquired for any public purpose. But when the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 had been enacted by the State government for the purpose of requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain specified purposes, and when in fact, there is another general law on subject viz. the Land acquisition Act, in that event the State government cannot travel beyond the scope of power conferred under this special Act and to acquire the property which was otherwise permissible to acquired under the land Acquisition, Act in the garb of power under Section 3 (1) of the said Act. When there is a General statute and a special statute and when the special statute clearly provides certain definite purpose for which the act could be invoked, the State Government had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the propose enumerated under the Act and acquired it for a different purpose. Land Acquisition Act is a general law for acquisition of the property and this means a special law enacted for some special purpose and the provisions of this Act could be only invoked for the purpose specifically provided under the Act. In the instant case, the only power that was conferred upon the State Government was to requisition the property for some specified purposes. Admittedly, the State Government has travelled beyond the subject specified for the purpose for which the power could be exercised. The exercise of a statutory power is invalid unless the repository of the power has acted honestly and in good faith. The deliberate promotion of a purpose be it public or private, alien to that for which the power was conferred is to be regarded as an act of bad faith. It is well settled that where a prima facie case of misuse of power has been made out, it is open to a court to draw the inference that unauthorised purpose had been pursued if the competent authority fails to adduce any grounds supporting the validity of its conduct. 12. It is well settled that where a prima facie case of misuse of power has been made out, it is open to a court to draw the inference that unauthorised purpose had been pursued if the competent authority fails to adduce any grounds supporting the validity of its conduct. 12. FOR a public purpose the property could be acquired under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act which is general law for acquisition of the property. But when there is special law and when the special law prescribed the circumstances and purposes for which the summary procedure for requisition and acquisition of the property could be made, the same must be strictly construed and the property could not be acquired under the provisions of the said Act which is a special statute enacted for a special purpose and that the authorities concerned cannot travel beyond the purpose specifically mentioned in the statute. The powers under the provisions of West Bengal Act II of 948 are drastic. But conferment of such power to the public authority is on a trust and the said power is not to be illegally exercised [see Srilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U. P. reported in (1991)1 SCC 212 ]. The procedural safe-guard should be commensurate with the sweep of the powers. The wider the power, the greater the need for the restraint in its exercise and correspondingly more liberal the construction it the procedural safeguards envisaged by the statute. Frank futer, J. In Vitareill vs. Seaton 359 US 535 at 546-47 said-"if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed this judicially evolved rule of administrative law is not firmly established and if I may add right so, he that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword." "the history of liberty" that the same learned Judge." has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards. "NC Nobb v. U. S. 318 U. S. 332 at 347 followed by the Supreme Court of India in Ranjit Thakur U. K., AIR 1987 SC 2386 ." If there was a valid order of requisition and that there after the government considered it necessary to acquire the property because of the nature of the need in that event there could be a valid or for of acquisition under Section 4 of the Act. It would be a fraud upon the statute to invoke the power of requisition solely for the purpose of acquisition of the property under the Act. In order to requisition the property under the Act the purpose which was specifically specified by the legislature must be fulfilled and this is the condition precedent for-requisition of the land under the act. If there is a valid order of requisition on a valid ground only in that event power of requisition under Section 4 of the said Act could be invoked but in the instant case from the affidavit filed by the State authorities it is clear that" from very beginning the property was sought to be acquired and it was only (or the purpose of acquisition of the property, the order of requisition was passed which is on the face of it illegal and void. When the commercial Tax Department approached the State Government for acquisition of the property for the purpose that event nothing prevented the State government for acquisition of the property for the purpose that event nothing prevented the State Government from taking recourse to the ordinary laws of acquisition. 13. IN this case on the face of taking two different stand as to the purpose of requisition there could not be any formation of the opinion as to the purpose for which it was sought to be requisition. Admittedly there was no material on record before the authorities concerned to form the requisite opinion as specifically required under Section 3 of the said Act. Accordingly, the finding of the learned trial judge that the State Government has formed a bonafide opinion is not correct as it is contrary to the record and two contradictions stand taken by the State before us. Merely forming an opinion will not be sufficient. Accordingly, the finding of the learned trial judge that the State Government has formed a bonafide opinion is not correct as it is contrary to the record and two contradictions stand taken by the State before us. Merely forming an opinion will not be sufficient. The formation of the opinion must be on the basis of materials on record and on proper application of mind taking into consideration all relevant factors such a formation of opinion is on the face of it, illegal and inoperative. With regard to the service of notice the appellant's case was that no notice was served as mandatorily required to be done under Section 3 (2) of the said Act read with rule 3 of the Rules framed under the Act for this purpose. On behalf of the State it was submitted that they have done it by affixing the same on the outer door on some conspicuous part of the house in question. Service under Section 3 (2)of the said Act provides, an order under sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier. When a challenge was thrown about non-service, no material was produced before the Court that any attempt was made for serving the copy in the mode prescribed in rule 3 (a) of the said rules and with regard to the service by affixation no further material was produced excepting a mere averment that it was served by affixation, whether the witnesses were there and under what circumstances it was affixed had not been disclosed at all. In the absence of disclosure of relevant materials by the State authorites when specified challenge was thrown and in view of the mandatory requirement of service of notice before the order can be made effective, such a service has to be made in the manner indicated under the rules and the authority concerned cannot skip over the method of service provided in rule 3 (a) and under such circumstances it must be held that there was no service on occupier of the premises as mandatorily required under Section 3 (2) of the said Act and unless it could be held that there was valid service, the order of requisition cannot be valid in view of the fact that the Section 3 (1) of the Act provides the power to pass an order of requsition and that unless it is served upon the owner or occupier in the manner prescribed under the rules, the order of requisition cannot be held effective at all. Further no notice was addressed to the appellant no. 1 under the Land Acquisition Act the order of acquisition is published in the Gazette and also the notification under the land Acquisition Act is also circulated by affixing the same on the land in question over and above the Gazettee notification. But under the impugned act the service of the order of requisition is only made by which the owner and occupier may know that the property has been requisitioned and that the owner and occupier lose their valuable right to occupy the land or the premises. The valuable proprietory right of a citizen cannot be allowed to be taken away without complying with mandatory requirement of law. The provision of service has to be strictly construed. We are clearly of the view that there was no service of notice as required under Section 3 (2) of the said Act. 14. ON the question of giving pre-decisional hearing is concerned it is true the Act is quite silent about giving of hearing and it is true that the supreme Court had considered this question in S.M. Nandis case (supra. Since then the Supreme Court had changed its earlier view and the principle is now well settled that where the statute does not expressly exclude hearing or application of the principles of natural justice, natural justice has to be observed and hearing must be given. Since then the Supreme Court had changed its earlier view and the principle is now well settled that where the statute does not expressly exclude hearing or application of the principles of natural justice, natural justice has to be observed and hearing must be given. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India reported in AIR 198. 1 SC 818 the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 18aa of the said Act does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional state the phrase "immediate action is necessary" in Section 18aa (a) does not exclude absolutely, by inevitable application of cardinal canon of fair play in all cases under Section 18aa (a) may be invoked. Supreme Court held that even though the power has been conferred to take over management where immediate action is necessary but that does not mean that without giving some sort of hearing at pre-decisional stage, action could be taken. In this case Supreme court categorically held Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India, 819-20 (1) that "the mere use of the word 'immediate' in the phrase "immediate action is necessary" does not necessarily and absolutely exclude the prior application of the audi alteram partem rule, as immediacy or urgency requiring swift action is a situational fact having a direct nexus with the likehood of adverse effect on fall in production. And, such likelihood and urgency of action to prevent it, may vary greatly in degree. The won is likely to affect production' used in Section 18-AA (1) (a) are flexible enough to comprehend a wide spectrum of situations ranging from the one where the likelihood of the happening of the apprehended event is imminent to hat where it may be reasonably anticipated to happen sometime in the near future, Cases of extreme urgency where action under Section 18-AA (1) (a) to prevent in production and consequent injury to public interest, breaks absolutely no delay, would be rare. In most cases, where the urgency i; not so extreme it is practicable to adjust and strike an balance between the competing claims of hurry and hearing. The audi alteram partem rule, is a very flexible, malleable and adaptable concept of natural justice. In most cases, where the urgency i; not so extreme it is practicable to adjust and strike an balance between the competing claims of hurry and hearing. The audi alteram partem rule, is a very flexible, malleable and adaptable concept of natural justice. To adjust and harmonise the need for speed and obligation to act fairly, it can be modified and the measure of its application cut short in reasonable proportion to the exigencies of the situation. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, the question has to what extent and in what measure) this rule of fair hearing will apply at the pre-decisional stage will depend upon the degree of urge icy, if any, evident from the facts and circumstances of the peculiar case. 15. FURTHER, the reason for forbearance to imply the ex elusion of the audi alteram partem rule from the language of Section 18-AA (1) (a) is, that although the power thereunder is of a drastic nature and the consequences of a take-over are far-reaching and its effect on the rights and interests of the owner of the undertaking in grave and deprivatory, yet the Act does not make any provision giving a full right of appeal, at the post- decisional stage, the so-called right of a post- decisional hearing available to the aggrieved is illusory as in its operation and effect the power of review, if any, conferred thereunder, is prospective, and not retrospective, being strictly restricted to and dependent upon the post take-over circumstances. " 16. IN this case it was clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that "where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule or prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute will be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. IN this case it was clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that "where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule or prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute will be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring power is silent with regard to giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review on appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process of frustrate the need for utmost promtitude. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurdayal Singh, reported in air 1980 SC 319 ". . . It is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and preemptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing, land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to arts. 14 (and 19) bruke an enquiry under S. 17 of the Act." The Supreme Court has constitently taken the view that the quasi judicial or administrative decision rendered in violation of the audi alteram partem rule wherever it can The read as an implied requirement of the law is null and void. (See Menakatgandhi vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 sc 597 , S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan Reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 . Accordingly it is difficult to hold that merely requirement of observing the principles of natural justice is not there in case of requisition under section 3 (1) of the said Act. (See Menakatgandhi vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 sc 597 , S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan Reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 . Accordingly it is difficult to hold that merely requirement of observing the principles of natural justice is not there in case of requisition under section 3 (1) of the said Act. Some sort of hearing in some form or manner is necessary for the purpose of passing a valid order of requisition under s. 3 (1) of the said Act in view of the fact that there is no provision of appeal, revision or review of the order passed under the Act and that there is no scope for any post decisional hearing even when the property will be requisitioned under Section 4 of the Act there is no provision there for hearing or giving notice. Such drastic power of taking unilateral decision without giving any notice and/or hearing depriving a citizen of his property would be against the fundamental principles of fair play the fundamental requisite of the principles of natural justice is the opportunity to be heard must be given before any person is prejudicially affected by any administrative action. In the instant case, the order of requisition was passed after 3 years from the date when a request was made for acquiring the property and we do not find any bonafide reason and/or any ground for not complying with the principles of natural justice when as a matter of fact there was three years' time between the date of requisition made by the department and the date of the order. Unfortunately, in the instant case, not even service of the order of requisition as mandatorily required to be done under Section 3 (2) of the said Act was also not complies with. When power has been conferred upon the Government to requisition a property for some specified purpose which would deprive the owner and occupier of the property, their right to property and/or right to enjoying the same temporarily or permanently, in such a case authority concerned must act fairly and must observe the principles of natural justice. When power has been conferred upon the Government to requisition a property for some specified purpose which would deprive the owner and occupier of the property, their right to property and/or right to enjoying the same temporarily or permanently, in such a case authority concerned must act fairly and must observe the principles of natural justice. Where a power is improperly exercised and the body in question acts without power or in a case where the authority travels beyond the scope of the act, it is the fundamental principles of fair play that the person likely to be affected must be given an opportunity to place their view points and on consideration of the same they are required to pass the order. Principles of natural justice have now become the part of fundamental right, it is no longer a principle of administrative law but it has become a part of the laws of the land. Accordingly, it cannot be considered that such a drastic power could be exercised by the authority concerned keeping everybody in the darkness and secret from the owner or the occupier of the property in question. It is not a case of taking action in the interest of the state or for an emergent situation. But in the ordinary course of action if such an action is taken in that even it cannot be said to be the prerogative of the state to acquire the property in secrecy of office. We are of the view that the learned trial Judge was wrong in dismissing the writ application without consideration merely by holding that the authority concerned had formed a bonafinde opinion about the necessity for requisition and possession whereof was taken over on the strength of such order. It is the question of deprivation of the property and deprivation of the property cannot be made except by law and when it is clear that appellant was deprived of his property unlawfully and in contravention of law it is the duty on the part of the court to grant appropriate relief. 17. LASTLY, it was contended that unfinished and incomplete building could not be requisitioned under the provision of the said Act and that on requisition the possession of the property had been taken over by the State ownership still remained during the continuance of the order of requisition with the appellant-writ petitioner. 17. LASTLY, it was contended that unfinished and incomplete building could not be requisitioned under the provision of the said Act and that on requisition the possession of the property had been taken over by the State ownership still remained during the continuance of the order of requisition with the appellant-writ petitioner. In case of acquisition both ownership and possession vested to the acquiring authority and after acquisition of ownership the acquiring authority can make construction and development and can also demolish the structure (hereon and can to do whatever they like according to their own choice. But in case of requisition as the ownership remains with the appellant and in law when purpose of requisition is over the State had to return the property in its original form to the owner unless it is finally acquired under Section 4 of the said Act. If after requisition of the property if the State Government can make further construction in that event it has to be considered that after requisition of the property the State Government can demolish structure altogether. The purpose of requisition is to get a right of possession and use and occupation of the property and in the absence of any provision contained in the act it is not permissible on the part of the state government to make any addition or alteration in the structure and/or to make any investment for making finishing works. During the period under requisition the owners had to be paid compensation as provided under the law and that there is no provision for either adjustment of amounts spent on the property from the compensation payable. Accordingly, we are of the view that in the absence of any provision in the Act such things are not permissible. It can only be done after the property is finally acquired under the law. So long as the ownership remains with the owners no construction, addition or alteration or any work could be done on the premises in question ordinarily even without any consent in writing from the owner in view of the power conferred under Section 3 (1) of the said Act: the possession of the State government is nothing but that of a tenant who has only right to occupy and can keep the property in possession and utilise the same in the original state in which it had been requisitioned. 18. 18. ACCORDINGLY, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge on 29th May, 1992 and make the rule absolute for the reason given by us we set aside the order of requisition dated 7th November, 1986 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector. A writ in the nature of certiorari do issue quashing; the impugned order of requisition no. 14/86/11/48 dated 7th November, 1986 issued by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 a writ of mandamus do issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect or further effect to the said impugned requisition order no. 14/86/11/48 dated 7th. November, 1986. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. There will be no order as to costs. All parties to act on the signed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertakings. Appeal allowed.