A. S. TRIPATHI, J. This revision is filed against the remand orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad on 14- 9-1993, 28-9-1993, 12-10-1993, 26-10-1993 and 5-11-1993 declaring the same to be illegal. It is further prayed that in view of the fact that the remand orders are illegal the revisionist be admitted to bail in case Crime No. 324 of 1993 under Sec tion 302, I. P. C. and Crime No. 328 of 1993 under Sections 25/27, Arms Act Police Station Kydeganj, District Allahabad. . 2. It is alleged that the committal order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 209, Cr. P. C. on 12-10-1993 did not contain the order, of remand according to law. The provisions of Section 207, Cr. P. C. are not complied with necessary papers were not supplied to the revisions. However, no remand orders were passed on 14-9-1993 and 28-9-1993. The report of Chemical Examiner for blood-stained earth was not received and the committal order has been passed without this report. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had passed mechanical order and had not applied his mind. The remand orders are illegal and, therefore, they are liable to be quashed. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A. G. A. appearing for the State at great length and perused the record of the lower court. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionist laid emphasis on the order passed by the learned Magistrate on different dates. They are said to be passed in mechanical way without applying the mind. These orders do not contain direction for remand in jail custody. The revisonist was brought before the court on 31-8- 1993 and the following order was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate: "aaj Abhiyukt jail se talab hokar nyayalaya. aaya. Uprokt apradh mein arop-patra prastut kiya. Darj registar ho. Nakalain taiyar hain. Waste dene nakal dinak 14-9-1993 ko pesh ho. Tab-takk muljim ko nyayik adhiraksha mein rakha jai. " 5. Then the accused-revisionist was brought before the court again on 14-9-1993. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as it is evident from the order-sheet passed the following orders: "accused present in custody. Fix 28-9-1993 for appearance. Sum mon the accused from jail. " Then again on 28-9-1993 the revisionist was brought before the court and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the following orders: "aaj pesh huwa. Awaj dilayee gayee. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as it is evident from the order-sheet passed the following orders: "accused present in custody. Fix 28-9-1993 for appearance. Sum mon the accused from jail. " Then again on 28-9-1993 the revisionist was brought before the court and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the following orders: "aaj pesh huwa. Awaj dilayee gayee. Muljim Rajesh jail se hirasat mein haajir aya. Waste Hajiri tareekh 12-10-1993 mukarrar kee gayee gai. Muljim jail se talab howe. " 6. On 12-10-1993 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate committed the accused to the court of Sessions and directed that the accused shall remain in custody during and till conclusion of the trial. 7. The learned counsel for the revisionist vehemently argued that in the committal order there was no order for remand, therefore the custody of the revisionist was illegal and he was entitled to bail. However, in the alternative he argued that there was no remand order at all on 14-9-1993 and 28-9- 1993. 8. It has further been argued that after committal of the case the learned Sessions Judge also did no pass any order of remand under sub section (2) of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the date fixed in the case on 19-10-1993, 26-10-1993 and 5-11-1993. The only order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is that on 19-10-1993 when the accused was brought before the court 26-10-1993 was fixed with the direction that charge will be framed on that date. No specific order of remand was passed. On 26-10-1993 again when the accused was brought before the court it was directed that for appearance again 5-11-1993 be fixed. On 5-11-1993 again when the accused did not appear on account of illness and was not brought before the court the court directed that 17-11-1993 be fixed for appearance. In all these orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge no specific order or remand was passed. 9. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that in the absence of specific remand order passed by the learned Magistrate on different dates and also no order for remand being passed by the learned Sessions Judge custody of the revisionist was illegal and he was entitled for bail. 10. 9. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that in the absence of specific remand order passed by the learned Magistrate on different dates and also no order for remand being passed by the learned Sessions Judge custody of the revisionist was illegal and he was entitled for bail. 10. On the other hand learned A. G. A. appearing for the State argued that although no specific order of remand was passed on some dates by the learned Magistrate and also by the learned Sessions Judge, but on the warrant of remand there was initials of the Presiding Officer and that will be deemed to be an order of remand and, therefore, the custody could not be illegal and the accused revisionist was not entitled to bail. 11. The learned counsel for the parties have referred a number of cases on the point of remand which are to be considered for disposal of this revision on merits. 12. The learned counsel for the revisionist referred to the decisions passed by this High Courts in Writ Petition No. 10884 of 1989-Ram Shanker v. Adhikshak, Janpad Karagar, Faizabad and another (Lucknow Bench), Writ Petition No. 10885 of 19%9-Vijai Kumar alias Aggu v. Superintendent, District Jail, Faizabad and another (Lucknow Bench), Writ Petition No. 260 of 1991-Shivaji Singh alias Netaji and another v. Adhikshak, District Jail, Lucknow and another (Lucknow Bench), the case of Vashisht Muni v. Super intendent, District Jail, Faizabad and others reported in U. P. Criminal Rulings, 1993, page 159, Habeas Corpus Petition No. 4605 of 1993, Sukhdeo Singh alias Sukha Singh and another v. The Superintendent, District Jail, Nainital and others ; Writ Petition No. 236 of 1992, 237 of 1992, 238 of 1992 and 239 of 1992 (Lucknow Bench) decided by a common judgment by Honble S. Saghir Ahmad, J. and Honble H. N. Tilhari, J. 13. In all these cases a continuous view has been taken that whenever accused is brought before the court and enquiry or trial is postponed, a specific order of remand has to be passed by the court sending him to jail custody and for appearance on the next date. Simply fixing date for appearance of the accused was not enough under the law for judicial custody. Again a reference was made to the case of Nakul Singh and another v. State, reported in 1982 U. P. Criminal Rulings page 100. Simply fixing date for appearance of the accused was not enough under the law for judicial custody. Again a reference was made to the case of Nakul Singh and another v. State, reported in 1982 U. P. Criminal Rulings page 100. In that case also it was held that express order of remanded has to be passed under Sections 209 and 309 Cr. P. C. remanding the accused to jail custody for a specified period and in absence of such specific order detention would be illegal. 14. The learned counsel for revisionist referred to the case of Khatri and others v. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1985 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) page 228. In that case Honble Supreme Court clearly held that deten tion without remand order is illegal. 15. The cases referred above, i. e. Writ Petition Nos. 236 of 1992, 237 or 1992, 238 of 1992 and 239 of 1992 Honble Mr. Justice S. Saghir Ahmad and Honble Mr. Justice H. N. Tilhari by a common judgment con sidered the Full Bench case of this Court in the case of Urooj Abbas v. State U. P. , reported in 1973 Criminal Law Journal pages 1458 and held that the said Full Bench case needs reconsideration by a larger bench as the same was in conflict with the judgment of Honble Supreme Court passed in the case of Madhu Limaye and others, v. State reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court page 1014. In the case of Madhu Limaye Honble Supreme Court has held that the remand order must be passed by the Magistrate applying his mind to all the relevant matters. The remand orders, if passed patently in routine and mechanical manner will make the detention illegal. 16. In the aforesaid case Honble S. Saghir Ahmad, J. and Honble H. N. Tilhari, J. formulated following three quastions and referred the matter to larger bench of five Judges: (1) Whether under Section 309, sub-section (2) Cr. P. C. the power of the courts to adjourn or postpone the enquiry or trial of the case as well as to remand the accused to jail custody by a warrant is controlled by the expressions and conditions referred to there in, i. e. for the reasons to be recorded and on terms as it thinks fit ? P. C. the power of the courts to adjourn or postpone the enquiry or trial of the case as well as to remand the accused to jail custody by a warrant is controlled by the expressions and conditions referred to there in, i. e. for the reasons to be recorded and on terms as it thinks fit ? (2) Whether the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Urooj Abbas v. State of U. P. , (1973 Criminal Law Journal page 1458) to the effect that there is no need to record an order of remand in writing separately in the order-sheet nor there is any need to record the reasons there for in writing for remanding the accused to jail has been correctly laid down . (3) Whether the interpretation placed on Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Urooj Abbas vide 1973 Criminal Law Journal page 1458 is in consonance with the principles of law enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?" 17. These questions have been referred to the larger bench of five Judges of this Court and the matter is still pending. While referring the matter to the larger bench the Court directed that pending the accused to jail custody without specific remand order was held illegal and accused was enlarged on bail. 18. Again reference was made to the case of Tej Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. and another, reported, in 1977 ACC page 273. In that case also it was held that detention without specific order of remand is illegal. 19. On the other hand learned A. G. A. appearing for the State relied on the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya v. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fathegarh and another, reported in AIR 1955 Allahabad 193. In that case it was held that: "the Magistrate ordinarily while adjourning the case direct that the accused should remain in custody as before, but the omission to mention as such in the order sheet-does not matter when the warrant contains the Magistrates authority for detention. " 20. In that case this observation was made by the Supreme Court in the provisions of U. P. Special Powers Act (Act No. 14 of 1932 ). In the said case the question was about the validity of the said Act. " 20. In that case this observation was made by the Supreme Court in the provisions of U. P. Special Powers Act (Act No. 14 of 1932 ). In the said case the question was about the validity of the said Act. This Court had not considered the provisions of Sections 209 and 309, Cr. P. C. and, therefore, this case is not of much help for the matter in question regarding Interpretation of Sections 209 and 309, Cr. P. C. 21. Moreover the Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case as referred above has clearly held that remand order should not be mechanical without applying the mind and specific order of remand should be passed for jail custody of the accused. 22. In the case of Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1953 Supreme Court page 277, it was clearly held by Honble Supreme Court that: "detention of person in custody after the expiry of the remand order, without any fresh order of remand committing him to further custody while adjourning the case under Section 344, Criminal Procedure Code, is illegal. " 23. Similar provisions are given under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24. In view of these conflict in the decisions of Honble Supreme Court and by a Full Bench of this Court the matter has been referred to larger Bench of five Judges for reconsideration. Pending decision of the larger Bench this court in all the cases referred above has been following the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case that remand order must not be machanical. In most of the cases it has been held that mere signing of warrant is not enough. A specific order of remand has to be passed. 25. Now I proceed to examine the relevant provisions of Sections 209 and 309, Cr. P. C. The two sections as amended upto date are quoted below: "209. In most of the cases it has been held that mere signing of warrant is not enough. A specific order of remand has to be passed. 25. Now I proceed to examine the relevant provisions of Sections 209 and 309, Cr. P. C. The two sections as amended upto date are quoted below: "209. Commitment of case to Court of Session where offence is triable exclusively by it when in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall- (a) commit after complying with the provisions of Section 207, or Section 208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until such commit ment has been made ; (b) subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, re mand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of the trial; (e) send to that Court the record of the case and the docu ments and articles if any, which are to be produced in evidence ; (d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session. " 26. The State amendment in Section 209 of the Code reads as under: "uttar Pradesh: In Section 209 for clauses (a) and (b), the following clauses shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted, namely: (a) as soon as may be after complying with the provisions of Section 207, commit the case to the Court of Session ; (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until commitment of the case under clause (a)and thereafter during, and until the con clusion of trial. " "section 309 of the Code is contained in Chapter XXIV of the Code which makes "general provisions as to Enquiries and Trials". Section 309 reads as under: "309. " "section 309 of the Code is contained in Chapter XXIV of the Code which makes "general provisions as to Enquiries and Trials". Section 309 reads as under: "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.- (1) In every enquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witness has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commence ment of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any enquiry or trial, if any, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjourn ment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show-cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him. Explanation 1.-If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a sus picion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2.-The forms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused. " 27. Again reverting back to the case of Vashisht Muni v. Superinten dent, District Jail, Faizabad and others a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Lucknow Bench has considered the implications of the State amendment under Section 209, Cr. P. C. and also the provisions of Section 309, Cr. " 27. Again reverting back to the case of Vashisht Muni v. Superinten dent, District Jail, Faizabad and others a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Lucknow Bench has considered the implications of the State amendment under Section 209, Cr. P. C. and also the provisions of Section 309, Cr. P. C. and held that : "the warrant of remand thus authorising the Superintendent of Jail to keep the petitioner in custody during the course of entire enquiry till its conclusion cannot be held to be a valid warrant of remand under Section 309, Cr. P. C. 28. The learned A. G. A. appearing for the State laid emphasis on the amended Clause (b) of Section 209, Cr. P. C. providing that subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until, commitment of the case under Clause (a) and thereafter during, and until the conclusion of trial. 29. Learned A. G. A. argued that in view of this amended provisions once the Magistrate has committed the case to the Court of Session and remanded the accused to custody till conclusion of the trial, no further order of remand was required to be passed by the learned Sessions Judge when he adjourns or postpones the proceedings but under the provisions of Section 309, Cr. P. C. merely signing the warrant- sheet by the Session Judge is enough. 30. When the personal liberty of a citizen is in question the provisions of Statute have to be interpreted keeping in view the provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 31. The provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. apply only till the stage of committal of the case to the court of Session. Thereafter when the trial begins the provisions of Section 309, Cr. P. C. will apply. In sub- section (1) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. it has been provided that in every enquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular, when the examination of witness has once begun, the same shall be continued day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Sub section (1) of Section 309 calls for a duty upon the Court to hold enquiry or trial as expeditiously as possible and unless adjournment or postponement is necessary then the reasons must be recorded. 32. After this stage once the trial has begun the adjournment of post ponement must be made after recording the reasons. 33. Under sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. it has been provided that once the trial is postponed for such time as the Court considers reasonable then if the accused is in custody be remanded by a warrant. In this sub section also it calls upon the court to remand the accused by a warrant when ever postponement of the trial is made. The two explanations added to Section 309 clearly indicate that an order of remand has to be passed before remanding the accused to custody by warrant, on postponement of the case. This clearly shows that merely signing the warrant sheet is not enough. An order of remand has to be passed whenever the trial is postponed. 34. Now it is apparent on record that on 14-9-1993 and 28-9-1993 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad had not passed any remand order on the order-sheet. He had simply signed the warrant of remand which is known as intermediate custody warrant under Section 167, Cr. P. C. signing of this intermediate warrant as contemplated under Section 167, Cr. P. C. is not an order of remand as required under Section 209, Cr. P. C. or Section 309, Cr. P. C. Therefore, on these two dates on 14-9-1993 and 28- 9-1993 there was no remand order in the order-sheet and for that period the custody of the accused revisionist becomes illegal. 35. Similarly when the case was sent to the Court of Session and learned Session Judge had proceeded with the trial and fixed several dates but did not pass any order of remand. The order-sheet shows that simply dates have been fixed for attendance and charge. No order of remand was passed as contem plated under Section 309 sub-section (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure. These orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are mechanical and also the learned Session Judge did not pass any order of remand. Only intermediate custody warrant was signed which was not an order of remand. No order of remand was passed as contem plated under Section 309 sub-section (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure. These orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are mechanical and also the learned Session Judge did not pass any order of remand. Only intermediate custody warrant was signed which was not an order of remand. However, the committal order dated 12-10-1993 does contain an order of remand of accused during and till conclusion of the trial as contemplated under the amended clause (b) of Section 209, Cr. P. C. But there was no remand order on 12-9-1993 and 28-9-1993 and also there is no remand order on 19- 10-1993, 26-10-1993 and 5-11-1993 when the trial has proceeded before the learned Session Judge and the same was postponed without any remand order. Again it is clarified that under Section 309 sub- section (2) when the trial is postponed the accused has to be remanded to custody by a warrant. This sub-section also calls upon the court to pass an order of remand. Simply signing of inter mediate custody warrant as contemplated under Section 167, Cr. P. C. is not enough. 36. Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case as referred above, has clearly laid down the law that the accused cannot be sent to jail without a remand order and the remand order must be passed applying the mind of the court and must not be routine and mechanical in nature. 37. In the case of Hussain Ara Khatoon v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court page 1369 it was held that speedy trial is the part of fundamental right guarantees right of liberty. 38. Further in the case of Natbar Prarida v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1975 SC page 1465, it has been held that the position of law under Section 309, Cr. P. C. is different. Section 309 sub-section (2) Cr. P. C. is attracted only after cognizance of an offence has been taken or the commence ment of the trial has proceeded. The court as no inherrent power of remand. 39. Further in the case of Nurul Huda v. State reported in 1984 Alld. LJ page 560, it has been held that: "the Magistrate when remands an accused to custody after submission of charge-sheet the earlier irregularities of earlier remand stand cured and the accused cannot be released for those irregularities. The court as no inherrent power of remand. 39. Further in the case of Nurul Huda v. State reported in 1984 Alld. LJ page 560, it has been held that: "the Magistrate when remands an accused to custody after submission of charge-sheet the earlier irregularities of earlier remand stand cured and the accused cannot be released for those irregularities. " 40. However, in this case the facts are different. After submission of the charge-sheet no remand orders have been passed by the learned Magistrate on two different dates. While committing the case to the Court of Sessions an order of remand appears to be incorporated in its last paragraph. That will not cure the Absence of remand orders of earlier two different dates. 41. In the case of Surjeet Singh v. State of U. P. reported in 1984 Alld. LJ p. 375 (Full Bench), it has been held that: "in a case the accused was committed to the court of sessions on 26-2-1983 but the warrant did not mention that the accused was remanded to custody. The court of session received the record on 26-2- 1983 itself but made no order for remanding the accused to custody. Eventually the order commiting him to custody was made on 27-6-1983 remanding the accused being in custody for a considerable time without legal remand order. That illegal custody does not entitle the accused to bail as a matter of right. " 42. In this case this court has held that once the case has been com mitted to the Court of Session and a valid remand order is passed by the Magistrate the accused will not be entitled to bail if the custody was illegal for some period in between as a matter of right. However, in this case the court has observed that the Sessions Court was also required to pass an order of remand. 43. Also in the case of Kedar v. State of U. P. reported in 1977 Cr. LJ p. 1230 (Alld.), 1977 Alld. Cr. Rulings page 163; 1977 AWC 205, it was held that Sessions Judge has a power of remand if the accused is in custody once he has taken cognizance of the Sessions trial. In this case it was observed that it was called upon the Session Judge also to pass an order of remand. 44. Cr. Rulings page 163; 1977 AWC 205, it was held that Sessions Judge has a power of remand if the accused is in custody once he has taken cognizance of the Sessions trial. In this case it was observed that it was called upon the Session Judge also to pass an order of remand. 44. In the case of Veru Vishwanathan v. Stale of Karnataka reported in 1971 Mad LJ (Cri) p. 13 and the case reported in 1971 Cr LJ 1368, it was held that : "recording reasons for order of remand was necessary. Such order cannot be passed as a matter of right. The remand order without reasons recorded construed grave injustice to the accused. 45. In the case of Chhitar v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1980 Cr. LJ p. 94, it was held that every time if the case u adjourned there should be fresh order of remand to judicial custody. 46. In the case of Jeewan Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in 1978 Cr. LJ (Patna) p. 119, it was held that an accused was entitled to be released when he was detained without a proper order of remand in a case how so grave it may be, even it may be the murder case. 47. After examining the facts of this case and discussing the case-law on the point it appears that it has been established law that accused cannot be detained in custody without a remand order. In Madhu Limaye case Honble Supreme Court has clearly held that the remand order must not be mechanical without applying the mind of the court. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Urooj Abbas has taken a different view and the matter has already been referred to a larger bench of five Judges of this Court which is pending con sideration. 48. In this particular case on two dates as pointed out above the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had not passed any order of remand. That made the custody of the accused illegal for that period. However, on a liberal interpretation of the committal order it may be taken that while committing the case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had mentioned that he has committed to the Court of Session during custody till conclusion of the trial. This may be taken to be an order of remand till conclusion of the trial. However, on a liberal interpretation of the committal order it may be taken that while committing the case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had mentioned that he has committed to the Court of Session during custody till conclusion of the trial. This may be taken to be an order of remand till conclusion of the trial. But what has been discussed above, the order of remand in this nature is only till the cognizance has been taken by the Session Judge and the trial has started as provided under Section 309 (1), Cr. P. C. but once the trial is postponed or adjourned for any reason then the accused if in custody has to be remanded for the next date by a warrant of remand as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. As contemplated under Section 209, Cr. P. C. the learned Magistrate when committing the case to the court of Session may remand the accused to custody. Similarly under Section 309, sub-section (2) Cr. P. C. once the trial is adjourned or postponed for any reason to be recorded the accused if in custody may by a warrant be remanded to judicial custody till the next date. The provisions of sub-section (2) again provide for a remand on postponement of the trial. Once a remand of the accused in custody is requir ed then, in my opinion, an order has to be passed by the Court remanding the accused to judicial custody for further period. There are conflicting decisions on this point of different High Courts. In some cases it had been held that no order is required to be passed by the Session Judge once the Magistrate while committing the case has remanded the accused to custody during and conclusion of the trial. Also the amendment of the State of U. P. in Sec tion 209, Cr. P. C. authorises the Magistrate to remand the accused to judicial custody during and till conclusion of the trial. 49. In my opinion, the amended provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. will remain in force only till the provisions of Section 309 (1) of the Cr. P. C. are applicable and continued. But once the provisions of sub- section (2) of Section 309, Cr. 49. In my opinion, the amended provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. will remain in force only till the provisions of Section 309 (1) of the Cr. P. C. are applicable and continued. But once the provisions of sub- section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. begins to apply on adjournment or postponement of the trial then a fresh remand is required if the accused is in custody. If the accused is on bail then the question does not arise but in case when the accused is in custody then to deprive him of the personal liberty an order or valid remand has to be passed by the Court applying its mind. A mechanical signing of a custody warrant is not enough as held by Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case. 50. The same principles apply when a accused in custody is to be remanded either in Section 209 or under Section 309 sub-section (2), Cr. P. C. In my opinion, once a remand is required either during enquiry or commitment or on postponement after commencement of the trial by the Session Judge an order is required. Since the remand is required it must be by an order of the Court. As such as I understand the intention of the legislature was while detaining sub-section (2) of Section 309 that on postponement of the trial the accused if in custody has to be remanded by a warrant. Again at this stage it was vehemently argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate that simply signing of custody warrant was enough under this sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. I am unable to agree with the line of argument advanced by the learned A. G. A. on this point. 51. The interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. has to be made keeping in view the provisions of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Consti tution of India, where the necessary safeguards in respect of the personal liberty of the citizen have been provided. Accordingly, in my opinion, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. requiring a remand by warrant when the trial is postponed, is mandatory if the court decides to keep the accused in further custody. The Court may on postponement of the trial release the accused from custody. Accordingly, in my opinion, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. requiring a remand by warrant when the trial is postponed, is mandatory if the court decides to keep the accused in further custody. The Court may on postponement of the trial release the accused from custody. But once the court decides to detain the accused further, if the accused was in custody before the court then the accused has to be remanded,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . to jail on postponement of the trial. As such it requires an order to be passed by the trial court on postponement of the trial. In my opinion, without passing an order of remand simply putting initials on custody warrant is not sufficient to justify the detention of the accused. Again application of the mind of court is necessary whenever a remand is made either under Section 209 or under Section 309, sub-section (2), Cr. P. C. and application of mind can only be judged by passing an order of remand by the Court. 52. In this particular case, therefore, it is clear that on two dates, 14-9-1993 and 28-9-1993 no order of remand was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Similarly the learned Sessions Judge had also not passed any order of remand on 19-10-1993, 26-10-1993 and 5-11-1993. 53. A situation has to be visualised when the accused is brought before the court in custody either during enquiry or trial, he expects that the court will pass an order either of his release or his further custody. In such a situa tion mere mechanical signing of the custody warrant will not fulfil the require ment of law for passing of an order whose personal liberty is in question and who cannot be detained without an authority of law. The point authority of law requires that the court will express its opinion to the accused that he is to be detained in further custody either during enquiry or trial. Mechanical signing the custody warrant will deprive the accused of his right to know that he is being detained by the Court further for valid reasons and he is entitled to know the cause of his further detention. Mechanical signing the custody warrant will deprive the accused of his right to know that he is being detained by the Court further for valid reasons and he is entitled to know the cause of his further detention. In this view of the matter it is always required that the court while directing further detention by warrant of remand must apply its mind and pass orders of directing the accused to be detained further for a specified period. In the absence of an order mere signing the custody warrant will not fulfil the conditions that an accused has a right to know as to for how long he will be detained in custody. As such an order of remand is equally necessary under Section 309 sub-section (2), Cr. P. C. on postponement of the trial. 54. Learned A. G. A. appearing for the State emphasised that it is a case of murder, a heinous crime the point of remand may not be strictly inter preted. 55. I have given anxious thought to this aspect of the matter but I am unable to appreciate the contention of the learned A. G. A. The law is equal for every body. The provisions of statute equally apply to every accused whether involved in minor offence or major offence. But the law cannot be interpreted differently for minor offence and major offence. As such, simply because the revisionist is involved in a case of murder the interpretation of the Statute cannot be other than what has been discussed above. 56. In view of what has been discussed above, in the absence of order of remand by the court the detention of accused becomes illegal and as such he is entitled to be bailed out in this case. 57. The revision is accordingly allowed and it is directed that the revi sionist, Rajesh Mishra, shall be admitted to bail on furnishing two sureties and a personal bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in case crime No. 324 of 1993 under Section 302, I. P. C. and case crime No. 328 of 1993 under Section 25/27, Arms Act, Police Station Kidganj District Allahabad. Revision allowed. .