Judgment :- This appeal is against the conviction and sentence of the learned Special Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate), South Arcot District at Cuddalore in S.C.No. 1 of 1985, dated 3. 1987. This appellant who was the Village Administrative Officer of Punavasal village, alleged to have received bribe of Rs. 25 on 7. 1984 for issuing the community certificate. The prosecution has examined 11 witnesses and the case of the prosecution in the lower court is as follows: The son of P.W.1 by name Muruganandam was studying in 10th standard in Orathur Higher Secondary School. As this school is at a distance of about four miles away from his village Ponnavasal his father P.W.1 wanted to admit him in the school hostel, where free boarding and lodging is provided to the backward community boys. As this boy Muruganandam belongs to a backward class P.W.1 approached P.W.8, who is working as Junior Assistant in Orathur School, for getting admission of his boy in the hostel. P.W.8 advised him to produce the community certificate and also the income certificate for admitting the boy in the hostel. On 7. 1984, P.W.1 approached his appellant, who was the Village Administrative Officer in charge for Ponnavasal village, and requested for the community certificate and income certificate for which this appellant demanded Rs. 25 as bribe. Though P.W.1 expressed his inability, this appellant insisted that unless the amount as demanded by him was paid, he would not issue the community certificate. Therefore, P.W.1 saying that he would come on the next day, came to Cuddalore and orally gave the complaint to the Vigilance Inspector P.W.11, who recorded the complaint Ex.P-1. He registered a case against this appellant in Crime No. 4/AC/84 under Sec. 161, Indian Penal Code and asked P.W.1 to come on the next day early morning with the amount demanded by this appellant. P.W.11, the Inspector of Police, sent requisition to P.W.2 attached to the Housing Board and one Varadharajan, Deputy Registrar, to be the witnesses in the trap case. On the next day morning P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Varadharajan, were present in the Vigilance office at 5.00 a.m. P.W.11 explained to P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Varadharajan the salient features of the phenopthalence test and conducted the demonstration by spraying the phenopthalene powder over the currency notes M.Os. On the next day morning P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Varadharajan, were present in the Vigilance office at 5.00 a.m. P.W.11 explained to P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Varadharajan the salient features of the phenopthalence test and conducted the demonstration by spraying the phenopthalene powder over the currency notes M.Os. 1 and 2 brought by P.W.1 and asked the witness Varadharajan to handle the currency notes M.Os. 1 and 2 and dip his fingers in the Sodium Carbonate solution which was colourless. When he did so, the solution turned to pink colour P.W.11 prepared a mahazar Ex.P-2 for the demonstration and also for the currency notes M.Os. 1 and 2 P.W.1 was instructed to go along with P.W.2 and handover the money to the appellant only when he demanded. All of them went in a jeep to Panapatti village and except P.Ws. 1 and 2, others were waiting at a distance of about 1 km. away from the house of this appellant. When P.Ws. 1 and 2 went to the house of this appellant he asked P.W.1 whether he had brought the money. P.W.1 paid M.Os. 1 and 2 currency notes and the appellant receiving the money kept in within his left-hand side shirt pocket. Thereafter, this appellant prepared the community certificate Ex.P-3 and told P.W.1 that he would issue the income. certificate in the prescribed form which would be supplied in the school and to come with that form. P.Ws. 1 and 2 came out and informed P.W.11 as to what had happened. P.W.11 and all others came to the house of this appellant P.W.1 was kept away and P.W.11 introducing himself to the appellant, asked him whether he received money from P.W.1. This appellant got perplexed and P.W.11 arranged to prepare the sodium carbonate solution in two glass tumblers for dipping his right and left hand fingers. When this appellant did so, the solution turned to pink colour and the solution was preserved in M.Os. 5 and 6 bottles. P.W.11 asked this appellant to produce the money received from P.W.1. The appellant took out M.O. 3. Again sodium carbonate solution was prepared in which the M.O. 3 was dipped and that solution also turned to pink colour. M.O. 7 is the solution of that test. P.W.11 prepared a mahazar Ex.P-4 for what had happened in the house of this appellant. The appellant took out M.O. 3. Again sodium carbonate solution was prepared in which the M.O. 3 was dipped and that solution also turned to pink colour. M.O. 7 is the solution of that test. P.W.11 prepared a mahazar Ex.P-4 for what had happened in the house of this appellant. Thereafter, the house of the appellant was searched for which Ex.P-5 house search list was prepared and nothing incriminating was seized from his house. P.W.11 prepared a plan Ex.P-14 for the place where he seized the M.Os. 1 and 2 and also sodium carbonate solution. Two days later P.W.11 came to know that this appellant was creating a kist receipt Ex.P-6 on 7. 1984 as though he received the kist amount from P.W.1 on 7. 1984. This document was attested by P.W.3, the village Menial. Therefore, he seized Ex.P-6 receipt. As the accused was arrested, the Revenue Divisional Officer. Chidambaram, suspended the appellant and also granted sanction under Ex.P-10 for the prosecution of this appellant. 2. When this appellant was questioned under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to explain the incriminating circumstances found against him, he denied the allegation of receiving birbe. He also stated that P.W.1 paid the kist amount Rs.25 for which he prepared the kist receipt Ex.P-6 and the alleged community Certificate Ex.P-3 was obtained from him when he was in the police custody. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Arcot at Cuddalore considered the evidence before him and has found that the prosecution has established the charges against this appellant under Sec. 161, Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(e) read with Sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corporation Act and convicted him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs. 100. Challenging this conviction and sentence, the accused has come forward with this appeal. 4. The point consideration is whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt of this appellant. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mr. Karpagavinayagam argues that without any acceptable evidence against this appellant, the learned chief Judicial Magistrate has convicted this appellant and there is no reliable evidence to prove the prosecution case. 6. 4. The point consideration is whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt of this appellant. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mr. Karpagavinayagam argues that without any acceptable evidence against this appellant, the learned chief Judicial Magistrate has convicted this appellant and there is no reliable evidence to prove the prosecution case. 6. P.W.1 has said that when he wanted to admit his son Muruganandam, who was studying in the 10th Standard in Orathur Higher Secondary School, in the hostel, intended for the backward community certificate and income certificate for admission of the boy in the hostel, that when he approached this appellant, who was the village Administrative Officer (V.A.O.) at that time, he demanded Rs. 25 as bribe for issuing the community certificate and therefore, he launched the complaint Ex.P-1 to the vigilance Inspector at Cuddalore, who, according to the prosecution, laid the trap to catch this appellant. P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined by the prosecution to speak about the demand made by the appellant for money and also for payment of Rs. 25 for the purpose of getting the community certificate. Even though P.W.11 secured the services of P.W.2, who is working in Housing Board, Vellore, and another person by name Varadarajan, Deputy Registrar, to be the witnesses for this trap and to observe the behaviour and conduct of this appellant, the evidence of P.W.1 is that though he and P.W.2 went upto the house of this appellant, P.W.2 was remaining outside the house of this appellant at some distance and he alone entered into the house of this appellant. But P.W.2 would that he also accompanied P.W.1 and he was present along with P.W.1 throughout and that demand was made by this appellant for birbe and the amount M.Os. 1 and 2 were paid by P.W.1 to this appellant, in his presence. Another, important aspect of this case is that P.W.1, who gave the complaint against this appellant, himself was treated as hostile as he did not support the prosecution case in all aspects. Therefore, the learned counsel for this appellant, Mr. Karpagavinayagam, would contend that the evidence of P.W.1 who alleged the payment of bribe to the appellant, cannot be believed as he was treated as a hostile witnesses and the other witness P.W.2, who has spoken about the demand of money by this appellant and the payment of M.Os. Therefore, the learned counsel for this appellant, Mr. Karpagavinayagam, would contend that the evidence of P.W.1 who alleged the payment of bribe to the appellant, cannot be believed as he was treated as a hostile witnesses and the other witness P.W.2, who has spoken about the demand of money by this appellant and the payment of M.Os. 1 and 2 by P.W.1 to this appellant, cannot be believed because according to P.W.1 he did not accompany him and as he alone went inside the house of this appellant, the alleged demand of this appellant and the payment by P.W.1 could not have been witnessed by P.W.2 and therefore, in this case, there is no acceptable in this case, there is no acceptable evidence to support the prosecution case. 7. It is true that there is inconsistency in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 on certain fact and it is because of that, P.W.1 was treated as hostile after the cross-examination. But this is a case in which the appellant himself would admit the payment of Rs. 25 by P.W.1 to him though according to him, this amount was towards the kist payable by P.W.1. P.W.2, the trap witness, was sent with P.W.1 only for the observation of the change of hands of money M.Os. 1 and 2 if any. As mentioned above, this fact is admitted by the appellant himself. The cash M.Os. 1 and 2 mentioned in the Mahasar Ex.P-2 prepared by the Vigilance Officer, had gone to the hands of this appellant and this amount has been later on seized from the appellant by the Vigilance Officer under Ex.P-4. mahazar. It is true that the mere recovery of the money from the accused is not sufficient to prove the guilt as held by the Supreme Court in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1432: 1975 Crl.L.J. 1224. Therefore, it has to be proved that this payment was towards the bribe, for the favour which P.W.1 wanted from this appellant. But the appellant’s plea is that he received this amount when P.W.1 tendered it towards the kist amount payable by him for his land. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, as P.W.1 is owning 25 cents of land in patta No. 35 in Manakudaiyaniruppu village and admittedly kist was due from P.W.1, the payment of Rs. But the appellant’s plea is that he received this amount when P.W.1 tendered it towards the kist amount payable by him for his land. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, as P.W.1 is owning 25 cents of land in patta No. 35 in Manakudaiyaniruppu village and admittedly kist was due from P.W.1, the payment of Rs. 25 was only towards the kist as explained by this appellant and as there is inconsistency between the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 as there is no other reliable evidence to prove the demand of bribe by this appellant, the version of the accused, which is more probable, has to be accepted when especially P.W.1 has been treated as a hostile witness. No doubt P.W.1 has been treated as hostile witness by the prosecution. But on a perusal of his evidence, I find that he did not fail to support the prosecution with regard to the payment of the bribe to the appellant or demand of the bribe by him. On the other hand in the cross examination he gave answers to certain facts connected with P.W.2 contrary to the prosecution version. Even though in the chief examination P.W.1 said that after his complaint on 7. 1984 evening to P.W.11, he was asked to come on the next day morning to the Vigilance Officer, where he met P.W.2 and one Varadharajan, and Phenopthalene test demonstration was done at that time, in the cross-examination he said that he met P.W.2 and Varadharajan at about 8.00 p.m. in the vigilance office on 7. 19,84 and the phenopthelane test also was done, on the same night. Therefore, this part of the evidence relating to his meeting the trap witness P.W.2 and Varadharajan was changed in the cross-examination. Another part of the version in the cross-examination is that though he had P.W.2 went together to the house of this appellant, he changed it as though be alone entered into the house of this appellant, whereas P.W.2 was standing outside. In the chief-examination P.W.1 has stated that he and P.W.2 went together to the house of the appellant and this appellant and this appellant asked him whether he brought the amount. But contrary to that, in the cross-examination, he changed it as mentioned above. In the chief-examination P.W.1 has stated that he and P.W.2 went together to the house of the appellant and this appellant and this appellant asked him whether he brought the amount. But contrary to that, in the cross-examination, he changed it as mentioned above. It is because of this deviation from the chief-examination, P.W.2 was treated by the prosecution as hostile, after the cross examination by the accused. The deviation is only in respect of time of arrival of the trap witnesses and the accompaniment of P.W.2 into the house of this appellant. It cannot be forgotten that the trap witness P.W.2 and Varadharajan were brought by P.W.11 only for witnessing the payment of the amount to the appellant. But in this case, as the appellant himself would admit the payment of this amount M.Os. 1 and 2 by P.W.1 to him, the role of the trap witness in this case and the phenopthalene test, loose it’s significance. Therefore, even if we accept what has been stated by P.W.1 in the cross examination namely, that the trap witness came to the office of P.W.11 on the night of 7. 1984 and that P.W.2 did not accompany him into the house of this appellant, still it will not affect the prosecution case. P.W.1 would stand by his words that this appellant demanded Rs.25 as bribe for issuing community certificate, that he paid this bribe of Rs. 25 to him on 7. 1984 and obtained the certificate Ex.P-3. He has also stated in his evidence that when this appellant issued Ex.P-3 community certificate, he asked him to get prescribed application form from the school, so that he would sign in that form, for the issuance of the income certificate. There is no deviation in this version of P.W.1. For the reason that P.W.1 did not support the prosecution in every aspect, it cannot be argued that his evidence has to be rejected in toto. IN Kershoram Bora v. State of Assam, 1978 M.L.J. (Crl.) 644, the Supreme Court has observed that merely because a witness is declared as hostile his evidence cannot be rejected on that ground alone, though when the prosecution has declared him hostile, the prosecution exhibits its intention not to rely on the evidence of such a witness. IN Kershoram Bora v. State of Assam, 1978 M.L.J. (Crl.) 644, the Supreme Court has observed that merely because a witness is declared as hostile his evidence cannot be rejected on that ground alone, though when the prosecution has declared him hostile, the prosecution exhibits its intention not to rely on the evidence of such a witness. As mentioned above, the prosecution treated him hostile only for the deviation made by him with regard to the unimportant aspect relating to the trap witness. I am using this word ‘unimportant’ consciously for the reason that the trap witness becomes unnecessary when appellant himself has admitted the payment of the money by P.W.1. In view of the circumstances under which P.W.1 was treated as hostile, I feel that his evidence cannot be completely rejected as unreliable. This Court also in Charles Waker Devadas v. State by the Inspector of Police, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 346, has held that the evidence of the hostile witness need not be rejected in toto and the Court can rely upon such portion if found satisfactory. But the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that when the principle of criminal law is that the benefit of doubt be given to the accused, the prosecution cannot make use of the advantageous portion in the evidence of P.W.1 to support its case, discarding the disadvantageous portion against it. Certainly, this argument carries weight and even if this principle is applied, the disadvantageous portion in the evidence of P.W.1 is only the time of arrival of the trap witness and the non accompaniment of P.W.2 into the house of the appellant. Even if these portions are taken as such, as said above, they cannot affect the prosecution case in any manner, because the payment of the money is admitted by the appellant, and P.W.1 has consistently stated through-out his evidence that he paid this money as bribe as it was demanded by the appellant. Therefore, even taking the evidence of P.W.1 as a whole the prosecution case has not been let down by P.W.1 and therefore his evidence cannot be rejected even though he was treated as hostile witness by the prosecution. 8. Therefore, even taking the evidence of P.W.1 as a whole the prosecution case has not been let down by P.W.1 and therefore his evidence cannot be rejected even though he was treated as hostile witness by the prosecution. 8. As P.W.1 in his cross-examination has stated that P.W.2 did not accompany him when he entered into the house of the appellant, though P.W.2 would state that he also went along with P.W.1, for the argument sake, even if the evidence of P.W.2 is discarded, it cannot be stated that there is no independent evidence to corroborate the version of P.W.1 because Ex.P-3 admittedly written by this appellant would completely corroborate the evidence of P.W.1. It is the prosecution case that only for the purpose of securing the certificate Ex.P-3, this appellant demanded Rs. 25 and on payment of Rs. 25 he issued the certificate Ex.P-3. Therefore, the prosecution very much relies upon Ex.P-3 to prove the demand of bribe by this appellant. Now, there are two important documents namely Exs.P-3 and P-6 placed before the court. The document namely Ex.P-3 is relied upon by the prosecution to prove their case whereas another document Ex.P-6 is relied upon by the appellant to extricate himself from the charges. Therefore, now the task before this Court is to find out which of these two documents can be given Weight to in this case to get the truth. 9. It was suggested to P.W.1 that Inspector of Police in Special Branch, by name Dakshinamoorthy, working in Cuddalore, and another police constable Rajaram, both owning land in Manakudaiyaniruppu, are related to him and they wanted certificates from this appellant deserting them as small land holders, for the purpose of raising loan, though they own more than 6 acres of land, but was refused by the appellant, they have set up P.W.1 to implicate him in this offence and P.W.11, the Inspector of Police, (Vigilance Cell) also was under their influence and therefore the prosecution is motivated. P.W.11 would admit that the Inspector Dakshinamurthy and the constable Rajaram, are related to him. But he would completely deny the suggestion that he was a pawn in their hands to wreak their vengeance against this appellant and he was not aware of any move by those person to get the certificate from this appellant describing them as small land-holders. P.W.11 would admit that the Inspector Dakshinamurthy and the constable Rajaram, are related to him. But he would completely deny the suggestion that he was a pawn in their hands to wreak their vengeance against this appellant and he was not aware of any move by those person to get the certificate from this appellant describing them as small land-holders. There is no direct ill-feelings or enmity between this appellant and P.W.1. Therefore, there was no necessity for P.W.1 to act according to the direction of the said Dakshinamurthy and Rajaram. Further, from the mere suggestion of the accused that those persons approached him for certificate a small landholders, it cannot be viewed that they have developed enmity against this appellant. As a matter of fact, this appellant was not the regular V.A.O. for Manakudaiyaniruppu village where Dakshinamurthy and Rajaram own lands, as spoken by P.W.5. The evidence of P.Ws. 4 to 6 discloses that this appellant was the V.A.O. of Pannapattu village and he was in charge of Manakudaiyaniruppu village also for some time till he was placed under suspection after this incident and P.W.6 took charge from him and subsequently P.W.5 was appointed as the V.A.O. of Manakudaiyaniruppu village. As this appellant was not the regular V.A.O. of Manakudaiyaniruppu village, even if this appellant had refused to issue the small land-holder’s certificate to those persons at the time when he was incharge, they might not have took it seriously as this appellant was in charge temporarily. But one thing is certain and that is P.W.1 was in need of the community certificate for admitting his son in the hostel, attached to the Higher Secondary School in Orathur, P.W.8, the Junior Assistant, attached to the Higher Secondary School in Orathur, has spoken in his evidence that P.W.1 approached him making enquiry for admission of his son Muruganandam in the hostel, intended for the backward class and it was he who advised him to obtain the community cum-income certificate from Tahsildar for admission of the boy in the hostel. From the evidence of P.W.8 it is very clear that after the reopening of the school in the month of June 1984, P.W.1 who is only an agricultural cooly, as seen from Ex.D-3, a certificate issued by the Tahsildar on the recommendation of this appellant under Ex.P-5, issued for some other purpose, was very eager to admit his son in the hostel, intended for the backward class people as he is eligible for that concession. Therefore, only for that purpose, he seems to have approached the appellant. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the community certificate could be obtained that the community certificate could be obtained only from Tahsildar but not from V.A.O. and only after the application submitted before the Tahsildar, the Tahsildar would call for the remarks from the V.A.O. through the Revenue Inspector and therefore P.W.1 would not have straight away approached this appellant for the community certificate. He also refers to such a procedure which was known to P.W.1, as in the month of June 1984 for the admission of his daughter by name Thialnayagi in Seva Mandir School, Parangipettai, P.W.1 required the community certificate for which he gave the application under Ex.D-2 to the Tahsildar himself and after obtaining the report Ex.D-5 from this appellant the Tahsildar issued the income certificate Ex.D-3 and as this procedure is fully known to P.W.1, he could not have approached this appellant directly for the community certificate. P.W.4 is the Revenue Inspector and he would also state that the community certificate would be issued only by Tahsildar after receiving the report from V.A.O. which would also be processed through him. Now one thing is clear and that is though the community certificate would be issued only by the Tahsildar, he would not issue the certificate on the mere request but would call for the report from the V.A.O. concerned and only on his recommendation the community certificate would be issued. For admitting the daughter of P.W.1, though the application was given by P.W.1, under Ex.D-2 to the Tahsildar, the Tahsildar had issued the income certificate Ex.D-3 only after receiving the report of this appellant under Ex.D-5. For admitting the daughter of P.W.1, though the application was given by P.W.1, under Ex.D-2 to the Tahsildar, the Tahsildar had issued the income certificate Ex.D-3 only after receiving the report of this appellant under Ex.D-5. Even though it was stated by P.W.4 that the application for community certificate should be presented before Tahsildar and thereafter Tahsildar would call for the report from the V.A.O. on a perusal of Exs.D-2, D-3 and D-5, I find that the procedure was not being followed. Ex.D-2 is the application given to Tahsildar by P.W.1 for the income certificate and this application has been initialled by the Tahsildar on 16. 1984 and the stamp affixed therein also is initialled with the same date. Therefore, it is certain that Ex.D-2 application was given before Tahsildar only on 16. 1984. Ex.D-5 is the letter of this appellant dated 16. 1984 addressed to Tahsildar certifying that P.W.1 has no lands except 25 cents and his annual income was only Rs. 1,200. It is pertinent to note that this certificate is dated 16. 1984 indicating that even 5 days before presenting the application before Tahsildar this certificate was issued by this appellant to P.W.1 and subsequently on 16. 1984 when Tahsildar issued the income certificate under Ex.D-3, this appellant endorsed in his certificate Ex.D-5, that P.W.1 had arrears of land tax but paid the house tax fully. Only under this endorsement of the V.A.O. the Revenue Inspector also has made endorsement. Therefore from Exs.D-2, D-3 and D-5, now it is made clear that the parties who want to obtain the community certificate from Tahsildar, seem to approach the V.A.O. first to get his letter addressed to Tahsildar certifying that his income was so much or that be belongs to a particular community and after obtaining the certificate from the V.A.O., that would be attached to the application to be presented before the Tahsildar, probably to avoid the delay in getting the reports from the V.A.O. Even though for the daughter of P.W.1, the application Ex.D-2 for income certificate was received by the Tahsildar on 16. 1984, he has issued the certificate Ex.D-3 on the very same day, as the certificate of the V.A.O. was annexed to the application. The Tahsildar was able to verify the letter of the V.A.O. and issue the income certificate on the very same day. 1984, he has issued the certificate Ex.D-3 on the very same day, as the certificate of the V.A.O. was annexed to the application. The Tahsildar was able to verify the letter of the V.A.O. and issue the income certificate on the very same day. As the V.A.O. had issued his certificate Ex.D-5 on 16. 1984 itself, for annexing his certificate along with the application to be presented before Tahsildar it is very clear that the party who wants to apply for the income certificate or community certificate before the Tahsildar, has to obtain the V.A.O. certificate in advance and annex that with his application to be presented before the Tahsildar and that was the procedure followed as seen from the records placed before the court. Therefore similarly for the community certificate also P.W.1 had first approached this appellant for the issuance of the certificate addressed to Tahsildar for presenting the application before Tahsildar along with the V.A.O.s’ certificate, On a comparison of Ex.D-5 with Ex.P-3, I find that the words therein are identical and both the certificates are addressed to the Tahsildar. Therefore it is futile to argue on the part of the appellant that P.W.1 would not have approached the V.A.O. for getting the community certificate as the Tahsildar alone was competent to issue that certificate. 11. From the discussion above, and also in view of the evidence of P.W.8, it is clear that P.W.1, who is only an agricultural cooly and who wanted to educate his son Muruganandam by admitting him in the hostel, for which community certificate was required he should have certainly approached only this appellant, who was in charge V.A.O. of Manakudaiyaniruppu village. 12. It is admitted by the appellant when he was questioned under Sec. 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, that Ex.P-3 certificate was written by his own hands and signed by him. But according to him this was obtained from him by the Inspector of Police. He said that when the Inspector of Police demanded from him to issue the community certificate, he refused saying that he could issue the certificate only when the report was called from Taluk office, but the Inspector obtained the community certificate from him when he was kept in the office of the Vigilance Inspector. He said that when the Inspector of Police demanded from him to issue the community certificate, he refused saying that he could issue the certificate only when the report was called from Taluk office, but the Inspector obtained the community certificate from him when he was kept in the office of the Vigilance Inspector. Even though this appellant had issued Ex.D-5 income certificate even before the application was presented before Tahsildar under Ex.D-2, he would say that he refused to issue the community certificate when demanded by the Inspector as the procedure was to issue the same, after the report was called for from Taluk office. His version that Ex.P-3 was forcibly obtained from him in the office of the vigilance Inspector cannot be true for the reason that in Ex.P-3, below the signature of the appellant his rubber stamp with regard to his designation and place is affixed. It is not his version that his rubber stamp kept in his house was brought by the police office for affixing his rubber stamp below his signature. If the Inspector, was interested only in getting the certificate Ex.P-3, from this appellant he would have been satisfied with the certificate signed by this appellant and he would not have been thought of affixing the rubber stamp below the signature of this appellant. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the rubber stamp below the signature of this appellant in Ex.P-3 should have been affixed only in the house of the appellant when Ex.P-3 was issued by him to P.W.1. From this circumstances, it is beyond doubt that Ex.P.3 certificate has been issued by the appellant to P.W.1 on 7. 1984. But on the previous day itself, P.W.1 had narrated in his complaint to P.W.11 in Cuddalore alleging that this appellant demanded Rs. 25 as bribe for the issue of the community certificate. As P.W.1 is educated only upto 3rd Standard and is an agricultural colly, P.W.11 himself recorded his complaint under Ex.P-1 on 7. 1984 at 6.00 p.m. Therefore looking from any angle, it is made clear that only because of the demand made by this appellant, P.W.1 had launched the complaint Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-3 community certificate has been issued by this appellant on 7. 1984 after payment of Rs. 25 by P.W.1. 13. Now, let us consider the defence version namely the payment of the amount towards kist. 1984 after payment of Rs. 25 by P.W.1. 13. Now, let us consider the defence version namely the payment of the amount towards kist. Ex.D-6 is the kist receipt said to have been prepared by this appellant on 7. 1984 itself on payment of Rs. 25 by P.W.1 and according to the appellant, as this witness was in arrears of the kist from 89 onwards, he appropriated the kist amount paid by this witness, viz., Rs. 25 for 1389, 1390 and a portion for 1391. Even though in his evidence, P.W.1 initially stated that he was not in arrears of the land tax, later on in the cross examination, he has admitted that he did not pay kist as it was not demanded from him. P.W.4, the Revenue Inspector, would state that from Ex.D-4 chitta, P.W.1 was owning 25 cents in patta No. 35, which is held jointly in the name of three persons namely, P.W.1, Ganesa Padaiyachi and Kaliyamurthi Padaiyachi. Ex.D-4, which was prepared by this appellant on 16. 1984 shows that the total kist for patta No. 35 was only Rs. 5.65 for Fasli 1893. It should be borne in mind that this total kist of Rs. 5.65 is payable by three persons in whose name the patta was standing and therefore, P.W.1 was liable to pay only one third of the amount mentioned in Ex.P-4 chitta. However, P.W.4 would state in his evidence that the kist amount mentioned in Ex.P-4 was only the basic amount and Rs. 2.50 and Rs. 0.45 for the accounts local cess and for No. 6 account, another Rs. 1 will be ordered and the local cess will differ according to the crops. Even according to his own version, the basic tax and the local cess did not exceed Rs. 10 for the entire patta. But P.W.4 has stated that for Fazli No. 1390, he saw from No. 14 account that the total kist was Rs. 36.59 for patta No. 35. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the evidence of P.W.4 as the kist was Rs. 36.55 for Fazli 1390 P.W.1 was liable to pay one third of the amount i.e. Rs. 12 and odd and P.W.1 has paid this amount for Fazli 1389 and 1390 and balance of Rs. 36.59 for patta No. 35. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the evidence of P.W.4 as the kist was Rs. 36.55 for Fazli 1390 P.W.1 was liable to pay one third of the amount i.e. Rs. 12 and odd and P.W.1 has paid this amount for Fazli 1389 and 1390 and balance of Rs. O.50 for Fazli 1391 as detailed in the kist receipt Ex.P-6 and the evidence of P.W.4 probabilises that Ex.P-6 kist receipt should have been prepared for the payment of Rs. 25 by P.W.1. The evidence of the Inspector P.W.11 is that as he came to know that this appellant was creating records after his arrest on 7. 1984, he investigated and found that Ex.P-6 was created subsequently and therefore he seized this document. P.W.3 is the Village Menial of Sirugaloor village and he has attested Ex.P-6. P.W.3 himself would state that he was asked by this appellant to sign this receipt on 7. 1984 mentioning the ante-date 7. 1984 and after signing that as directed by this appellant, he became afraid as the Vigilance Officer visited the village 2 days prior to that and therefore he requested the appellant to strike his name and the appellant thereafter struck him signature. Even though it was suggested to P.W.3 that he was false by deposing at the instance of the police, P.W.3 would state in his evidence that he signed this receipt only on 7. 84 when this appellant prepared the receipt. It is also be borne in mind that the appellant was arrested by the vigilance Inspector on 7. 84 and was released on the same day at 6.00 p.m. on his own bond. The entire records of the V.A.O. were in the bands of this appellant till 7. 1984 and P.W.6 would state that only on 7. 1984 he took charge of Manakudaiyaniruppu Village from this appellant. Therefore, as this appellant was in custody of the entire documents relating to the administration of the village til 7. 1984 though he was arrested on 7. 1984, there was every chance for him to prepare the records in support of his version. I am only mentioning the possibility. 14. Now, in the light of this advantage, to the appellant when we scrutinise Ex.P-6 kist receipt, as found by the court below, it throws considerable doubt with regard to its origin. 1984, there was every chance for him to prepare the records in support of his version. I am only mentioning the possibility. 14. Now, in the light of this advantage, to the appellant when we scrutinise Ex.P-6 kist receipt, as found by the court below, it throws considerable doubt with regard to its origin. Even though P.W.4 would state that he was able to see from the Account No. 14 that the total kist for Fazli 1390 was Rs. 36.59 the V.A.Os. P.Ws. 5 and 6 who succeeded this appellant would state in their evidence that No. 14 account and 10 part II chitta account were not handed over by this appellants when they took charge. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 makes it clear that the important documents like 14 account and 10 Part II chitta were retained by the appellant himself even after he was asked to handover charge to P.W.6. Therefore when the appellant was keeping the village records with him, even after the registration of the case against him, he had all the facilities to make entries in the village accounts to suit his convenience. Now, on a perusal of Ex.P-6 prepared by this appellant, the kist for 1389 and 1390 was only Rs. 250. However, for 1391, 50 paise is given credit to as though P.W.1 had paid a portion of the kist for 1391. This appears to a cooked up document and an apportionment has been made for the amount paid by P.W.1. It is pertinent to mention from the evidence of P.W.4 that the kist would be demanded in the month of April, P.W.1 has stated in his evidence that the kist was not demanded from him after 1389 and therefore he did not pay kist. No doubt Ex.D-1 dated 35. 1984 issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to all the V.A.Os. is relied upon by the appellant that there was instruction to collect the kist amount from the land-holders. But Ex.D-1 shows that the collection should be completed before 30.6.1984. There is no evidence to show that the kist was demanded from P.W.1 before 84. When P.W.1 had not paid kist from 89 Fazli onwards for the reason that nobody demanded the kist from him as he is a joint pattadhar, there is no circumstances to indicate that he himself voluntarily went to the appellant to pay the kist. There is no evidence to show that the kist was demanded from P.W.1 before 84. When P.W.1 had not paid kist from 89 Fazli onwards for the reason that nobody demanded the kist from him as he is a joint pattadhar, there is no circumstances to indicate that he himself voluntarily went to the appellant to pay the kist. Secondly, even if he approached this appellant to pay the kist, he would have first verified the kist amount for the relevant years and would have paid the kist amount for such Fazlis and he would not have paid 50 paise as portion of the kist for 91 Fazli. Therefore, the adjustment of this fraction for 91 Fazli in Ex.P-6 would show that as Rs. 25 was seized from this appellant by P.W.11, the appellant has prepared this kist receipt Ex.P-6 altering and adjusting this amount for each Fazli. As Ex.D-4 chitta copy issued by this appellant for 1893 shows that the total kist for 3 pattadhars was only Rs.5.65, it is difficult to accept that for Fazli 1389 for the one third share of P.W.1, he was to pay Rs. 11.45 towards kist and Rs. 1.05 penalty. Even as mentioned above, the actual kist amount which must be found in No. 14 account was retained by this appellant even after he handed over the charge to P.W.6. 15. If really this appellant has received Rs. 25 only towards the kist and the kist receipt also was prepared immediately in the presence of P.W.1, this appellant when enquired by P.W.11 in the presence of P.Ws. 2 and Varadharajan after conducting the phenopthalane test in his residence could have mentioned that P.W.1 paid the amount towards the kist and he had also prepared the kist receipt for the payment of the amount. But this appellant did not mention about the payment of kist amount by P.W.1 and the evidence discloses that when he was questioned by P.W.11, he got perplexed and handed over the money from his pocket after the phenopthalene test. Therefore, all these circumstances when taken together the cumulative effect of it is that Ex.P-6 has been created subsequently as stated by P.W.3 the attestor of this receipt. 16. No doubt, the appellant at the time of the statement under Sec. 313, Code of Criminal Procedure has stated that he mentioned to P.W.11 the Inspector of Police that Rs. Therefore, all these circumstances when taken together the cumulative effect of it is that Ex.P-6 has been created subsequently as stated by P.W.3 the attestor of this receipt. 16. No doubt, the appellant at the time of the statement under Sec. 313, Code of Criminal Procedure has stated that he mentioned to P.W.11 the Inspector of Police that Rs. 25 paid by P.W.1 was towards the kist and in spite of that he was arrested. But the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 11 is that this appellant simply handed over the M.Os. 1 and 2 cash from his pocket without saying anything. There is no need for P.Ws. 2 and 11 to falsely depose against this appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that P.W.2 cannot be treated as an independent witness as his wife was working as Revenue Inspector and under whom the appellant had to work and P.W.11 also cannot be an independent witness as he was obliged to his colleague Dakshinamurthy, the Inspector of Police in Cuddalore and therefore these witnesses are suppressing the truth and also the representation made by the appellant when he was arrested in his residence. The learned counsel has cited series of decisions as to the importance of the independent witnesses for the trap cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. He has cited the decisions in Darshan Lal v. The Delhi Administration, 1974 Crl.L.J. 307, Gulam Mohmood v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1558: 1980 Crl.L.J. 1096, Pannalal v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1191: 1979 Crl.L.J. 936, Satpal v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 294: 1976 Crl.L.J. 295, S.V. Rameswara Rao v. State, (1992)2 Cur.Crl.R. 150 and Periyasamy v. Inspector, Vigilence and Anti Corruption Department, 1994 Crl.L.J. 753. It is true that in all these decisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized the independent evidence of the trap witnesses to place reliance on him. In the first case Darshan Lal v. The Delhi Administration, nothing was recovered from the accused, who was a police constable and it was alleged that he threw away the money suspecting the arrival of the police and the money planed for the trap was handed over by the trap witness himself. There was no other independent witness to prove the prosecution case. There was no other independent witness to prove the prosecution case. In the next case (Gulam Mahmood v. State of Gujarat), while insisting for the independent evidence the Supreme Court insisted looking at the background also. In that case, the complainant himself was an accused in four cases and he has stated that he was giving money to the accused of that case on several occasions previously and only for the demand of the bribe on 7. 1972, he launched the complaint. As he himself was an accused in four cases, his evidence was found in suspicion. In the third case (Pannalal v. State of Maharashtra) also, the complainant was an accused and his allegation was that when the approached for suppressing his previous conviction bribe was demanded from him. As he was also a convict and an accused in the subsequent case, his evidence also was not relied upon. In the fourth case SatPal v. Delhi Administration, the witnesses in that case were found to be in poor in moral fibre and certainly such persons testimony cannot be given weight to. In the fifth case S.V. Rameswara Rao v. State, the accused were working as Forest Ranger and Forester and the complainant, who was a forest guard, alleged that the accused were insisting him to collect mamuls from the villagers by allowing them to graze the land in the forest area and pay them the collected money. The statement of the accused supported by the evidence of the villagers including the Village Administrative Officer, proved that the complainant was misusing his position as Forest Guard demand money to graze the land and on complaint to the accused, he had strictly warned him of such conduct. Therefore in the light of the evidence of the villagers, the evidence of the complainant was disbelieved on the ground that he was not an independent witness. There cannot be a rule in generality to evidence of which witness should be accepted and whose evidence should be rejected. It depends upon the nature and character of the witnesses. Nothing has been alleged against P.W.1 to suspect his character or discrediting his trtestimoney except for the fact that he was treated as hostile for not supporting the version of the accompaniment of P.W.2. Similar except the fact that wife of P.W.2 was working as Revenue Inspector, nothing has been suggested against P.W.2 also. Nothing has been alleged against P.W.1 to suspect his character or discrediting his trtestimoney except for the fact that he was treated as hostile for not supporting the version of the accompaniment of P.W.2. Similar except the fact that wife of P.W.2 was working as Revenue Inspector, nothing has been suggested against P.W.2 also. No doubt P.W.2 admits that his wife was working as Revenue Inspector. But he would say that he did not know whether this appellant was working in her jurisdiction. Even assuming that this appellant was working in her jurisdiction, it is not even the suggestion that there was any ill-feelings as between them or P.W.2 in any way connected with this appellant. P.W.2 has stated that he had not even seen this appellant previously and he did not know about him. When no motive is suggested against P.W.2, for the reason that the wife of P.W.2 was working as a Revenue Inspector, it cannot be taken that P.W.2 is not an independent witness. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that P.W.2 has stated in his evidence that even at 6.00 p.m. on 6. 1984, P.W.11 met him requesting to be the witness for the trap case where P.W.11 has stated in his evidence that only at 8.00 p.m. on 7. 1984, the F.I.R. was registered and therefore P.W.11 could not have met P.W.2 requesting to be the witness for the trap case. This inconsistency does not in any way affect the prosecution case or discredit the testimony of P.W.2 as an interested witness. As argued by the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) as the complaint was given by P.W.11 even by 6.00 p.m. before the registration of the case by P.W.11 for obtaining the permission of his superior, he might have contacted P.W.2 in the meanwhile in the process of securing witnesses for the trap. P.W.11 has no motive against this appellant to suppress if anything was stated by this appellant relating to the payment of kist P.W.1. Therefore, there is no circumstances to disbelieve the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and 11. 18. From the above discussion, the weight to be attache to Ex.P-6 is next to nil and the result of it is that the payment of amount Rs. 25 was only to secure the certificate Ex.P- 3. Therefore, there is no circumstances to disbelieve the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and 11. 18. From the above discussion, the weight to be attache to Ex.P-6 is next to nil and the result of it is that the payment of amount Rs. 25 was only to secure the certificate Ex.P- 3. As the evidence of P.W.1 is that only for the purpose of issuing this certificate Ex.P-3 this appellant demanded the bribe of Rs. 25 and after the complaint oh 7. 1984, Ex.P-3 certificate has been issued by this applicant on 7. 1984, the evidence of P.W.1 is fully corroborated by the issuance of Ex.P-3. Therefore, the lower court, rightly relying upon this circumstances, has found that the prosecution case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 19. The learned counsel Mr. Karpagavinayagam, has challenged the sanction order Ex.P-10 issued by Revenue Divisional Officer, Chidambaram, P.W.10 on the ground that this certificate has been issued without application of mind. P.W.10 in his report Ex.P-10 has stated that after fully and carefully examining the materials placed before him with regard to the allegations and the circumstances and he having been satisfied that this appellant should be prosecuted, ordered for the sanction for prosecution under Sec. 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned counsel would argue that the kist receipt and other connected records for the collection of kist were not perused by P.W.10 and had these documents been placed before him, he would not have given sanction for prosecution and as all the relevant records were not placed before the sanctioning authority and there is also nothing to show that P.W.10 had applied his mind before ordering the sanction, Ex.P-10 cannot be in compliance with Sec. 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore, the sanction cannot be accepted. This Court in Public Prosecutor v. G. Sadagopan, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 785, has held that the order of sanction must show that all relevant materials were placed before the authority sanctioning the prosecution and the authority considered those materials and the order sanctioning the prosecution resulted therefrom and the sanction need not set out the reasons for the sanction. This Court in Public Prosecutor v. G. Sadagopan, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 785, has held that the order of sanction must show that all relevant materials were placed before the authority sanctioning the prosecution and the authority considered those materials and the order sanctioning the prosecution resulted therefrom and the sanction need not set out the reasons for the sanction. In Indu Bhushan Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 1958 M.L.J. (Crl.) 448, the Supreme Court has observed that it is not for the authority to judge the truth of the allegations made against the accused by calling for any record from his office or calling for the connected claim cases and find out how they stood, and in the absence of any question in cross examination as to what the relevant papers deposed to in chief-examination were, it should be taken the papers placed before the authority apparently gave him the necessary material to decide that sanction is to be accorded. In Ex.P-10, on the top under the caption ‘Read’ the first document is mentioned as the report of the Directorate and next other connected records. Therefore, from this one can understand that the connected records relating to this offence were placed before P.W.10 and P.W.10 also has mentioned that after carefully examining the documents placed before him, he was satisfied that this appellant should be prosecuted for the offence. It was not even suggested to P.W.10 that he did not peruse all the relevant records to satisfy himself that he should give sanction for prosecution or that he did not apply his mind for sanctioning the prosecution. The only suggestion to him, was that the kist receipt and the other records relating to collection of kist were not placed before him. P.W.10 was not expected to hold an enquiry with regard to the allegation made against this appellant. On the other hand, from the records placed before him if he was satisfied that it was a fit case for prosecution, he had the powers to sanction. Therefore, from the report Ex.P-10, there is nothing to show that it is not in accordance with Sec.6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, the court below was perfectly right in concluding that the offence against the appellant was established. As I fully concur with the findings of the court below, the result of it is to dismiss the appeal. 20. Therefore, the court below was perfectly right in concluding that the offence against the appellant was established. As I fully concur with the findings of the court below, the result of it is to dismiss the appeal. 20. However, in view of the G.Os., passed under G.O.Ms. No. 180, dated 21. 1989 and G.O.Ms. No. 781, dated 14. 1990, the entire sentence period stands remitted. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In view of the G.Os. mentioned above, though the conviction and sentence is confirmed, the appellant cannot be arrested or detained.