R. C. LAHOTL ( 1 ) THIS order governs the disposal of IA 9121/93 filed by the plaintiff-petitioner under Order 39 Rule 2a of the Civil Procedure Code seeking punishment of the defendant- respondents for committing breach of the orders dated 7. 5. 93 and 30. 9. 93 passed by this court.- ( 2 ) IT purports to be a tenant-landlord dispute. On 12. 1. 93, the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction alleging himself to be a tenant of the defendant-respondent and seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with peaceful and useful enjoyment of the suit premises bearing no. C-18/4, Industrial Area, Wazirpur, Delhi, shown in red in the site plan annexed with the plait. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the plaintiff, he was a tenant in the suit premises. The defendant was obstructing peaceful user of the premises by the plaintiff. For about 3 days, prior to the institution of the suit, the defendant had created obstacle by putting heavy materials and objects on the approach way leading to a toilet which was in use of the plaintiff- petitioner. ( 4 ) THE defendant-respondent is vehemently contesting the suit. The gist of the plea taken in the written statement is that plaintiff was neither a tenant nor a sub-tenant nor even a licencee in the suit premises. He was a rank trespasser. M/s. D. Bhawani Stainless Steel were in occupation of the premises under a Commission Agency Agreement entered into by it with the defendant and with them, the; plaintiff was working as a supervisor, M/s. D. Bhawani vacated the premises either inducting the plaintiff in possession or the plaintiff himself had forced entry of himself. Insofar as the alleged toilet (which has come to be marked and denoted by words KLMN in the sketch map forming part of the affidavit) is concerned, it was neither a toilet nor ever used by the plaintiff much less as a toilet. ( 5 ) SOON on filing of the suit, the plaintiff had sought for appointment of a local commissioner, which was allowed. On 22. 1. ( 5 ) SOON on filing of the suit, the plaintiff had sought for appointment of a local commissioner, which was allowed. On 22. 1. 93 when the Commissioner visited the spot, he could not inspect the portion marked KLMN inasmuch as he found a wooden door which could have been a source of entry from the premises in possession of the plaintiff to the portion marked KLMN was closed and blocked from the other side. The commission had been issued ex-parte. The defendant had no notice either of issuance of the commission or of the date and time of execution. thereof. The defendant was not also available on the spot. Though someone, referred to as son of the defendant landlord had appeared before the Commissioner on being called but the report of the Commissioner does riot show any effort having been made by the Commissioner either on his own or at the instance of the plaintiff or his counsel at securing access to the portion KLMN. ( 6 ) HERE itself it would be useful to refer to another report of the Local Commissioner dated 1. 11. 93, the commission having been issued once again by the court at the end at the instance of the plaintiff. This was a by-party commission. The Commissioner did visit and inspect the portion marked KLMN along with other parts of the premises inspected by him. The Commissioner found that the door marked at K (providing access from the plaintiffs portion to the alleged toilet) was open. The Commissioner found KLMN to be a small room being used only as a store. There was no W/c nor any sewerage system. Some iron parts were lying in the room which were removed by the Commissioner to find out if there was any pot for use of the place as latrine or urinal but there was none. The result of the observations made by the Commissioner was his finding that the place was more of a store than a toilet. He also found from the condition of the place that it had not been used as a bathroom for months together. However, the Commissioner noticed that in the building plan approved by the Municipal Corporation, the place was marked as one proposed for use as toilet. He also found from the condition of the place that it had not been used as a bathroom for months together. However, the Commissioner noticed that in the building plan approved by the Municipal Corporation, the place was marked as one proposed for use as toilet. ( 7 ) IN this background, now the two orders passed by the court may be noticed, breach whereof by the defendant-respondent has been alleged. ( 8 ) ON 7. 5. 93, the counsel for the defendant no. l made first appearance in the case. He was allowed 4 weeks time for filing the written statement to the pending interlocutory applications. The counsel for the plaintiff had stated orally before the court that one of the toilets in the suit premises shown in red colour and as LKMN in the site plan was being used by the plaintiff but than the defendant had blocked its entry at point k with the result that the plaintiff could not use the only toilet available in the premises in plaintiffs occupation. Presumably because the defendant was not present in the court and the defendant s counsel was not duly instructed on the point, the counsel had stated that at that stage he was no in a position to say as to whether the plaintiff had been in possession of the said toilet or not. Under the circumstances, the court directed :- " Without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the defendant, till further orders, the defendant shall - not create any obstacle in the use of the said toilet by the plaintiff. ( 9 ) THE date 30. 9. 93 was the next date appointed for hearing in the suit. On that date, further 3 weeks time was allowed to the defendant for filing written statement and reply. The court further directed :- " Defendants are directed to make available access to the toilet on the ground floor forthwith and file an affidavit of compliance within 2 days. " ( 10 ) A perusal of the contents of IA No. 9121/93 reveals that the grievance of the petitioner has been that inspite of the orders passed by the court, he was not allowed access to the toilet KLMN. In the reply, it is stated that insofar as the opening of the door was concerned, that was had been immediately by the defendant-respondent. In the reply, it is stated that insofar as the opening of the door was concerned, that was had been immediately by the defendant-respondent. It is also stated that the defendant s counsel Dr. A. K. Kaul, Advocate had taken care to personally visit the premises on the same date, i. e. , 30. 9. 93 and having contacted the petitioner on the spot, had shown him the access having been made available by opening the door. The gist of defence appears to be that though the door was open but the place KLMN was neither a toilet nor capable of being so used and the defendants could not be blamed for breach of the order of the court if the plaintiff could not have used and cannot use the place as a toilet. The defendant s compliance with court order had stood made by opening the door. ( 11 ) THE report of the Commissioner dated 1. 11. 93 puts it beyond any shadow of doubt that insofar as access by the plaintiff to the place KLMN is concerned, it was made available. The other aspect of the grievance remains to be adjudicated upon. ( 12 ) IT may be noted that at no point of time, either on 7. 5. 93 or on 30. 9. 903, the court had recorded a finding even prima facie that the place KLMN was a toilet or was at any point of time so used by the plaintiff. The interim order dated 13. 9. 93 reveals on its face that it was intended primarily to take care of the plaintiffs grievance of the door having not been opened by the defendant presumably in the light of the report of the Commissioner dated 22. 1. 93. The Court expected and rather mandated the defendant to open the door. The defendant did it. The court had not only not expressed so but also could not have intended the defendant to permit the use of place KLMN by the plaintiff as a toilet even if it was not a toilet. ( 13 ) A few circumstances need to be taken care of and noticed even now though as incidental inasmuch as they would be subject matter of inquiry in the suit which is yet to be tried. ( 13 ) A few circumstances need to be taken care of and noticed even now though as incidental inasmuch as they would be subject matter of inquiry in the suit which is yet to be tried. The plaintiff has not placed any document on record in prima facie support of his case of being a tenant in the suit premises. No receipt showing the payment of rent has been filed. Excepting the affidavit of the petitioner, there is absolutely no other material brought record nor supporting testimony adduced to persuade the court in holding the premises KLMN having been in use of the plaintiff much less used as a toilet before the date of cause of action. The plaintiff claims to be a partner of M/s. Jai Durga Industries running in the suit premises. There must be employees, workers, customers or visitors who must have used the toilet as such, at the instance of the plaintiff if at all he was in occupation or use of it. The plaintiff could very well have examined anyone of them in support of his case. That has not been done. ( 14 ) IN cross-examination held on 13. 7. 94, on the affidavit of the plaintiff, he has admitted that there was no tenancy in writing. He further stated that the toilet in question had a sewer line which was still in existence. He went on to admit that he had last used the toilet in November, 1992 and there was a flush in the toilet. ( 15 ) THE report dated 1. 11. 93 of the commissioner belies prima facie a major part of the statement of the plaintiff. ( 16 ) THE defendant has on the other hand, controverted all the material averments and allegations made by the plaintiff. During his cross-examination, he admitted that there was a wash basin installed in KLMN but that would not by itself prove the existence of a toilet. In photograph exhibit P-9, something between letters AB was suggested by the plaintiff to be a pipeline but the witness explained that it could not be a pipeline but was beeding of a wooden door. The photograph prima facie suggests the defendant s version to be correct. In all other photographs brought on record, the place KLMN is shown being used as a store room. The photograph prima facie suggests the defendant s version to be correct. In all other photographs brought on record, the place KLMN is shown being used as a store room. ( 17 ) THE proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2a Civil Procedure Code, though civil in nature, involve penal consequences. The burden of proof lies on the petitioner to allege arid prove facts and circumstances enabling fixing of liability of breach on the person proceeded against. The underlying concept behind proceedings contemplated by Order 39 Rule 2a Civil Procedure Code is to maintain and uphold the dignity of the court and sanctity of the orders passed by it. It also aims at securing compliance with the orders of the court. Undoubtedly, the orders of the court are too sacrosanct. The court would not bear or connive at their violation. But at the same time, it would not blink its eyes at the realities and punish a person for non- compliance with an order which could not have been complied with. In the case at hand, it would have been quite different if the court would have at any point of time arrived at a positive finding, even prima facie of the place KLMN being a toilet. As already noticed, the case is not so. Insofar as the parties are concerned, it a case of oath against oath. The version of the defendant-respondent appears to be more probable in view of the facts found by the Commissioner during local investigation. If the place KLMN is not shown to be a toilet, the defendant-respondent would not be punished by the court for his failure in permitting the use of the place as toiler. In so far as permitting access to the petitioner to the place KLMN by opening the door is concerned, that the defendant- respondent has certainly done. He has done it as he could have done it. ( 18 ) IN the opinion of this court, the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2a Civil Procedure Code are misconceived. In any case, the present one is not considered to be a fit case where this court would be inclined to punish the defendant-respondent by holding him guilty of breach of an order of injunction passed by the court. The proceedings are, therefore, directed to be dropped.