JUDGMENT - Lodha R.M., J.:—This Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC') has been filed by the present appellant dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 23-10-1981 passed by Assistant Judge, Nagpur in Civil Appeal No. 130/80, Nathu and 2 others v. Yamunabi and another, whereby he confirmed the judgment and decree passed by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Katol on 5-4-1980 in Civil Suit No. 87/74, Yamunabai and another v. Nathu and 2 others. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Katol, by its judgment and preliminary decree dated 5-4-1980 decreed the respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiffs') suit for partition of the property described in Schedule C attached with the plaint against the appellents (hereinafter referred to as 'defendants') and the said Court declared that plaintiff No. 1, defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 are entitled to 3/10th share each, while plaintiff No. 2 and defendant No. 3 are entitled to 1/20th share each in the property described in Schedule C attached with the plaint. This preliminary decree was challenged by the defendants in the Court of Assistant Judge, Nagpur and vide the judgment and decree dated 23-10-1981 the Appellate Court concurred with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court referred to hereinabove. 2. The only substantial question of law which arises in the present Second Appeal and which has been pressed by the learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants is whether the two Courts below erred in law in not including in partition, the properties mentioned in the Deed of Settlement dated 30-9-1996 (Ex. 27) whereby the late Bakaram Nimkar only gave the properties mentioned in the Deed of Settlement dated 30-9-1966 (Ex. 27) to the plaintiff No. 1 Yamunabai for her life time or in other words the question is whether the properties mentioned in the Deed of Settlement dated 30-9-1966 executed by deceased Bakaram Nimkar in favour of plaintiff No. 1 Yamunabai which were given to her for her maintenance became her absolute property, and therefore was not available for the partition between the parties. 3. For adjudication and determination of the aforesaid substantial question of law, it would be proper to refer to the relevant ad material facts first. Bakaram Nimkar had married Gunabai and from the said wedlock defendant No. 3 Gangubai, defendant No. 1 Nathu and defendant No. 2 Sahebrao were born. 3. For adjudication and determination of the aforesaid substantial question of law, it would be proper to refer to the relevant ad material facts first. Bakaram Nimkar had married Gunabai and from the said wedlock defendant No. 3 Gangubai, defendant No. 1 Nathu and defendant No. 2 Sahebrao were born. Gunabai died in the year 1965 and after her death he married plaintiff No. 1 Yamunabai on or about 30-9-1966. Plaintiff No. 2 Shewantibai was born from the wedlock of Bakaram and plaintiff No. 1 Yamunabai. Thus plaintiff No. 1 is the step-mother of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and plaintiff No. 2 is the daughter of plaintiff No. 1 from Bakaram. Bakaram executed a Deed of Settlement Vyavastha Patra—(Ex. 27) on 30-9-1966 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 for her maintenance and the property mentioned in the said Deed of Settlement (Ex. 27) were given to plaintiff No. 1 for her life period. The Deed of Settlement as translated reads as under : “Deed of Settlement” (Valued at Rs. 6900/-) This Deed of Settlement is executed in favour of Yamunabai alias Gunabai w/o Bakaramji Nimkar, aged 30 years, Agriculturist, of Mowad, Tahsil Katol, Distt. Nagpur, by Bakaram s/o Bhagwanji Nimkar, aged 50 years, occu. Agriculturist, R/o Mowad, Post Mowad, Tahsil Katol, Distt. Nagpur. This Deed of the Settlement is executed as follows :— You are my wife by 'Gandharva' ¼xka/koZ½ since there should be no negligence in respect of your foods, clothing etc. and since you are my heir, I am under obligation to make provision for your food and clothes etc., the following property is given to you by this Deed of Settlement for your life period. The details of this property are as follows : 1) Mouza Mowad, distt. Registration, Distt. Nagpur, Post Mowad, Katol Municipal Committee and within the jurisdiction of Nagpur Zilla Parishad, Thak No. 4, M. No. 267, P.H. No. 1, field by name Labhan, Field No. 604, Area 18.00, Jama Rs. 74.00 Bhumidhari rights—out of this field from western boundary mark excluding beyond motor road, Dungi, purchased area 5.00 Jama Rs. 24.37, boundary—North and South, out of this area 2.00 Jama Rs. 9.00, on western side boundary south, north-bounded on East—our remaining area field by name Mangadi, on North—road on south—Mahadeo Bari's field (price of this field Rs. 1500/-). 74.00 Bhumidhari rights—out of this field from western boundary mark excluding beyond motor road, Dungi, purchased area 5.00 Jama Rs. 24.37, boundary—North and South, out of this area 2.00 Jama Rs. 9.00, on western side boundary south, north-bounded on East—our remaining area field by name Mangadi, on North—road on south—Mahadeo Bari's field (price of this field Rs. 1500/-). 2) House No. 22, in Ward No. 6, consisting of two rooms facing North—area 13 x 9 hands, bounded by East—house of Tulsiram Nimkar, West—Road, North—Road, South—house of Baliram Khasre (Price of house Rs. 400/-). The above properties are our ancestral and some part of it is self-acquired and I am in possession of the same. For the reasons stated above, I hereby by this Deed of Settlement give you till your life time the possession of this property. You should enjoy till your life time and maintain yourself from out of this property. You are not entitled to mortgage, make gift or sale etc. of this property. You will get your name recorded in the proper concerned records in respect of above properties. The properties are not attached, invested by any mode and has no charge etc. of any kind from anybody. This deed of settlement is executed before the witnesses on this 30th day of September, 1966 by Shri Dhavad, Arjanvis (Petition writer ) of Katol. Sd/- Bakaram Bhagwan Nimkar, R/O Mowad—/. Witnesses: 1. Sd/- Vithoba Sonbaji Bhelkar. 2. Sd/- Nathu Bakaram Nimkar, Mowad." 4. It appears that on 16-11-1967 a partition deed was executed which is Ex. 28 on record between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1 to 3. In the said partition deed, the properties which were given to the plaintiff No. 1 for her maintenance vide Deed of Settlement Ex. 27 were also included. The plaintiff No. 1 and the plaintiff No. 2 were not the parties to the said document of partition dated 16-11-1967 (Ex. 28). 5. Bakaram died thereafter and the plaintiff No. 1 demanded partition of the property left by Bakaram by way of notice dated 4-7-1994 which was served on the defendant No. 1 on 8-7-1994; but despite the demand, the defendants did not agree for partition, compelling the plaintiff to file the suit on 25-7-1994 against the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. In the plaint, the plaintiffs averred that the partition having taken place between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. In the plaint, the plaintiffs averred that the partition having taken place between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 vide partition deed dated 16-11-1967, was not binding on the plaintiff No. 1 because she was not party to the said partition and that despite the fact that she was entitled to the share in the said property, no share was given to her. It was also averred that the properties which have been given to her for her maintenance vide Settlement Deed (Ex. 27) were her absolute properties and could not be included in the said partition deed executed on 16-11-1967, and therefore, the said partition deed dated 19-11-1967 is not binding on her. The plaintiffs thus claimed that a decree be passed directing the partition of property described in Schedule 'C' and separate possession of portion thereof that might be allotted to the share of the plaintiff be given to the plaintiffs. 6. The defendants contested the claim of the plaintiffs and inter alia submitted in the written statement that before the marriage of Bakaram with plaintiff No. 1 Yamunabai, an oral partition was effected between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and Katcha lists were also prepared and it was only thereafter that on 30-9-1966 Bakaram executed Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) in favour of plaintiff No. 1 after his marriage with her and later on a partition deed was executed on 16-11-1967 between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 as per previous oral agreement. The defendant thus submit that since the partition took place between Bakaram and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 prior to Bakaram married with plaintiff No. 1, it is binding on the plaintiffs. The defendants also submitted that in this view of the matter, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. 7. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed 8 issues at Ex. 12, viz.: “1. Do the defendants prove that the house described in Schedule `A' (3b) was the only ancestral property in the hands of Bakaram? 2. (a) Do they prove that the fields S. Nos. 63/2 and 64/2 of mouza Khairgaon were purchased jointly by Bakaram and his brother Tukaram? (b) Do they prove that Bakaram owned only the eastern area of 0.75 acres therein? 3. 2. (a) Do they prove that the fields S. Nos. 63/2 and 64/2 of mouza Khairgaon were purchased jointly by Bakaram and his brother Tukaram? (b) Do they prove that Bakaram owned only the eastern area of 0.75 acres therein? 3. Do they prove that rest of the property in Schedule 'A' was purchased for Bakaram and Gunabai mother of the defendants, by Jainabai and they are the owners thereof as heirs of the said ladies? 4. Do they prove that the entire property was partitioned before marriage of plaintiff No. 1 as alleged in para 5 of W.S. and that the registered partition-deed, dated 16th November, 1967, was made in accordance with the prior partition? 5. Is the said partition binding on plaintiffs? 6. What is the property available for partition? 7. To what share are the parties entitled ? 8. What relief and costs?” The trial Court recorded the evidence of the parties and thereafter decided issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 against the defendants. The trial Court on issue No. 6 held that the property available for partition was the property described in Schedule 'C' attached with the paint. On these findings, the trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit and declared that plaintiff No. 1, defendant No. 1, and defendant No. 2 are entitled to 3/10th share each in the properties described in Schedule C attached with the plaint and plaintiff No. 2 and defendent No. 3 are entitled to 1/20th share each in the property described in Schedule C attached with the plaint. 8. The defendants challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Katol on 5-4-1980 in terms stated above before the Assistant Judge, Nagpur in Civil Appeal No. 130/80 and the Appellate Court after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record held that the trial Court has not erred in holding that defendants have failed to prove that the property at Sr. No. 3(b) was the only ancestral property in the hands of Bakaram and fields Nos. 63/2 and 64/2 were purchased jointly by Bakaram and his brother Tukaram and rest of the property in Schedule A was purchased by Bakaram and Gunabai (mother of defendants) by Jainabai. No. 3(b) was the only ancestral property in the hands of Bakaram and fields Nos. 63/2 and 64/2 were purchased jointly by Bakaram and his brother Tukaram and rest of the property in Schedule A was purchased by Bakaram and Gunabai (mother of defendants) by Jainabai. The Appellate Court also held that the trial Court did not commit any error in holding that the defendants failed to prove that the entire property was partitioned before the marriage of the plaintiff No. 1 as alleged in para 5 of the written statement and that the registered partition deed dated 16-11-1967 was made in accordance with prior partition. The Appellate Court also found that there was no oral partition as alleged by defendants and the joint family properties for the first time were partitioned by partition deed dated 16-11-1967. The Appellate Court also held that the trial Court has not committed any error in giving the finding that the partition dated 16-11-1967 was not binding on the plaintiffs. The Appellate Court upheld the finding of the trial Court that the property described in Schedule C of the plaint was only available for partition, and therefore, the property which has been given to plaintiff No. 1 pursuant to Vyavastha patra dated 30-9-1969 (Ex. 2) cannot be included in the properties to be partitioned because that was the absolute property of plaintiff No. 1. The Appellate Court thus affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court declaring the respective shares of the parties. 9. In view of the aforesaid findings, now the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant may be examined as to whether the properties which were given to plaintiff No. 1 by way of Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) for her maintenance during her life time became the absolute property of plaintiff No. 1 or could be included in the joint family properties for its partition. A perusal of Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) would reveal that the properties mentioned in the said document have been given to plaintiff No. 1 by Bakaram for her maintenance. The relevant portion in the Deed of Settlement translated in English reads as under : “You are my wife by `Gandharva'; ¼xka/koZ½ since there should be no negligence in respect of your foods, clothing etc. 27) would reveal that the properties mentioned in the said document have been given to plaintiff No. 1 by Bakaram for her maintenance. The relevant portion in the Deed of Settlement translated in English reads as under : “You are my wife by `Gandharva'; ¼xka/koZ½ since there should be no negligence in respect of your foods, clothing etc. and since you are my heir, I am under obligation to make provision for your food and clothes etc., the following property is given to you by this Deed of Settlement for your life period.” -------------------------------- “I give you till your life time the possession of this property. You should enjoy till your life time and maintain yourself from out of this property. You are not entitled to mortgage, make gift or sale etc. of this property...........” 10. A look at the Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) would show that the properties as mentioned therein have been given to plaintiff No. 1 for her maintenance, though it is clearly mentioned in the said document that it was only for her life time. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under : “14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, Whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” 11. The question is, whether the property which has been given to the plaintiff under Vyavastha patra (Ex. The question is, whether the property which has been given to the plaintiff under Vyavastha patra (Ex. 27) for her maintenance can be said to have been acquired by the plaintiff No. 1 under the said instrument or the plaintiff No. 1 had pre-existing right of maintenance and, therefore, even if it is mentioned in the Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) that it is only for her life period such stipulation cannot be made effective and she became absolute owner under section 14(1) of the aforesaid Act. 12. It is well settled that a Hindu wife has a right of maintenance and if the property is given to the Hindu wife for her maintenance under the instrument, it cannot be said that the property has been acquired by the Hindu wife under that instrument, because such property is given to her in lieu of pre-existing right of maintenance and if the property is given in virtue of her pre-existing right, such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 even if the instrument prescribes restricted estate in the property. 13. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 came up for consideration before the Apex Court in (Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, and after considering the object of the said legislation, the Apex Court held: “It will, therefore, be seen that sub-section(1) of section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property.” The Supreme Court while considering sub-section (2) of section 14 held as under : “This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in (Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi)2, 1970(2) S.C.R. 95 . It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society. It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society. It must be constructed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the board sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section(1). The language of sub-section(2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this, would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1) for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of sub-section (1). The Explanation to sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislative in enacting sub-section(2). It is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and in the light of other provisions of the statute, so as, as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section(2), must therefore, be read in the context of sub-section(1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section(1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, Will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. This constructional approach finds support in the decision in Badri Prasad's case (supra) where this Court observed that sub-section(2) “can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods enacted therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property”. It may also be noted that when the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 which ultimately culminated into the Act, was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha, Clause 18(2) of the Draft Bill, corresponding to the present sub-section (2) of section 14, referred only to acquisition of property by a Hindu female under gift or Will and it was subsequently that the other modes of acquisition were added so as to include acquisition of property under an instrument, decree, order or award. This circumstances would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that sub-section (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right—a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or Will. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property." 14. In (G. Krishna Das v. V. Venkayya)3, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 361, the Apex court held that where a widow was placed in possession of certain joint family property in lieu of her right to maintenance, her right to the property in question became enlarged into an absolute estate under section 14(1) of the Act. 15. Again in (Vajia v. Thakorbhai)4, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 993, the Supreme Court held that the widow's right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is undoubtedly a “pre-existing “ right. The Supreme Court further held that any property given to her in lieu of maintenance is merely in recognition of the claim or right which the widow possessed from before and it cannot be said that such a right has been conferred on her for the first time by virtue of the document concerned. 16. The position that where a Hindu wife gets land in lieu of maintenance from her husband, her right becomes absolute by virtue of section 14(1) of the Act was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in (Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh), 1987 Mh.L.J. 878(S.C.). The Supreme Court thus held: “It is obvious that section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right to a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that this is to say, if she has a vestige of title. The Supreme Court thus held: “It is obvious that section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right to a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that this is to say, if she has a vestige of title. It makes no difference whether the property id acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill of exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under section 14(1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of the section 14 is in the nature of an exception to section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable right." 17. The legal position, therefore, is crystal clear that a Hindu wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband and if any property is given to her for her maintenance by any instrument, a right is not created by the instrument under which the property has been given to her for her maintenance, but under the pre-existing right and when the property has been given to the Hindu wife for maintenance for a pre-existing right, the said property becomes the absolute property of that Hindu wife despite the restricted estate created by that instrument. Such property, therefore, as acquired by the Hindu wife is covered under section 14(1) of the Act and she would become full owner of the said property and not a limited owner. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the properties which were given to plaintiff No. 1 for her maintenance by document vide Vyavastha Patra (Ex. Such property, therefore, as acquired by the Hindu wife is covered under section 14(1) of the Act and she would become full owner of the said property and not a limited owner. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the properties which were given to plaintiff No. 1 for her maintenance by document vide Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27), became her absolute property even if there was covenant to the effect that it was only for a life time of plaintiff No. 1 and since she was absolute owner of the said property under section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, the said property was not liable to be partitioned and could not have been included in the properties which were to be partitioned between the parties, and therefore, the courts below have not committed any error of law in holding that the properties which are available for partition are the properties mentioned in Schedule C annexed with the plaint and the properties mentioned in Vyavastha Patra (Ex. 27) could not be included for partition. 19. Consequently, this Second Appeal is devoid of any merit and is, therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----